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Special
Operations Liaison
Officer (SOLO)
Spain

Special Operations

YEARBOOK

2021

Allow me to first extend my warmest greetings to all the readers this year's edition of the MCOE Yearbook. I hope you and your families are healthy and avoided the ravages of the pandemic that has engulfed us. I am hopeful that in the near term we will be able to turn the corner and return to a more normal way of life.

It was a high honor for me to be appointed to the position of Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (CMCOE) in March 2020. I would like to express my gratitude to the Authorities involved in this decision-making process for their faith in me. I accept the responsibility that has been bestowed upon me, knowing the tremendous work that has already been accomplished in order for the unit to achieve its current esteemed status within the joint operational structure.

As Commander, it is my responsibility to constantly seek improvement and perfection, and I will focus my efforts and tasks in that direction. To do so, I rely on a team of military personnel with extensive professional experience, excellent techni-

cal knowledge, and, most importantly, high levels of motivation, initiative, and a perfectionist mindset. I am proud of each one of them.

Throughout 2020, changes to the legislative body that encompasses the various units of the joint structure have occurred, including those affecting MCOE. In a nutshell, the MCOE retains the same mission, the same organization, and similar tasks as previously, with a greater emphasis on execution of its responsibilities as a Special Operations Component Command for missions and commitments at the national and international levels. Additionally, MCOE retains the task and responsibility to improve the interoperability of Special Operations Units within the three Services.

In accordance with the unit's main mission of carrying out the planning, conduction, and monitoring of the special operations assigned to it, with the breadth and diversity that this entails, we must always be prepared to respond to all situations requiring special operations expertise, demonstrating that we are the

most valid, effective, and efficient asset available.

This, as simple as it sounds, implies great preparation and work, extensive and detailed planning, and a high capacity for anticipation, foreseeing potential scenarios and adequate military response options, and materializing the capacity to advise authorities who may require it.

Following a period of transition in the MCOE, which coincided with some personnel changes and previous legislative adjustments, the future looks very promising for further consolidating and strengthening the MCOE in its rightful place within the joint structure.

The most difficult challenge is to consolidate and promote trust, which is fundamental and necessary to all organizations, both within the three services and in the joint organizational structure. The MCOE strives to be recognized as the unit responsible for uniting and empowering all aspects of special operations wherever possible. That is our goal, and we are striving to achieve it.



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MCOE

GREEN BERET AWARD

In 2017, the MCOE created the "BOINA VERDE" (GREEN BERET) Award, an annual distinction in recognition of the work of individuals, institutions, or organizations that have collaborated with or supported Special Operations in general, or the MCOE, as well as authors whose pieces of work favor the knowledge of military life and Special Operations activities and units.

The award has both civilian and military categories. Reserve or retired personnel are given priority when it comes to receiving the military modality award.

The recipients of the 2020 MCOE GREEN BERET Award were the following:



Military category Award Major General (R) Jaime Íñiguez Andrade

This award was given in recognition of his entire professional career, which culminated in him becoming the first Commander of this Joint Command, demonstrating his unwavering commitment to Special Operations, which he maintains even as a military retiree.



Civilian category Award Mr. Ángel Expósito Mora, journalist

This award was granted in recognition of his long-standing and visible involvement with the Armed Forces in general, and Special Operations in particular, as a journalist and social media communicator.





The rules of the Award also state that the GREEN BERET can exceptionally be awarded outside of the two categories mentioned above. In this instance, the nomination committee decided to grant the Extraordinary Award (posthumous) to Civil Guard Lieutenant Colonel Jesús Gayoso Rey. It was awarded for the remarkable and forthright collaboration between the GAR (Rapid Action Group), under his command, and the MCOE, which helped to consolidate professional ties between both units, resulting in joint work and several exercises. Due to COVID-19, he died on March 27, 2020. Ms. Lourdes Estvariz Méndez, his widow, received the award.

The ceremony was held at the Retamares Base on December 18, 2020, and was presided over by the Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command and was simulcast to several Special Operations units.

The Award-winners on previous occasions, in military and civilian categories, respectively, were the following:

2017

ADM. Fernando García Sánchez and Mr. Octavio Diez Cámara

2018

ADM. Teodoro López Calderór and Mr. Pedro Morenés and Fulate

2019

LTG. Rafael Sánchez Ortega and Ms. Macarena Moreno Arruego

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MISSION

OF THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

On May 22, 2020, the Defense Official Gazette (BOD in Spanish), No.103, issued Royal Decree 521/2020, of May 19, which establishes the basic organization of the Armed Forces. This RD is committed to:

a new organization of the Armed Forces with the capacity to always update itself, combining the efforts of the three Services (Army, Air Force, and Navy) for a common and sole purpose. Simultaneously, such organization needs to be able to take advantage of specific capacities depending on the nature and context in which they must operate.

Regarding the Operations Command in Art.11, the RD (in Art. 11.2) specifies the permanent constitution of the Joint Special Operations Command (MCOE). Under the Operations Command, the MCOE will be responsible for:

planning, conducting and follow-up of all assigned special operations.

Subsequent to the RD, the Defense Order 710/2020, of July 27, developed the basic organization of the Defense Staff. In that Order, the Operations Command (MOPS) is identified as the organization responsible for operational planning, conducting, monitoring, and directing the sustainment of military operations; and it is organized into a series of elements among which the MCOE is included:

- a) Commander
- b) Deputy Commander
- c) Joint Operati<mark>ons Command Staff (EMMOPS).</mark>
- d) Joint Specia<mark>l Opera</mark>tions Command (MCOE).
- e) Core of the Multinational Joint Headquarters (ES-OHQ).
- f) Head of Security and Services (JESES-RETAMARES).

