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The British Presence in the  
Spanish Military

Benito Tauler Cid (coord.)

Spanish  
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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

*Cover illustration:*

*-Flag of the 11th Regiment of the British Legion, 1835.*

*In June 1835 Spain, after the agreement reached with Great Britain, launched the organisation of the British Auxiliary Legion, which was a paid Spanish unit with its equipment purchased by Spain.*

*Regarding organisation and regulations, the legion followed the provisions of the British Army. For this reason, each of his regiments/corps received two flags, according to the British tradition, Color Party. One of them the Royal and the other the regimental, with the color of the regiment and the number of the same in both. In the case of the Royal Flags, these were, red-golden, to clearly differentiate them from the regimental flags of our regular units. The use of the two-color red-golden in 1835, was an exception except in some «units» of the National Militia.*

*Provenance: Ejército de Tierra, Museo del Ejército Toledo.*

*- Senior Officer of the Royal Marines, 1835.*

*In the case of the Royal Marines, their uniforms were of a style similar to those of the Army, even in the colour red.*

*Provenance: LAYER JAMES, British Military Uniforms. Made in London Great Britain, 1948.*

*Text plates printed by R. And R. Clark, Ltd, Edinburgh.*

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COMISIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE HISTORIA MILITAR  
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# Presencia británica en la milicia española

## The British Presence in the Spanish Military

**Benito Tauler Cid (coord.)**

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In this edition, 100% chlorine-free paper from sustainably managed forests has been used.

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## Abbreviations

AGMAE, General Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

AGMM, General Military Archive of Madrid

AGMS, General Military Archive of Segovia

AGS, General Archive of Simancas

E, Estate

CJH, Finance Council and Boards

AHN, National Historical Archive



## Introduction

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The British, encompassing the English, Welsh, Scots and, also the Irish, who are closely linked to them during certain periods, have performed in a multitude of environments and scenarios, initially under the banners of the monarchies of the Iberian Peninsula and later under the Spanish.

In this work, the eighth volume of Military History, which is dedicated to the British presence in the ranks of the Spanish militia, the aim is to look back over time and see that this participation, sometimes occasional, has had continuity over time, although it is a participation exercised in a more private way, without an idea of a «nation», than that of other national groups, sometimes developed under situations of crisis between courts and governments that maintained confrontations with each other over very long periods of time. This presence can be seen from the time of the Reconquest of the peninsula, where they are mentioned in the Chronicles, until the middle of the last century, coinciding with the great national crisis that ended in 1939.

There are logical differences between this British presence and those studied in previous works based on our classic «nations»: Irish, Italians or Walloons, and also with nations more eccentric

to the nuclei of our monarchies, such as the Germanic and/or Swiss. British participation in the Spanish ranks will have a different character, as there are no personalities or families seeking to lead the group and thus obtain perks or privileged positions for services rendered, there will be no national lobby, and each of the participants will be managed by their individual interests.

Over seven chapters, the various authors will go through the details and temporal characteristics of the project. They are not intended to cover the British presence in the Spanish ranks, but rather to present a sample of it, paving the way for further work. In the first of these, José Luis De Mesa covers a broad historical period of almost four hundred years through the medieval Chronicles and subsequent research. Already from this early period, it can be seen the duality in the modalities of participation, the first somewhat official and collective in character, based on the economic interests of the British establishment, and a second, much more individual procedure, tailored to the self-interest of the lords and participants.

With the arrival of the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century and until the coronation of Isabella I in 1558, relations between the English Crown and the Spanish Monarchy enjoyed one of the most cordial periods, with the relationship between the Crowns overcoming the personal and intellectual difficulties of the reigning families themselves. Accordingly, Eduardo De Mesa will provide details of the interventions of two British contingents in two projection operations of different natures and developments. The British participants are far removed from the technological and organisational developments seen in the continental contingents, but they will be used to develop a new organisational model and, above all, to raise awareness of logistical and political-military aspects.

The 17<sup>th</sup> century was characterised by the large number of scenarios in which the Spanish Monarchy was involved, which led to an urgent need for more men to deal with the crises. In this context, Davide Maffi highlights the value of British units in the service of the Catholic Monarchy. Once again, the social and religious differences of its members will become evident, but also the value of its veterans. Moreover, with varying degrees of quality, this involvement would develop not only with directly recruited English and Scottish Tercios but also with the British Royal Auxiliary Corps units in Flanders.

Mark Lawrence presents the British involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession. Participation with subsequent influences for both the UK and Spain. In his analysis, he notes that the main impact will be at the operational and political levels for both states. The importance of British maritime participation and presence will begin to become clear, as will the harshness of the operations and their severe implications for the British land component on the operational side. On the political level, it will contribute to the consolidation of the United Kingdom with the birth of the British Army through the union of English and Scottish veteran troops.

Spain's turbulent 19<sup>th</sup> century will see British fighters in Spanish territories. Sometimes as part of the British Army, outside the scope of the subject, as in the case of the War of Independence, but at other times under the flags of Her Catholic Majesty, as in the case of the political initiative in support of the liberal regime and the throne of Isabella II. Participation that will be of great importance as it will cover all the fundamental aspects of a state, both political and economic, in accordance with the liberalist mentality prevailing in the United Kingdom and in the military aspects, with greater importance placed on the naval than on land, where participation was channelled outside the state military organisations, as Benito Tauler proposes.

The African campaigns of the 20<sup>th</sup> century would bring in their second decade the return of foreigners to the Spanish Army, albeit in a different form to the old national regiments. The Tercio de Extranjeros was born with a clear vocation for the social integration of non-national personnel, first in the army and later in society. Miguel Ballenilla focuses on the process of recruitment of Anglo-Saxon personnel from both sides of the Atlantic, on the social conditions in Western countries after the end of the Great War. Faced with a large response from volunteers, difficulties began to appear, imposed by the governments themselves, often at the behest of the press of the time. This will result in a mass discharge of volunteers, leaving the recruitment process as a private act.

In the last of the chapters, Joaquín Serrano delves into the British participation in the Civil War, highlighting the differences in the actions and organisation of each side. In the National Army, the contribution was again of an individual nature, with the combatants adapting to the conditions of the fight like any other volunteer. By contrast, a British unit was created in the People's Army: the

British Battalion. It brought together the combatants who had previously been scattered in sections and companies throughout the theatre of war. The work also highlights the British maritime participation in the conflict with an exhaustive identification of the different ships, both warships and merchant vessels, which took part on it.

We are faced with a new presence and participation under the flags of Spanish monarchies and governments whose main difference with the majority of those studied in previous works is its individualistic character, as well as the absence of pressure in defence of the particular interests of the participants

## Chapter one

### **British in the Reconquest and in the wars in the Iberian Peninsula. 12<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> centuries**

*José Luis de Mesa Gutiérrez*  
Magistrate and historical researcher  
Translated by Linguaserve

#### **Abstract**

The presence of troops from the British Isles in the tasks of the Reconquest is practically unknown until the 12<sup>th</sup> century, and purely testimonial between it and the 15<sup>th</sup> century, through small contributions made by nobles from England, Scotland and Ireland, accompanied by their respective hosts or innkeepers, and even in a personal capacity. There will only be a greater presence during the 14<sup>th</sup> century due to the decisive intervention of England in the dynastic wars of Castile and in the warlike conflicts that will take place in the Iberian Peninsula, facing each other, in one way or another, the kingdoms of Castilla, Aragon and Navarra; although there will also be small groups that will take part in the problems that arose between the nobility, especially from the county of Catalonia, and the kings of Aragon in the 15<sup>th</sup> century.

#### **Keywords**

Reconquest, Castile, Aragon, Navarra, Pedro I of Castile, Enrique II of Castile, Pedro IV of Aragon, Carlos of Navarra, Black Prince.



## Reconquest and Crusades

The first news that Anglo-Saxon fighters had arrived in the Iberian Peninsula was at the time of the Second Crusade, specifically in 1147. On 23 May of the same year, a squadron of crusaders from Flanders, Germany and what is now Great Britain set sail from the English port of Devon to fight in the Holy Land.

After a stop in Galicia to make the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela, they headed south, arriving in Porto where, after a series of talks with the city's bishop and the king of Portugal, they helped the latter to conquer Lisbon and a few other fortresses held by the Muslims, some of whom had already stayed in the neighbouring country.

«In this fleet came many counts and other great lords, but the documents do not give their names, except for four: Mo-sén Guilhem de Longuaespada, Count of Lincoll, who is said to have been the greatest knight in all of England and France, another was called Childe Rolim, another Liberche and another Ligel... and the English and other people took the door of Poniente, where the Martyrs are now»<sup>1</sup>.

In the work *Crucesignati Anglici Epistola de Expugnatione Olisiponis*, written to narrate the event, it is said that, in addition to Germans, Flemish and French, the expedition included Normans, Scots and English, from Northampton, Hastings, Bristol and Lispiwch, among other places, providing some names of their chiefs such as the Englishman William Vitulo, his brother Rudolph, and Herveo de Gianville. It also reports that the former wanted to continue to the Holy Land, but that the latter convinced them to help the Portuguese monarch. That for the expropriation of Lisbon they built 2 mobile towers, one 95 feet high, which was set on fire by the enemy, another 83 feet high, as well as 2 Balearic slingshots that could throw 500 stones per hour. They plundered the town of Almada, an action in which 30 warriors and 100 auxiliary soldiers sent by Saherio de Archelles took part. Finally, the Englishman Gilbert de Hastings was appointed bishop of the future Portuguese capital.

The others continued their journey towards the Middle East, but some ships went to the Spanish Levantine coast, with their crews

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<sup>1</sup> *Coronica do muito alto, e muito esclarecido príncipe D. Affonso Henriques, primeiro rey de Portugal*, Chap. XXX.

and warriors taking part in the siege and capture of the city of Tortosa, which took six months. After this event, several of the expedition members, mainly English and Welsh, stayed in the county of Barcelona, although some only did so temporarily, such as Osberto Anglicus, who 20 years later resumed his interrupted journey to the Holy Land. «The English, together with the Knights of the Temple and many other foreigners, stood on top, towards Romelino, by the river»<sup>2</sup>.

According to Zurita, after the capture of Tortosa, there were English crusaders in the Fraga and Lerida campaigns in 1149<sup>3</sup>. It seems that during the 12th century the English nobleman Sir Roger Tosney, fought several times against the Muslims in Spain, since in his country he was known as «The Spaniard».

In 1211, after his failure to ask the King of France for help in fighting the Almohads, Alfonso VIII of Castile turned to Pope Innocent III who wrote to the high clergy of France and Provence to exhort and convince the nobles of their dioceses to come to Spain as crusaders. The Castilian monarch also sent his English physician, Master Arnold, to Poitou and Gascony, vassal regions of the King of England, although located in France, to request the help of his nobility.

As a result, a large number of foreign crusaders, known as *ultramontans*, appeared in 1212 in Toledo where Christian forces were gathering, including the bishops of Bordeaux and Nantes from French areas of English vassalage. According to the Chronicles, see Archbishop Jiménez de Rada in his *De Rebus Hispaniae*, their performance was distinguished by the cruelty they showed towards the defeated Muslims before the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, but by the time the battle took place the *ultramontans* had practically disappeared from Spanish territory. According to the troubadour Gavaudan, some of these foreigners were English and Gascons<sup>4</sup>.

Only two small groups were left, totalling between 120 and 130 knights, several of them from Poitou led by Theobald of Blazon, who was the son of Pedro Rodriguez de Guzman, royal Chamberlain to Alfonso VIII, who had been killed years earlier at the battle of Alarcos. The future Queen of Castile, Berenguela la Grande, informed her sister, Blanca, wife of the King of France, of the departure of the *ultramontane* and the performance of the

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<sup>2</sup> *Annales Ianuenses. De Captione Almerie et Tortuose.*

<sup>3</sup> Zurita. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón*, Book II, Chap. IV.

<sup>4</sup> O'CALLAGHAN, Joseph F.: *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, p. 69.

aforementioned Theobald: «Theobald of Blason did not do so, but served our father faithfully and fought manfully in combat»<sup>5</sup>.

The presence of crusaders from the island of Great Britain was not found again until the capture of Valencia by the King of Aragon, James I, which, according to Jerónimo Zurita in his *Annals*, was attended by people sent by the King of England, Henry III Plantagenet: «Also in the stories of England it is referred that Henry III sent help from people of his kingdom to King James to this conquest, and the stories of France confirm that the English came and served the king in the war».

The same monarch, it seems, had had dealings with the Castilian King Ferdinand III to carry out a joint Crusade in North Africa, and in 1254 he agreed with Alfonso X of Castile that the troops of both would unite to carry out the Crusade in these territories, but Pope Alexander IV did not consent to the English King, who had made a vow of the Crusade, changing the area in which he was to carry out the same, i.e. the Holy Land to the Maghreb.

The definitive loss of Christian Palestine allowed crusaders from various European territories to move to Spanish lands in order to help the Christian monarchs of the Iberian Peninsula in the reconquest of the territories that still remained in Muslim hands. As a result, in 1309 a group of English nobles led by Sir Robert de Tony, accompanied by Sir Walter Haket and Sir Walter Kynsmeade, among others, arrived in the Iberian Peninsula, the latter two dying in battle at an unknown date and place<sup>6</sup>.

When a decade later, in 1319, the Castilian Infantes Peter and John led an expedition against the Vega of Granada, it is known, by a certificate issued by King James II of Aragon, after another Castilian one, that the English knight John Hampton Mortimer had attended the expedition. In the battle in which the aforementioned infants died, he was unfortunate enough to be wounded several times and fall prisoner on 25 June of that year in Saracen hands, which held him in captivity for 4 years in Alvalá de Bençayder, perhaps Alcalá la Real<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> DE LA CRUZ, Fray Valentín. *Berenguela la Grande, Enrique I el Chico (1179-1246)*, p. 100.

<sup>6</sup> FRANCO ORDOVÁS, Gonzalo. *Amistad, alianza y traición. Inglaterra, Castilla y Aragón en el siglo XIV*, pp. 64 and 65. Seville 2018.

<sup>7</sup> ROMANO, David. *Un inglés en la guerra contra el moro. Al Quantara*, vol 2, file 1 and 2, pp. 457-459. Madrid 1981. Archives of the Crown of Aragon, Chancellery Register 226, fol 68-2

In 1330 a curious retinue of 7 knights and 20 squires of Scottish origin arrived in Seville, commanded by Sir James Douglas, who carried the heart of his monarch, Robert Bruce, who had died the previous year, and who had wished to be buried in the Holy Sepulchre. Since King Alfonso XI of Castile and León had undertaken the conquest of Tarifa at that time, the Scots took advantage of the occasion and joined the Christian army, as had a group of Crusaders of English origin, which has not been identified or quantified in the Chronicles.

Sir Douglas, who had accompanied his king in his wars against England, brought with him a group of Scottish knights from the so-called «Lowlands» who had taken part in the above-mentioned war conflicts and who accompanied him for that reason, not because they were Robert Bruce's kin: the brothers William and John Sinclair, William Keith and the also brothers Robert and William Logan.

The route of their journey is not sufficiently known: it is known that they were in Flanders (Suys), but not if they arrived directly in Seville or if they made a stopover on the northern Spanish coast in Galicia or Portugal. Nor is it known why, instead of continuing the journey to the Holy Land, they decided to join the Castilian troops. When Alfonso XI received news of his arrival in Seville, it is said that he offered him all sorts of perks if he entered his service, which were rejected by the Scottish nobleman, who, if he accepted to join the crusade, we can say «gratis et amore». From Seville, Sir Douglas and his companion joined the troops of the king of Castile, which included French and English nobles attracted to Spain by the ideal of the Crusade, with whom they gained knowledge, being very well received by those who until recently had been their enemies: the English crusaders.

According to the chronicler in Robert Bruce's Gesta<sup>8</sup>, the Castilian king granted the Scottish nobleman the command of the vanguard formed by foreigners. After the siege began, there was a battle in which the aforementioned vanguard intervened, during which Sir Douglas was killed, although at one point he threw his king's heart

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<sup>8</sup> BARBOUR, John. *La Gesta de Robert Bruce*. Translation by Toda Iglesia, Fernando. Salamanca 1988. LÓPEZ DE COCA, José D. Enrique and Krauel, Blanca, *Cruzados escoceses en la frontera de Granada (1330)*. Anuario de Estudios Medievales no. 18, 1988, pp. 254-261. García Fitz, Francisco y Novoa Portela, Feliciano. *Cruzados en la Reconquista*. Madrid 2014.

out against the Muslim enemy, so that he would symbolically take part in the fight against the infidel.

At the end of the battle not only had the Scottish nobleman died, but so had his companions Sir William Sinclair, Robert Logan and Sir Walter Logan. The survivors, always according to the aforementioned chronicle, among whom was Sir William Keith, who did not take part in the combat because he had broken an arm, managed to recover not only the royal heart but also the body of Sir Douglas, who was repatriated to Scotland.

The medieval French-speaking chroniclers Jean le Bel and Jean Froissart, in their works, suggest that the Scottish nobleman, on the day of the decisive battle for the capture of Thebes, whose siege had begun on 7 August 1330, attacked the Grenadians at his own risk and that the Castilian troops did not come to his aid. According to an eyewitness, Sir James fought five enemies by himself, receiving an injury from each of them.

Jean Froissart, in his *Chroniques*, alludes to James Douglas, mistakenly identified as Guillaume, using Jean le Bel's *Chronique* as the source in the initial part of his own. He tells of his journey and his death in Spain while fighting in the service of Alfonso XI of Castile-Leon: «Avint que lis rois Alphons d'Espagne entendi que li rois de Grenade, lui quatrime rois, estoit venus a poissance logier a l'entree de son pais. Ja avoit il mandé ses honmes, et se mist aussi a poissance a l'encontre de ses ennemis. [...] Li dis messires Guillaume de Douglas se traist a l'un des costés a toute sa route, pour mieuls faire sa besongne et pour mieuls monstrier son acquit et sa vaillance. [...] Mais messires Guillaume Douglas et li Escotois i fissent mervelles d'armes, et ocirent et abatirent moult grant fuission de Sarrasins. Finablement, il demorerent la tout mort sus la place, dont ce fu damages et grant mauvesté pour les Espagnols; mais li auqun dient que il le fissent tout volentiers et par envie. Ensi demora li coers dou roi Robert de Brus la, et li gentils chevaliers qui le portoit, et toute la route des Escos»<sup>9</sup>.

There is not much news about these events in Castilian sources, although the following reference is made in the *Gran Crónica de*

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<sup>9</sup> FROISSART, Jean. *Oeuvres de Froissart. Chroniques*, 25 vols, ed. Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove, Osnabrück, Biblio, 1967 [reprinted from Brussels edition], 1867-1877. Bel, Jean le, *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, 2 volumes in 1 volume, Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez (eds.), Paris-Geneva, Champion-Slatkine-Mégariotis Reprints, 1977 [reprinted from the Paris edition], 1904-1905.

*Alfonso XI*: «And out of the king's host was slain a strange count, which went out of his own land, to do God's service, and to prove his body against the enemies of the cross; and so this count is dead, as he died for his own sake, and went out from the face of the Christians, and the Moors went away to worship him, and as he should not have done, so this count was slain, whom God shall forgive»<sup>10</sup> .

Another reference to these facts reads as follows: «And one day there was a skirmish in which they did much evil to the Christians, and they killed a foreign count who had come to serve God in that war, he was killed because of him because he had left the squadron»<sup>11</sup> .

According to Lopez de Coca and Krauel, the following conclusion can be drawn from the above-mentioned foreign chronicles: «When the Grenadians retreated, Douglas chased them with a dozen men, but when he saw that he was alone, he decided to return, and the Muslims surrounded Sir William Sinclair. Sir James runs to help him with his own, but he is outnumbered and ends up being slaughtered by his enemies»<sup>12</sup>.

Following the Castilian version of the Froissart *Crónicas*, Sir Douglas embarked on the Scottish port of Morois and went by sea to the Flemish town of Sluis, where he was anchored for 12 days without going ashore, having in his company 1 standard bearer, 6 knights of the nobility of his country and 26 squires, young and gentlemanly, as well as his armed retinue and from there he headed directly to Spain: «My lord William Douglas arrived there, it happened that the king of Spain came out of the fields to approach his enemies. The King of Granada also went out in such a way that they could see their respective banners well. They began to arrange their armies in order of battle, one against the other. My Lord William Douglas stood by his side with his entire troop to better accomplish his task and show his effort. When he saw the armies lined up on either side, and saw the king's moving a little, he thought he was going to attack. As he preferred to be one of the first rather than the last, he chopped up spurs, and all his company with him, even the army of the king of Granada and went to attack the enemies. He thought that

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<sup>10</sup> *Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI*. Edition by Diego Catalán, Vol I, Madrid 1976.

<sup>11</sup> BARRANTES MALDONADO, Pedro. *Ilustraciones de la Casa de Niebla*, p. 289.

<sup>12</sup> LÓPEZ DE COCA, José Enrique and Krauel, Blanca, *Cruzados escoceses en la frontera de Granada (1330)*. *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* no. 18, 1988, pp. 254-261.

the King of Spain and all his army would follow him, but they did not do so being very ugly deceived, as they did not move all day. The enemies surrounded my lord William Douglas and all his troops. They did wonders with the weapons, but they could not last long and they all died in great calamity. It was a great regret and a great cowardice on the part of the Spaniards who were very much insulted by all those who heard it, because if they had wanted to, they could have helped the gentleman and some of their people»<sup>13</sup>.

If we listen to the foreign chroniclers, the Scottish nobleman attacked the enemy with his bravery during the decisive battle and was not helped by the Castilians; but this is only an attempt to mitigate his fate and death. The Castilian chronicles agree, for this and other occasions, that the foreign crusaders did not pay attention to the warnings that the natives of the country gave them on how to fight their opponents, the famous «tornafuye», which gave such good results to the Muslims in their way of fighting, making the enemy fall into an ambush when after chasing the Islamic horsemen they reached a place where their own infants were ambushed and the knights who appeared to be fleeing turned around and caught their unwary pursuers between two fires, who very often lost not only the battle they were fighting but also their own lives.

And this is what must have happened because the Spanish chronicles agree in their chronological narration of the events, that the definitive battle in which the Grenadian troops were defeated took place days after the death of Sir James and some of his companions, because there is also news that one of them, Thomas de Lavington, years after the events occurred, professed in the Order of Carmel.

Although there is no record in the national chronicles of the Battle of Salado in 1340, when the Benimerins were defeated, of crusaders from Great Britain, it seems that a Count of Cambrige, whose name has not reached us, went to the battle.

Alfonso XI offered to mediate between Philip VI of France and Edward III of England, who were involved in what was later called the Hundred Years' War, on 26 May 1341, and later asked for help from both of them to continue the Crusade. It seems that

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<sup>13</sup> FROISSART, Jean. *Crónicas*, pp. 61 and 62. It should be noted that the chronicler always calls him William when his real name is James; in some other chronicles he is known as Jacobus.

the King of France encouraged the enlistment of Gascon nobles, while the English King did not consent, so many of them aligned themselves with the French monarch and abandoned the English, who finally, in order to gain the support of Castile against France, authorised their nobles to go on the Crusade in Spain.

For this reason, between 1342 and 1343, some nobles from both opposing monarchies took part in the siege of Algeciras, among whom, on the English side, we can mention Henry de Grosmont<sup>14</sup>, Duke of Lancaster and William de Montaigu<sup>15</sup>, Count of Salisbury, at the head of his estates, who were accompanied, according to Froissart, by Sir Thomas Holand, Sir Matthew Gournay, Sir William Cousance, Sir Thomas Colvill, Sir Thomas Cok and Sir Thomas Wale. The first two are referred to in the *Poem of Alfonso XI*, in which one of its verses refers to Grosmont: «the Earl of Derby in England»<sup>16</sup>.

«And the Count of Arbi and the Count of Solusber, fine men from the English kingdom, came to the war of the Moors for the salvation of their souls, because they were very good knights and brought good campaigns with them, and they were very well off». The Chronicle goes on to say that the Count of Arbi was of very high lineage, that of kings, and that the Count of Solusber had taken part in many battles, losing an eye in one of them<sup>17</sup>.

As European crusaders from different backgrounds had come to the siege, to avoid a dispute between them, Germans and English were accommodated separately from French and Navarrese. In June, Gaston de Bearn, Count of Foix, and his brother Roger Bernal, Viscount of Castelbon, arrived «and brought with them a few campaigns from Gascony where they were from». To avoid problems with the French Crusaders in the camp, the Gascons were placed near the English, with whom they had more in common, as both were subjects of the King of England.

