349 Carlos Setas Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the peace process with the afhgan taliban Contact at international level with the Taliban regime towards the end of the nineties highlighted, on the one hand, their almost medieval nature and their lack of unders-tanding of the world and of diplomacy, and, on the other hand, a Machiavellian knack of pursuing their own interests as part of talks. They also see less need for a certain level of honesty in talks with third parties due, essentially, to religious considerations that place them in a superior position in terms of truth and moral justice. The Taliban have exhibited considerable aptitude for justi-fying grounds for breaking off talks that could at the very least be considered treacherous, calling their opponents “heretics” in the case of Shia and “atheists” if describing former Communists in Afghanistan or “hypocrites” in the case of other Mujahideen groups. It should come as no surprise if during the current round of talks the Taliban do not deem it necessary to deal with the Western “infidels” and their “puppets” in Kabul in a spirit of honesty. The same, incidentally, could also be said of the Pakistanis.44 6. Conclusions If one analyses relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1947, it is clear that these have not exactly been the best of neighbours, with Pakistan having cause for concern ever since taking its first steps as an independent state. When one combines this state of affairs with the rivalry, which one could say borders on obsession, of Pakistan with its huge Indian neighbour, it becomes easier to fathom why the country wishes to have a friendly neighbour at its western border. Pakistan’s right to pursue its national security objectives at regional level is irrefutable. As to the way in which it endeavours to do so, its activities have been far more questionable. Pakistan lives in a dangerous neighbourhood, though it could be said that the most problematic neigh-bour is Pakistan itself. The stability that Afghanistan could achieve after 2014 depends on how able the Taliban are to continue the fight against the government in Kabul. This, in turn, will depend first of all on them maintaining their rear-guard bases in Pakistan and thereafter on the support of the ISI and the Pakistani army. This support, like in the nineties, would not necessitate direct intervention of Pakistani forces, but instead a steady provision of supplies, advisory support from the army and that the flow of fighters from Pakistani border areas could continue to swell Taliban ranks. This is one of the options available to Pakistan in order to promote its interests in its neighbour Afghanistan. Another, perhaps the most evident, would include establis- 44 SCHAFFER, Howard B. and SCHAFFER, Teresita C. How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States. Rolling the Roller Coaster, Washington, United States Institute for Peace, 2011, p. 39.
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