The MCOE is responsible for

planning, conducting, and monitoring special operations which it has been

assigned, as well as for enabling the integration and interoperability of special operations capabilities, and for planning and conducting the joint exercises required to ensure the operational efficiency of the assigned special operations units. It also advises CMOPS on all issues related to special operations. it constitutes the basis for a Special Operations Component Command Headquarters capable of fulfilling national requirements and international agreements.

The Chief of the Defense Staff (JEMAD in Spanish) exercises command of the operational structure of the Armed Forces, and the different Component Commands, previously designated, that will carry out the operations that be determined, according to the operational plans in force. In addition to the Land, Maritime and Aerospace Component Commands, the transversal Component Command of Special Operations may be activated, in accordance with current military doctrine.



OPERATION "EAGLE CLAW"

The aim of this section is to provide a general description of certain special operations and to highlight the most important lessons learned.

The purpose is not to conduct a detailed analysis of the operation itself, of which there has been much after-action analysis. Rather the aim is to focus on those aspects that can most serve as a valuable lesson for the MCOE given its mission to plan, conduct, and monitor all assigned special operations, including the establishment of a Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) when tasked.

8 Americans killed in Iran raid

Rescuefails

'It was fully my decision': Carter

From Recold name auctions

WASHINGTON — President Cartee and Solary the aboved American actioning in process U.S. hortages in Techna was "a homenatural musicing," and was not directed against the government or the people of Iran, Ile said that its softertaking the "dangerous" misson, he does not soften a world have "as excellent chance for sweet word have "as excellent chance for sweet word have "as excellent chance for sweet was the process of the control of the

Carrier said be ordered the mission for present Associates large and a section of the danger of conflict in the world. "It was my decision to attempt this resette mission," he said its a nationally schemized report to the nation at 4 am Chicago time.

Carses said that "in the aftermath of this attempt, we continue to hold the frasian government responsible" for the safety of the bittinger. At the time Carter spoke, there had been no reaction from the militants holding the em-



THE UNITED STATES used as Egyption air base as a staging area for the abortive rescue attempt of the hostages in Iran. At itempt of the hostages in Iran. At itempt of the hostages in Iran. The U.S. aircraft carrying Marines and Cla agents reportedly crashed near the states of Value and Control of the States of Value and Classifications.

scrubbed before it began. Powell said Carter ordered the rescue effort can reled because of "equipment failure," and in the subsequent efforts to with draw the American raiding force, a C 130 collided with a belieupter, killing the exist way.


White House sources said the "equipment failure" announced by Powell was the failure of an aircraft engine. It was not immediately clear whether that failure was in any way connected


Powell said the injured Americans are being given medical treatment and are expected to recover

THE C 130 Hercides can carry a lead of \$4,000 pounds and has a range of over 4,000 miles. This tactical transpect was especially designed to be able to land on reach or unimproved fields.

to land on rough or unimproved fields.

Presonably, the plane was flows





Planned deployment of helicopters and airplanes in Desert One

OPERATION "EAGLE CLAW"

Under Jimmy Carter's presidency, US special operations forces carried out Operation "Eagle Claw" in April 1980 to free hostages kidnapped by the Iranian government and held in the US Embassy in Tehran since November 1979.

The operation envisioned the use of military helicopters and aircraft in tandem with ground forces, causing them to converge at a refueling point in the Iranian desert (Desert One). The operations included a dangerous ground convoy towards the US Embassy in Tehran, where the hostages would be released, and culminated with the hostages' exfiltration to a nearby stadium where they would ultimately be extracted by helicopters to an old, abandoned base in the desert, from which they would be airlifted to a safe location.

The military command structure included:

Joint Task Force TF 1-79. Commander: US Army Major General. Deputy: USAF Brigadier General.

Transport Force. Commander: USAF Colonel. It included transport aircraft and a CCT (Combat Control Team).

Helicopter Force. Commander: USMC Lieutenant Colonel. Coordinated with aircraft carrier USS "Nimitz", from where they would depart.

Ground forces. Command: US Army Colonel Army. It included Delta Force and Rangers.

This organization was created specifically for the mission and consisted of three distinct commands: fixed wing (airplanes) transport, rotary wing (helicopter) units, and ground forces, all of which were subordinated to a single joint command

created for the mission. Unfortunately, the power and influence of the individual services (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), outweighed that of the joint command established for the operation. Its critical to recall that at that point in time the concept of Joint operations had not been formally codified or well-established within the US Department of Defense.

Without delving into the details of the operation, it is evident that the plan was complex, including a command structure created for the occasion, requiring a significant amount of coordination and convergence of forces, a large margin of error, a high risk of losing surprise (key to success), and the need for detailed adjustments required for a successful outcome.

Ultimately, each of the individual compo-

nents (land, air, and aviation forces) worked within its own stovepipe, with each one preparing and updating its own plans in an isolated vacuum, without an effective (Joint) headquarters to supervise the preparation and ensure synchronization.

The result of this operation was a resounding failure. The number of aircraft available was reduced due to difficulties in getting helicopters to "Desert One" from the USS Nimitz as it sailed through the Persian Gulf. In addition, the collision between an aircraft and a helicopter during the refueling process, resulted in the death of eight soldiers, as well as the appearance of local buses in the vicinity of the area, which had a negative impact in

maintaining secrecy, caused the operation to be canceled and the force had to withdraw hastily, leaving the helicopters behind.

The operation's outcome is recognized as a significant negative factor in President Carter's reelection bid, which he ultimately lost to Ronald Reagan in November of that year.

The subsequent post-operation investigative commissions identified numerous planning flaws, such as a lack of detailed contingency plans, an ineffective command and control structure, and a lack of interoperability and coordination between the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, Such

findings and commissions spurred the reorganization of the Department of Defense and the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which strengthened the joint structure by giving it greater weight and relevance so that the different Services were forced to better work together.