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<sup>14</sup> Henry of Lancaster, 1299-1361, fought against the Muslims as a crusader in Rhodes, Cyprus and Granada, being known as the «father of soldiers». Appointed Earl of Derby, he fought the French in Buronfone and Sluys. Lieutenant of Aquitaine was made Duke of Lancaster in 1354. He died from the plague.

<sup>15</sup> William de Montaigu, 1301-1344, first Count of Salisbury, fought in France, and was taken prisoner in 1340 in Lille; he died from the effects of a wound received at a tournament.

<sup>16</sup> *Poem by Alfonso Onceno*. Edition by Juan de Victorio, Madrid 1991.

<sup>17</sup> *Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla, Crónica de Alfonso XI*. Volume I, p. 361.

Taking advantage of their presence, Alfonso XI received the emissaries sent by the King of Granada surrounded by all of them and invited them to visit the places where they were camped. It seems that the English Crusaders attracted the attention of their enemies because of the helmets they wore with animal figures on them.

As for the actual performance of these English crusaders, a Chronicle says: «And when the counts of Arbi and Salusber, and the other people of the English and Germans, had armed themselves, they went into the fight very much; and the Moors of the city came out, all of them on horses and on foot, and waited for them in the field, and the fight between them was very strong. And the Christians, who were in the fight, were not very firm with the Counts, and they left them like men that had entered the fight snatched. And when the King saw this, he commanded all that passed by the barrier to be armed, and to come in and seize the Christians; and they did so....and the Moors fled in such haste, and without agreement, that they came into the city of the English Christians, but when they saw that it was not these two, they did much to seize them, and laid their hands on the gates of the city»<sup>18</sup>.

According to the version of the same Chronicle, page 362 of Cayetano Rosell's: «And it came to pass one day that the Moors went out to fight with the Christians over the work of that raid, and the Counts of Arbi and Soluber armed themselves and all their campaigns, and went there; for when they came to the fight, the knights of Castile who were in the guard beat the Moors, and were thrown into the city by the bailiff, and they came so close that they struck the Moors who were lying in the cellar with their spears, and the Moors who were at the city gate. And all the Moors of the city besieged that place, and went out, and heard a great fight with them. And Count Arbi was shot in the face and killed by two knights, but the Moors were locked up.»

According to the Spanish chronicles, both Derby and Salisbury fought recklessly, without following the advice they were given. At the beginning of August, the Castilian monarch asked the foreign nobles to prevent his people from engaging in combat with the enemy until the royal banner was moved. He found it difficult to

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<sup>18</sup> Crónica de Alfonso XI, p. 364.

convince them, as they were stubborn individuals «but they were hard-headed people from the provinces», unfamiliar with the way of fighting on the peninsula, which had little or nothing to do with what was practised on the battlefields of France, most of whom «and all the rest of them acted for themselves, who were not guided by me».

In reality, the English nobles' desire to fight contrasted with the disinterest that the Gascon and French showed in doing so, more concerned with receiving money than risking their skins in warlike actions, according to the oft-quoted *Crónica*, which, referring to the former, tells us that, once they had disembarked, when they were on their way to Seville, they learned that the Muslims had agreed with the King of Castile that they would fight in the open on a certain day; this led the counts to force the march, arriving for the time being at the Seville capital, the two of them with only four knights, but there they learned that the news was false, so they no longer rushed to Algeciras, but equipped themselves and all their men in a convenient manner.

The English nobles abandoned the siege before it was over, without taking part in the decisive battle of the Palmones River in which the Muslim army was defeated. But before returning to England, in August 1343, the Dukes of Derby and Salisbury accompanied the Grand Admiral of Castile, the Genoese Egidio Bocanegra, with all his men, when he went with a fleet of Castilian galleys against the enemy who was taking refuge in the port of Ceuta. However, the battle did not take place because a «bad Christian» communicated the plans of the Castilian and Aragonese admirals to the Muslims who withdrew and returned to the safe port. As a consequence of the conquest of Algeciras, Edward III of England congratulated King Alfonso XI of Castile-Leon on several occasions in writing.

The reason for the leaving, which we can deduce from the *Crónica Alfonsina*, pg. 370, should not have been simultaneous, was that, having established a truce for three years between the kings of England and France, the latter commissioned Derby to go to Rome to carry out some diplomatic mission to the Pope, although his leaving was to take place after the main battle had been fought against the Grenadians or Algeciras had been taken by storm. But Alfonso XI, after hearing the King of England's letter, decided to discharge them, so at least Derby was able to leave immediately.

What is no longer so clear is when Salisbury departed, since according to the *Crónica*, pg. 371, he was very ill in Seville, trying to join the Castilian royal by ship when he heard that the Moors were coming over Gibraltar, pretending to be put on a ship and taken to the place of the battle to take part in it, but he was so ill that the doctors did not allow him to do so. After his return to his country, Salisbury would die there because of the illness he had acquired in Spain. In 1349, both Sir Hugh Hilton and his brother Sir William, Earl of Cambridge, took part in the Gibraltar campaign which took place between that year and 1350.

The Prologue of *The Canterbury Tales* tells of an English knight who fought against the Moors in the kingdom of Granada during the siege of Algeciras. In this respect, López de Coca believes that its existence may be real or fictitious:

«More explicit is Geoffrey Chaucer in the prologue to his *Canterbury Tales*: among the pilgrims described we find 'a truly gentlemanly sir' who had travelled further than most men. And he adds that he occupied a place of pre-eminence when he was in Prussia. He participated in the Algeciras site and rode in Benamarin. He also rode in Lettow and Russia. And he was present at the fall of Adalia (1361) and the sacking of Alexandria (1365)»<sup>19</sup>.

### The English intervention in Spain. Background

The allusion to nobles and knights of Gascon origin, that is to say born in French territory but in obedience to the King of England, forces us to go back to the year 1060, when William the Conqueror, after defeating the Saxons at the Battle of Hastings, became King of England and Duke of Normandy, vassal of the King of France for the latter. The English crown increased its dominion on the French mainland in 1154 with the counties of Anjou, Maine and Turena, which were joined in 1167 by the duchy of Brittany. After Eleanor of Aquitaine's marriage to the King of England, she took over more possessions on French soil: the duchies of Guyena, also known as Aquitaine, and Gascony, as well as the county of Poitou. When Henry II of England died in 1189, his son Richard,

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<sup>19</sup> LÓPEZ DE COCA CASTAÑER, José Enrique. *El Reino de Granada y Las Cruzadas Tardías (Siglo XIV)*.

*The Kingdom of Granada And The Late Crusades (14th Century)*. *Baetica. Estudios de Arte, Geografía e Historia*, no.36-37. p. 102. 2014-15.

known as the *Lionheart*, inherited England, as well as Poitou, Gascony and Guyenne, with Brittany being lost as English rule.

Years earlier, when Eleanor of England married Alfonso VIII of Castile, he contributed the duchy of Gascony as a dowry to the marriage, but its effective possession was not claimed by the Castilian monarch, who only carried it out in 1205, moving to the said territory with a small expedition, having to lay siege to Bayonne which, along with other towns, had not recognised him as king. In view of this, and taking into account that he was not given an affectionate welcome by those who were to be his vassals, Alfonso did not emphasise his claim, but neither did he formally renounce his rights, which remained unexercised until Alfonso X was tempted to do so by Gaston de Bearn and other Gascon nobles, but finally Alfonso X, the «Wise Man», reached an agreement with the King of England and formally renounced his rights over Gascony.

The outbreak of what later became known as the *Hundred Years' War* meant that the Christian kingdoms of Spain became involved in it to a certain extent, although indirectly, through the alliances that they made with the opposing monarchies during that century. This meant that the causes and ups and downs of the conflict had to be explained, albeit briefly, until English troops entered our country and formed part of one of the opposing armies, either the Castilian, Aragonese or Navarre armies.

From 1327, England's territorial presence on what is now French soil was limited to Guyenne or Aquitaine, a narrow strip of land along the Atlantic that included the Saintonge, Bordeaux, the Bordelais, the diocese of Dax and Bayonne, with the Gascons willingly admitting to English rule, but the King of England, Edward III, was opposed to rendering vassalage over this territory to his namesake, the King of France. This was compounded by the problem of succession that the Gallic monarchy had at that time, which ended with the proclamation as king of Philip VI of Valois, who was not recognised as such by Edward of England, who declared him a usurper and claimed the crown of Saint Louis.

Both monarchs had allies both inside and outside the continent, so England won over German counts and dukes and even for a time Emperor Louis IV to its cause, while the Valois maintained very good relations with the Count of Flanders, the Dukes of Brittany and Burgundy, and secured the collaboration of the Counts of

Foix and Armagnac, as well as the Duke of Lorraine or the Count of Savoy and the King of Bohemia, by means of stipends.

In 1340, Edward jumped with his troops to the continent, and after Flanders had joined his ranks, he was proclaimed King of France in Ghent, and was recognised as such by his subjects in Guyenne and Flanders. From a military point of view, the English fleet defeated the French fleet at the Battle of Sluys. In 1341 another civil war began in Brittany, which would last 23 years, in which the supporters of Jean de Monfort, supported by England, would oppose those of Charles de Blois, who was supported by France.

After the English victories at Calais and Crécy, in 1349 Flanders returned to the French authority, and the following year Philip VI died, who was succeeded by his son John the Good; in 1356 the battle of Poitiers was won by the English who came to take the French monarch prisoner. In 1360, following the peace signed between France and England in Bretigny, England gave up the European continent from the Loire to the Massif Central and the Pyrenees, Calais, Ponthieu and the county of Guines. For his part, Edward III undertook to renounce the throne of France and return the territories occupied by England outside the aforementioned borders to France.

One issue that may cause some confusion is the existence within the English armies of those years of Companies, called Gascon with their chiefs bearing French names and surnames. This was mainly due to the fact that Gascony belonged to the King of England and later other territories were conquered by arms, all of them were called Aquitaine, in term of today's French territory. Its inhabitants, including its nobility, were certainly of Gallic origin, but its territory was part of the King of England's possessions, to whom they lent vassalage and owed loyalty and obedience, so the companies commanded by Gascon nobles and recruited in that region were part of the English armies. And although these companies, depending on the time, rented their services to one another, whether in Spain, Italy, Germany or other countries, in the contracts that the Gascon nobles signed with the state that rented their services there was always a clause by which, in the event of war or conflict with England, they were exempt from taking up arms against their king or even against the English princes.

We will examine the English performance in Spanish territory, although it is sometimes intertwined, through the one they

performed in the three Hispanic kingdoms in which they acted in order of importance: Castile, Navarre and Aragon.

## Castile

As for the relations between the two sides and the Spanish Christian monarchs, in March 1357, they arrived in Tarazona in support of Peter I of Castile and Leon, the Lord of Lebret and his brothers: «who were great lords of Guiana, with good chivalry that came to serve him»<sup>20</sup>. An Aragonese chronicler wrote about this: «The Lord of Labrit and his brothers with good company from the people of Gascony»<sup>21</sup>. The main reason for the help of the Lord of Labrit<sup>22</sup> is that his enemy, the Count of Foix, was helping the Aragonese king in his deputations with the Castilian.

After several years of failed attempts by Edward III to reach an alliance with the crown of Castile, such as the planned marriage of his daughter Joan of Woodstock to King Peter I, which failed due to the premature death of the bride, on 22 June 1362 in St Paul's Cathedral in London, several agreements were solemnly reached between the sovereigns of both kingdoms.

In the same year, as a consequence of one of the wars between the kings Peter I of Castile and León and Peter IV of Aragon, and the agreements signed between England and Castile, a special agreement was signed between the Duke of Armagnac, who was the vassal of the English monarch, and Peter I, by which troops of Gascon origin came to reinforce those of the Castilian monarch, and it seems that they took part in the siege of Calatayud. López de Ayala mentions this when he speaks of the war against the King of Aragon in 1363: «Others came this year to help the King, Lois, Prince of Navarre, brother of the King of Navarre, and Captal de Buch, who was a great lord of Guiana and a very good gentleman, and a lot of good company with them on horseback and on foot»<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla. Don Pedro Primero. Volume I, p. 478. Cayetano Rossell.

<sup>21</sup> ZURITA, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón*, Book IX, Chapter XI

<sup>22</sup> Also known as Monsieur d'Albret was Arnaud Amanieu, brother-in-law of Captal du Buch and nephew of Count Jean I d' Armagnac.

<sup>23</sup> RUSSELL P. E., *The English Intervention in Spain & Portugal in the time of Edward III & Richard II*, p. 26. Oxford 1955. LÓPEZ DE AYALA, Pedro, *Crónicas: Crónica de Don Pedro Primero*, p. 290.

According to other sources, at the end of 1361, Peter I of Castile gathered a contingent of 6,000 men to attack Muhammad V of Granada, including Anglo-Gascon mercenaries commanded by Hugh Calveley and Jean D'Armagnac. Once the campaign was over, the agreement between Peter and the noble Gascon was renewed, with the latter's men taking part in 1362 in the campaign that the Castilian monarch conducted against the Aragonese<sup>24</sup>.

Another author points to the previous year as the one in which Sir Hughes of Calveley rented his services and those of his men to Peter I in the campaign against Muhammad V of Granada<sup>25</sup>.

In the Iberian Peninsula, the confrontation between the kings of Aragon and Castile, both named Peter, led the Aragonese to propose to Pope Urban V that he grant a Bull to the so-called *White Companies*<sup>26</sup>, formed by mercenaries and adventurers from many European countries, which were devastating French territory after the momentary end of the war between the kings of England and France, so that they could pass into Spain to fight and expel the Granada Muslims who were allies of the king of Castile, having to cross Castilian territory to do so, the aforementioned Pontiff agreed to the request.

But the real reason was not that, but that the Aragonese were facing the Castilian king, and that in the disputes between Peter I of Castile and his bastard brother Henry of Trastámara to take over the kingdom, the latter was supported by the king of Aragon. During the stay in France of Trastámara between 1361 and 1362, the Aragonese king reached an agreement with Henry, by which the latter with his brothers Tello and Sancho and the Castilian contingents that accompanied them would put themselves at his service to fight against Peter of Castile for a price of 40,000 florins per month and that, in addition, for 100,000 florins per month

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<sup>24</sup> VILLALÓN, L. J. Andrew y Kagay, DONALD J. *Hundred Years War. A Wider Focus*.

<sup>25</sup> Fowler, Kenneth. *Deux entrepreneurs militaires au XIVe siècle: Bertrand du Guesclin et Sir Hugh Calveley.*, pp. 243-256. *Actes des congrès de la société des historiens médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur republic.*

<sup>26</sup> These companies, so called because they were dressed in white, consisted of a few hundred men: infantrymen, archers, crossbowmen and men-at-arms, veterans of the war between France and England, who placed themselves under the orders of a captain or a nobleman and rented their services to the highest bidder. Their composition was very varied in its origin: French, English, Gascon, Béarnaise, Flemish, German and Genoese, but also some Castilian, Navarre and Aragonese. According to Froissard, the Prince of Wales used 12,000 of them in his campaign in Castile, a figure that is clearly exaggerated in the light of modern authors and research. Their members of French origin were also known as *routiers*.

the King of Aragon would rent the services of 3,000 lances from the Great Companies. But, as this amount seemed very high, an agreement was finally signed on 23 July with 10 company captains, all of whom were Gascons of English obedience except John Amery, for which the amount payable was reduced, but in the end these companies were not set up.

Following Zurita, in 1362 the King of Castile allied himself with the Counts of Foix, Armagnac, the Lord of Labrit and other greats of Gascony to attack the King of Aragon, who were joined by the Captal del Buch: «who entered to run the Aegean regions»<sup>27</sup>.

In the following year, in aid of the King of Castile, the Prince Luis of Navarre and the Captal del Buch arrived: «who was a great lord of Gujana and a very good captive, and a very good companion to them, both on foot and on horseback»<sup>28</sup>.

At the end of 1364, Peter IV of Aragon reached an agreement with Charles V of France, to hire the White Companies, which caused great damage in the neighbouring country. It should not be forgotten that in 1361 and 1362, Henry of Trastámara and his brothers had commanded some of these units in the service of Arnauld de Audrehen<sup>29</sup>, whom we will see fighting under his command in Castile years later.

Towards the end of 1365, the aforementioned companies were concentrated in Montpellier and Avignon. It should not be forgotten that Pope Urban V supported the adventure economically, on the one hand to send those who plundered them away from his domains, and on the other hand because the Castilian king was not among his followers (at that time Western Christianity was divided by the so-called Western Schism), entering Catalonia through Roussillon. At least two English captains are among its chiefs: Hugues de Calveley<sup>30</sup> and Matthew Gournay, despite the fact that their king had ordered them, as his vassals, not to do so.

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<sup>27</sup> Zurita, work cited, Book IX, chapter XL.

<sup>28</sup> LÓPEZ DE AYALA, Pedro. *Crónica del Rey Don Pedro y del Rey Don Enrique su hermano, hijos del rey Don Alfonso Onceno*. Volume II, p. 83.

<sup>29</sup> Arnauld de Audrehen: 1305-1370, lieutenant to the King of France in 1351, Marshal of France in 1353, he led the French vanguard in Poitiers, being taken prisoner. He took part in the talks that led to the 1357 truce, and was appointed ambassador to England two years later. In 1365 he went to Hungary to obtain free passage for the Companies through the kingdom, which Pope Urban V wanted to send to the Holy Land.

<sup>30</sup> Hughes de Calveley, 1341-1393, after his time in Spain was appointed Seneschal of the Limousin and Governor of Brest. In 1379, he commanded the English fleet that faced a French-Spanish one.

Calveley had commanded the English archers at the Battle of Poitiers in 1356, and in 1364 the English rearguard at Auray, where he had a distinguished performance, proving himself a competent commander, had also participated in Josselin in the so-called Combat of the Thirty. For his part, Gournay was a veteran of the battles of Crecy, Poitiers and Auray, but one of his brothers had been arrested in Burgos in 1361 as one of the perpetrators of the murder of Edward II of England.

With Calveley came the companies of John Cresswell, Robert Birkhead, Robert Scott, Bernard de la Salle, Arnaud du Solier and Renaud de Vigneulles; later they were joined, under the command of Mattheu Gournay, by those of Walter Huet, John Devereux, Wiliam Ludlow, William Butler, Norman Swinford and Robin de Ades, which gave rise to 7 companies with a total of 800 men. Stephen de Cosington also joined them, but this one perhaps to act as a link between Calveley and Prince Edward<sup>31</sup>.

The companies that supported Henry were of two classes: those formed by soldiers of different nationalities, uprooted in search of wealth and fortune, who often engaged in banditry to achieve their ends, which constituted what was called *The Great Company*, and others made up only of Frenchmen, called *Franças*, who had been recruited solely for the occasion.

The entry of its components into Spain, some 1,000 men, was carried out by groups of 200, each of them commanded by a captain and guided by Aragonese knights. Peter IV lacked money to pay his stipends but managed to get the Castilian suitor to take over his payments. Despite this, the Aragonese monarch did not hesitate to continue deceiving the heads of the mercenaries: on 25 February 1366, he granted Calveley 2,000 gold florins and the title of Baron of Aragon.

Before entering Spain, López de Ayala, in his *Crónica de Don Pedro Primero*, states that in 1366, Señor de Lebret (Lord of Albret) arrived in Burgos with other gentlemen, who offered to convince friends of his who were in the service of Henry to abandon him, and that they and Señor de Armagnac would gladly put themselves at the service of Peter, but since he did not respond, they returned to their country<sup>32</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> FOWLER, Kenneth. *Deux entrepreneurs militaires au XIVe siècle: Bertrand du Guesclin et Sir Hugh Calveley.*, pp. 243-256. *Actes des congrès de la société des historiens médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur republic.*

<sup>32</sup> LÓPEZ DE AYALA, Pedro, *Crónicas* p. 311.

On 16 February, Calveley and Du Guesclin signed a contract in Zaragoza by which they constituted a large company for the campaign in Castile and Granada, from which it can be deduced that for the moment the idea of the Crusade against the Muslims was still latent in them, although it could have been a way of concealing the true intention, to overthrow King Peter I. Curiously, Du Guesclin took the lion's share: the profits and acquisitions of all kinds would be divided into four parts, of which three would go to the Breton nobleman. It was also agreed that Calveley could leave the expedition at any time and go into the service of England if his king or any of his sons requested it, and even if Sir John Chandos came to Spain to take part in the war against Castile or Granada<sup>33</sup>.

Finally, the aforementioned companies entered Castile; the vanguard consisted of Calveley's Gascon and English, who had previously occupied the towns of Magallon, Borja and Tarazona in Aragon, without any opposition from Peter IV, who had no strength to do so. Thus, the passage from Zaragoza to Tudela was left free for the mercenaries, who helped the Trastámara to snatch most of the kingdom of Castile-Leon from its legitimate monarch, who had to take refuge in Galicia, from where he sent letters asking for help to both the King of England and his son Edward.

Meanwhile, Du Guesclin and Calveley convinced the Trastámara to proclaim himself king of Castile, apparently so that the donations he was granting them would not lack legitimacy, which he did between Calahorra and Alfaro, to be crowned in Burgos, on 30 March 1366, in the monastery of Las Huelgas. As a reward, Henry II awarded Calveley the title of Count of Carrion<sup>34</sup>.

At the end of August of that year, Henry discharged most of the mercenaries, who returned to France through Roncesvalles, but Du Guesclin, Calveley and Gournay remained in Spain, with some 1,400 men. Both Englishmen operated in the Arga Valley, occupying Miranda de Arga and Puente la Reina, in a manoeuvre that would in the future facilitate the advance of the Prince of Wales' troops, which suggests that they were already aware of the Prince's plans. In this summer of 1366, some English knights

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<sup>33</sup> FOWLER, Kenneth Work cited, pp. 243-256.

<sup>34</sup> In this respect, it should be remembered that King Henry was known as the King of Mercy because of the number of perks he granted to his supporters when he actually reigned in Castile.

who had fought in Spain despite the banning of their monarch, returned to their obedience, among them Sir Robert Knolles.

Peter I of Castile finally set sail for Aquitaine and began a series of negotiations to get the Prince of Wales to help him back on the throne. Both had as their common ancestor King Ferdinand III the Saint and despite the bad record that fell on Peter for his actions, both personal and in the performance of his duties as monarch, an individual with the chivalrous qualities that Prince Edward possessed and demonstrated could never fail to support in his claims the legitimate son of a king against those of a bastard, as was Henry, even though he was the son of the same father, but above all there had to be legitimacy to the throne.

Charles II, King of Navarre, joined the negotiations, through whose territories the English armies would have to pass, ready to make agreements with one another, not to comply with the pacts and to make the most of them, in this case through the concession of seaports and Castilian territories that had previously been Navarre. How he managed it: he was paid 220,000 guilders for any damage the troops might cause when crossing his domain and he was promised to deliver Alava with Vitoria, Calahorra, Logroño, Nájera, Haro, Alfaró and even the county of Treviño, he promised to contribute 2,000 men to the expedition: 1,000 riders and as many pawns, the Libourne agreement was signed.

As a curiosity, it was agreed that the noble followers of Henry who might be taken prisoner during the campaign would be handed over to Peter, but that the rest would fall to whoever took them captive, who would have the right to receive the full ransom demanded for them.

Following these talks, the Prince of Wales summoned his nobles and principal captains to notify them of his plans to help the Castilian monarch, some of whom opposed his intentions. He also sent messengers to England to ask for his father's opinion, from which he received an affirmative reply, which was forwarded to him by John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, his brother<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> John of Gaunt, 1340-1399, son of Edward III of England, Earl of Richmond in 1342, Earl of Lancaster in 1361, Duke of Lancaster the following year, Lieutenant of Aquitaine, Lieutenant General in Guyena in 1388, Duke of Aquitaine in 1390. Married to a daughter of Peter I of Castile, he sought to obtain the crown for which, with Portuguese help and Castilian knights who were supporters of the murdered King Peter, he invaded Castile several times without any positive result for his claims. His son Henry would dethrone King Richard II.

After obtaining parental consent, Prince Edward brought his nobles and captains together again and this time their response was entirely affirmative. We must not forget the prestige that this prince enjoyed as a warrior and driver of men, the main factor in the victorious battle of Poitiers and for the fruitful ride that he and his men had carried out for 2 months, leaving from Gascony to the Mediterranean Sea, with a journey of almost 1,000 kilometres, which made his men achieve a great deal of booty, and which his captains and nobles thought could be reissued.

