OPINIÓN LIDERAZGO EN COMBATE… CITAS DEL GENERAL MATTIS: “No better friend, no worse enemy than a U.S.Marine”. “Okay, this is what we’re going to do. We’re going to get over there and form a very small team… and we’re going to start thinking about what we are going to do to go kick some ass.” Mattis later recalled that Moore “was very aggressive, very supportive. He’s a fighting admiral. He was very comfortable with his authority and power and not restrained in his thinking about how we could get naval forces into Afghanistan. He was a superb leader.” General Mattis returned to the MarCent building and announced, “We are going to invade Afghanistan…and I’m going to need to know what else we’re going to need.” Mattis’s guidance on growing the staff was simple: regardless of rank, he wanted a small group of staff officers who possessed operational experience, initiative, and sound judgment. General Mattis chose to employ the traditional naval nomenclature (N),* rather than the standard Marine general (G) or staff (S) designators to delineate his staff sections. Mattis replied with a grin that he had come with a thousand of his best friends to “go to Afghanistan to kill some people.” General Mattis responded enthusiastically, “Give me 1,000 men ashore for 30 days and we could make the enemy’s life hell on earth for raids.” General Mattis explained that Task Force 58 had established a foothold ashore and was “going to support the Afghan people’s effort to free themselves of the /terrorists and the people who support terrorists.” Mattis recalled, sobre sus relaciones con el LCC bajo cuyo TACON operó la TF-58 en Afganistán “I explained I didn’t generally ask permission to wipe my nose and that my intentions messages laid out clearly what operations I had coming up.” General Mattis later commented on the situation sobre la conducción de la campaña de Afganistán por el mando Operacional: It just showed the inability of a displaced… higher headquarters to coordinate mutually supporting ops. Essential misunderstandings reflected their lack of first-hand familiarity with the ground and with the Pakistanis and with the anti-Taliban force relationship. Had they understood those things, they could have done much better. There was a breakdown in the intelligence operations interface; there was very little awareness in Tampa that the enemy was escaping every day because of their… operational view. 30 BOLETÍN DE INFANTERÍA DE MARINA CAP. IM. ARTURO ESTEBAN CEBALLOS
BOLETIN INFANTERIA MARINA 20
To see the actual publication please follow the link above