In addition, the Unified Functional Combatant Commands were created, among them the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which became operational on April 16, 1987. Three of the four services (Army / USAF / Navy) then stood up their own special operations forces, under the overall control of USSOCOM (NOTE: The USMC established its SOF component in 2006).



Aircraft wreckage in Desert One

CONCLUSIONS

The hostage crisis was successfully resolved shortly after President Ronald Reagan's arrival at the White House, with Iran agreeing to release the hostages.

The failure of the operation had a significant impact on the international image and prestige of the United States. Likewise, in the political arena, the repercussions affected President Carter's reelection campaign.

From a military standpoint, the importance of having a robust and well-prepared

joint structure was identified as the most effective tool for planning and conducting operations, with the four services operationally subordinated to the newly established regionally oriented Geographic Combatant Commands.

The structure of the United States Department of Defense underwent a comprehensive reorganization, and this contributed to the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, which promoted, among other things, the creation of the United States Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM).

In the case of special operations, USSO-COM was established as an independent command (Functional Combatant Command). This organization was tasked, among other things, with dealing with a crisis like this one, bringing together the appropriate subordinate structure to provide military options at the strategic-political level, as well as conducting operations.

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

MOE (ARMY)



The Special Operations Command is made up of special operations units and their support units, grouped under a single command, which are organized, trained, and equipped to carry out special operations.

According to IG (Army Regulation) 161/125 of 1961, the EMC (Army Central Staff) laid down the rules for the creation, on an experimental basis, of two UOEs, which would be the future COE (Special Operations Companies, by their Spanish name) No. 71 (Oviedo) and COE No. 81 (Orense).

According to IG 161/142 and its implementing regulations, in 1965 and 1966, the final rules were laid down for the creation of the COEs. Eighteen COEs were created as a direct consequence of this IG, in addition to four more which were subsequently added.

With the creation of GOE I (Special Operations Group, by its Spanish name) "ORDENES MILITARES" in Madrid, a further step was taken in the organization of the UOEs, which one year later, under the META Plan, would lead to the creation of the GOEs. Beginning in July 1996, as part of the FMA (Maneuver Force Command) and under the permanent supervision of the Deputy Commanding General of the FMA, the gradual professionalization process of all the GOEs started and the Special Operations Command (MOE) began to come into view. It was in 1997 when the MOE was activated, initially in Jaca, and later in Alicante, to start a new era for the UOEs.





Special Operations Command Headquarters

The CG. MOE (SOC HQ) is an organic, operational, and deployable headquarters, upon which a special operations task force (FOE in Spanish) can be organized, in addition to its inherent functions of command, employment, and unit preparation.

HQ Group

This organic unit integrates Special Operations combat and combat support capabilities, allowing the MOE to generate suitable command and control structu-

res in a limited way. It provides the MOE with organic capabilities (ISR, HUMINT, telecommunications and information systems, specific and joint targeting, CEMA, etc.) that enable it to organize the required operational structures. It is made up of the Intelligence, Signal, and Training Companies. The latter provides support for the Special Operations training of the units within the MOE.

Special Operations Groups

They are the units that provide SOF capabilities at the 2nd tactical level. They are also the framework for the establishment

of operational structures at (specific or joint) SOTG level, with the possibility to integrate non-organic means, units, and personnel.

Special Operations Logistics Unit

It provides the combat logistics support required by the MOE and the SF Groups, for the setup of operational organizations at their respective levels, as well as the logistical requirements for training.

Brigadier General Raimundo Rodríguez Roca is the current MOE Commander.


Special Operations

SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE FORCE

FGNE (NAVY)





In 1966, the Special Operations Unit was created, based on the




existing Amphibious Climbers Company (Cía. de Escaladores Anfibios), within what was then called the Support Group. In 1967, its members were entitled to use the Green Beret, unique to special operations units, and the following year, the Tercio de Armada was created, taking the UOE as part of its Landing Task Force.

Combat diving was born in 1953 within the old "Tercio de Baleares", in the diving training center of the "Illetas" Submarine Base, in Palma de Mallorca. The Marine Corps 1LT Antonio Gorordo Álvarez, organized the first group of combat divers. In 1967, MAJ Gorordo Álvarez was commissioned to create the Combat Divers Experimental Unit (UEBC in Spanish). In 1970 the unit was officially given the name Special Combat Diver Unit.

In 2004, the Naval Special Warfare Command was created, subordinate to the Fleet Admiral and under the command of an Marine Corps Colonel or Navy Captain (NATO OF-5).

After more than five years of experience with this organizational model of naval special warfare capabilities, the Navy decided to merge the three units into a single organic unit, creating the Naval Special Warfare Force (FGNE) and establishing its base in the "Algameca" Naval Station in Cartagena (Murcia). The Naval Special Warfare Force (FGNE) was born on June 10, 2009, consisting





of the Naval Special Warfare Command (MGNE), the Special Operations Unit (UOE) of the "Tercio de Armada", and "MAJ Gorordo" Special Combat Diver Unit (UEBC) from the Navy Diving Center.

Marine Corps Colonel Pedro Antonio Martínez Rodríguez De Lema is the current Commander of the FGNE.

"Estol" is a historical term that originates in the raids organized by the Almogavars (13th and 14th centuries), who embarked on the galley ships of the Kingdom of Aragon under the command of Roger de Flor, Berenguer de Entenza, and Bernardo Rocafort, with Roger de Lauria as Fleet Admiral. These embarked units assailed enemy ships with extreme force and bravery, and they were used in advanced reconnaissance tasks of the Fleet.

PARACHUTE SAPPER SQUADRON

EZAPAC (Air Force)



The EZAPAC is the ground element of special air operations capabilities of the Air Force, which also includes fixed-wing and rotary-wing aerial elements, whose main mission is to support air operations, mainly those aimed at reaching air superiority, regardless of their location or duration. Its uniqueness lies on the capability to conduct missions of Special Operations Air Land Integration (SOALI), namely CAS/TGO, CCT, and PR.