The final Capitulations were then signed between Peter and Edward, the latter receiving the ports and territories of Vizcaya and the seigniory of Castro Urdiales in Santander, having to advance 550,000 gold florins for the payment of the troops, which would be reimbursed by Peter within 2 years. In addition, English merchants received tax exemptions in their transactions with Castile, and a good number of the best trading enclaves were transferred to the English, as well as the fleet of Castilian northern ports with their shipyards, which meant that Castile's naval power, so feared by England, would be in ruins. To ensure that this would happen, Peter gave up hostages, like three of his young daughters.

After the agreement, the Duke of Lancaster returned to England to recruit troops to be taken to Aquitaine in early 1367; the same activity was carried out in Aquitaine frantically from October 1366 until January of the following year. The English captains who had accompanied Henry on his victorious expedition to Castile and who had been discharged by him, such as Robert of Knolles or Eustace d'Auberchicourt, as soon as they were called up, were placed under the command of the Prince of Wales.

This option was also taken by Sir Hughes Calveley, with 400 men on horseback, despite not having been licensed by Henry: «And King Henry, as he wished to know how Hugo would leave him, and how he could make him angry, would not do so, since the said gentleman was obliged to go and serve his lord the prince, who was the son of his lord the King of England»<sup>36</sup>.

In the Prince of Wales's territories, the men in charge of recruiting men for his army were John Chandos and Thomas Felton, Grand Seneschal of Aquitaine, and their work was very fruitful, as they raised some 24 companies, including the 8 arrivals from Castile

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<sup>36</sup> LÓPEZ DE AYALA, Pedro, *Crónicas. Crónica de Don Pedro Primero*, p. 341.

who had previously served Henry in his first confrontation with his half-brother, 7 of whom had remained in the Prince's territories, while the other 9 came from other regions. The majority of the companies were composed of English or Gascon, who were lightly armed, and at least one was made up of Béarnaise.

At the beginning of 1367, men recruited in England and Wales arrived in Brittany in 20 ships: 400 men-of-arms, crossbowmen and pawns of all kinds and some 800 Welsh archers, armed with the famous Long Bow<sup>37</sup>, which made them so famous, at their head the Duke of Lancaster. The stipend they received was 200 guilders for flag bearers and knights, 50 for squires and 40 for archers. Those who landed went overland to Dax, in the south of France, near the border with Navarre, where they joined the Prince of Wales' troops and those sent by the Earl of Foix, until they gathered between 7,000 and 8,000 troops.

The number of members of the Anglo-Piedtrian army is disputed; the authors give a minimum figure of 6,000 men and a maximum of 12,000, although most modern writers stick with the former, which does not match that given by the sources of the time that raise the number of its members to around 10,000 at the Battle of Nájera. It is logical that between the departure of the troops to Castile and the day of the battle they would have suffered a good number of casualties due to the hardship of the journey and the fighting with the enemy, although some people joined them both in Navarre and in Castile, who I do not think numbered 2,000: Calveley's men, the Castilian deserters and the contingents provided by the King of Navarre<sup>38</sup>.

A large number of nobles, both English and Gascon, accompanied the Prince of Wales on his adventure in Castile. At least three were Counts, three had a Viscounty, 59 of them had the title of Sir and 15 that of Sieur. There were also participants who were Lords. Fourteen of the expeditionaries were armed with knights during the Spanish adventure<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>37</sup> The bows were between 1.5 and 1.9 cm long, preferably made of yew wood, or elm, their narrow arrows had a maximum range of 400 metres, being able to pierce armour with great effectiveness between 100 and 200 metres, being able to throw one every 5 seconds, nailing the archers to their feet in the combat with the arrow equipment to throw them more quickly.

<sup>38</sup> CASTILLO CÁCERES , Fernando. *Estudios sobre Cultura, Guerra y Política en la Corona de Castilla (Siglos XIV-XVII). Análisis de una batalla Nájera 1367*, pp. 31-77. *Cuadernos de Historia de España* LXXIII, 1994. Madrid 2007.

<sup>39</sup> VILLALÓN, L. J. Andrew y Kagay, Donald J. *Hundred Years War. A Wider Focus*.

At the beginning of February, when nobody was expecting him, in his policy of making agreements with everyone so as not to fulfil any of them, the King of Navarre had reached an agreement with the Aragonese monarch not to allow the Anglo-Gascon army to pass through his territories, but the arrival in Pamplona of Sir Hughes Calveley made him change his mind once again. Carlos of Navarre joined the expedition, promising to respect and fulfil the agreements reached previously, and consequently gave free passage through his territories to the Anglo-Gascon armed retinues, who arrived in Pamplona on the 23rd of that month. James <sup>40</sup> of Majorca, Lord of Montpellier, also attended with him.

On 2 February 1367, Henry of Trastámara released Sir Hugh Calveley in writing from his obligations to him, and that same day the English nobleman and Bertrand Du Guesclin agreed in writing to terminate the agreement or contract that united them in Spain<sup>41</sup>.

#### Entry into Spain and the Battle of Nájera

The passage of the Pyrenees through Roncesvalles was carried out by dividing the combatants into 3 squadrons and in 3 consecutive days: Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday: in the first of these days it was carried out by the vanguard, commanded by the Duke of Lancaster and John Chandos<sup>42</sup>, which grouped together the most important nucleus of the army, including all the fearsome English archers, as well as 10 companies, 5 of them English, 1 Gascon and 1 Béarnaise. According to Froissart it was made up of some 10,000 horses (a clear exaggeration) with 200 banners and among the important figures who formed part of it he cites the names of the marshals of Aquitaine Guichard de Angle and Stephen Cosington, William Beauchamp, son of the Duke of Warwick, Hugh de Hastings, the lords of Neville, Rays and Auteberre, Garsis du Chastel, Richard Taunton, Robert Ceni,

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<sup>40</sup> James of Majorca, 1336-1375, was taken prisoner during the Battle of Luchmajor and was later transferred to Játiva and then to Barcelona, from where he escaped in 1362. He intervened in the conflict as a vassal of the King of Navarre; son of King James III of Majorca, he claimed the crown in 1374 and with the help of Castile invaded Aragon with little effective result, but died at the beginning of 1375.

<sup>41</sup> FOWLER, Kenneth Work cited, pp. 243-256.

<sup>42</sup> John Chandos, Seneschal of Poitou, Viscount of Saint Sauver, Constable of Aquitaine, took part in the battles of Sluys, Crecy and Poitiers.

Creswell, Aimery de Rochechovart, Robert Briquet, Gaillard de la Mote, William Clinton, Willecock and Peverell<sup>43</sup>.

The second squadron included most of the units of English origin, including one company of that origin and one Gascon, as well as the Spanish and Navarrese, who were led by Prince Edward and Kings Peter I and Charles II, but the latter soon abandoned the expeditionary force. Alongside them entered Spain gentlemen like Louis de Harcourt, the Viscounts of Rochechout and Chatellerault, the Lords of Pons, Parthenay, Poyanne and Pierrebufière, Tonnay-Boutonne, Argenton, Thomas Felton, Grand Marshal of Aquitaine, and his brother William, Eustace d'Auberchicourt, the Seneschals of Quersin, Saintonge, La Rochelle, Limousin, Roerge, Ginois, and de Bigorre, Richard Punchardoun, Neil Lorine, Aghorisses, Thomas de Wetwnhale, Thomas Balastre, Louis de Meval and Raymond de Mareuil with 10,000 horses (exaggeration persists). That day the pass was carried out with wind and snow<sup>44</sup>.

On Wednesday, the rearguard, under the command of the Count of Armagnac<sup>45</sup>, James of Majorca and Jean de Grailly<sup>46</sup>, crossed the port and included 6 companies of mercenaries, 4 of which were Gascon. And nobles and knights like Monsieur d'Albret, who arrived with 200 lances, his nephew Bernard de Albret, Monsieur de Gironde, the counts of Perigord and Comminges, the viscount de Quarmain, the lords of Clisson, Chaumont, Lesparre, de Ros, Condon de Mussidan, Pincornet, the brothers Jean, Helyes and Aymon de Pommiers, Robert Knolles, PetitonCurton, Aymery de Tastes, Bertrand de Taride, Perducatd'Albret, Breteuil Camus, Naudon de Bageran, Bernard de la Salle. Hortingo, Lamit, in total about 10.000 horses (exaggeration persists)<sup>47</sup>. In the Navarre capital, Hughes Calveley joined the Spanish and English troops with his 400 men, and 600 men defending Agreda when the coalition forces arrived.

<sup>43</sup> Froissart. *Crónicas*, p. 225.

<sup>44</sup> Froissart. *Crónicas*, p. 226.

<sup>45</sup> Jean de Armagnac, 1319-1375, Count of Armagnac, lieutenant to the King of France in Languedoc in 1352, later allied with the English, returned to the alliance with France in 1368, fighting the English.

<sup>46</sup> Jean de Grailly, Captal del Buch, of Gascon origin, Knight of the Garter, fought in Poitiers, fought in Prussia as a crusader, being taken prisoner in the battle of Cochorel; Constable of Aquitaine in 1371, he was captured by the French in Soubire, dying in the Temple prison, when he refused to serve the King of France.

<sup>47</sup> Froissart. *Crónicas*, pp. 226 and 227.

Below is a table of the different companies that were in the Black Prince's army, based on data provided by the various *Crónicas* of the time<sup>48</sup>.

<b>Companies recruited in Aquitaine</b>		
<b>Captain</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Position in the Battle of Nájera</b>
Bertucart de Albret	Gascony	Main Body
Lamit	Gascony	Main Body
Le Bourg Camus	Gascony	Main Body
Naudon de Bageran	Gascony	Main Body
Gaillard de la Motte	Gascony	Vanguard
Garciot du Castel	Béarnaise	Vanguard
Richard Tauton	English	Vanguard
<b>Companies from Castile</b>		
<b>Captain</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Position in the Battle of Nájera</b>
Eustace d'Auberchicourt	Gascony	Vanguard
John Devereux	English	Vanguard
John Cresswell	English	Vanguard
Robert Birkhead	English	Vanguard
William Butler	English	Vanguard
Bernard de la Salle		Vanguard
Monsieur d'Aubeterre		
Yuan de Galles	French	
<b>Other Companies</b>		
<b>Captain</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Position in the Battle of Nájera</b>
John Sands		
John Alan		
John Sakes	English	
Robert Hawley	English	
Monsieur de Retz		Vanguard
Aimery de Rochechouart		Vanguard
Robert Cheyney	English	Vanguard
William Felton	English	Destroyed before battle
Thomas Peverell	English	
Bourg Breteuil		Main Body

<sup>48</sup> VILLALÓN, L. J. Andrew y Kagay, Donald J. Hundred Years War. A Wider Focus, pp. 306-322. FLOWER, Kenneth. L'emploi des mercenaires par les pouvoirs ibériques et l'intervention militaire anglaise en Espagne (vers 1361-vers 1379), pp. 23-35. Realidad e Imágenes del Poder. España a finales de la Edad Media. Adeline Rucqoicord.

This army is described by the chronicler Zurita in his Book IX, Chapter LXVIII as follows: «The Prince and Peter brought the flower of the cavalry of the English and Bretons and Gascons who were the most highly trained warriors of the time; and in this army came the Lord of Labrit and the Count of Armeñaque and all the most barons of the Duchy of Guiana, as well as the partiality of the Count of Fox and the Count of Armeñaque».

Faced with the threat, Henry of Trastámara called Bertrand de Du Guesclin to his aid<sup>49</sup> and sent a letter to the English Prince expressing his surprise at the attack and asking him where he would leave Navarre to engage in combat. It took Edward four weeks to reply to the letter from the usurper, and while he was in Logroño thinking that the enemy army would pass the river Ebro there, the loyal Anglo-Gascons and Castilians headed for Álava, taking over Salvatierra, resting for several days because dysentery was beginning to rage in their ranks.

The reason for this variation in the itinerary was that the English troop commanded by William Felton had reached Santo Domingo de la Calzada, discovering that their enemies had taken up residence in Bañares; the Prince of Wales decided to take his troops to Burgos through the lands of Alava with the intention of crossing the river Ebro through the town of Miranda de Ebro.

From Pamplona, the order of march of the army was the same as that with which they had crossed the Pyrenees, being preceded by a small vanguard, a detachment mounted under the orders of William Felton, with whom his brother Thomas, Robert Knolles, Thomas du Fort, Gaillard Vighier, Raoul de Hastings, Hugh Stafford, Dimon Burley, Richard Taunton, 160 lances and 300 archers marched. The expeditionaries settled in Navarrete and from there, one night, they entered the camp of Henry, capturing the knight on duty and some of his men, and killing several of them.

Meanwhile, Henry received different opinions from the King of France himself and his Castilian advisors as to how he should conduct the war: while the Castilian nobility were in favour of direct confrontation, the French monarch, Du Guesclin and his

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<sup>49</sup> Bertrand de Du Guesclin, born in Brittany in 1320 to a family of the lower nobility, fought against the English with unequal fortunes, winning some battles and defeating others. Prisoner in the battle of Nájera, after being released he continued to help Henry to the point of being one of the main architects of the assassination of Peter I in Montiel. Constable of France in 1370, he died in 1388.

captains preferred a war of attrition with small combats in order to undermine the enemy troops, who also had to face increasing difficulties in terms of logistics, given that the winter was very extreme. The small units and groups or isolated enemy soldiers who went out into the fields in search of fodder and supplies were always attacked by the followers of the Trastámara, as López de Ayala refers to in his *Crónica de Don Pedro Primero*, which made a dent in their morale as the lack of food for man or beast combined with the possibility of being attacked when they least expected it.

After the Anglo-Spanish changed direction and knew that they were in Salvatierra, Henry left his camp in Bañares and occupied the heights of Zaldiaran to block the road from Vitoria to Miranda de Ebro. As the Prince of Wales did not seem to react, the suitor decided to take the initiative, for which he sent troops to block the Ebro passage: 3,000 men, French and Castilian, commanded by his brother Tello<sup>50</sup>, which included such famous knights as Alfonso of Aragon, future Marquis of Villena<sup>51</sup>, Pablo González de Mendoza or Juan Ramírez de Arellano, while the French were sent by D'Audrehen and Pierre de Villaines.

On the way they first encountered a group of Anglo-Gascons from Sir Hughes Calveley's company, who were guarding his luggage, which they put on the run after killing most of the servants and taking over the baggage; the survivors told the Lancaster what had happened. Tello's men attacked the Duke of Lancaster's camp, injuring and killing everyone they found in front of them, so the English army began to adopt the combat formation and Tello, his brother Sancho, and their men left the place, chasing some English and Gascon knights, which led to individual combats<sup>52</sup>.

Continuing their march, Tello's men found the camp set up in Ariñez by Felton's vanguard detachment, some 200 men-at-arms and 200 Anglo-Gascon archers, which they attacked. Felton managed to entrench his detachment on a hill, dismounted his men-at-arms, protected by their armour and shields and armed with spears and swords, using the archers, who launched their

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<sup>50</sup> Tello, Lord of Biscay, who had fought with his brother in the White Companies, married to Ms Juana Lara, died in 1370, possibly from poisoning.

<sup>51</sup> Alfonso of Aragon, a member of the Aragonese royal family, held the titles of Count of Denia and Ribagorza in that kingdom, receiving the title of Marquis of Villena from Henry II.

<sup>52</sup> Froissart. *Crónicas*, p. 235.

arrows incessantly, trying to decimate their adversaries before reaching the final clash. In this way he managed to repel all the attacks carried out by the Castilian light cavalry, which, throwing their spears at them, approached the enemy as much as they could to hit them with their swords, but if their weapons and bodily defences were very appropriate for fighting the Grenadians in rapid attacks, they were not for confronting entrenched enemies, well-armed and defended with their personal protections.

Therefore, Audrehen and Villaines, with their experience in the Franco-English wars, decided that their men-at-arms should dismount and attack their opponents as infantry, while the Castilian light horses insisted on their rides. Finally, the combined action of both tactics, after a harangue by Tello, succeeded in overcoming the resistance of their enemies. Felton died, as well as most of his men, the rest being taken prisoner, except for some servants who informed the Prince of Wales of what had happened.

Among the prisoners of certain importance made by the Castilians in this battle and in the previous encounter were Sir Richard Tauton, Mitton and Hastings, without any further information about the latter, as the expedition included two nobles with the same surname: Hugh of Hastings and Sir Ralph Hastings.

As for Felton's death, according to Froissart, he threw himself against the enemy down the hill with his horse, hitting a Castilian knight with his lance, and continued his fight until he was surrounded by the enemy and was shot down, while his brother and the rest of his subordinates remained on the hill, as he had forbidden them to follow him<sup>53</sup>.

The victory injected morale into Henry's ranks, and showed that the tactic of attrition was the most appropriate in the face of enemy troops. Moreover, for the first time, the prestige of the Prince of Wales as a soldier and tactician was called into question, but this proved to be very misleading, as more than 3,000 men had defeated only a small enemy group of about 400 in a small battle, without the armies having faced off in a major battle. But this fact reassured the Trastámara in their idea of reaching a direct confrontation with the enemy. When Prince Edward learned what had happened, he deployed his army in battle order, in case

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<sup>53</sup> The hill would be called *inglesmendi* (mountain of the English) by the natives of the area.

the enemy posed a threat, but Henry refrained from doing so for the time being.

On 31 March, Edward and Peter's troops arrived in Viana, and the following day, within sight of Logroño, they entered the city, which had remained faithful to Peter I, where the soldiers rested and were suitably supplied. This was the moment when the Prince of Wales replied to Henry, who had settled in Nájera, in terms that were even insulting and contemptuous of the Trastámara, which he did not recognise as legitimate, depriving him even of the title of king.

Consequently, the suitor concentrated all his forces and with them and headed for Nájera to cut off the path of the Petrists. To celebrate the battle, Henry chose an extensive, flat and open terrain, but which the Englishman entered not where he was expected to, but through a side that unfolded towards the great valley that descends from the mountain to the village of Huercanos.

The coalition army was largely made up of high-quality veteran warriors with the most modern weaponry at the time, and can therefore be considered the most effective and select on the European continent, at least in the West, together with their experience in the combat tactics of the time. With regard to their numbers, the differences in the figures provided by the contemporary authors have been mentioned above: after detailing their components by corps or battles, López de Ayala provides a higher total figure: 10,000 men-at-arms and 10,000 archers, i.e. 20,000 troops<sup>54</sup>.

According to the *Crónica de Don Pedro Primero*: «From King Peter's side the battle was ordered in this guise. They all came on foot, and in the vanguard came the Duke of Alencastre, the Prince's brother, who they called John, who was the Prince's Constable of Guiana, and Mosen Raul Camois, and Mosen Hugo de Caureley, and Mosen Oliver, Lord of Clison, and many other Knights and Squires of England and Brittany, who were three thousand men-of-arms, very good men, and very much used in wars. Others on his right-hand wing were the Count of Armiña who is the Lord of Lebret, his relatives, the Lord of Mucident, the Count of Rosen, other great Knights and good Squires of Guiana, up to two thousand spears. And in the other wing of

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<sup>54</sup> LÓPEZ DE AYALA, Pedro. *Crónicas: Crónica de Don Pedro Primero*, pp. 344 and 345.

his left hand came the Captain of the Buch, and many Knights and Squires of Guiana from the side and the departure of the Count of Fox, and Senesorgas of Germany, and Espiota, and many Captains of the Companions for two thousand men-of-arms. And in the last «battle» came King Peter, and the King of Naples, son of the former King of Majorca, who said James, and the Prince of Wales, and the Banner of the King of Navarre with his rich men and knights and his squires, up to three hundred men-of-arms, and many other Knights of England; and in this battle there were three thousand spears; so there were all those ten thousand men-of-arms, and as many arrowheads, and these men-of-arms were then the flower of the cavalry of Christendom: when there was peace between France and England, and the whole Duchy of Guiana was for the Prince of Wales; and so came with him all the good men of the said Duchy; so did Foxencos; as did Armiñagues: others all the rich men and knights of Brittany, and all the Cavalry of England: and others came with King Peter of his own up to eight hundred men of Castilian arms and Ginetes»<sup>55</sup>.

On the contrary, the army of the Trastámara was very heterogeneous, its armament was inferior to that of the other side, there were still slingers in its ranks, and the tactics that the Castilian and Aragonese knights who made it up were used to were not in accordance with those of their adversaries, and what was worse, the Castilian-Aragonese nobility despised the advice of the captains of the White Companies, for them after all, mercenaries, not knights, so fighting on foot or increasing the protection of the armed knights was not within their ideology.

To this, we must add that in Henry's ranks there was widespread distrust and hatred among the Castilian pawns, who knew firsthand the exactions to which the French and Breton components of the White Companies had subjected the Castilian lands they had crossed. As well as a fear, not unfounded, of desertions among its members, we must not forget what happened to the 600 men who had passed over to King Peter I in Agreda, which in fact happened because, shortly before the start of the combat, a certain number of riders and auxiliary pawns who formed part of the ranks of Tello, passed over to the enemy. The authors also disagree on the total number of Trastamarans, while López de

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<sup>55</sup> Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla. Crónica de Don Pedro Primero, pp. 552 and 553.

Ayala puts it at 4,500 on horseback and others on foot, Froissart provides enormously exaggerated figures<sup>56</sup>

The deployment of Edward of Wales' troops was as follows: the vanguard or first battle was made up of some 3,000 men under the command of, among others, the Duke of Lancaster, John Chandos, Steven de Consigton and Guichard de Angle<sup>57</sup>. The bulk of the mercenary companies were in this vanguard: 6 formed by English, 2 by Gascon and 1 by Béarnaise, all on horseback, including the fearsome archers; the second battle of 3,000 men, was made up of the largest group of English expeditionary, including the members of 5 companies, 4 of them Gascon, with a Castilian detachment of 800<sup>58</sup> and another Navarrese one of 300 lancers. This group was under the direct command of the Prince of Wales, who was accompanied by King Peter I, the suitor James of Majorca and Martín Iñiguez de la Carra, also known as Martín Enríquez, a lieutenant of Navarre. The third battle was divided into two wings: the right wing, made up of 2,000 Gascon knights, was commanded by Jean de Armagnac, while the left wing, another 2,000 men, was under the command of Jean de Grailly and the Lord of Albret, the Count of Foix<sup>59</sup>.

Before the battle, the constable of Aquitaine, John Chandos, asked the Prince to convert his triangular banner into a square one, as he had long since been promised by both the English king and his crown prince. The latter agreed to the request and, with the help of King Peter I, the ceremony was carried out, then he harangued his men and encouraged the Castilian king.

According to Chandos' Herald, the Prince's army was divided into 4 columns: the vanguard with the Duke of Lancaster, John Chandos and the more experienced troops, flanked by archers. The left wing was led by Sir Thomas Percy, Count of Worcester and Oliver de Clisson, the right wing was led by the Captal del Buch and the Lord de Albret, with the Navarrese cavalry of Martin Enriquez de Lacarra and the Gascons. The Prince, Peter I and

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<sup>56</sup> LÓPEZ DE AYALA, Pedro. *Crónicas: Crónica de Don Pedro Primero*, pp. 343 and 344.

<sup>57</sup> This was a knight of Poitou, who, after fighting for France at the Battle of Poitiers, had entered the service of England after the Treaty of Bretigny.

<sup>58</sup> Possibly the number of Castilian fighters loyal to Peter was greater, since in addition to the knights who had accompanied him into exile and the 600 men who had joined his ranks in Agreda, it would be necessary to consider the men who joined him belonging to the militias of Logroño, since this city had always been faithful to him.

<sup>59</sup> Arnaldo Amanieu de Albret ended up being related to the French royal family and was appointed Grand Chamberlain in 1382. He died in 1401.

dismounted troops settled in the centre, while the reserve, on horseback, was under the command of the Count of Armagnac, Hugh Calveley, Perducat d'Albret and James of Majorca.

For its part, the Trastámara deployed his men in the following way: the vanguard was made up of some 1,000 men, French, Breton and the Knights of the Band<sup>60</sup>, with some recently recruited Castilian slingers and pawns, captained by Du Guesclin and the Marshal of Audrehem; next the brother of the Trastámara, Tello, who commanded a «battle» of Castilians, some 1,000 men, mostly light cavalry and pawns; the third «battle», made up of Aragonese knights and those of the military orders of Santiago and Calatrava, another 1,000 troops, was under the command of Alfonso of Aragon, and finally the fourth battle, which was commanded by the suitor himself, was made up of 1,500 men.