Being the successor to the pioneers of military parachuting in Spain, EZAPAC is an emblematic unit in the Air Force. Heir to a glorious military, aeronautical and parachuting legacy, its members have participated in countless national and international missions. They are also a point of reference in military parachuting, both inside and outside our borders.

On September 9, 1965, the 1st Paratrooper Escuadrilla (*escuadrilla is a company-sized unit in the Spanish Air

Force) was renamed Parachute Sapper Escuadrilla (EZAPAC), and it was an independent unit under the command of the Commanding General of the Tactical Air Command (MATAC) in Alcantarilla. It was temporarily stationed at El Copero Airfield, in 1973.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the unit achieved a high level in HALO-HAHO capabilities, an added value for EZAPAC that no other Spanish SOF unit possessed at the time. On February 9, 1994, the unit was reorganized, its TOE increased, and it was

assigned a predominantly SOF role. On May 3, 2002, the Parachute Sapper Escuadrilla (=company) became Parachute Sapper Squadron (squadron = battalion-sized unit in the Spanish Air Force)

As an SOF unit, the EZAPAC increased its training level with the reception of new equipment, thereby improving its techniques and procedures without losing the essence of its traditions.

Air Force LTC Juan José Arboli Nevot is the current Commander of EZAPAC.



ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE MCOE

JAN 09-10

TASK FORCE TAKUBA Conference. Legal issues of the operation (Paris, France)

JAN 14-15

Special Operations Forum (MOE, Alicante, Spain)

JAN 20-23

NATO TEO WG (Technical Exploitation Operations WG) (NSHQ-Chievres, Belgium)

JAN 29-31

TF TAKUBA Working Group (Paris, France)

FEB 2-6

NSHQ OPS&INTEL Synchronization Conference (SHAPE-MOS, Belgium)

FER 3-7

Brazilian delegation Visit to the MCOE (PCB 2020)

FEB 6

National Coordinating Meeting BTEC 2020

FEB 11-13

JEMAD, CMOPS, and CMCOE travel to Area of Operations (Iraq and Turkey)

FEB 13-14

SOF Aviation JSOAC Conference (London, UK)

FEB 17-28

Exercise FLINTLOCK 20 (Mauritania)

FEB 17-25

Area Reconnaissance (Iraq) with PRT, prior to deployment of SOTG XII

FEB 20

Visit of members of the XXI CADCOG course to the MCOE

FEB **26-28**

Attend the SENIOR LEADERSHIP SEMINAR (SLS) + DVD FLINTLOCK 20 (Nouakchott, Mauritania)

FEB **25-27**

Electronic Warfare and Electromagnetic Operations Seminar (Retamares, Spain)

MAR 9-12

MENA Synchronization Workshop (Mons, Belgium)

MAR 14-16

A/I - EVALOP SOTG XII - (Chinchilla, Spain)

MAR 16-17

PCB ALGERIA (Algeria)

MAY 11-15

SOFIC TAMPA (via VTC

MAY 27

DEU NRF 2023 FORCE SENSING CONFERENCE (via VTC)

30 AUL

SOF Commanders Roundtable (SOCEUR) (via VTC)

JUL 7-8

Validation experiment of the concept of PR (Personnel Recovery)

AUG 3

Joint Special Operations
Conference (EMMOE)

AUG 24-28

FLINTLOCK-21 IPE

SEP 7-11

Joint Targeting MAPEX-20 Seminar

SEP 15

SOFEX-20 IPC

SEP 16-18

TFP-21 Exercise IPE

SEP 21-24

SOFEX-20 Area Reconnaissance

SEP 22

YELLOW DAGGER 20 (DEU SOCC NRF) (via VTC)

ост 13

NATO SOF Commanders Conference (via VTC)

ост 15-16

SP-NATO NDPP bilateral Seminar

ост 20-22

CASTOR-20.
MCOE support to CCFOE (Agentina)

ост 26

EVALOP SOTG XIII (vi. VTC)

NOV 3-6

EPAO (Operational Support Practical Schools)

NOV 18-19

SEA GUARDIAN Operation Activation Exercise

NOV 19

FRME SOF (SOCCENT)
Commanders Virtual
Conference

17

NOV 26 DEC 13

Senegal Cooperative Security Activities (EZAPAC + MCOE)

DEC 3

MERCURIO-20 Exercise (Bétera, Spain)

DEC 15-17

Gray Zone Seminal
(Toledo, Spain)

DEC 18

SOF Unit Commanders' Annual Meeting (via VTC) + Green Beret Award Ceremony (Retamares, Spain)

DEC 21

SOF Forum (FOROES Gray Zone (via VTC)

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FOE V DEPLOYS IN AFGHANISTAN

SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

NATO's Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan, including Spain's support to counter-terrorism operations, aims to support the Afghan Special Operations units by providing training and advice.

Between May 11 and Nov. 23, 2020, Special Operations Task Force V (FOE in Spanish) was deployed in what, without a doubt, was a mission replete with unexpectedness.

In the days prior to the deployment, the ongoing international events foreshadowed the mission's dynamics: Uncertainty.

On the one hand, the emergence of COVID-19 at the end of February indelibly marked the way of life and work of the FOE, including several periods of confinement or quarantine because of the several outbreaks that resulted in the restricted mobility of the units. Additionally, the closing of dining facilities due to positive

cases among their workers forced the unit to rely upon US combat rations for sustainment for extended periods of time. On the other hand, the peace agreements signed by the United States with the Taliban in Doha on February 29, 2020, which imply a progressive reduction to zero, by mid-2021, marked the complete end of the coalition's actions against the Taliban.

As a result of the anti-COVID measures in RSM, FOE V deployed with less than half of its strength. Over the months, and because of the reduction of troops, NSOCC-A, and therefore FOE V had to reorganize, which is why in mid-September another thirty-three percent personnel reduction took place has been sustained under FOE V current manning levels. After the closure of Camp Taylor and Camp Duskin in August 2020, the FOE relocated at Camp Morehead.

If today the world situation is a good

example of VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous) environment, the Afghan scenario is an even more apt example due to the internal and international political situation. Despite all this, FOE V has been able to keep calm despite the chaos due the need to continue maintaining contact with the Afghan partner units and even assuming new tasks, such as supporting the advice of the ANASOC Staff, or the inclusion of an intelligence analyst in the CSAR (Combined Situational Awareness Room), whose outstanding performance has been awarded through international recognition.

The good work done by the Operational Teams did not go unrecognized, whose persistence and dedication repeatedly earned the acknowledgement of our Allied SOF partners. Once again, it is evident that this "Special Operations Community" exists, and it grows steadily stronger.



OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

SOTG XII'S DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ

From May 25 to December 3, 2020, SOTG XII was deployed in Iraq, in Operation *Inherent Resolve*, within the framework of Spanish counter-terrorism operations. Although this is a consolidated contribution of the Spanish special operations units, the situation generated by COVID-19 pandemic significantly affected the deployment.

On this occasion, the SOTG contribution was smaller than usual, both to guarantee personnel safety and to be able to adapt to the changes that Operation Inherent Resolve implemented following the positive results obtained in its fight against Daesh.

Operations Command (MOE, Army), the Parachute Sapper Squadron (EZAPAC, Air Force), and support personnel from the Army. Although the working conditions were unusual and the unit was significantly downsized, the SOTG contributed to the operations of Partner units without interruption, adapting to the new operating conditions and new mission guidelines. In this way, they kept continuous contact with Partner units; providing their operations with mentorship, information, and ISR support, and carrying out technical exploitation of captured material, in

addition to supporting them in the design of their capability maintenance programs.

On the other hand, the changes in the operation required the adaptation of the SOTG deployment, moving units to the north, as well as partnering with units of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, known as the CTS, which joined the standard partner units of the SOTG.

Although all the activities were carried out from the beginning of the deployment, the new role with the CTS was adopted gradually throughout the mission, enlarging the SOTG force to fully assume and lead the tactical training of a CTS partner unit. The mission was not easy due to the small initial size of the SOTG, and the assumption of new responsibilities in new locations, while maintaining the previous ones while not forgetting the complexity brought about by the pandemic. Despite these challenges, the effort made by all the members of the SOTG XII showed the commitment and dedication of a unit which, once again has shown the quality of Spanish special operations units and Spain's commitment to our allies and the Iraqi people.

pecial Operations

SPECIAL OPERATIONS LIAISON OFFICER (SOLO) SPAIN

Lo Que Sea, Cuando Sea, Donde Sea

I am now entering my third year as the Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) to Spain. The COVID19 pandemic has proven to be quite a challenging hurdle and impediment to expanding US-ESP SOF collaboration. However, the future is still bright, particularly as the COVID19 vaccination becomes more widely available both in the US and Spain. With a little luck, I expect the second semester of 2021 to provide additional opportunities for US-ESP SOF units to expand collaboration, build readiness and improve interoperability.

Knowing your unit's history and background is vital for any military officer or non-commissioned officer, and I would like to take the opportunity to provide a brief overview of my Special Forces Group's unit history.

The history of the 7th Special Forces Group is very important as that is the Special Forces unit in which I served as a captain and major, and which I consider to be part of my extended family. In fact, the 7th Special Forces Group is known as the Red Empire due to its bold, red logo and its unofficial motto is "The Family Business".

The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was first constituted as the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, 1st Special Service Force on 9 July 1942 at Camp William Harrison, Montana. This specialized Canadian-American unit was organi-

zed and trained to conduct commando raids against Nazi Germany's fledgling nuclear weapons capability in the Scandinavian region of occupied Europe. However, the unit was diverted to the campaign in the Aleutian Islands, where they were confronted by not only Japanese, but the brutal arctic climate. Upon successful culmination of the Aleutian Campaign, the Special Service Force was transferred to the European theater. They fought with distinction in both southern France and Italy, where they earned the nickname "The Devil's Brigade."

The 1st Special Service Force was disbanded in France in 1945. It was reactivated on September 1953 at Fort Bragg as the 77th Special Forces. In 1960, the Group was recognized and designated as the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces. In 1965, the Group participated in Operation POWER PACK in the Dominican Republic. Throughout the 1980s, the 7th Special Forces Group played a key role supporting democratic governments of Central America in their fight against communist insurgencies. In the 1980s 7th Group was primarily assigned to the Latin America region which necessitated the need to speak fluent Spanish, and to a lesser extent French and Portuguese. From 1981 through 1992, 7th Special Forces Group Soldiers spearheaded Counterinsurgency Operations during the Civil War in El Salvador. Since 1987, the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) has trained host nation forces from Andean Ridge Countries for counter-narcotics Operations.

In December 1989, 7th Special Forces Group Soldiers participated in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. Since 1994, 7th Special Forces Group Soldiers have participated in numerous peacekeeping operations to include Operation SAFE HAVEN in Panama and Joint Task Force Safe Border as part of the Military Observer Mission Ecuador/Peru, providing a stabilizing influence to resolve this centuries old border dispute.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 7th Special Forces Group has deployed to combat operations in Afghanistan supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and currently provide support for Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL. From 2004 to 2011, 7th Special Forces Group deployed the Group for combat operations in Iraq, assisting the El Salvadorian contingent in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) personnel continue to distinguish themselves in operations that span multiple AORs (NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, & CENTCOM), including working side-by-side with our Spanish SOF brothers in Afghanistan.