Henry, who still ignored Du Guesclin's advice, had his men cross the river Najerilla, arranging them on a vast plain. To the left and the rear of Tello's men appeared aligned the Petrist army, whose two wings attacked their opponents, of which, while some went over to the enemy's ranks, before the combat began some riders and the banner of San Esteban del Puerto with all its components did it, the others had to suffer the deluge of arrows thrown at them by the English archers, and put them very soon in flight, which soon became a disbanding, their leader, Tello, being one of the first to leave the battlefield on the back of his steed and in a hurry.

So fast and swift was it that Armagnac's cavalry failed to catch up with them, so the victors stopped chasing the fugitives and launched themselves against the left flank of Du Guesclin's men. As a result, the Gascons of Juan de Armagnac put the Count of Denia's men to scatter, as they were attacked from both their left and their rear, the enemy archers caused them many casualties and were not helped by the bulk of his army.

While the avant-gardes had been attacked to the cries of Guyena, San Jorge!, and Santiago, Castile!, respectively, although while the advance was taking place the Anglo-Gascon archers had shot down the ranks of enemy knights and soldiers with their arrows. For their part, Henry's slingers, in the early stages of the attack, managed to defeat a certain number of enemies, but were soon put out of action by the English archers.

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<sup>60</sup> The Order of the Band was instituted by King Alfonso XI of Castile and Leon in 1332. Its emblem reproduced the battle script of the Castilian kings.

Although initially Du Guesclin's men made John Chandos' men weaken, he almost died at the hands of a Castilian warrior whom he finally defeated, and although Henry decided to advance with his men to sustain the vanguard, his initiative was curbed by English arrows. Finally, the Trastamaran centre was surrounded, as the men of the Count of Foix and John of Grailly went against it, which provided a boost to the men commanded by the Prince of Wales and the Lancaster, who arrived at a hand-to-hand combat with their adversaries, in which axes, swords, knives and spears were used.

As the events unfolded, since Henry was unable to obtain from his followers a last decisive and victorious effort, his men also fled, as did the suitor, who was lucky enough to have his squire Ruy Ferrández de Gaona give him a fresh horse, with which he fled without being able to be seized by James of Majorca's men who went out in pursuit of the fugitives. The defeated suitor continued his flight with some loyalists, until he was finally able to take refuge in France.

Many of the Trastamaran followers drowned when they tried to cross the Najerilla River, which unfortunately for them, their captain had left behind. At the end of the battle Du Guesclin had been taken prisoner, by Sir Thomas Cheyne, along with the Marshal of Audrehem, Sancho, Count of Albuquerque, and also brother of Henry, Pedro Lopez de Ayala and a large number of great lords and nobles of Castile. The number of prisoners exceeded 2,000 and the number of dead is estimated to have reached 6,000. In this regard, López de Ayala, in addition to naming a number of lords and nobles, gives the total figure of 400 men-at-arms killed, not providing the number of those who did not belong to that military body, i.e. the members of the municipal militias or the peasants recruited<sup>61</sup>.

Casualties among the winners were rather low, and the *Crónicas* consulted do not give much information about them, although some of them mention John, Lord of Ferrers, as having been killed in combat<sup>62</sup>.

The victorious troops, once the battle was over, and as was their custom, sacked not only the enemy camp, but also Nájera. After the victory, the winners went to Burgos where King Peter entered

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<sup>61</sup> LÓPEZ DE AYALA, Pedro. *Crónicas: Crónica de Don Pedro Primero*, p. 353.

<sup>62</sup> VILLALÓN, L. J. Andrew y Kagay, Donald J. Hundred Years War. A Wider Focus.

in the company of his brother Sancho and a large number of Castilian nobles who had recognised him once again as monarch, accompanied by Marshals Guichard of Angle and Stephen of Consignton with 500 men-at-arms. But almost immediately the disagreements between Peter I and Prince Edward began because the former did not want to keep his promises and gave in to a series of vendettas that were not to the liking of the English heir. Peter again claimed that he would keep his promises, but he did not go through with it, which made Prince Edward very unhappy, as the cities, towns and territories granted refused to pass under foreign rule as well, and the Castilian king did nothing to remedy the situation. This led Edward to head for Valladolid, but the climate and the lack of payment prompted the English to return to their country, even though they were still plundering Castile.

It should also be noted that after the battle, French and Breton knights taken prisoner in Nájera were exchanged for English and Gascon knights held by their enemies since their capture by the men of Tello and Sancho, including Sir Thomas Felton, Richard Taunton and Hugh de Hastings.

#### Subsequent events

It should be noted that after the victory of Nájera, the Anglo-Gascon soldiers dedicated themselves to looting, robbing and burning villages and regions, not saving the monasteries of San Millán de la Cogulla or Oña from their depredations; they also dedicated themselves to persecuting the Jews, who had mostly supported Peter, razing the Jewish quarters of Aguilar de Campoo and Villadiego, giving rise, with some excesses, to the hostility of the Castilian people against him.

But the Prince of Wales himself also tried to go against his ally, trying to reach an agreement with the monarchs of Aragon, Navarre and Portugal to invade Castile, put an end to both Peter and Henry and divide the Castilian-Leonese kingdom between the four of them, because for the English the possession of Castile was essential in their conflict with France due to the strategic, economic and political advantages they could obtain, without forgetting the decided support of the French kings for Henry's aspirations.

Finally, at the beginning of July, after reaching an agreement with Peter of Aragon to pass freely through his territories, the Prince

of Wales and his men headed for Aquitaine, ending the English intervention in the contest for the Castilian crown. Peter tried to get Prince Edward to leave him 1,000 of his men for whatever might happen, but he was unsuccessful<sup>63</sup>.

At the end of 1368, the Castilian king sent a delegate, the dean of Segovia, Juan Gutiérrez, to England to receive English military aid, but King Edward III did not want to intervene directly in the Castilian problems and the Prince of Wales demanded that Peter comply with what was offered in 1367, so no agreement was reached.

After the departure from Castile of the Black Prince and his men, some Englishmen remained there to serve King Peter, because with him, in Montiel, the knight of such origin Ralph Helme was murdered<sup>64</sup>.

## Navarre

On the part of this Spanish kingdom, as its dynasty in those years belonged to the French house of Evreux, its monarch, Charles II, was at the same time king of Navarre, count of Evreux and had territorial possessions in Normandy, including the city and fortress of Cherbourg, but he gradually lost them either by force of arms or by purchases or exchanges of land or rights in favour of the king of France. Thus Cherbourg, after being in the hands of the King of England, was recovered by Navarre in 1393-1394, to be finally ceded in 1404 by the then King of Navarre, Charles III, to the Gallic monarch in exchange for the County of Nemours and other lands in France.

From January 1354, Charles II of Navarre tried to ally himself with the King of England through his son, the Duke of Lancaster, which was finally achieved. In 1365, Philip of Navarre, brother of the Navarrese monarch, and the aforementioned Duke made an incursion into French lands with between 900 and 1,200 lance, 1,400 or 1,600 archers and 2,000 infants, both Navarrese and English, including Robert Knolles and John of Fotheringham. After the ride, Philip went to England from where he returned with the help of 60 German knights, 100 men-at-arms and 200 English archers, who were joined on French soil by another 400 men-at-

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<sup>63</sup> VALDEÓN BARUQUE, July Henry II of Castile. The Civil War and the Consolidation of the Regime (1366-1371)

<sup>64</sup> Froissart. *Crónicas*, p. 273.

arms and 800 archers, also of English origin, all of whom were defeated by the French at Gue de Saint Clément,

The rental by the aforementioned Charles II of companies of English or Gascon origin was commonplace so that they could operate preferably in Normandy; it was almost always Gascon companies who entered his service from 1356 onwards, because at that time most of the nobles of Gascony were theoretically vassals of the King of England and therefore enemies of the King of France.

In 1358 the so-called Jacquerie, a peasant rebellion, broke out in France, which only lasted one month: from May to June of that year, the revolts were reduced by the Navarre, French and English troops commanded by Carlos II of Navarre, who divided his army into three groups, one of which, made up of English, was commanded by Robert Scort. On 13 June that year, his men engaged in combat with the rebels between Latenoy and Nointel, and logically the peasant masses were defeated and put on the run, with very few managing to save their lives. Charles entered Paris on 15 June accompanied by English soldiers who left the garrison in the French capital, while he established his royalty in Saint Denis. Among his men were the English sent by James Pipe<sup>65</sup>.

The aforementioned English were the object of attacks by the Parisians, many of whom were killed, and those who managed to flee or were released continued to serve the Navarrese monarch, although they camped out on the outskirts of Paris and dedicated themselves to massacring anyone who left or tried to leave the city. During the summer months of Navarre and England, they took over several fortresses near the French capital.

In his fleeing diplomacy, Charles reached an agreement with England whereby, in exchange for his help in the English monarch's seizure of France, he would receive Champagne, Brie and other Gallic territories; as a result, Navarre and English troops would operate jointly for an annuity, thoroughly plundering the country. On 22 September 1359, Charles II signed peace with France at Pontoise, but in November of the same year, with the help of the troops of Captal de Buch, he took over the town of

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<sup>65</sup> FIRNHABER-BAKER, Justine. *Soldiers, Villagers and Politics: Military Violence and the Jacquerie of 1358*, p. 104. Pépin, Guilhem, Lainé, Françoise & Boutouille, Frédéric. *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre des Cent ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sump-tion*. Bordeaux 2018.

Clermont. Peace was finally signed with France in 1360 in Calais, whereby the Navarrese sovereign recovered his possessions in Normandy.

After the signing of the Bretigny peace between France and England, a group of English captains placed themselves at the service of the King of Navarre, against even the opinion of Edward III of England, who in 1364 sent them a letter reprimanding them for their attitude. Among them, and in addition to the names already mentioned or that may be, we have Denis and Henry from Portsmouth.

On 2 July 1363, the peace of Murviedro was signed between the Castilian and Aragonese crowns, after Navarre's troops, allied with Castile, had taken possession of Tarazona, reaching Valencia, with the companies of Captal de Buch in their ranks, which had been placed at the disposal of Charles II of Navarre for the price of 1000 escudos of gold per year.

Also in 1363, in the Languedoc fought mercenary companies of such origins under the banner of Navarre and in 1364, war against France, Charles II recruited 1,000 men-at-arms who were sent to Normandy, under the command of the Captal del Buch, the Gascon Jean de Grailly, who fought in that region and in Burgundy with his men defending the mentioned banner. It should be remembered that the Captal, because of his lineage, was a cousin of the King of Navarre and was obliged to serve him, so when Charles called him to war against France, Grailly came to his aid and recruited both English and Gascon mercenaries, but in small numbers, no more than 400 men-at-arms. According to Froissart, he also hired an English mercenary, a *very experienced man-at-arms*, Jean Jouel, who had between 200 and 300 troops at his disposal, so that in the end the Captal del Buch was able to count on an army of approximately 700 lances, 300 archers and 500 other men.

Against them, the still Dauphin of France sent Du Guesclin, several French and Breton captains, and even Gascons, such as Albert's Perducat, who would later accompany the Black Prince in his Spanish adventure.

The Valognes town, which belonged to the Navarrese king, was defended by 100 Englishmen under the orders of a captain of that nationality, who surrendered to the French troops as soon as they were promised a safe life, except for 8 knights who did

not lay down their arms, who, after being reduced by force, were executed<sup>66</sup>.

Then the French went against the fortress of Pont D'Ouve, which was also defended for the Navarrese monarch by the English, commanded by Hugues de Calveley, who was initially victorious over the enemy's attempts, but finally had to surrender to Du Guesclin.

After being pursued, the two armies met in Cocherel where they fought. There the men of the King of Navarre formed three columns, the first one, all English, both men-of-arms and archers, under the command of Jean Jouel; the second one was constituted under the command of the Captal, composed of about 400 men-of-arms, forming a third column, with as many men-of-arms, under the command of less known nobles. The French formed four columns, the last of which was at the rear and consisted only of Gascons, perhaps for fear that they would move on to the opposite ranks. The two armies were formed face to face for a long time, the French began to show fatigue because they had not eaten or replenished their forces, and their antagonists were situated at an elevation that gave them a tactical advantage.

According to Froissart, Du Guesclin convinced the other French chiefs to carry out a mock retreat and at the moment the men of the Navarrese monarch descended from the privileged place they occupied to pursue them, turn around and attack them when they had broken out of their formations, preparing a chosen group of 30 mounted knights so that they could seize the Captal and take it to their own rear. The manoeuvre devised by Du Guesclin was carried out and the result was as expected. The Captal, in the middle of the combat, was taken prisoner and led to the rear, and Jean de Jouel, after fighting hard and receiving several serious injuries, met the same fate, although he died of his injuries before the end of the day<sup>67</sup>.

In that year of 1364, Louis, the brother of Charles II of Navarre, went with 800 lances and 2,000 infantry to La Charite sur Loire, where he reinforced his garrison with 300 men-at-arms commanded by two English captains: Sir Robert Birkheard and

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<sup>66</sup> RAMÍREZ DE PALACIOS, Bruno, *Charles II dit le Mauvais. Roi de Navarre, Comte D'Evreux*, p. 236.

<sup>67</sup> Froissart. *Crónicas*, pp. 195-220.

Sir John Cresswell<sup>68</sup>, who had to surrender to the French by agreeing not to take up arms against the Gallic monarch for a period of 3 years.

In November of the following year, Edward III asked him to discharge his company, but in 1366 he returned to the service of Charles II and recruited English knights such as Sir John Devereux, Sir William Ludlow, Sir John Cresswell, Sir William Butler, Sir Norman Swinford and Robin Ares, as well as Sir Stephen Cosington, Marshal of Aquitaine, who had fought at Poitiers alongside the Black Prince, many of whom would eventually form part of the Anglo-Petrine army.

In 1365, Charles of Navarre reached an agreement with the Lord of Albret, Arnaud-Amanieu, to place him in his service, whom he appointed a lieutenant in Languedoc, Burgundy and other parts of France. Albret would also take part in the Castilian adventure years later.

It is recorded that on 4 March of the following year several English knights and squires were placed in the service of the King of Navarre, among the former Michael Londel and Etienne de Cosingtonel and among the latter John de Karzawac (John Karseval) and Normand de Swinford<sup>69</sup>. In September, Charles II attacked Aragon with his troops of English and Gascon origin, but they were rejected by the Aragonese. All of them, plus John Stokes, and Robin de Ares, paid homage and were placed under the orders of the King of Navarre in 1369.

Despite their agreements with both sides, and the precautions taken by the various authorities, the passage, through Navarre, of the mercenary companies in one direction or another, down towards Castile or up towards Aquitaine, gave rise to much unpleasantness because those men were engaged in indiscriminate plundering: thus the town of Valtierra was taken up by arms by a group commanded, according to the documentation of the time, by Captain Johan de Eurosa, who may be Jean d'Evreux, who, after serving Henry, later passed to Castile under the orders of the Black Prince. For his part, Calveley entered Puente la Reina at the beginning of 1367, after leaving the Trastámara service, apparently to «convince» Charles II that it was more convenient

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<sup>68</sup> Shortly afterwards we find both English nobles and their men among those who accompanied Prince Edward during his campaign in Spain.

<sup>69</sup> LACARRA, José María. *Historia Política del Reino de Navarra desde sus orígenes hasta su incorporación a Castilla*, Volume III, p. 89.

for him to respect the agreement sealed with the English prince and the Spanish monarch, than the one signed with Aragon<sup>70</sup>.

In 1377, Sir Edward Berkeley left London for Navarre to negotiate a treaty with Charles II. In 1378, the latter reached an agreement with the English crown for the defence of Cherbourg, whereby the English monarch promised financial support and a detachment of English troops, 500 archers and the same number of men-at-arms for this defence. For this reason, in June, he arrived at the aforementioned William of Farington fortress with 100 men-at-arms and 500 archers, who helped guard it until Cherbourg was temporarily handed over to the English in July, by virtue of the agreements signed between the King of Navarre and the King of England

It also seems that, in view of the fear that Castile would invade Navarre, another treaty was signed between the two kings whereby England would send troops to help Charles II. The English monarch therefore ordered John Nivelles, his lieutenant in Aquitaine, to put 500 men-at-arms and as many archers at the disposal of the Navarrese for a period of 4 months, but Nivelles took time to carry out the orders received and when he did so, he did so with a dropper.

When the Castilian troops recovered the city of Logroño, which had remained in Navarrese hands for some time, among its defenders they took several Gascon knights who were in the service of the King of Navarre as prisoners. During this war, several Gascons killed the governor of the frontier of Guipúzcoa, Rui Días de Rojas.

Once Navarre had been invaded, Nivelles sent some contingents that the Navarrese monarch used to garrison the main castles, cities and towns of his kingdom. Thus the city of Estella received 300 men in arms, under the orders of Perducat de Albret, a soldier of fortune, of Gascon origin, who had once accompanied the Prince of Wales in Castile. Larraga was also defended by Gascon gunmen, sent by Roger Bernard de Foix.

In October Sir Thomas Trivet, another veteran of the Black Prince's expedition<sup>71</sup>, arrived, initially with 160 troops, which

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<sup>70</sup> AZCARATE AGUILAR-AMAt, Pilar. El Azote de las Compañías y Sus Estragos en Navarra (1366-1367). Hispania no. 177 (1991), pp. 73-101.

<sup>71</sup> This nickname, for which he is best known, due to the colour of his armour, was not given to him at that time but after his death, for the first time in Grafton's Chronicle of England in 1369.

were later reinforced with 20 archers and 20 men-at-arms. But this number varies according to other sources: López de Ayala says there were 300, while Froissart raises them to 600 lances and 1,000 «pillards». What is certain is that on 23 April 1379 Trivet was paid 1,100 Aragonese Guilders for 100 men-of-arms and 100 «pillards» for 2 months<sup>72</sup>.

«And the said king of Navarre, seeing that there were no people to defend his kingdom, went to Bordeaux a few days ago and sent an English captain named Mosen Tomas Trevet, and other captains with him, in number of one hundred and sixty lances, and they were distributed, and put in Pamplona, in Tudela, Los Arcos, Viana, Estella, Lerin, Sangüesa, and in other places by the guards»<sup>73</sup>.

So did two Gascon gentlemen: André Handry (Andreas Angles according to the chronicles) with 55 men-of-arms and 50 archers, other authors say only 80 and Monnot de Plaissac, with another 100 soldiers<sup>74</sup>.

Sir Thomas and Sir Geoffrey d'Argenton arrived with 300 men-at-arms and 298 archers, which were supplemented by 217 men-at-arms and 200 archers in early 1379. From 20 June 1378 to 20 January 1379, Charles II had at his service English archers, of whom the number is not given, sent by John Berry<sup>75</sup>

Some of the troops who accompanied Trivet became part of the garrisons in Pamplona, Estella and Sangüesa, although most of them, with their chief at the head, settled on the Tudela salient and in several castles on the southern border of the Kingdom of Navarre. According to Froissart, the distribution of Anglo-Gascon troops was as follows: Trivet in Tudela, Plaissac in Cascante, Perducat de Albret in Los Arcos, Tristan de Castelbo in Miranda de Arga, Raimond de Pailhas in Corella and Lescun in Puente la Reina.

Charles II also contracted around 11 Gascon companies, including Perducat de Albret, which was made up of 60 men-at-arms and 60 «pillards», the latter of whom were responsible for supplying the men-at-arms, so we can imagine, taking into account their

<sup>72</sup> General Archive of Navarre, Leg 39, no. 30.

<sup>73</sup> CARLOS, Príncipe de Viana, *Crónica de los Reyes de Navarra*, volume 3, chapter 19, p. 180. Edit. by José Yanguas y Miranda

<sup>74</sup> RUSSELL P. E., *The English Intervention in Spain & Portugal in the time of Edward III & Richard II*, p. 270.

<sup>75</sup> FOWLER, Kenneth *L'emploi des mercenaires par les pouvoirs ibériques et l'intervention militaire anglaise en Espagne (vers 1379)*, pp. 23-35.

French name, how they managed to do so. Most of the men in arms were from Gascony and some other French regions, but 7 of them were English<sup>76</sup>.

Henry II of Castile laid siege to Pamplona, but the arrival of English reinforcements prevented the city from falling into Castilian hands, with the Castilian having to abandon the siege and withdraw. Then the English went on the counter-offensive: starting from Tudela, Gascon and English men-of-arms and archers, with Navarrese *infanzones* (infantrymen), crossed the river Ebro near Calahorra under the orders of Trivet. As they advanced to the gates of Soria, the incursion was about 70 kilometres deep into Castilian soil, so Trivet was congratulated by Charles II, but given the circumstances in which the invaders found themselves: with no accommodation or supplies, they soon withdrew, leaving behind a good number of wounded and sick. After a series of talks between the Castilian and Navarrese monarchs, a peace was finally reached, the treaty of Briones, and as a consequence the Duke of Lancaster and his men had to leave Navarre<sup>77</sup>.

Many years later there are reports that in the battle of Aljubarrota against the Portuguese, there were some troops of Anglo-Saxon origin in both armies.

## England and Aragon

The first news of alliances between the Aragonese and English crowns is provided by the best chronicler of the Kingdom of Aragon, Jerónimo Zurita, who states that in 1158 the Count of Barcelona, Ramón Berenguer, as Prince of Aragón, allied himself with King Henry of England to try to take Toulouse away from the Count of Toulouse, but in the end the siege had to be lifted because of the help the Count received from the king of France<sup>78</sup>.

In 1354, the Aragonese monarch, Peter IV, made plans to take Gascon mercenaries to the island of Sardinia and fight against its rebels. To this end, on 28 April, he received the Captal del Buch with 30 knights and 40 archers on horseback, as well as the Lord of La Esparra, *who was a great lord in Gascony*. Zurita, who

<sup>76</sup> PEPIN, Guilhem. *Les routiers gascons, basques, agenais et périgourdines du parti anglais: motivations, origines et la perception de leur présence*, pp. 32 and 33. Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre des Cent ans.

<sup>77</sup> SUÁREZ FERNÁNDEZ, Luis. *Intervención de Castilla en la Guerra de los Cien Años*.

<sup>78</sup> ZURITA, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón*, Book II, Chapter XVII.

refers to it, says that the latter fell ill on the expedition, but there were no warlike actions involving either<sup>79</sup>.

Referring to Calveley at the beginning of his service to Peter IV, Lope de Ayala says: «Others who came from England were Hugo de Carualoy and Eustace and Mayeu de Gornay and Guillen Alemant and Lohan de Ebreus, and many other great warriors and squires and men-of-arms from England. Others came from Gujana and Gascueña, many good captains and squires and men-of-arms»<sup>80</sup>.

In 1366, the Aragonese monarch ordered the English, led by Hugues de Calveley, to enter Castilian territory via the border between Borja and Magallón, which they did without any resistance, as the garrisons of these two cities abandoned them<sup>81</sup>.

Following Zurita, in that year the salary paid to the so-called «Baranes» was 200 guilders that of the knights was 100, which was reduced in the squires to 50, while the archers received 40<sup>82</sup>.

Also in that year, always according to Zurita, many English companies with many people from Navarre went to surround Jaca and «fought» it twice; but the defenders of the city resisted their attacks fiercely and killed many of them. According to the aforementioned chronicler, the King of Navarre referred to them as follows: «they were from the English and Gascon who came to serve the King of Aragon in the war of Castile and who wanted to leave Spain through the ports of Jaca where they had entered»<sup>83</sup>.

On 3 June the following year, the Aragonese monarch informed his first-born son that Hugo de Calveley, John Chandos and the Count of Armagnac were approaching the Aragonese borders with 1,000 lances to sign peace agreements with Aragon, with Calveley and William Eliman taking the lead in negotiating and signing them. As a result, in August Peter IV donated the castles and sites of Mola and Elda to Calveley.

It seems that during the time the talks lasted, there was a small battle between the troops of one side and the other, in one of which Bretons in the service of Aragon took the Lord of Barbazan,

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<sup>79</sup> Zurita. Work cited, Book VIII, chapter LIV.

<sup>80</sup> LÓPEZ DE AYALA, Pedro. *Crónica del Rey Don Pedro y del Rey Don Enrique su hermano, hijos del rey Don Alfonso Onceno*. Volume II, p. 119.