Lo Que Sea, Cuando Sea, Donde Sea 7th SFG's Official Motto



Special Operations

SPAIN SUPPORTS SENEGAL IN THE CREATION

OF A SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT



The creation of a special operations unit, within the Senegalese air force, is an important project in which Spain is committed to strengthening the security and defense structures of this African country in the area of Special Operations. Under the direction of the Joint Special Operations Command (MCOE), this special operations activity expands upon others carried out by several units of the Spanish Armed Forces in the Sahel, with the aim of reinforcing the capabilities of those countries where transnational instability is generated, in order to increa-

se national security. A successful project carried out in Cape Verde since 2014, prompted the Senegalese authorities to request a similar project within the Senegalese Air Force in 2015.

In August 2016, an SOF advisor, and an operational detachment of the Air Force Parachute Sapper Squadron (EZAPAC) were deployed to Senegal to lead the creation and training of the Senegalese Air Force Special Operations Unit.

Since 2016, this project has been develo-

ped in different locations in Senegal, namely in the capital, Dakar, or in Thiés—the most industrialized city in the country, 60 km east of Dakar, and the third largest in terms of population—and it includes training Senegalese personnel in different areas such as: patrolling, weapons and marksmanship, map reading, land navigation, personal defense, urban combat, and telecommunications, among others. In addition, the SOF advisor in the capital has provided support in the elaboration of the necessary doctring framework of the new Unit

Currently, the continuity of the project is achieved through regular activities that enhance or complement the capabilities acquired by the FSA (Force Spéciale Aérienne). A Special Operations Aviation Task Unit – Fixed Wing (SOATU-FW) of the 35th Wing, consisting of a T-21 aircraft, was also periodically deployed in support of the mission. This made it possible to strengthen efforts and increase the number of skills to be acquired, such as static-line parachute insertion, which is key to their operations, or extending the lessons related to air-ground integration, taught in different phases.

The ultimate goal of the project is to enable the FSA to autonomously carry out the operations entrusted to it, to improve the capabilities of the Senegalese armed forces, and to strengthen their security and defense structures so that they can effectively face the risks that threaten their security. It is common for FSA members to take part in operations conducted in the Casamance region, in the south of the country, on the border with Gambia

It is also noteworthy that this project has been widely recognized by the Senegalese authorities, such as during the visit of the Spanish and European Union Ambassadors, in which they expressed their satisfaction with the progress of the training activities the Spanish Units provide to the Senegalese Armed Forces. They stressed the importance of this type of cooperation for relations between Spain and Senegal.

Through this activity, modeled and coordinated by the Joint Special Operations Command (MCOE), Spain maintains its constant commitment to its allies and contributes to international stability and thus to Spanish Security, in areas such as North Africa and the Sahel, which are essential for this security.









EXERCISE FLINTLOCK 20

2020

The Joint Special Operations Command (MCOE) planned, coordinated, and conducted the participation of Spanish Special Operations Units in Mauritania during Exercise FLK20

Between Feb 10 and Feb 29, 2020, personnel from the Special Operations units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, plus a team from the Civil Guard's Rapid Reaction Group (GAR in Spanish), deployed a Joint Special Operations Task Force (Joint SOTF) to Atar and Nouak-chott, Mauritania; along with personnel from the Joint Special Operations Command. This year, the Army Special Operations Command (MOE) led the Joint SOTF, and participated in all the

planning and preparation activities, together with the MCOE, which conducted the exercise.

As in previous years, the objective of the exercise was to maintain and improve the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities (CT/CI) of the Special Operations units of African Partner Nations (APN), and to deepen and exchange tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP, s) of Spanish Special Forces Operational

Teams, in a desert environment, as well as in their cooperation with the various Western contingents participating in the exercise, in this case: Belgium, Italy, Portugal and the United States, which could cooperate at any time with the Spanish units.

The objective of this deployment was to train personnel of the Mauritanian Armed Forces. For this purpose, the personnel were deployed in two rotations, the first



(16 pers.) on a civilian flight, and the second rotation (40 pers.), together with the sensitive military equipment (weapons, protective equipment, night vision and communications means) on a Spanish Air Force C-130 (T-10) aircraft, to Atar (Mauritania). To complete the participation in the operational organization of Exercise FLINTLOCK 20, two officers of the Spanish Army joined the "Joint Multinational HQ" (JMHQ), the organization responsible for conducting and coordinating the military support activities to be developed during the execution phase of the exercise.

Exercise FLINTLOCK 20 was organized and conducted by the US Special Operations Command for Africa (SOCAFRICA), more specifically by the Joint Special Operations Task Force Trans Sahara (JSOTF-TS).

At the Spanish national level, the MCOE is the joint organization responsible for planning, coordinating, and conducting the activities carried out, as well as liaising with the various actors involved, such as SOCAFRICA, African Partner Nations and Civilian Agencies that participated.



THE ATLANTIC TIES

OF THE MCOE

Latin (Ibero) America has always been a top priority for Spain, as we share strong historical and cultural ties as well as a common language. However, as stated in the ESN-2017 (Spanish acronym for National Security Strategy), our relationship extends beyond these ties, and this region is designed as an area of future projection as part of Spain's strategic development.

Therefore, the National Defense Directive 2020 recognizes that defense relationships with Ibero-America are of particular interest due to the importance of shared challenges and the opportunities provided by mutual support. Accordingly, the Defense Policy Directive stresses a strong focus on cooperation

with Ibero-America, particularly in areas such as education or institutional support to the armed forces, which even serve as a bridge between the European Union and NATO.