<sup>81</sup> Zurita. Work cited, Book X, chapter LXII.

<sup>82</sup> Zurita. Work cited, Book X, chapter LXVI.

<sup>83</sup> Zurita. Work cited, Book X, chapter LXVI.

a Gascon knight under the orders of the Black Prince, and other English knights as prisoners, so that Peter IV asked Du Guesclin, who had them in his possession, to set them free.

In 1371 the Aragonese monarch reached an agreement with the Duke of Lancaster whereby, in order to fight the judge of Arborea in Sardinia, the services of Sir Walter Benedict, Sir William Elmham and other captains, knights and people of war were hired to go to the aforementioned island, with 1,000 men-at-arms and between 500 and 1,000 archers, and 1,000 men armed with spears, but for unknown reasons the expedition was not carried out. The contingent consisted of 1,000 lances, each with 3 horses and 1 «pilart» armed with a coat of mail, bacinet, spear and sword, 500 archers, each with 2 horses, and 1,000 pawns with tabards, bacinet, ovoid shield, spear and sword<sup>84</sup>.

In 1389, always following Zurita, the Count of Armagnac sent several companies of English men-at-arms against Aragon, sending the attacked monarch to Pedro de Marça and Simon de Marimón, with their men, to oppose the invaders. Interestingly, during the following year, Captain Marigot Marxes gathered 600 bassinets and some English companies, of which in the previous year had entered Aragon, and with all these elements he made war on the Count of Armagnac in the name of the King of Aragon.

When Aragon lost its king, Martin the Humane, after the Price Ferdinand de Antequera, regent of Castile who belonged to the Trastámara dynasty, an enemy of England and a faithful ally of France, was appointed Aragonese monarch, the English royal house did everything possible to ensure that Ferdinand did not give up the Aragonese crown, for which he gave his strong support to his opponent, the Count of Urgel. For this reason, he sent some 1,000 men-at-arms, archers and other types of English and Gascon soldiers to help him.

According to Zurita, in 1412 the Count of Urgel gathered together the companies of arms that he had been able to take out of Gascony, and sent them to help the city of Valencia, which was attacked by Castilian and Aragonese troops who were loyal to Ferdinand de Antequera. A combat was fought in Murviedro and the people who had left Valencia were defeated, and their leader was killed<sup>85</sup>.

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<sup>84</sup> Zurita. Work cited, Book X, chapter XIII and book XI, chapter VIII.

<sup>85</sup> Zurita. Work cited, Book XI, chapter LXX.

The following year, the Earl of Urgel reached an agreement with the second son of the king of England that if his father allowed him, the Duke would personally come to the aid of the rebel with 1,000 bassinets and 3,000 archers, and that if his personal contribution was not allowed the bassinets would be reduced to 500, the number of archers being maintained. But before all this happened, the English monarch died and his second-born passed with his men to England to defend his brother's rights to the crown, although some companies of Gascons and Englishmen remained in Gascony, of which a supporter of the Earl of Urgel, Antonio de Luna, offered to hire 500 horses and several companies of archers<sup>86</sup>.

Following Zurita, at the beginning of June, the Gascon captain Bernaldo de Coarasa went to Balaguer, where the Count of Urgel had settled, with 100 horsemen and as many crossbowmen to defend the town. For his part, Antonio de Luna entered Aragón from Gascony with 350 men-at-arms and 400 archers on foot, without the aforementioned Aragonese chronicler indicating the nationality or nationalities of these troops. Finally an English captain, named Basilio, entered with his men through Montearagón. To add further confusion to the numbers of fighters, Zurita claims that Antonio de Luna occupied Loarre with a troop of English and Gascon: 150 on horseback and 170 on foot<sup>87</sup>.

The group of the aforementioned captain Basilio, some 200 men in arms and archers, was defeated in Alcolea by the supporters of Ferdinand on 10 July 1413, and the aforementioned Basilio and some 40 of his men were taken prisoner. The rest, according to Zurita's account, were killed, although he also states that the survivors abandoned Luna's and managed to return to Gascony via Jaca despite being pursued by those loyal to Ferdinand.

Another group locked themselves in Balaguer with the Count of Urgel, participating in the defence of the fortress. The siege was going badly for the defending garrison, which resisted, given the efforts of the count's mother, who said a lapidary sentence to her son about it: «Son, or king or nothing». But in the end, the foreign auxiliaries abandoned the count, but in a dignified manner<sup>88</sup>.

According to Zurita, the group of English and Gascons consisted of men-at-arms, archers and crossbowmen, but he does not give

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<sup>86</sup> Zurita. Work cited, Book XII, chapters XII and XIII.

<sup>87</sup> Zurita. Work cited, book XII, chapter XVII.

<sup>88</sup> CARRIAZO, Juan de Mata. *Inglaterra y los ingleses vistos por un cronista castellano*, *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 44 (1952), pp. 65-89.

their figure. He also claims that the earl of Urgel sent a captain called Menault de Favars, a Gascon, to Gascony to recruit more men, but that the said captain kept the money and did not return to the Aragonese kingdom. Finally, he tells us that on 15 October, 36 Englishmen left Balaguer with a licence and others, and he does not give out the number without it, granting them, as King of Aragon, safe conduct to be able to leave his domains<sup>89</sup>.

In this respect, Álvaro García de Santamaría says in his Chronicle of John II of Castile: «Chapter 284—The earl had some captains of the English, who had come to serve him on his wages; and they saw that they were starving, that there could be no grinding, no meat, and no wages. And they had often told him that since he did not give them any wage or anything else, he should give them leave to go home. And they sent word to the King to secure them and to give them safe conduct to go to their lands, and that they would go out.

«King what a please for me. And they, who saw that they had won the King's departure, tried to leave on the Count's leave. The count had given them clothing, and stopped them as much as he could; and when he could not stop them, he gave them leave to go. And on Sunday, 15 October, thirty-six Englishmen went to the King with their leave and twenty others without it... The King gave safe conduct to the English to go to their kingdoms. And he said to them, «I have forgiven you, go with my assurance, and from now on do not dare to enter my kingdoms, but be sure that I will punish you so that those who hear it will be an example.»They had him at their mercy, and went from there to their own land.

«But this time only the captains of the English seemed to come out. The others continued inside the town, until the Count of Urgel surrendered on 31 October 1413. All the English who were in debt to the count, who had come to serve him on his wage, went out to the King. And they came to the King, and said unto him: -Lord, we came here in the pay of the Count, to serve him, and now we are here at your mercy, ready to serve you and do your bidding.

«And the King answered them: I have already forgiven you, and I will give you my safe conduct to get out of the ruined kingdoms. And henceforth be punished, and not you again,

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<sup>89</sup> Zurita. Work cited, book XII, chapter XXVIII.

but be sure that if you enter into my kingdoms in such a manner, that I will punish you in such a way that it shall always be an example to those who hear it. «And so they left with their safe conduct»<sup>90</sup>.

### A last century of Crusades

After the enthronement of the Trastámara dynasty in Castile, the task of re-conquering the territory was greatly delayed, but this did not stop crusaders of Anglo-Saxon origin from pouring into Castile and participating in the events that followed. Thus, in 1381, Edmund de Langley, son of King Edward III of England, arrived, whom the Castilian chronicles call Aymon de Cantarrigia. In 1383, he was able to participate in a campaign against Granada, although in the same year he returned to Great Britain with his companions.

In 1406 the future Count of Foix and his brother, the Captal de Buch, arrived on the Iberian Peninsula and fought against the Grenadians<sup>91</sup>.

In 1485, Henry VII of England ordered public prayers to be held throughout his kingdom for the success of the Crusade that the Kings of Spain were carrying out against the Muslims of Granada and in 1488 he sent them, letters of congratulations for the victories they were achieving against them. It also appears that between the aforementioned Spanish and English monarchs there were contacts to bring an Anglo-Spanish crusade to African lands, but if such deals existed they did not go beyond that.

At the end of 1486 Sir Edward Woodville, brother of the Queen of England, arrived in Lisbon by sea<sup>92</sup>. The English nobleman from the Portuguese capital continued his journey by sea to Sanlúcar de Barrameda and from there he went overland to Seville where he was received by Queen Isabel of Castile herself, after which he joined the military expedition that was to take over the city of Loja.

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<sup>90</sup> Manuscrito de la Colombina, pages 206 v. and 207.

<sup>91</sup> GARCÍA DE SANTAMARÍA, Álvar. *Crónica de Juan II*, p. 270.

<sup>92</sup> Woodville in 1472 was sent to the continent, specifically to Breton lands with 12 knights and 30 archers to support the Duke of Brittany in his quarrels with the King of France. He later took refuge there when he commanded an English fleet when he was pursued by Richard III, usurper of the crown of England. In 1485, he took part in the Battle of Bosworth, in which the aforementioned Richard III was to die, being re-established in his former domains and possessions by the new English monarch.

Logically Sir Edward, known in the Spanish Chronicles as Earl of Scales, did not arrive in Spain alone, but he did so with the accompaniment of warriors: artillerymen, archers and men-at-arms, who fought on foot with axes and spears, whose number varies according to the sources: a minimum of 80 and a maximum of 300, «From the King of England a knight called Earl of Scales, man of great status and royal blood, was in the company with up to a hundred English, archers and men-at-arms who fought on foot with spears and axes<sup>93</sup>». And also: «three hundred artillerymen and very strong gunners who had come to Castile to serve God and wage war against the Moors<sup>94</sup>»

Alonso de Palencia, in his book *Guerra de Granada*, says that he was the Lord of Villaescalesi and that on his mother's side his ancestry came from Luxembourg and he adds: «He set sail for Seville in the company of 300 principal knights, all of whom were equally motivated by the hope that the English, tired of internal struggles, would obtain forgiveness for all their sins if they fought against the Moors of Granada, who were bitter enemies of the Christian religion. Fortune was in their favour, for Edward's arrival with his comrades in arms was as timely as that of any other Spanish soldier. He stopped for a few days in Seville, busy preventing armaments and buying horses, and went to meet Ferdinand in the town of Loja, where he was received with great honour by the King and the Greats»<sup>95</sup>.

Another chronicler of the time says about this: «Others, with the purpose of serving God and the King and the Queen, came this year from the King of England, a captive who is called the Earl of Scales, the great one of royal blood, and who brought in his company many Englishmen, archers and men-of-arms, who fought on foot with axes and spears: «And especially that Earl of Scales, an Englishman, with his darting men, who ventured into dangerous places and situations; and so each of the others fought for the parts they were fighting»<sup>96</sup>.

A Spanish author says: «And he took with him this time an Earl of England, a kinsman of the Queen's, who was called the

<sup>93</sup> PULGAR, Hernán, *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*, in *Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla III*, pp. 433-47

<sup>94</sup> BERNÁLDEZ, Andrés. *Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla. Historia de los Reyes Católicos III*, p. 622.

<sup>95</sup> PALENCIA, Alonso de. *Guerra de Granada*, pp. 235 and 236

<sup>96</sup> PULGAR, Fernando del. *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*, pp. 213 and 221.

Earl of Scales, and who spent that time here, serving God and waging war against the Moors, with three hundred artillerymen and archers, who were very much in earnest ..... and who fought against the Moors, the English sayings, and certain men of the mountains ..... Like the Earl of Scale, he saw the fight, and said that because the fight was locked and the Moors were defending themselves, he wanted to fight for his land; and he took off his horse, armed in white, with a sword girded and an axe in his hands, and with a band of his own, likewise armed with his axes, he threw himself at the Moors, with a manly and earnest heart, striking at one and all, killing and overthrowing, which lacked neither heart nor strength. And when the Spaniards in the hills saw this, they did not hesitate to follow the English: ..... and the English earl was stoned to death with a stone, and his tooth was broken; and three or four of his men died»<sup>97</sup>.

During the siege and taking of the Loja suburbs, the Anglo-Saxons behaved bravely, wounding Woodville himself, according to the chronicles twice, once in the mouth of a stone, as well as several of his men, while others died in combat, their number varying in data, as was to be expected, since while some mention the word some, others give the figure of three, three or four, and finally that of 20.

In this respect, Alonso de Palencia points out: «The English Count Edward, confident in the courage of his people, went to meet some Moors stationed in a strait. To the point, a stone thrown from there shattered the hard-working captain's jaw and teeth. His people, following the example of their chief, fought fiercely; they knocked down as many Moors as opposed to them, and each of the four who succumbed to their blows had sent five, six or more Agarans to hell before dying, so that the English found piles of the bodies of the Grenadians in all the streets of the suburb»<sup>98</sup>.

Pulgar tells the story as follows: «The Earl of Scales was especially wounded by two wounds, one in his mouth, which knocked out two teeth, and some of the English who were with him were killed»<sup>99</sup>.

A new chronicler manifests: «Where an English gentleman came, a very noble man, called the Lord of Scales with eighty or a

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<sup>97</sup> BERNÁLDEZ, *Memorias del Reinado de los Reyes Católicos*, cap. LXXIX, pp. 167 and 168.

<sup>98</sup> PALENCIA, Alonso de. Work cited, pp. 239 and 240.

<sup>99</sup> PULGAR, Fernando del. Workcited, p. 222.

hundred fighters. And he bravely fell into the siege, and three teeth were broken, and he was killed by his own men. To which, as the king sent out the courage that he was avidly seeking for the harm he had received in his person, he replied that it was not too much to lose three teeth for the service of the one who was given them all<sup>100</sup>.

Even some of his men were taken prisoner by the enemy, such as Pedro de Alamanç, born in Bruges, who was captured with his brother and two other relatives; all of them were sent to Fez where they remained imprisoned for several years<sup>101</sup>.

After recovering from his injuries, after being greatly entertained by the Spanish monarchs, Sir Edward returned to England after passing through Lisbon. Several of his companions, such as his chaplain Petrus Bernart, after his performance at the capture of Loja, continued on a pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela.

Thanks to the research work of Eloy Benito Ruano, we know the names of some of those who accompanied Sir Woodward in his Spanish adventure: William Marstun, chamberlain to the King of England and the aforementioned Petrus Bernart. It also mentions other combatants who took part in the wars in Granada in those years, so they probably accompanied Sir Edward: Joannes Guinicium from Richmond, Joannes Mortimer from Northampton; Joannes Villisetum from Scotland, John from England, Rafaele Militum from Leeds, Rogerius Besul from Windsor, Thoma Bert from York, Thoma Lyll from Durham, Thoma Noel from Docester, Bulen and Roberto Flecheros from England<sup>102</sup>. It also provides names of other Englishmen who may have been part of the armies of the Catholic Kings in their wars with Granada: Andrés Picardo, who was held captive in Illora and Monclin, as well as Radulfus de Anguia (Rudolf of England?), who brought 7 companions.

But Woodville was not the only English nobleman who came to help in the completion of the reconquering work; the chronicles mention others who fought in those years in the ranks of the armies of the Catholic Kings, such as William Famy Lameriq, who

<sup>100</sup> VALERA, Mosén Diego de. *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*, p. 201.

<sup>101</sup> BENITO RUANO, Eloy. *Gente del siglo XV*. Madrid 1998. *Un Cruzado Inglés en la Guerra de Granada*. Anuario de Estudios Medievales no. 9, pp. 585-593. *Extranjeros en la Guerra de Granada*. Actas del I Congreso de Historia de Andalucía, Tomo II, pp. 303-319.

<sup>102</sup> The names have respected the spelling of the documentation of the time, often in Latin, so it is sometimes difficult to know how they would be written today.

for his bravery in battle would be armed as a knight in Cordoba in October 1487.

The previous year, the French knight Philibert de Shaunde, Lord Schande, who was in the service of Henry VII Tudor, King of England, arrived. He did so from the British Isles with about 2,000 men, which suggests that a good number of his followers originated there.

Another fighter of Anglo origin was Sir Henry Guilford of Kent, who fought with distinction against the Moors<sup>103</sup>. He was also knighted by the Spanish monarch after his participation in the wars against the Granada Muslims Winston Browne of Essex, a soldier of fortune. Captain Francis Vernel was also celebrated for his courage.

Although he was not of English origin, we must also mention the Irish knight Ubertus Statum of Ybernia, according to the spelling of the time, and Hubert de Staunton according to the modern one, who, after taking part in the conquest of Loja, went to Tangiers where he was in the service of the Portuguese until 1487, when he returned to the Iberian Peninsula where he remained until the conquest of Granada, in which he took part, returning to his country in June 1492.

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<sup>103</sup> There is controversy about its existence, as García Fitz and Novoa state in their work *Cruzados en la Reconquista*.

## Chaper Two

### English military interventions in the wars of the Spanish Monarchy, 1500-1600.

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#### Abstract

Since the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> Century until the crowning of Elizabeth I in 1558, the relationship between the English Crown and the Spanish Monarchy was friendly in spite of some aroused problems: the divorce of Henry VIII from Katherine of Aragon and the schism of the English Church from Rome. As examples of this alliance stand out two military interventions of English contingents in support of the Spanish troops. The first of them campaigned in the north of Spain with the aim of conquering the Gascony in 1512; the second fought in the Low Countries during St Quentin campaign in 1557.

#### Keywords

England, Spain, Spanish Monarchy, Army, International Relations, War, Alliances, 16<sup>th</sup> century.

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## Development of Spanish-English relations during the 16<sup>th</sup> century

With the advent of the Modern Age, the balance of power in Western Europe changed substantially, especially the relations between France and its neighbours. Thanks to its victory over England in the Hundred Years' War and an early centralisation of the state, its dominance over the rest was evident<sup>2</sup>.

For example, Castile, which had been an ally of France during the aforementioned conflict against England<sup>3</sup>, began to vary its coalition policy because of the needs of Ferdinand the Catholic after his marriage to Isabella. When the former –because of confrontations with Louis XI of France for possession of Roussillon and La Cerdaña – subordinated the interests of the Castilian Crown to those of Aragon, traditional alliances mutated<sup>4</sup>. Thus, when Henry VII came to the throne after the battle of Bosworth in 1485<sup>5</sup>, England went from being the enemy in fighting for control of the Atlantic<sup>6</sup>, to being an ally against the Valois monarchy<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> On the military side of this process, see Contamine, Philippe, *Guerre, État et société à la fin du Moyen Âge. Études sur les armées des rois de France, 1337-1494*, Mouton, Paris-La Hague, 1972, in particular part four.

<sup>3</sup> Classic works are: Suárez Fernández, Luis, *Intervención de Castilla en la Guerra de los Cien Años*, University of Oviedo, Valladolid, 1950; Russell, Peter E., *The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1955. See also the article by José Luis De Mesa Gutiérrez in this same publication.

<sup>4</sup> On Louis XI, see Sablon du Corail, Amable, *Louis IX o le jouer inquiet*, Paris, 2015. Regarding the French invasion of the two counties and their subsequent reconquest by Juan II of Aragon: Calmette, Joseph, *Louis XI, Jean II et la révolution catalane (1461-1473)*, Slatkine Reprints, Geneva, 1977, pp. 163-169, 348-378; Vicens Vives, Jaime, *Juan II de Aragón (1398-1479). Monarquía y revolución en la España del siglo XV*, edition by P. Freedman and J. M. Muñoz i Lloret, Urgoiti Editores, Pamplona, 2006, pp. 307-359.

<sup>5</sup> Grummit, David, *A Short History of the Wars of the Roses*, I. B. Tauris, London, 2013, pp. 122-130.

<sup>6</sup> For an introduction to the subject, see Suárez Fernández, Luis, *Navegación y comercio en el Golfo de Vizcaya. Un estudio sobre la política marinera de la Casa de Trastámara* CSIC, Madrid, 1959. For military actions: Fernández Duro, Cesáreo, *La Marina de Castilla desde su origen y pugna con la de Inglaterra hasta la refundición en la Armada española*, Editmex S. L., Madrid, 1995, pp. 99-108, 125-156; García de Castro, Francisco Javier, *La Marina de guerra de Castilla en la Edad Media (1248-1474)*, University of Valladolid, Valladolid, 2014, pp. 130-132, 169-171, 178-82, 187-189.

<sup>7</sup> Diplomatic relations have been studied in depth thanks to two biographies of Catherine of Aragon, the cornerstone of the alliance: Mattingly, Garret, *Catalina de Aragón*, Ediciones Palabra, Madrid, 2000; Williams, Patrick, *Katherine of Aragon: The Tragic Story of Henry VIII's First Unfortunate Wife*, Amberley Publishing, 2014

During the Hundred Years' War and the final decades of the Middle Ages<sup>8</sup>, England had remained faithful to the Dukes of Burgundy. After the death of Charles the Bold at the Battle of Nancy (1477)<sup>9</sup>, this policy continued with his heir, Mary of Burgundy, and her husband, Maximilian of Habsburg<sup>10</sup>. English wool was sold at the markets of Antwerp, while the island was strategic for the defence of the English Channel and therefore of the Netherlands. These, among other reasons, led to the alliance being maintained, and confirmed during the Philip the Fair's reign of the Netherlands<sup>11</sup>. Thus, when his son Charles inherited the Spanish crowns, a coalition system was already in place that would remain in force even after Henry VIII divorced his Spanish wife and broke with Rome<sup>12</sup>.

However, everything changed definitively once Elizabeth I succeeded her half-sister Mary Tudor in 1558. From the more or less tense alliance, a state of cold war developed that would eventually lead to open warfare until its conclusion in 1605, once the two sovereign protagonists of the confrontation –Philip and Elizabeth– disappeared from the scene and gave way to new protagonists whose aspirations did not involve confronting each other<sup>13</sup>.

During the time the Spanish-English alliance lasted, two military events occurred that were milestones in the 16<sup>th</sup> century: the campaign of Gascony in 1512 and of St Quentin in 1557. In

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<sup>8</sup> For a military view of the Anglo-French conflict, see Prestwich, Michael, *A Short History of the Hundred Years War*, I. B. Tauris, London, 2018.

<sup>9</sup> Vaughan, Richard, *Charles the Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy*, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2002, pp. 399-432.

<sup>10</sup> For the difficult situation, see Sablon du Corail, Amable, *La guerre, le prince et ses sujets : Les finances des Pays-Bas bourguignons sous Marie de Bourgogne et Maximilien d'Autriche (1477-1493)*, Brepols, Turnhout, 2019, chapters 2-8.

<sup>11</sup> Cauchies, Jean-Marie, *Philippe le Beau : Le dernier Duc de Bourgogne*, Turnhout, 2003, pp. 104-109.

<sup>12</sup> The best biography of Henry VIII from the point of view of international politics, despite the years passed since its publication, is: Scarisbrick, J. J., *Henry VIII*, Eyre & Spottiswoodie, London, 1968.

<sup>13</sup> Despite the vital importance of the confrontation between Philip II and Elizabeth I, it is striking that no monograph analysing the events as a whole has been published in Spain. Something that our English counterparts have done: Wernham, Robert B., *Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485-1588*, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1966; idem, *After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the Struggle for Western Europe, 1588-1595*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984; and idem, *The Return of the Armadas: The Last Years of the Elizabethan War Against Spain, 1595-1603*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002.

both cases, the Spanish armies were reinforced by contingents of English troops, although the result of their assistance was completely different in both cases, as will be described below.

The first joint action of the two armies should have taken place in 1511, when some 600 English archers arrived in Cadiz to cooperate with Ferdinand the Catholic during the ongoing conquest of North Africa<sup>14</sup>. But their poor discipline, as well as their weakness for Andalusian wine, caused the Spanish monarch to dismiss them even before aborting the operation on African territory<sup>15</sup>.

### The campaign in Gascony (1512)

The origin of the expedition was the signing of the Holy League in October 1511 between Pope Julius II, the Spanish Monarchy and the Republic of Venice to confront the French expansionism of Louis XII<sup>16</sup>. Soon the Holy Roman Emperor, the Swiss Cantons and, in November, Henry VIII of England joined the alliance. The latter also signed an agreement with his father-in-law Ferdinand in which they agreed to invade Guyenne and Gascony from Guipúzcoa<sup>17</sup>. The English king wanted to recover the former Plantagenet possessions in France lost during the Hundred Years' War. The alliance stipulated that Henry would send some 6,000 men for the offensive, while the Catholic king would dispatch the same number of men, as well as deliver horses and artillery to the English, who would land on Spanish soil without either<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> For previous campaigns and future plans, see Alonso Acero, Beatriz, *Cisneros y la conquista española del norte de África: cruzada, política y arte de la guerra*, Ministry of Defence Publications, Madrid, 2005.

<sup>15</sup> Floristán Imízcoz, Alfredo, 'Tres invasiones, una conquista: Navarra, Francia e Inglaterra en 1512-1513', in *En los umbrales de España. La incorporación del Reino de Navarra a la Monarquía Hispánica.*, Government of Navarre, Pamplona, 2012, p. 324. I would like to thank Professor Floristán Imízcoz for his enthusiastic help in preparing this paper.

<sup>16</sup> See Doussinague, José M., *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico*, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1944; and idem, *Fernando el Católico y el Cisma de Pisa*, Madrid, 1946.

<sup>17</sup> For a brief account of diplomatic relations between the two crowns, see Sarrablo, Eugenio, 'Una alianza anglo-española del siglo XVI', Supplement to *Revista de Archivos*, Bibliotecas y Museos 57, Madrid, 1951, pp. 1-20; Terrateig, Baron de, *El Católico y la excomunió de los reyes de Navarra*, Imprenta y editorial Maestre, Madrid, 1954.

<sup>18</sup> Santoyo, Julius-Caesar, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos. Historia de una expedición militar inglesa en Guipúzcoa (junio-octubre de 1512)*, Grupo Dr. Camino de historia donostiarra de la real sociedad vascongada de los amigos del país (CSIC), San Sebastián, 1974, pp. 7-9; Murphy, Neil, 'Henry VIII's first invasion of France: The

In April 1512, preparations in England were at their peak. The monarch had finally decided to send over 7,000 men under the command of some of the distinguished members of English nobility, while at least another 4,000 men would serve on ships as sailors, soldiers, etc<sup>19</sup>. However, most infantrymen were still armed with the longbow, while others were armed with *bills*, a weapon very similar to the halberd. In short, the contingent bore more similarity to the army that fought at Agincourt in 1415 than to those deployed in the Italian Wars at the same time<sup>20</sup>. In early May, the second Marquis of Dorset, Thomas Grey, took command of the troops, and the services of the only non-English troops to take part in the expedition were accepted: 500 Landsknechts under the command of Burgundian Captain Guyot de Heulle<sup>21</sup>.

Around 100 ships gathered in Southampton, most of them Flemish or Cantabrian; they left port on 3 June and arrived in Pasajes on the 8. When the troops disembarked, they were received by the Bishop of Sigüenza, Fadrique de Portugal, who represented Ferdinand the Catholic. He gave them a letter from the Aragonese king, in which he explained that the second Duke of Alba, Fadrique Álvarez de Toledo, would soon be arriving in command of 6,000 infantry, 2,500 horsemen and the cannons and carriages needed for the invasion<sup>22</sup>.

After a quick inspection, it was agreed that the English camp would be located between Renteria and Oyarzun, where the officers' tents were erected and around them the soldiers' bivouacs, all under a rain that did not stop falling for much of the summer<sup>23</sup>. In order to maintain good relations between the population and the English,

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Gascon expedition of 1512', *The English Historical Review* 542, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 25-26.

<sup>19</sup> Santa Cruz, Alonso de, *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*, 2 vols., edition by Juan de Mata Carriazo, Escuela de estudios hispano-americanos de Sevilla, Seville, 1951, vol. II, p. 162.

<sup>20</sup> To study the British army that landed a year later in northern France and suffered almost the same problems, see Cruickshank, Charles G., *Army Royal: Henry VIII's Invasion of France, 1513*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969

<sup>21</sup> Zurita, Jerónimo, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando el Católico. De las empresas y ligas de Italia.*, 6 vols., edition by Ángel Canellas López, Government of Aragon, Zaragoza, 1989-1996, vol. 5, p. 188; Murphy, 'Henry VIII's first invasion of France', op. cit., pp.33-35.

<sup>22</sup> Sarrablo, 'Una alianza anglo-española', op. cit., p. 10; Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., pp. 18-19; Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando*, op. cit., p. 269.

<sup>23</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., p. 20; Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando*, op. cit., p. 270.

Dorset issued a proclamation informing any soldiers who dared to confront or insult the civilian population of their punishment<sup>24</sup>. Even so, it was the Navarrese merchants who brought all kinds of food and necessary goods to the camp, following the order of the King of Navarre. Thus, John III of Navarre ingratiated himself with the English commander, who assured him that his goal was Gascony, not his kingdom<sup>25</sup>.

However, soon after they arrived, the English soldiers began to show their discontent with their living conditions and how hard they found the climate, humid like in England but much warmer. In an attempt to satisfy them, the camp was dismantled and set it up again near Irun, on the border with France and 40 km from Bayonne, the capital of Gascony. Shortly afterwards, on 28 June, French forces appeared on the other side of the Bidasoa river, causing some of the English troops, without any order or discipline, to cross the river to face them. The enemy, taken by surprise, decided to retreat before coming to blows. Finally, Dorset, his officers and the rest of the army crossed the water to collect their men after imposing some order<sup>26</sup>. As they raced madly across the river, these green troops had put themselves in great danger, as a surprise counterattack by the French cavalry would have wiped them out without help from their superiors. Such actions clearly showed that most of the English were not professional soldiers.

The British commander's lack of authority was evident, though it does not appear that he even attempted to impose himself. This was another problem that undermined the morale of the English contingent. In addition to the little patience the troops showed while waiting for the arrival of the army under Alba's command

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<sup>24</sup> MURPHY, 'Henry VIII's first invasion of France', op. cit., p. 43. English armies often cried these proclamations, see Phillips, Gervase, 'To cry «Home! Home!»: Mutiny, morale, and indiscipline in Tudor armies', *The Journal of Military History* 65, Society for Military History, s. l., 2001, pp. 313-332. On war and English society during the reign of Henry VIII, see Davies, C. S. L., 'The English people and war in the Early Sixteenth Century', in A. C. Duke and C. A. Tamse (eds.), *Britain and the Netherlands, vol. VI: War and Society. Papers Delivered to the Sixth Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977, pp. 1-18; Gunn, Steven, *The English People at War in the Age of Henry VIII*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018.

<sup>25</sup> Sarrablo, Una alianza anglo-española', op. cit., p. 10; Santoyo, De crónicas y tiempos británicos, op. cit., pp. 21-22; Murphy, 'Henry VIII's first invasion of France', op. cit., p. 48.

<sup>26</sup> Santoyo, De crónicas y tiempos británicos, op. cit., pp. 25-26; Zurita, Historia del Rey Don Hernando, op. cit., p. 279.

with the promised horses, chariots and cannons<sup>27</sup>. The Spanish general and his men were gathered in Vitoria awaiting the orders of the king, who wished to cross Navarre and thus ensure its neutrality. John's refusal to let the Spanish army pass through his territory, let alone give a number of strongholds, provided the perfect excuse for Ferdinand to order the invasion of the Kingdom of Navarre<sup>28</sup>. Meanwhile, despite Ferdinand's pleas, the English commander refused to participate in the invasion of Navarre on the pretext that he did not have licence to do so<sup>29</sup>.

At the same time, the inactivity of the soldiers and the onset of dysentery further strained nerves in the English camp. The situation finally exploded when a company rioted, shouting that they were being cheated by the captains, who were keeping part of their pay<sup>30</sup>. This time Dorset reacted quickly, and together with the officers and a good number of loyal soldiers forced the insurgents to change their attitude. After a brief investigation, the ringleader was hanged, although it was suspected that the reason behind the confusion was Louis XII's money, which somehow found its way into certain pockets and incited insubordination<sup>31</sup>.

The only consolation in the midst of all this weariness was the alarms that were raised, almost daily, when French units appeared

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<sup>27</sup> Sarrablo, 'Una alianza anglo-española', op. cit., p. 11; Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>28</sup> The bibliography on the conquest is extensive, including: Correa, Luis, *Historia de la conquista del Reino de Navarra por el Duque de Alba, General del ejército del Rey Fernando el Católico, en el año de 1512*, edition by José Yanguas y Miranda, Imprenta de Longás y Ripa, Pamplona, 1843; Boissonnade, Prosper, *Historia de la incorporación de Navarra a Castilla, ensayo sobre las relaciones de los príncipes de Foix-Albret con Francia y con España (1479-1521)*, Government of Navarre, Pamplona, 2005; Adot Lerga, Álvaro, *Juan de Albret y Catalina de Foix o la defensa del estado navarro (1483-1517)*, Pamiela, Pamplona, 2005; Monteano Sorbet, Peio J., *La Guerra de Navarra (1512-1529). Crónica de la conquista española*, Pamiela, Pamplona, 2010; OSTOLAZA ELIZONDO, María Isabel; Panizo Santos, Juan Ignacio and Berzal Tejero, M<sup>a</sup>. Jesús, *Fernando el Católico y la empresa de Navarra (1512-1516)*, Government of Navarre, Pamplona, 2011; Floristán Imízcoz, Alfredo (coord.), *1512, conquista e incorporación de Navarra. Historiografía, derecho y otros procesos de integración en la Europa renacentista*, Ariel, Barcelona, 2012; Floristán Imízcoz, Alfredo, *El Reino de Navarra y la conformación política de España (1512-1841)*, Ediciones Akal, Madrid, 2014.

<sup>29</sup> Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando*, op. cit., p. 280; Boissonnade, *Historia de la incorporación de Navarra*, op. cit., pp. 418 and 459.

<sup>30</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>31</sup> Sarrablo, 'Una alianza anglo-española', op. cit., p. 14; Murphy, 'Henry VIII's first invasion of France', op. cit., p. 43. Rioting for this type of reason was common in the Tudor armies throughout the 16th century, see Phillips, 'To cry «Home! Home!», op. cit., *passim*.

on the other side of the Bidasoa to observe the English camp. Once the voice was given, guard companies advanced rapidly towards the enemy, who fled as soon as they came dangerously close. Sometimes a party was ordered to go into French territory, which is why on more than one occasion it arrived at the very gates of Bayonne<sup>32</sup>.

Meanwhile, Alba's troops invaded and conquered Navarre with very little opposition: on 25 July he received the keys to Pamplona from its authorities<sup>33</sup>. Once the situation was under control, both Ferdinand and Alba wrote to Dorset insisting that he should be patient as the joint invasion of Gascony could be carried out shortly. The king also thanked him that, due to the presence of the English army, the French had not dared to cross the Navarre border to disturb the operation, fearing that in their absence Dorset would advance towards Bayonne. But the silence between the two allies during the three weeks that the war lasted caused British officers to distrust the Catholic<sup>34</sup>. Moreover, the chivalric code that imbued the military prevented them from breaking up camp without having fought the French. For them, the aim of the war was to conquer French soil<sup>35</sup>.

However, despite the good words, unrest continued in the English camp throughout August. Fights and soldiers killing each other were common, exasperated by the lack of beer they made up for with huge quantities of wine and cider, which also increased the cases of dysentery. Midway through the month, the situation deteriorated even further: a confrontation between an Englishman and a Basque in Irun led to the death of the former and the escape of three of his compatriots who ended up half dead. The German Landsknechts were the first to hear of the scuffle as they were camped just outside the town, so they sounded an alarm and headed into the town, while the English followed closely behind. In the blink of an eye the village was looted and many of its inhabitants killed. At no time did the officers attempt to stop the soldiers, knowing that if they tried they would also end up dead. Therefore, they decided to wait for the troops to return to camp and, once there, forced them to return the stolen goods to the people<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>33</sup> Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando*, op. cit., pp. 284-287.

<sup>34</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., pp. 34-36; Murphy, 'Henry VI-II's first invasion of France', op. cit., p. 46.

<sup>35</sup> Murphy, 'Henry VIII's first invasion of France', op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>36</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., pp. 37-40.

As soon as the French learned of the confrontation between the allies, they decided to test the enemy and a column marched from Bayonne with the intention of launching a surprise attack. However, thanks to the Gascons who supported the return of the British government, Dorset was informed of the French intentions. After imposing some discipline among his men, he crossed the Bidasoa again, this time looking for battle. On seeing them, the French decided to withdraw but were pursued<sup>37</sup>. The English, as they advanced, took and plundered Saint-Jean-de-Luz with fury, where they killed a good part of the population, and other nearby villages. In the search for a pitched battle, Dorset's troops reached the gates of Bayonne, but because they had not received the promised horses and cannons, they decided to return to Irun as they were in danger of being completely surrounded in enemy territory. Without horses the army had no 'eyes', as there was no light cavalry that could discover the enemy nearby. And without artillery, a walled city like Bayonne could not be taken. The situation finally led the officers to consider the unreasonableness of their mission and so they decided to return to the camp and, soon after arriving, fed up with so many setbacks, agreed to send the army back to England<sup>38</sup>.

In September, however, Ferdinand informed the English commander that Alba's troops were ready to invade Gascony and were marching towards Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port. Soon 400 Spanish light cavalymen arrived with the mission to guide Dorset and serve him in all his needs<sup>39</sup>. When the news reached them, the officers met but before they could decide what to do, another mutiny broke out among the soldiers, who cried that they would return to England at any cost, before remaining in that place. The English commander was forced to write a letter to the Catholic king expressing his troops' intention to return to the island in less than 25 days –exactly for St. Michael's Day– and therefore begged him to grant him a license to rent the ships needed for transport<sup>40</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

<sup>38</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., p. 41; Murphy, 'Henry VIII's first invasion of France', op. cit., pp. 49-50.

<sup>39</sup> Santa Cruz, *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*, op. cit., pp. 216-217; Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., p. 44; Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando*, op. cit., p. 311. Santa Cruz echoes the rumours of the power of French gold over the decisions of some English military.

<sup>40</sup> Sarrablo, 'Una alianza anglo-española', op. cit., p. 13; Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., p. 46; Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando*, op. cit., p. 312; Murphy, 'Henry VIII's first invasion of France', op. cit., pp. 50-52.

Despite being surprised by the announcement, the Aragonese king gave his consent as everything pointed to several captains being bribed by Louis XII to dissolve the English army. From that moment on, events developed with unusual speed: 51 boats were rented and the necessary supplies for navigation were purchased, attempts were made to convince deserters to return to the ranks, and they were guaranteed that they would not be punished. Even so, most of them preferred to ignore the call and remain in the region<sup>41</sup>.

Ironically, the climate changed once they decided to return. To everyone's surprise, autumn was very mild, though dysentery remained active in the camp. When Dorset fell ill in October, it was his second in command, Lord Thomas Howard, who had to take charge of the retreating army. It was he who met with several of Ferdinand's emissaries, who asked him to have the troops spend the winter in the houses of the inhabitants of the cities, towns and villages of the region, so that the offensive could begin early the following spring. Howard reacted in the worst possible way, as he questioned the Aragonese monarch's sincerity and denounced the fact that he had made it seem as if the English inactivity had been caused by the officers. If they were to invade Gascony, why wait until spring? They could start at that very moment. This is why he made clear his intention to return to his homeland<sup>42</sup>.

After the Spanish emissaries withdrew, it was decided that the contingent would be divided into four bodies and each would embark from a different port: San Sebastián, Rentería, Guetaria and Fuenterrabía. However, as preparations for departure were being finalised, letters were received from Henry VIII ordering the Commander-in-chief to remain in Spain until spring, when he would receive reinforcements from England to invade Gascony. On hearing the news, the soldiers almost mutinied again so the officers decided to disregard the orders knowing the end they could suffer if they stood up to their subordinates. The ships finally left the aforementioned ports on 24 October 1512; of the almost 10,000 men who had arrived in Spain at the time, just over 6,000 returned, the rest had perished through illness or had deserted<sup>43</sup>.

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<sup>41</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., p. 48; Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando*, op. cit., p. 354. On English defectors and their relationship with their superiors, see Phillips, 'To cry «Home! Home!»', op. cit., p. 321.

<sup>42</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., pp. 49-51.

<sup>43</sup> Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos*, op. cit., pp. 52 and 54.

After returning to the island an investigation was launched to find out exactly what had happened and the reasons for the failure. Despite Henry VIII's anger, none of the officers were punished for disobeying his orders, and it was as if nothing had happened<sup>44</sup>.

### The St Quentin Campaign (1557)

Hostilities between 1556 and 1559 were the last between the Habsburg and French Valois monarchies. Once again, the trophy for which they both fought was control of the Italian Peninsula. The efforts of Henry II of France were spurred on by the unreasonableness of Pope Paul IV, who wanted to see the Spanish out of Italy and his native Naples<sup>45</sup>. But, unlike on other occasions, this time England was not going to remain a mere witness to the conflict<sup>46</sup>.

Although the marriage treaty of Philip II and Mary Tudor agreed that England would not take part in the wars of the Spanish Monarchy, the phrasing was so vague that it was not clear whether it referred exclusively to the war between Charles V and Henry II at that time or, on the contrary, to any future war. In addition, Flanders had a mutual defence pact with England, so in case of attack, it had to be helped by England.

However, despite Mary Tudor's pressure on the Privy Council, the latter's position was clear that the treaties of mutual defence agreed in 1542, and ratified in 1546, had been rendered obsolete by the marriage treaty, so England was not morally obliged to help its ally until France attacked the Netherlands or the Iberian Peninsula and the Spanish monarch asked for their help. Furthermore, in an apostille to its reply to the Queen, the advisory body hoped and expected that Philip would not be able to invoke such aid, since Mary and her territories would not be

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<sup>44</sup> Murphy, 'Henry VIII's first invasion of France', op. cit., pp. 52-56.

<sup>45</sup> Although there is no contemporary critical edition, the most complete account of this war is Andrea, Alexandro, *De la guerra de campaña de Roma y del Reino de Naples*, en el pontificado de Paulo IV, año de 1546 y 47, Viuda de Querino Gerardo, Madrid, 1589. It can be completed with the opposite vision: Nones, Pietro, 'Storia della guerra di Paolo IV, Sommo Pontefice, contro gli spagnuoli', in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, ossia raccolta di opere e documenti finora inediti o divenuti rissimi risguardanti la Storia d'Italia, volume XII, Gio. Pietro Vieusseux Editore, Florence, 1847.

<sup>46</sup> For the transition from the reign of Charles V to that of his son Philip II, see, Rodríguez-Salgado, María José, *Un Imperio en transición. Carlos V, Felipe II y su mundo, 1551-1559*, Barcelona, 1992.

able to carry it out with all their resources due to the fragility of the English Treasury. However, after Philip returned to England in March 1557, he again urged the Council to help him. Unable to continue to make excuses and contravene the wishes of the monarchs, its members finally reluctantly agreed to mobilise the infantry and cavalry units promised in previous treaties<sup>47</sup>.

However, a month later, the situation changed unexpectedly due to a poor attempt by the French enemy. Thomas Strafford, an English nobleman exiled in France after opposing the Spanish-English marriage and seeking to expel the Spanish from the island, landed with a group of followers, took Scarborough Castle, north of London, and proclaimed himself 'protector, governor and defender' of England, although with France's support. The operation was soon neutralised as Strafford and his supporters, numbering less than a hundred, were arrested and several of them, including the ringleader himself, were executed.

The failed attempt caused the Privy Council policy to change course and decided to support Mary in her confrontation with Henry II of France; for this reason, it offered 5,000 infantry and 1,000 horsemen to reinforce Philip's army and 3,000 more men to secure Calais, the last English possession on the continent<sup>48</sup>. War would be declared once preparations were completed, although neither the border with Scotland –France's ally– nor the Channel could be left undefended, placing a greater burden on the shoulders of the English Treasury. However, the military arrangement soon came to an end as, fortunately for the British military effort, the nobility had joined the expedition enthusiastically, which had made it easier to recruit and equip the troops for which they were responsible in their own districts. Once everything was ready, Mary made a solemn declaration of war with France on 7 June 1557<sup>49</sup>.

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<sup>47</sup> KELSEY, Harry, *Philip of Spain, King of England: The Forgotten Sovereign*, I. B. Tauris, London, 2011, pp. 129-130; DAVIES, C. S. L., 'England and the French War, 1557-9', in J. Loach and R. Tittler (eds.) *The Mid-Tudor Polity, c. 1540-1560*, The Macmillan Press, London, 1980, p. 161.

<sup>48</sup> To understand its military organisation in his last century as an English possession, see GRUMMIT, David, *The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436-1558*, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2008.

<sup>49</sup> Kelsey, *Philip of Spain*, op. cit., pp. 130-131; EDWARDS, John, *Mary I: England's Catholic Queen*, Yale University Press, New Haven-London, 2011, p. 294; LOADS, David M., *The Reign of Mary Tudor: Politics, Government and Religion in Tudor England, 1553-1558*, Ernest Benn Limited, London, 1979, pp. 242-244, 365-371; DAVIES, 'England and the French War', op. cit., pp. 162-163.

Despite this frenzy, the British contingent that embarked for Calais was far from the level of the other forces involved in the conflict, many of them made up of true war professionals. The English infantry, in fact provincial militia, were still largely armed with longbows and *bills*, but pikes and arquebus –more modern weapons– were still not numerically relevant<sup>50</sup>.

Despite this, Philip II embarked for Flanders with the idea of leading the English contingent as he intended to encourage the service of his new subjects even if he was only a consort king. Ironically, many English nobles who accompanied him had opposed the coronation of Mary and had even been part –themselves or members of their families– of plots against the Queen<sup>51</sup>.

In July, the troops –some 7,000 men: 1,200 riders, 4,000 infantry, 1,500 sappers and 200 miners– landed in Calais with everything needed for the campaign: artillery, mobile mills, furnaces, etc. While Philip, who had arrived a few days earlier, was already in Brussels to set up the affairs of the war<sup>52</sup>. However, English Commander-in-chief William Herbert, the first Earl of Pembroke – his seconds were Lord Grey and Lord Clinton– made it clear from the outset that he would not move from the fortress until he was provided with *limonero* horses for his artillery, wagons for the whole army and money in advance to feed his troops. In the end, and despite the pleas of the king's envoys and the king's own letters, Pembroke was late arriving in St Quentin, which spoiled the monarch's desire to fight at the head of the English. The nobleman preferred to look after his country's affairs and did not leave the city until her defence was more or less ready<sup>53</sup>.

However, shortly after arriving on the continent, the group of miners and sappers, escorted by several infantry companies, was sent to reinforce the siege of the French city and approaching works. Ironically, they set up their camp right where, shortly after arriving, a contingent of troops under the command of Monsieur

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<sup>50</sup> Davies, 'England and the French War', cit., pp. 163-164. For a study of the modernity of the English army during the first half of the 16th century, see Fissel, Mark Charles, *English Warfare, 1511-1642*, Routledge, London-New York, 2001, pp. 1-20; and Raymond, James, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-Century Britain and Europe*, I. B. Tauris, London, 2007.

<sup>51</sup> Loades, *The Reign of Mary Tudor*, op. cit., p. 372; Gunn, Steven, Grummitt, David and Cools, Hans, *War, State and Society in England and the Netherlands, 1477-1559*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 307-308.

<sup>52</sup> Davies, 'England and the French War', op. cit., p. 165.

<sup>53</sup> Kelsey, *Philip of Spain*, op. cit., pp. 133-134; Edwards, *Mary I*, op. cit., pp. 303-304.

d'Andelot tried to break through the siege and help those who were besieged. Although most of his men were intercepted, killed or forced to return to the French lines, some managed to enter the city. The English, although determined to defend their positions, did not stand out for their discipline during combat<sup>54</sup>.

The battle of St Quentin, which took place on 10 August 1557, St Lawrence's Day, meant the destruction of the French relief army under the command of the Constable of Montmorency. Over 5,000 Frenchmen perished in the battle while another 7,000 were taken prisoner. Since the battle of Pavia in 1525, the French army had not suffered a similar disaster: once again a large part of the French nobility died on the battlefield. Emanuele Filiberto of Savoy, Governor General of Flanders and Commander-in-chief of the Spanish Monarchy troops, won the victory thanks to an aggressive manoeuvre by his cavalry that took Montmorency by surprise and defeated the French army<sup>55</sup>.

However, the chance for the English to excel in combat was ruined by Pembroke's slowness. Despite knowing that the English troops were going to catch up with him after the battle, Philip II waited for them in Cambrai. The king arrived at the Spanish camp on 12 August at the head of the English units –dressed entirely in blue clothes and red sashes– accompanied by German troops and artillery<sup>56</sup>. Due to the lack of monetary resources and provisions, the council of war that met later, after debating what to do, decided that instead of launching a full offensive towards Paris, St Quentin would be taken after completing its siege, which had begun days before the battle took place.