For this reason, the MCOE has fostered and maintained relations with various countries in the area in the field of special operations for some years now, confident that the Spanish SOFs represent a versatile tool with a small logistical footprint, with a strong potential for support in the region. This support could be divided into two categories:

On the one hand, there are Central and South American countries with considerable development of their military capabilities. Spain can serve as a bridge between these countries and organizations like NATO or the European Union. In addition, the MCOE can offer its recent experience with the creation of joint special operations structures, a process in which some countries in the region are currently involved.



On the other hand, due to the fragile security situation in some nations, mostly in Central America, SOF are used to combat narco-terrorism or organized crime. In this scenario, the Spanish SOFs are able to contribute their recent expertise in counter-terrorism operations or security cooperation activities in North Africa.

In addition, for years, the MCOE has also participated in exercises and seminars in the Region, drawing expertise from their vast experience in fighting terrorism and drug trafficking, or in jungle warfare.

For all these reasons, the MCOE shall keep on promoting cooperation with our allies in Ibero-America in the field of special operations.









In spite of Hollywood's frequent Rambo-like portrayal of special operators, in recent history special operations forces emerge as critical joint, interagency, and international integrators in the face of future conflicts and an ever-more complicated battlespace.

Since August 31, 2019, Major General VIDAUD has been the commander of the COS. He graduated from Saint-Cyr Academy and was assigned to the 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment in 1990, which he commanded in 2008. From 2012 to 2017, Major General VIDAUD attended the CHEM course (equivalent to CAPSTONE), and he was assigned to the Defense Minister's cabinet. In 2017, he assumed command of the armed forces in the Indian Ocean's southern region (FAZSOI). During his career, the general has deployed to the Balkans, Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville, the Republic of Ivory Coast, Haiti, and Afghanistan on multiple occasions.

Over the course of its 28-year existence, the COS has increased the employment spectrum of special operations. From its beginnings as assault forces command, it expanded its expertise to include asymmetric and counter-terrorism warfare. The COS must overcome challenges such as the reappearance of hybrid threats and world powers, the emergence of new areasof confrontation, and the acquisition of new capabilities. The COS Staff is constantly evolving to gain agility, turn those challenges into opportunities, and maintain superiority over the enemy.

The COS, created in 1992 based upon the lessons learned from the first Gulf War, was initially tasked with a mission as an assault force, capable of operating ahead of conventional forces. Subsequently, its employment was expanded, while remaining within the scope of actions that could be carried outside of national territory.

The COS' capabilities reflect its evolution.

In the last 28 years, the COS has gone through four stages. Its first assignment was to deal with emergencies. The missions in the Comoro Islands (1995), the Central African Republic (from 1996), and more recently, in the context of the massacres in Ouagadougou (2014) and Bamako (2015), exemplify this "emergency" version of the COS.

Second, the COS conducted long-term operations in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), and in the Balkans in search of war criminals. It was in charge of training missions, especially in West Africa. In the first place, the COS presence there allowed it to quickly counter the Islamist offensive in Mali in January 2013.

The third generation of the COS was committed to the fight against terrorism. From Afghanistan (TF Arès, since 2003, then TF Jehol, in 2009), the COS learned the lessons that would make it one of the references in this domain. It gained experience through a variety of deployments in the Sahel and in the



Middle East. It gradually integrated the capabilities required to sustain this long-term pursuit: very short decision chain, dedicated resources, cooperation with all French services and allies involved in this fight, specific procedures, global and systematic approach to terrorist networks, implementation of means Intelligence. At the tactical and operational levels, it has evolved into a joint, interagency, and international integrator, as demonstrated by Task Force Takuba, a European TF in Mali. It also serves as an interdepartmental integrator, allowing ministries to gain access to specific conflict areas.

The COS is now entering its fourth era. It is the resumption of confrontations between world powers through hybrid strategies, characterized by the multiplici-

ty of civilian and military actors and the ambiguity of actions that are difficult to attribute, often below the threshold of open conflict. The game of the great powers is partially done using proxies. We face adversaries who have modern capabilities and who have recovered a certain form of technological symmetry: electromagnetic interference, night vision binoculars, drones, and so on.

In fact, the range of capabilities necessarily expands to include drones, fire support, intelligence, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, demining, urban combat, CBRN, remote medical support capabilities, among others. All these skills have been put into practice in the Middle East during the offensive against the Islamic State. Beyond the physical engagement environments, perception management is

also the subject of fierce competition to the point of having become a complete warfare domain.

In this context, we must synchronize all actions to implement the national strategy. This is our challenge in the future.

For that, the COS established four priorities over a fifteen-year horizon:

keep man at the heart of its system; always anticipate, always innovate; act and interact in a network; and provide an agile and

The COS is the operational command of a group of more than 4000 special operations forces personnel

The COS commander maintains operational control. He conducts the whole spectrum of special operations, using human and material resources provided by the Services, whose efforts are essential to carry out their missions. Success is shared collectively and with other units. Some of those units are almost exclusively dedicated to this Command within the four components of special operations forces:

- from the CFST (Commandement des Forces Spéciales Terre equivalent of the MOE),
- from FORFUSCO (Force maritime des fusiliers marins et commandos equivalent of the FGNE),
- from the BFSA (Brigade des Forces Spéciales Air - equivalent of EZAPAC)
- or from the medical service of the armed forces (1ère chefferie du service de santé - Forces Spéciales).

Other units support their operations from time to time. This is the case of remote piloted aircraft (UAVs), navy ships, communications or artillery regiments, and the DRM (direction du renseignement militaire - equivalent to CIFAS, Armed Forces Intelligence Centre in Spanish).