Pembroke's artillery settled into a battery and began to bombard the enemy population, as did the rest of the Monarch's army's cannons. The general assault was finally ordered on the 27 of the same month. After a brief resistance, the garrison succumbed to

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<sup>54</sup> MESA GALLEGO, Eduardo De, *La batalla de San Quintín, 1557*, Almena Ediciones, Madrid, 2004, p. 30; Cabrera de Córdoba, Luis, *Historia de Felipe II, Rey de España*, edition by J. Martínez Millán and C. J. de Carlos, Government of Castile and León, Valladolid, 1998, vol. I, pp. 134-135.

<sup>55</sup> FERNÁNDEZ SAN ROMÁN, Federico, *Batalla de San Quintín*, Imprenta de Vicente y Lavajos, Madrid, 1863, pp. 73-88; Mesa Gallego *La batalla de San Quintín*, op. cit., pp. 33-44; and Merlin, Pierpaolo, Manuel Filiberto. Duque de Saboya y General de España (Duke of Savoy and General of Spain), Editorial Actas, Madrid, 2008, pp. 104-105.

<sup>56</sup> Fernández San Román, *Batalla de San Quintín*, op. cit., pp. 99-100, doc. 2; Anonymous, 'Batalla de San Quintín', in *Colección de Documentos inéditos para la Historia de España*, vol. 9, Imprenta de la viuda de Calero, Madrid, 1846, p. 496.

the combined efforts of Spanish, German, Walloon and English soldiers –about 2,000 of whom intervened– deployed in different sectors so that each nation could show off its progress against the city. The English intervened in the attack on the main gate together with Julian Romero's troops. After being repelled once by the French and suffering 250 casualties, they finally managed to break through the defence and enter the city. The survivors, together with the Germans, set about looting the city despite the ban on doing so that both nations had received directly.

St Quentin's plunder was very rich as it was a population that lived from trade with Flanders and had a good number of merchants among its neighbours. The other side of the coin was that neither the elderly, nor women or children were respected. In the first moments after the assault, they were all killed without consideration. For their part, German mercenaries set fire to the main square when they received the order to withdraw outside its walls to stop the looting, so a third of the city's buildings were engulfed in flames. Interestingly, the English infantrymen filed a complaint with Emanuel Filiberto of Savoy in which they denounced the fact that the Germans, in groups of almost 100 men, had confronted and rob all the looters they came across, which had prevented the rest of the nations from taking what they considered to be fair by the laws of war.

In September, a muster of the Spanish army was carried out in the vicinity of St Quentin. The English cavalry consisted of four companies of heavy horsemen and another four companies of light cavalry, about 1,000 horsemen in all. The infantry was divided into 21 companies, with around 5,000 soldiers, as well as 12 artillery pieces and their equipment. The Spanish army totalled just over 43,000 men. Operations continued between September and October, before the arrival of winter, when Philip II's troops took the towns of Le Catelet, Noyon and Ham, in which the English contingent again intervened<sup>57</sup>.

Fortunately, after the violence came the calm. After the victory on 10 August and the fall of the city, diplomats from both sides met

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<sup>57</sup> Lemaire, Emmanuel et al., *La Guerre de 1557 en Picardie :Bataille de Saint-Laurent, siège de Saint-Quentin, prises du Catelet, de Ham, de Chauny et de Noyon*, Imprimerie typographique Charles Poette, Saint Quentin, 1896, pp. 312-315 ; Redworth, Glyn, 'Where were the English? Antoon van den Wijngaerde, the evidence of visual culture, and the 1557 siege of Saint-Quentin', in A. Sáez-Hidalgo and B. Cano Echevarría (eds.), *In Exile, Diplomacy and Texts: Exchanges between Iberia and the British Isles, 1500-1767*, Brill, Leiden, 2020, pp. 15-31.

again to try to reach a compromise that would bring peace. As an act of goodwill, a good number of troops were demobilised<sup>58</sup>. Those chosen by the Spanish Monarchy included the English, so that nation marched to Calais. However, unhappy with the loot obtained during the campaign, they would have stormed Ardres if the governor of the town had not been on his guard. Once at the English port, most of them were shipped back home. After their arrival, began to circulate the story that the English contingent had been the first to storm the walls and enter St Quentin, a claim that Philip II did not deny in order to flatter Mary and her subjects<sup>59</sup>. However, the first nation to actually set foot inside St Quentin had been the Spanish<sup>60</sup>.

Thus ended the participation of the English contingent in Philip II's first war. Mary died on 17 November 1558, although Calais was lost earlier after an attack by the Duke of Guise, which is why the English presence in France came to an end<sup>61</sup>. The subsequent enthronement of Elizabeth I, half-sister of the late Queen, brought about the end of the Spanish-English alliance, in force since the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, for political and religious reasons.

## Conclusion

As we have seen in the previous sections, the presence of English contingents alongside the armies of the Spanish Monarchy during the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century was punctual and fleeting.

The Tudor army still had a markedly medieval character, so its troops were not levied to fight an entire campaign but did so for about four months, which made it impossible to carry out long operations and planning more ambitious objectives. Moreover, if the logistic lines between England and the areas of operation

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<sup>58</sup> For the peace talks that culminated in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, see Haan, Bertrand, *Une paix pour l'éternité. La négociation du Traité du Cateau-Cambrésis*, Madrid, 2010.

<sup>59</sup> Loades, *The Reign of Mary Tudor*, op. cit., p. 372; Davies, 'England and the French War', op. cit., p. 166; Mesa Gallego, *La batalla de San Quintín, 1557*, op. cit., pp. 53-62; Kelsey, *Philip of Spain*, op. cit., p. 136; Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia de Felipe II*, op. cit., p. 148.

<sup>60</sup> Pardo Canalís, Enrique, '¿Quién fue el primero que entró en San Quintín?', *Cuadernos de Historia Jerónimo Zurita 1*, Institución Fernando el Católico, Zaragoza, 1951, pp. 115-121.

<sup>61</sup> Potter, David, 'The duc de Guise and the Fall of Calais, 1557-1558', *The English Historical Review* 388, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, pp. 481-512; Durot, Éric, *François de Lorraine, duc de Guise entre Dieu et le Roi*, Paris, 2012, pp. 397-402; Grummit, *The Calais Garrison*, op. cit., pp. 165-186.

were to be kept open, the economic effort was beyond the country's financial possibilities. It is therefore not surprising that in 1512, Dorset and his men landed with their food supplies almost consumed and had to buy more in the area of operations. The circumstance was leveraged by the locals to increase prices which, in turn, made it economically exorbitant to feed the soldiers properly. Logistics therefore meant that Henry VIII subsequently concentrated all his operations against France in the north, with Calais always as the main base of operations. This decision was evident in the conquest of Tournai in 1513 or Boulogne in 1544<sup>62</sup>.

Despite the disappointing result of the intervention in Gascony, the positive side was the knowledge English officers acquired of the art of warfare in vogue on the continent and of new combat tactics with more modern weaponry, which enabled them to keep pace with other European countries.

For the Spanish Monarchy, English presence alongside its units meant the triumph of a tenacious diplomacy that managed to avoid any obstacle and achieve its objectives. From the military point of view, only the first expeditionary corps was decisive, despite the meagre benefit to Henry VIII. Ferdinand the Catholic would likely not have achieved such a successful invasion of Navarre if Dorset's troops had not forced the French to station a significant part of their men to defend Bayonne. As for the second expeditionary corps, although its presence was not essential to the development and end of the campaign, it did provide Philip II with political gains among his English subjects, although the disappearance of Mary Tudor prevented him from taking advantage of them. Professor Redworth, in the article cited in the footnotes, stressed the importance the Spanish monarch gave to the English contingent in deploying the military devices both in the attack on St Quentin and in the march to Ham. By putting the contingent next to him, very close, the king intended to establish strong links with its members, as well as to show the rest of the nations that he trusted the English military as much he did them.

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<sup>62</sup> See CRUICKSHANK, Charles G., *The English Occupation of Tournai, 1513-19*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971; and Murphy, Neil, *The Tudor Occupation of Boulogne: Conquest, Colonisation and Imperial Monarchy, 1544-1550*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019.

## Chapter three

### The Century of Iron. English and Scots in the armies of the Spanish Monarchy in the 17<sup>th</sup> century

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#### Abstract

In the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, thanks also to the establishment of good relations between the courts of Madrid and London, the British and Scottish military presence in the royal armies increased considerably. Despite the persistence of a series of differences on the actual performance of these soldiers, due to old rivalries and differences in religion, the performance of these soldiers was quite well valued by the Hispanic high command. The outbreak of the civil war and the crisis that affected the Spanish Monarchy in the second half of the century saw a sharp decrease in the military presence of these two nations in the crown forces. Although in Flanders they remained as part of the army until the end of the century thanks also to the action of units of the English army that acted as allies alongside the Spanish in the final phase of the war in Holland and during the War of the Nine years.

#### Keywords

English, Scots, Flanders Army, Thirty Years 'War, Dutch War, Nine Years' War



### A tradition of service: the British at the service of the Monarchy in the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century

If there was a golden age in the service of English and Scottish soldiers in the armies of the Monarchy, it was certainly the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Until the outbreak of civil wars in all three British kingdoms in the late 30s, when, as we shall see, many of the veterans in the service of Philip IV returned home to take part in the fighting.

While it is true that during much of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, as we have seen, the British presence in the Crown's forces was limited, from the summer of 1604 there was a change. Thanks to the peace of London, which put an end to two long decades of direct confrontation between England and the Catholic Monarchy, and to the improved relations between the two countries, the foundation was set for an agreement with the court of St James to succeed in recruiting troops on the British Isles without limitations. For the first time in forty years, rapprochement between the two countries was expressed with the authorisation given to His Majesty's Catholic Ambassador to make levies on the islands, which were to reach 6,000 men<sup>1</sup>, as expected by the Spanish authorities, 700 of whom had already arrived in the Netherlands by late 1604<sup>2</sup>.

On this occasion, the expected arrival of troops made the presence of the northerners remarkable, and the war plans drawn up for the 1605 campaign envisaged using 4,000 soldiers recruited on the British Isles in the field armies, 2,000 of whom were engaged in the blockade of Sluys and the same number in Friesland<sup>3</sup>. For the first time, as compensation for the services rendered up to that point, particularly by the Irish, and as a sign of the new relations between the two countries, the units raised in the Stuart territories were organised into *tercios* and not into regiments, according to the criteria that had until then prevailed in the structure of the Army of Flanders, which provided that only Spanish and Italian units enjoyed that privilege. A radical change introduced by Archduke Albert on his arrival in Brussels, who

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<sup>1</sup> MESA GALLEGU, Eduardo de, Soldiers of «nations» for the army of Flanders: the Irish tercio, 1605-1620, Notebooks on Modern History 45, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 2020, p. 147.

<sup>2</sup> MESA GALLEGU, Eduardo de, The Pacification of Flanders. Spinola and the Friesland campaigns (1604-1609), Ministry of Defence, Madrid, 2009, p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> MESA GALLEGU, The Pacification of Flanders, cit., p. 49.

shortly afterwards granted equal privileges to the Flemish and Walloon units<sup>4</sup>.

In early 1605, the envoys of Philip III and Archduke Albert asked James I to allow the levy of three new *tercios* of infantry, one per nation. For this purpose, the Duke of Escalona received a significant amount of money, to pay 10 captains, including Scottish and Irish, and to make a levy of ten companies of 150 men each<sup>5</sup>.

In September 1605, the first *tercio* recruited in England joined the Army of Flanders, taking part in the final phases of the campaign; this unit was followed in May by a *tercio* of Scots<sup>6</sup>. These were usually *tercios* commanded by *maestres de campo* who had remained faithful to the Catholic religion, such as Count Thomas Arundell, who was at the head of the English *tercio*, and who was a member of a prominent Norfolk Catholic family, the Norfolk Howards and Arundell, whose father was imprisoned and died in 1595 in the Tower of London on charges of high treason for having remained faithful to the old religion<sup>7</sup>. However, as Barbara Donegan has pointed out, in these units the presence of Protestants was significant, and in some cases the Reformed represented the majority of the troops, with many English and Scottish nobles attracted by an insatiable thirst for glory and adventure, who passed into the service of the Catholic King despite their different religion<sup>8</sup>.

Despite the sharp increase in the British presence in the royal army, these northerners did not yet enjoy the «full confidence» of the Spanish High Command. It was true that the Irish enjoyed the full trust of the Spanish military authorities, so much so that they regarded them as natural allies in the fight against the English and Dutch northern heretics, but as for the English and Scots, who served in Flanders, the Spanish did not always prove to trust them. Firstly, the differences in religion weighed heavily. However, the attempt was to enlist only Catholics, although in reality it was not possible to avoid the fact that Anglicans or

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<sup>4</sup> MESA GALLEGU, Eduardo de, *The Irish in the Spanish Armies in the Seventeenth Century*, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2014, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> MESA GALLEGU, *The Pacification of Flanders*, cit., p. 50.

<sup>6</sup> MESA GALLEGU, *The Pacification of Flanders*, cit., pp. 83, 104.

<sup>7</sup> EDWARD, Francis, *The Enigma of Gunpowder Plot, 1605. The Third Solution*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2008, pp. 43-61.

<sup>8</sup> DONAGAN, Barbara, *War in England 1642-1649*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 49-50.

Calvinists were enlisted in the levies, and that these probably represented the largest component of the troops throughout the 17<sup>th</sup> century<sup>9</sup>. As we shall see, the Spanish authorities showed their mistrust on several occasions when making new levies of troops for the service of the king, particularly when it came to employing those units on the territories of the Iberian Peninsula.

Despite these suspicions and doubts about the good behaviour of these troops on the battlefield, in 1604 the friendly atmosphere established in diplomatic relations between the two crowns made it possible to create a true treaty of alliance between Spain and England. The latter possibility raised serious fears amongst the Dutch authorities, and brought certain resentment in the United Provinces against the benevolent attitude shown by the court of St. James towards the former rival<sup>10</sup>. A climate of suspicion with respect to English foreign policy, exacerbated by the fact that the English and Scottish units serving in the United Provinces army were called back, which should be stressed, were the most conspicuous part of the infantry in the service of the Dutch armies<sup>11</sup>. All this happened at a time when the Dutch Republic was engaged in a fight to the death for its own survival to cope with the offensives of Ambrose Spinola in Friesland.

The much-feared convergence and alliance between the two crowns never materialised. This was due to pressure from Dutch authorities on English «public opinion», to convince their former ally to continue the war against the Spanish. At the heart of this was the indecision of James I, who was divided between the traditional policy of sending large amounts of aid to his co-religionists in the Netherlands and a more favourable approach to Spain<sup>12</sup>. But in addition, there was a clear hostility from the vast

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<sup>9</sup> DONAGAN, Barbara, *War in England 1642-1649*», Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 45, 49-50.

<sup>10</sup> ALLEN, Paul C., *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621. The Failure of Grand Strategy*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2000, pp. 115 ff.; Schaub, Jean-Frédéric, *The Spanish Monarchy in the European system of states in Antonio Feros and Juan Gelabert (eds.), Spain in times of Quixote*, Taurus, Madrid, 2004, 104-105.

<sup>11</sup> In 1609, 50% of the infantry was made up of soldiers from the British Isles and these troops generally constituted the elite forces of the Republic's army. On average throughout the first decade of the 17th century, the forces enlisted in the domains of the first Stuart always constituted between one third and one half of the entire Dutch shock force: Fissell, Mark Charles, *English Warfare 1511-1642*, Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 153-156, 170 ff.; Manning, Roger B., *An Apprenticeship in Arms. The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. 24-61.

<sup>12</sup> ALLEN., *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621*, cit., p. 200

majority of the English population to the planned levies, which were being greatly delayed, and above all the consequences of the failed attack on the Parliament, the well-known gunpowder plot, in November 1605, which brought down like a house of cards all hopes of the Spanish authorities to get new soldiers from England and Scotland and cooled relations between the two powers. Guy Fawkes, the man who almost blew up a mine under the Westminster Parliament building, and other conspirators were not only Catholics, but veterans of the Army of Flanders<sup>13</sup>. The popular upheaval, which brought with it a strong Hispanophobia, led Sir Robert Cecil to introduce a law prohibiting British subjects from serving under Catholic princes. This law was immediately enacted by Parliament and in effect ended the possibility of continuing to make levies on the islands and led to the immediate return home of several units in service in Flanders<sup>14</sup>.

With no possibility of completing the units in service and of being able to obtain new companies, the English and Scottish presence in the Army of Flanders was quickly reduced considerably. In 1607, only four companies of the Count of Arundell's *tercio* and three Scottish companies remained in service in Friesland, with a total of some 635 men. From the end of that year's campaign, a radical reform of the British forces in service began and it is no surprise that in 1608 the size of the forces of this nation had been reduced notably<sup>15</sup>. While it is true that the three companies of Scots were still in service, in the case of the English, only one unit was standing and the total force had been reduced to just under 200 men<sup>16</sup>.

The truce of 1609 led to a further reduction in the number of these troops, and by August of that year only one company per nation remained in service. The Spanish authorities decided to keep in service only some of the most senior officers of proven Catholic faith, including Colonels William Semple and William Stanley, who had served in the royal armies since the 80s<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> FRASER, Antonia, *La congiura delle polveri*, Mondadori, Milan, 1999.

<sup>14</sup> DUNTHORNE, Hugh, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt 1560-1700*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 68.

<sup>15</sup> MESA GALLEGO, Eduardo de, *The strongholds of the Spanish Monarchy in Friesland (1605-1609)*, in Bernardo José García García, Manuel Herrero Sánchez and Alian Hugon (eds.), *The art of prudence. The Twelve Years' Truce in the Europe of the Peacemakers*, Fundación Carlos de Amberes, Madrid, 2012, p. 395.

<sup>16</sup> Mesa Gallego, *The Pacification of Flanders*, cit., pp. 166, 175.

<sup>17</sup> ESTEBAN ESTRÍNGANA, Alicia, *A break from war and military reform in the period of the Archdukes. Fundamentals of the reforms of 1609*, in García, Sánchez and Hugon (eds.), «The art of prudence», cit., pp. 454-455, 479.

The resumption of hostilities with the United Provinces from 1621 saw the return of English and Scottish units to the Army of Flanders. The good relations established with the court of James I favoured new levies on the islands and particularly in Ireland, where the attention of the Spanish authorities was focused on securing new troops. In fact, between 1621 and 1625 the number of British in the Army of Flanders increased, according to data provided by Geoffrey Parker, reaching almost 4,000 islanders, including the Irish. The troops fighting in the Spanish armies numbered 3,812 in 1623 and 3,926 in 1624; that is, over 6% and 5.50%, respectively, of the total army force deployed on the frozen northern plains<sup>18</sup>.

In 1621, two Scottish infantry companies, about 400 men, were enlisted to serve in the Earl of Tyrone's Irish *tercio*, and a third company joined these two units the following year. In February 1622, the Earl of Argyll undertook to raise 20 companies in Scotland and England for service in Flanders, and the following June the Scottish nobleman was serving at the head of his *tercio* in the army of Spinola<sup>19</sup>. In 1625, the Earl was still fighting in the Netherlands at the head of his *tercio* of 13 companies, most of which were comprised of soldiers recruited from England and Scotland<sup>20</sup>.

However, despite the efforts made by the Spanish authorities to recruit men, the Scots and English continued to prefer service in the Protestant armies. Holland remained the primary choice of the English, and service in Sweden attracted the Scots. In May 1624, the British contingent in the United Provinces numbered about 19,000 men, which was a quarter of the entire Dutch army<sup>21</sup>. It is estimated that in 1625, some 12,000 Englishmen and 10,000 Scots were serving in the United Provinces army<sup>22</sup>. This significant presence continued into the 30s with an average of 12,000 men serving in the forces of the Republic<sup>23</sup>. In total, as Barbara Donagan states, between 1618 and 1648 more than

<sup>18</sup> PARKER, Geoffrey, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 20042, p. 231.

<sup>19</sup> WORTHINGTON, David, *Scots in Habsburg Service, 1618-1648*, Brill, Leiden – Boston, 2004, pp. 68-69, 71.

<sup>20</sup> It should be remembered that several Irish companies also served in this unit. This situation was not strange, as it is necessary to highlight that there were Scottish and English companies serving in the Irish *tercios*: Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service*, cit., pp. 86-87.

<sup>21</sup> Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt*, cit., p. 66.

<sup>22</sup> Manning., *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, cit., p. 103.

<sup>23</sup> Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt*, cit., p. 66.

100,000 islanders, including some 50,000 Scots, took part in the Thirty Years' War as part of the various European armies, and only a small percentage of those troops served in the Catholic Monarchy forces<sup>24</sup>.

The opening of the British authorities would only last for a short period: the cooling of the friendship between the two courts and the breaking off of hostilities meant that in 1625 Charles I, once again, closed the door to the possibilities of obtaining new recruits in the British Isles<sup>25</sup>. This measure meant that in a few months the size of the British forces present in the Army of Flanders contracted rapidly. In 1627, only 1,772 soldiers from the British Isles remained in service and in the same year the *tercio* of the Earl of Argyll disappeared.

Only when friendly relations with England were resumed there was an increase in the levies and so in the 30s there was a further sharp rise in the presence of English and Scottish troops in the Army of Flanders. Between 1630 and 1635, a number of companies were raised in Scotland, and Sir Alexander Gordon, Earl of Sutherland, endeavoured in 1634 to raise a Scottish *tercio* of 15 companies, each with 200 men<sup>26</sup>. In 1633, thanks to this new opening by the island authorities, there were 3,494 British soldiers, always including the Irish, in service in Flanders; that is, they represented just over 6.5% of the total force of the army<sup>27</sup>.

However, it was from 1635 onwards that the Court of Madrid increased diplomatic pressure on Charles I, in order to obtain a greater number of levies in his domains<sup>28</sup>. The outbreak of war with France, the opening of new war fronts and the progressive depletion of human reserves in the territories of the Monarchy increasingly forced the Spanish military leadership to seek alternatives to the traditional recruitment areas, opening the door to mass recruitment of Protestant troops in order to increase the number of *tercios* and regiments in service<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> Donagan, *War in England 1642-1649*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>25</sup> Mesa Gallego, *The Irish in the Spanish Armies*, cit., p. 41.

<sup>26</sup> Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service*, cit., pp. 293-295.

<sup>27</sup> Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, cit., p. 231.

<sup>28</sup> Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, cit., p. 89

<sup>29</sup> On the worsening of the problem due to the demographic impoverishment of the peninsula and the massive use of Protestants, see Maffi, Davide, *Eretici al servizio del re cattolico. Mercenari protestanti negli eserciti spagnoli (secc. XVI-XVII)*, *Rivista Storica Italiana* CXXIII, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Naples, 2011, pp. 510-536.

Spanish pressure before the court of St James was not limited to asking for permission to make levies in the three kingdoms, but also aimed at convincing the Stuart sovereign to go to war against France and the Netherlands<sup>30</sup>. In fact, the 30s were marked by a strong rapprochement in the positions of the two crowns, with the English acting on several occasions in favour of the passage of Spanish ships in the English Channel, providing logistical assistance. There was, then, a good chance that this friendship could lead to a real partnership<sup>31</sup>. Therefore, the Count-Duke of Olivares tried in a number of ways to persuade the English of the advisability of a military alliance, stressing the need to contain Dutch ambitions, which threatened British trade, and to curb French expansionism<sup>32</sup>.

Beginning in 1635, the number of levies ordered from various Scottish warlords and great English nobles began to grow. In March 1636, a Tercio was recruited in England and Scotland, and in January 1638, Lewis Lindsay, Earl of Crawford, commanded a *tercio* of British soldiers he had helped to enlist<sup>33</sup>.

Despite all efforts made by the Spanish authorities, getting new recruits in England and Scotland was always a very difficult matter. It was necessary to fight against the hostility of public opinion, which looked unwillingly on an alliance with a Catholic power. Furthermore, the Spanish had to face strong competition from rivals, not only from Holland, which as already stressed was the natural destination of many of the levies made on the island, but also from France, which from 1635 was one of the privileged destinations of Scottish recruits. After 1635, more than 11,000 Scots joined Louis XIII's army, and between 1638 and 1643 alone, more than 8,000 mercenaries entered the service of France<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> ELLIOTT, John H., *The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1986, pp. 506-508, 535, 542-543, 548-550.

<sup>31</sup> TAYLOR, Harland, *Trade, Neutrality, and the «English Road», 1630-1648*, *The Economic History Review* XXV, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 236-260.