COS challenges

The COS's five biggest challenges in responding to new threats in the coming years are:

- The command system is the main challenge. Without a significant change, French special operations are at risk of being gradually and inexorably degraded.
- The resilience of our systems must be considerably improved on two fronts: autonomy in accessing those capabilities that favor structure-making, and the ability to operate in disrupted or competing environments (resources, electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace...).
- Having access to conflict areas, discreetly and in all environments, is a requirement for combating the growing number of access denial strategies.
- The ability to operate in immaterial fields (cyber influence) should enable us to seize opportunities while also protecting ourselves, with the need to keep up with especially rapid innovations.
- Finally, managing large amounts of data is key to identify operational opportunities in a context of "infobesity," which paradoxically creates a new fog of war that can paralyze decision-making.

AJP	Allied Joint Publication		(Afghanistan 2001–2014)
ASC	Cooperative Security Activity (Actividad de Seguridad	ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
, 100	Cooperativa)	JEMAD	Chief of Defense (Jefe de Estado Mayor de la
BOEL	Spanish Legion Special Operations Group		Defensa)
	(Bandera de Operaciones Especiales de la Legión)	JEMMCOE JSOC	Chief of Staff (Jefe de Estado Mayor del Mando
CAS	Close Air Support		Conjunto de Operaciones Especiales)
CESEDEN	Center for Advanced National Defense Studies	LNV	Non-Verbal Language (Lenguaje No Verbal)
	(Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional)	MATAC	Tactical Air Command (Mando Aéreo Táctico)
CG	Headquarters (Cuartel General)	MCOE	Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
CIFAS	Armed Forces Intelligence Center (Centro de		(Mando Conjunto de Operaciones Especiales)
	Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas)	MGNE	Naval Special Warfare Command (Mando de
CMCOE JSOC	Commander (Comandante del Mando Conjunto de		Guerra Naval Especial)
	Operaciones Especiales)	MOE	(Army) Special Operations Command (Mando de
CMOPS	Commander of the Joint Operations Command		Operaciones Especiales)
	(Comandante del Mando de Operaciones)	MOPS	(Defense) Operations Command (Mando de
CNV	Non-Verbal Communication (Comunicación No		Operaciones)
	Verbal)	MTT	Mobile Training Team
COE	Special Operations Company (Compañía de	NBQR	CBRN (Nuclear, Biológico, Químico y Radiológico)
	Operaciones Especiales)	NSE	National Support Element
CPX	Command Post Exercise	NSHQ NATO	Special Operations Headquarters (Casteau -
EADA	Air Deployment Support Squadron (Escuadrón de		Belgium)
	Apoyo al Despliegue Aéreo)	NSOS	NATO Special Operations School (Chievres -
EBA	Basic Special Operations Team (equivalent to		Bélgium)
	SFOD-A) (Equipo Básico de Operaciones Especiales)	OCE	Officer Conducting the Exercise
EGE	Army War College (Escuela de Guerra del Ejército)	OE,s	Special Operations (Operaciones Especiales)
EMAD	Defense Staff (Estado Mayor de la Defensa)	OFEN	Liaison Officer (LO) (Oficial de Enlace)
EMMOE	Military Mountain and Special Operations School	OMP	Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) (Operación de
	(Escuela Militar de Montaña y Operaciones Especiales)		Mantenimiento de la Paz)
EUROCORPS	European Corps	PCB	Bilateral Cooperation Plan (Plan de Cooperación
EZAPAC	Parachute Sapper Squadron (Escuadrón de		Bilateral)
	Zapadores Paracaidistas)	PLM	(in a Battalion-sized or smaller unit) HQ (Plana Mayor)
EXCON	Exercise Control	PR	Personnel Recovery
FAMET	Army Airmobile Forces (Army Aviation Regiment)	PTA	Primary Training Audience
E4.0	(Fuerzas Aeromóviles del Ejército de Tierra)	RSM	Resolute Support Mission (Afghanistan)
FAS	Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas)	RPAS	Remotely Piloted Air System
FGNE	Naval Special Warfare Force (Fuerza de Guerra Naval	SEA	Finance and Admin Section
FLIX	Especial)	SOALI	Special Operations Air Land Integration
FLK	Flintlock SO Exercise	SOATU	Special Operations Air Task Unit
FLOAN	Navy Aircraft Flotilla (Flotilla de Aeronaves de la	SOCAFRICA US	Special Operations Command-Africa
FOF	Armada)	SOCC	Special Operations Component Command
FOE	Special Operations Task Force (Fuerza de	SOF	Special Operation Forces
CAD	Operaciones Especiales)	SOFEX	Special Operations Forces Exercise
GAR	Rapid Reaction Group (Civil Guard) Grupo de Acción	SOLE SOLO	Special Operations Liaison Element
000	Rápida (Guardia Civil)	SOTG	Special Operations Liaison Officer
GCG	Army Headquarters Group (Grupo del Cuartel General)	SOTU	Special Operations Task Group Special Operations Task Unit
GOE	Special Operations Group (Grupo de Operaciones	STA	Secondary Training Audience
GOE		TAA	
П 70	Especiales)	TEO	Training, Advice, Assistance Tactical Exploitation Operation
HA-28	Eurocopter EC665 Tiger Attack Helicopter (Helicóptero de Ataque Tigre)	TO	Training Objective
HT-17		UEBC	
()) = ()	CH-47 Chinook Transport Helicopter (Helicóptero de Transporte Chinook)	OLDO	Special Combat Diver Unit (Unidad Especial de Buceadores de Combate)
HALO/HAHO	High Altitude-Low Opening / High Altitude-High	UOE	Special Operations Force Unit (SOF Unit)
/ I/ NEO/ I IAI IO	Opening		(Unidad de Operaciones Especiales)
HUMINT	Human Intelligence	USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
HVI	High Value Individual	VELOE	Special Operations Light Vehicle (Vehículo Ligero de
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force	v	Operaciones Especiales)
10/1	international occurry Assistance Force		operaciónes Especiales)



The behavior of the guerrilla* must be an example to follow, because in him the values and virtues of the Spanish soldier achieve greatness.

Code of Honor of Special Operations