<sup>32</sup> ELLIOTT, John H., *The Year of the Three Ambassadors*, in Lloyd-Jones Hugh, Pearl, Valery and Worden, Blair (eds.), *History and Imagination. Essays in Honour of H.R. Trevor-Roper*, Duckworth, London, 1981, pp. 166-181; and Sanz Camaño, Porfirio, *Spanish-English diplomacy in the 17th century. National Interest and Balance of Power during the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648*, Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla – La Mancha, Cuenca, 2002, pp. 109-135.

<sup>33</sup> Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service*, cit., pp. 115, 295-296.

<sup>34</sup> MILLER, James, *Swords for Hire. The Scottish Mercenary*, Birlinn Limited, Edinburgh, 2007, pp. 201-211.

The search for new soldiers became even more urgent from 1640 onwards, with the rebellion in Catalonia and the uprising in Portugal, which opened up two new war fronts in the interior of the Iberian Peninsula; giving rise to a desperate search for new recruits, which did not end with the outbreak of civil wars in the three kingdoms, but which led Charles I to refuse permission for new levies on the islands. The crisis, which hit the British Isles, also led to the departure from Flanders of some veterans of the Spanish army, such as the English *maestre de campo* Henry Gage, a Catholic nobleman, who left the command of his *tercio* to return to England and take charge of the royal troops against Parliament<sup>35</sup>.

In April 1641, the Earl of Herries asked for permission to make a levy of 2,000 Scots and the following year the Scottish nobleman announced the possibility to make a new levy of people for the service of the king. In 1644, the English Parliament enabled Ambassador Cárdenas to enlist 2,000 soldiers in England<sup>36</sup>. In reality, like many of those that followed, the levies were never fulfilled because of the instability of the three kingdoms and the inability of the various military entrepreneurs to carry out what was agreed with the Crown. Of the thousands of soldiers actually promised in the end only a handful of men were handed over to His Majesty's service.

Among the various adventurers who in these turbulent years offered levies for the service of Philip IV, the figure of Randal Mac Donnell, Marquis of Antrim, a descendant of a large Scottish family who also obtained a few fiefdoms in Northern Ireland at the beginning of the 17th century, is certainly noteworthy. This nobleman offered on several occasions to provide large levies of Scottish and Irish soldiers for the Army of Flanders. As early as November 1644, the Marquis promised to send some 6,000 men of his Scottish and Irish vassals to Flanders. In early 1645, the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo, Governor of the Netherlands, signed an agreement with the Scottish noble whereby his brother, Alexander Mac Donnell, undertook to raise a *tercio* of 1,200 soldiers, to serve in Flanders<sup>37</sup>, in exchange for the post of *maestre de campo*. This was the first of a series of levy capitulations contracted with the

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<sup>35</sup> Donagan, *War in England*, cit., p. 232.

<sup>36</sup> Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service*, cit., pp. 122-123, 125,

<sup>37</sup> OHLMEYER, Jane H., *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms. The Career of Randal MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim*, The Four Court Press, Dublin, 2001, pp. 154-156.

Marquis. In May 1645, during a trip to Brussels, where his wife lived, and after a meeting with the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo, Antrim promised to hand over a *tercio* of 2,000 men, always Scots and Irishmen, on the condition that he would be appointed *maestre de campo*. This proposal was not well received by Philip IV, who underscored the fears of enlisting so many Scots, when many of his compatriots were serving in the army of Louis XIV. In spite of these misgivings, the first promised soldiers began to disembark in Flanders during the summer of 1646 and during the same summer Antrim's wife, who, as has been said, lived in Brussels, sealed a new capitulation with the Spanish authorities on her husband's behalf for the levy of another 1,200 young men, a levy like most of the previous ones that was never fulfilled<sup>38</sup>.

As already stressed, the need to obtain soldiers to tackle the task of regaining control of Catalonia and crushing the rebellion in Portugal led to several proposals in the course of the 40s for levies in England and Scotland to service in the armies operating on the Peninsula. On those occasions, Spain's natural mistrust of troops enlisted in heretical countries was expressed several times at the Council of State, which refused to make use of those soldiers. Remember, as in 1645 the Marquis of Santa Cruz declared against making levies of Danes and English for Spain «because to bring here the English and people from Denmark would be to put in as many heretics<sup>39</sup>». That opinion was shared by many other advisors who, a few months earlier, had declared themselves against a levy of 6,000 Scots, stating that «it is not right to bring them to Spain as heretics»<sup>40</sup>. And even, in the first months of 1646, Don Francisco de Melo declared himself against the English coming to the Peninsula because, according to him, they «will be more profitable in Flanders as well as for the correspondence as for the hinderance of the religion and that which would be spent on the English will be better spent on the Irish»<sup>41</sup>. Finally, in 1647, Philip IV himself instructed the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo that the 2,500 English and 1,500 Scottish men being levied for service in Spain would be better off staying in Flanders, because heretics were better off left there<sup>42</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> OHLMEYER, Jane H., *Civil War and Restoration*, cit., pp. 171-172, 179, 196-197.

<sup>39</sup> AGS E leg. 2063 n.d., Council of State consultation, 21st November 1645.

<sup>40</sup> The King to the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo, 27 July 1645, inCEPB, volume III, cit., p. 531.

<sup>41</sup> AGS E leg. 2165 n.d., Council of State consultation, 15th June 1646.

<sup>42</sup> AHN E leg. 1411 n.d., the King to the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo, 8th August 1647.

The end of the civil wars, with the defeated royalists who were beginning to migrate to the continent, opened up new prospects of being able to enlist soldiers by taking advantage of the situation. From 1647 onwards, several English and Scottish noblemen began to offer to enlist troops among the exiles or simply among their vassals, taking advantage of the ties they still maintained in their homeland<sup>43</sup>.

Already this year, Lord Norris, ambassador of the unfortunate Charles I in Paris, offered to raise about 6,000 men, but his offer was rejected by the Council of State because of the exorbitant price of the operation and the cost of maintaining «alive» the *tercio's* cadre intended by the mentioned English noble <sup>44</sup>. More successful was the Marquis of Montrose, who in 1648 offered to call for a good number of royalist Scottish veterans, a proposal that was welcomed by the Council of State<sup>45</sup>. The proposal of Lord Crawford, a veteran of the Army of Flanders, who took over some of the levies of troops in Scotland, was also well received<sup>46</sup>. The arrival of men from the British Isles continued at a trickle in the following years, although their numbers were always small, and as illustrated later, the creation of an auxiliary corps under the command of the future King of England, from 1656, deprived the army of Flanders of some veterans.

However, despite the suspicions expressed by the Spanish authorities about the effective loyalty of the British troops, the behaviour of these units on the battlefields of Flanders was not so negative. In the 30s, English and Scottish soldiers proved to have good officers<sup>47</sup>. The officers who served in the 50s were almost all veterans of the Royalist army, and in 1659 the Marquis of Caracena declared that the English *tercio* serving in Flanders was one of the best units at his disposal<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup> STRADLING, Robert A., «Filling the Ranks: Spanish Mercenary Recruitment and the Crisis of 1640's», in Idem, *Spain Struggle for Europe 1598-1668*, The Hambledon Press, London, 1994, p. 266.

<sup>44</sup> AGS E leg. 2067 n.d., the State Junta, 8th March 1647.

<sup>45</sup> AGS E leg. 2168 n.d., Council of State consultation, 14th November 1648.

<sup>46</sup> AGS CJH leg. 977 n.d., War Council consultation, 19th February 1651. Ludovick Lindasy, Earl of Crawford, ended his career as a *maestre de campo* for a *tercio* of the Irish fighting on the Peninsula: Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service*, cit., p. 295.

<sup>47</sup> Donagan, *War in England*, cit., p. 232.

<sup>48</sup> AGS E leg. 2095 doc. 95, the Marquis of Caracena to the King, 8th November 1659

### The King of England's army: an auxiliary corps in Flanders

The auxiliary forces were not strictly speaking troops of the King of Spain, but the forces of an ally, or those recruited by one of the German princes, who during the Thirty Years' War specialised in enlisting and maintaining mercenaries with the aim of hiring them to the highest bidder, making them available in exchange for the payment of a sum of money agreed between both parties. These troops maintained their commander in chief, their generals and their officers and were in fact organised as an entirely independent army, operating under the terms of a contract signed between the two parties<sup>49</sup>.

In the early decades of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, a number of auxiliary corps operated in Flanders. Among them were the forces commanded by the Duke of Lorraine, Prince of the Holy Empire, exiled from his territories after the French invasion of 1633, who mobilised a small army at the service of the Spanish Crown throughout the 40s and 50s<sup>50</sup>. Also, the Prince of Condé, who kept a host of German, Irish and French troops at the service of Spain from 1651.

If these two auxiliary forces have been the subject of research in recent decades, little, if any, attention has been paid in Spanish historiography to the aforementioned army of the future King of England, Charles II, which acted in Flanders as an auxiliary Corps to the Army of Flanders from 1656 onwards and remained there until the end of the conflict.

The decision to constitute a corps of troops under the command of the pretender to the throne of England was taken by the political-military leadership of the Monarchy after the attack launched in the spring of 1655 by Cromwell's navy against the Spanish Caribbean, known as «the western design», which envisaged the conquest of a few Spanish possessions in the region by sending a powerful expeditionary force which ended in absolute failure<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>49</sup> On the origin of these forces, see the pages of Maffi, Davide, *In defence of the Empire. The armies of Philip IV and the war for European hegemony (1635-1659)*, Editorial Actas, Madrid, 2014, pp. (xxxx).

<sup>50</sup> The Duke's performance in the service of Spain is highly remembered in the works of Fulaine, Jean-Charles, «Le Duc Charles IV de Lorraine et son armée 1624-1675», Editions Serpenoise, Metz, 1997; and of Martin, Philippe, *Una guerre de Trente Ans en Lorraine 1631-1661*, Editions Serpenoise, Metz, 2002. A different view of the participation of Lorraine's forces on Spain's side that takes into account Spanish sources can be seen in Maffi, *In defence of the Empire*, cit., pp. (xxx).

<sup>51</sup> The British offensive failed completely in its attempt to take over Santo Domingo, the main objective of the London invasion plan. In the end, the only result that could be

At the same time, the Lord Protector began to draw dangerously close to France and, as early as October 1655, a treaty of friendship was signed between both countries, the first step towards a true treaty of alliance. It was signed in March 1657, when the English promised to send an expeditionary force to Flanders to fight alongside the French troops<sup>52</sup>.

The aggression against the Caribbean islands and the change in England's international policy, whose neutrality was also considered essential by Madrid in order to put an end to the long-running war with France (<sup>53</sup>), inevitably led Philip IV to declare war on the English Republic the following January. The entry into the conflict of this new enemy, which had a powerful navy that had defeated the fleet of the United Provinces some years earlier (1652-1654), and a veteran army strengthened by a decade of fighting<sup>54</sup>, led to new difficulties for maritime communications between Spain and its Northern provinces and America<sup>55</sup>. In fact, England's entry into the war definitively sunk Spain's chances of victory<sup>56</sup>. The opening of the conflict with Cromwell definitively blocked the sea route to Flanders, and forced the Spanish Government to seek an alternative route to send reinforcements

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achieved was the conquest of Jamaica, an island that was practically deserted: Gardina Pestana, Carla, *The English Conquest of Jamaica. Oliver Cromwell's Bid for Empire*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2017.

<sup>52</sup> This offensive alliance was a triumph for Mazzarino. Only thanks to English intervention France was able to secure her victory in a war that had hitherto been conducted with little chance of success: Bonney, Richard, *The European Dynastic States 1494-1660*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 240.

<sup>53</sup> In fact, since the proclamation of the Republic in 1649, Spain had tried to maintain good relations with the English, and likewise, Philip IV was the first European monarch to recognise the new state. That position allowed the Spanish monarchy to enjoy the friendship of the Lord Protector in those early years. That policy, as we have seen, failed in the face of Cromwell's aggressive attitude: Herrero Sánchez, Manuel, *The Spanish-Dutch rapprochement (1648-1678)*, Higher Council of Scientific Research, Madrid, 2000, p. 352.

<sup>54</sup> On the first Anglo-Dutch war see Jones, John R., *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century*, Longman, London, 1996. For the English army: Hainsworth, Roger, *The Swordsmen in Power. War and Politics under the English Republic 1649-1660*, Alan Sutton Publishing, Stroud, 1997. There is a huge bibliography on the English Civil War, but see the recent synthesis work of Scott Wheeler, James, *The Irish and British Wars 1637-1654*, Routledge, London, 2002.

<sup>55</sup> The maritime events of the conflict are summarized in the pages of Rodger, N.A.M., «The command of the Ocean. A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815», Allen Lane, London, 2004, pp. 20-32.

<sup>56</sup> USUNÁRIZ, Jesús María; *Spain and its international treaties: 1516-1700*, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2006, pp. 335-336.

to the loyal provinces. Not only did the presence of the English Navy cut the artery that linked Castile to its American colonies, but the annihilation of the «Treasure Fleet» in Tenerife destroyed what was left of the Monarchy's reputation. As already mentioned, according to Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, the end of the arrival of silver remittances from the Indies was one of the main reasons that forced the Crown to seek a dignified peace<sup>57</sup>.

The outbreak of this conflict forced the Monarchy to reconsider its entire policy towards the English royalists and opened the door to the treaty of assistance signed in Bruges on 2nd April 1656, with the exiled Charles II Stuart, pretender to the throne of his country, and son of the unfortunate Charles I, who had sought refuge, once expelled from France, in the Spanish Low Countries<sup>58</sup>.

The objective of the Madrid court in allying with the future king was simply to maintain internal tension in England, in the hope of an uprising in his favour that would weaken Cromwell's position and open the door to a new civil war<sup>59</sup>. Furthermore, it was thought that the alliance with Charles II would have a propitious effect on relations with the Irish, convincing them to move away from the service of France, which like Spain made numerous levies on the island from 1634. More than 30,000 islanders had served in the French armies until 1660<sup>60</sup>, although the Spanish were trying to convince them to leave their former employer<sup>61</sup>.

Thus, the plans provided for the maintenance of a small force, close to 6,000 men, paid for by the King of Spain comprising Irish,

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<sup>57</sup> DOMÍNGUEZ ORTIZ, Antonio, *The flows of the Indies and the foreign policy of Philip IV*, in DOMÍNGUEZ ORTIZ, Antonio, «American Studies», Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 1998. p. 106.

<sup>58</sup> FIRTH, Charles H., *Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657-1662*, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, New Series, XVII, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1903, pp. 67-119, in particular pp. 67-68.

<sup>59</sup> AGS E leg. 8471 fs. 90-91, Don Esteban de Gamarra to Don Luis de Haro, 23rd December 1655.

<sup>60</sup> GOUIER, Pierre, *Mercenaires irlandais au service de la France (1635-1664)*, *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 15, Belin, Paris, 1968, pp. 672-690.

<sup>61</sup> The policy was successful, as some of the Irish in the service of France, in particular almost the entire garrison of Saint Ghislain, taken over by the Army of Flanders at the beginning of the 1657 campaign, deserted to join Charles II's troops: Pérez Tostado, Igor, «Irish Influence at the Court of Spain in the Seventeenth Century», The Four Court Press, Dublin, 2008. p. 36. On the service of the Irish in the armies of the Spanish Monarchy throughout the 16th and 17th centuries there is an overwhelming bibliography. For a detailed view of the process of levying these soldiers, see the work of Mesa Gallego, «The Irish in the Spanish Armies», *cit.*, *passim*.

English and Scottish men loyal to the sovereign, commanded by the King's brother, the Duke of York, and a few veteran royalists who had accompanied the pretender into exile<sup>62</sup>.

Hopes of having a certain number of infantry regiments quickly were soon dashed, as the process of obtaining recruits was greatly delayed and, by the end of 1656, Charles II had only managed to gather a few soldiers. Of the 6,000 soldiers promised in April 1657, the King of England had managed to gather only about 4,000 men divided into five infantry regiments, three of them Irish, one English and one Scottish, which were joined shortly afterwards by a sixth Irish infantry regiment, formed by enlisting a few hundred deserters from the French army, and a small cavalry troop of no more than about 50 horsemen to form a company of guards to protect the Duke of York, commander-in-chief of the royalist troops. Command of these units was given to several great lords who had accompanied the pretender in his exile in France and later in the Spanish Netherlands<sup>63</sup>.

In June 1657, the Duke of York went out on the field with four of the new regiments that reached a force of about 2,000 men. Despite the hopes of the Spanish high command, their performance in that year's operations was low; the King of England's troops took practically no part in any major operation<sup>64</sup>.

Performance was quite different the following year, when an English regiment, a Scottish regiment and three Irish regiments under the Duke of York, fought in the battle of the Dunes<sup>65</sup>. That

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<sup>62</sup> AGS E leg. 8523 n.d., Don Esteban de Gamarra to Don Juan José de Austria, 20th October 1656.

<sup>63</sup> Thus, Lieutenant General Lord Middleton, a veteran of the civil wars, was given command of the Scottish Regiment, although he never commanded it in person. Effective command was assigned to James Livingston, Earl of Newburgh. While Henry Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, another veteran of a hundred battles, was rewarded with an assignment from the English regiment. The Irish units were given to other great English and Scottish men; personalities such as the Marquis of Ormonde, Lord Gloucester, the king's younger brother, who never took over command of the unit that remained in the hands of Lord Theobald Taafe, and the Duke of York, who delegated command to Richard Grace. The last regiment, formed with the Irish deserters from the garrison of Saint Ghislain, was given to the Earl of Bristol: Barratt, John, «Better Begging than Fighting. The Royalist Army in exile in the War against Cromwell 1656-1660», Helion, Solihull, 2016, pp. 30-32.

<sup>64</sup> Firth, *Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657-1662*, cit., p. 75.

<sup>65</sup> The sixth regiment, the Duke of Gloucester's Irish, had been captured by Turenau's troops at Mount Cassel at the beginning of the campaign: Firth, «*Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657-1662*», cit., p. 85.

clash, as we know, ended in a resounding disaster for the weapons of Spain, crushed by the allied Anglo-French forces. During the fight Charles II's own troops suffered a significant number of casualties, so much so that in the following weeks the army of the King of England was reduced to no more than 2,000 men<sup>66</sup>. In the following months, it was possible to get only a few men to complete the regiments that had been severely crushed in the course of the campaign. Thus, in July 1659, in the six regiments in service there were only between two and three thousand men in the ranks<sup>67</sup>.

Despite some historiographical myths, which describe these soldiers as brave professionals and proud fighters, among the best, if not the best of His Catholic Majesty's entire army, the reality was quite different<sup>68</sup>. First of all, amongst the exiles only the noblemen proved to be good soldiers, the other recruits constituted an undisciplined and poorly armed rabble, without any military training, and who deserted en masse. The Irish who served in their regiments were real scum and many of them were deserters from the Spanish army who enlisted not to take part in the campaign, because the troops of the pretender king of England stayed in the barracks until all the levies were completed<sup>69</sup>. As for the English, they were no better soldiers either; drunkards who did not miss the chance to plunder and many of them fled from Dutch territory, so they could go and serve the King of Denmark<sup>70</sup>. As can be seen, they bore no resemblance to the professional «redcoats» who served in the Lord Protector's army.

If such people were kept in service, it was simply to «English Charles II watching his own back»<sup>71</sup>. At the end of the war, only about 4,300 men remained in arms, soldiers so useless that the Marquis of Caracena proposed to reform them. Only the peculiar political situation in England after Oliver Cromwell's death, convinced Philip IV of the need to keep these men in service, with the aim of a probable monarchical succession and to maintain good relations with the Stuart<sup>72</sup>. Although the King of Spain was

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<sup>66</sup> Barratt, *Better Begging than Fighting*, cit., p. 107.

<sup>67</sup> Barratt, *Better Begging than Fighting*, cit., p. 107.

<sup>68</sup> Hainsworth, *The Swordsmen in Power*, cit., pp. 221-223.

<sup>69</sup> AGS E leg. 2088 n.d., Don Juan José de Austria to the King, 8 October 1656.

<sup>70</sup> AGS E leg. 8578 f. 56, Don Esteban de Gamarra to the Marquis of Caracena, 5 October 1657.

<sup>71</sup> AGS E leg. 2095 doc. 95, the Marquis of Caracena to the King, 8 November 1659.

<sup>72</sup> AGS E leg. 2170 n.d., the King to the Marquis of Caracena, 3 December 1659.

right about the restoration with the return to England of Charles II and his coronation in 1660, he was totally wrong about the success of maintaining good relations with the English monarch. Charles did not hesitate to send many of the best English units, Cromwell's veteran regiments, and not the gang of desperados he had gathered in Flanders, to fight alongside Portugal, constituting the best of the Portuguese rebels' shock troops<sup>73</sup>.

In addition to this, the presence of a few thousand Protestant soldiers had opened the door to a series of complaints from the religious authorities in the Spanish Netherlands. On several occasions these men had given occasion for scandal by publicly professing their own faith. For example, the Flemish bishops, disturbed by the example given by Charles II himself, who attended the Anglican rites in Bruges, asked for the King's intervention, so that as those heretical practices would be brought to an end. The protests did not obtain any satisfaction from Madrid: political interests led Philip IV to avoid a clash with the ally in matters of religion<sup>74</sup>.

### **The end of a military tradition: English and Scottish troops in the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century**

The end of hostilities with the French crown in 1659 led to a drastic reduction in the Spanish military establishment in the loyal Netherlands. On the one hand, the Army of Flanders had to send many of its veteran units to fight on the border of Extremadura, in an attempt to regain the Portuguese kingdom. While many other *tercios* and regiments were reformed, and troops discharged in order to save money. This process of reduction of the military machine led the Army of Flanders to be reduced in a few years to only about 11,000 soldiers.

The English and Scottish units, which had still been in the service of the King of Spain in the region, were not exempt from this reform process, and were greatly reduced. In fact, during the second half of the century, the Scottish and English presence

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<sup>73</sup> CHILDS, John: The English Brigade en Portugal, 1662-1668, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 53, 1975, pp. 135-147; Riley, Jonathon *The Last Ironsides. The English Expedition to Portugal 1662-1668*, Helion, Solihull, 2014.

<sup>74</sup> Don Juan de Austria to the King, 28th December 1657, in Lonchay, Henry et al. (eds.), «Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIIe siècle», vol. IV, *Précis de la correspondance de Philippe IV (1647-1665)*, Maurice Maertin, Bruxelles, 1933, pp. 587-588.

declined rapidly, despite the attempts already seen to get men from the «perfidious Albion», and the *tercios* in service in Flanders were reduced to little more than a handful of men. While some 2,300 men, representing 9.6% of all infantry in service, were still serving in 1661, in the following years the force size of these units was progressively reduced: during the Dutch War, according to reviews taken in 1675 and 1678, just over 600 men remained, less than 2% of the force, and by 1689, 1% of the infantry in service had been reduced to just over 150<sup>75</sup>.

However, during the reign of Charles II, given the good relations with the Court of Saint James and later, during the reign of William III in the Nine Years War, attempts were made, on several occasions, to get new levies to complete the British units that continued to serve in the royal armies. In fact, all the attempts to get a high number of soldiers failed, and as we have underlined the British units were reduced to very little. On a single occasion, during the Luxembourg War, thanks to the levies carried out a few years earlier, these soldiers came to represent a visible component of the infantry, when, according to data from the review taken in March 1684, 1,401 men were in service; that is, just over 8% of the total number of infantry in service.

The first attempts at a levy were made in 1667, when the King of England gave permission for a 4,000 men levy to be executed in the British Isles to reinforce the Army of Flanders. It was only possible to hire half of this number and many of them soon defected, as it was not possible to pay them<sup>76</sup>. New plans to consolidate the presence were made in the early 1680s, when the monarch authorised Alessandro Farnese to gather a good number of Irish and Scottish men; in total, some 2,000 men ranked in two *tercios*<sup>77</sup>. These levies were greatly delayed because of the chronic lack of money, and only in March 1682, when the last recruits arrived in Ostend, was it possible to constitute a *tercio* of Scots and a *tercio* of English with a force of 600 men each<sup>78</sup>.

<sup>75</sup> MAFFI, Davide, *The last tercios. The army of Charles II*, Desperta Ferro Ediciones, Madrid, 2020, p. 253.

<sup>76</sup> In fact, a good percentage of these soldiers were Irish, since the levies integrated personnel from the three kingdoms as a whole: Storrs, Christopher, *The Resistance of the Spanish Monarchy 1665-1700*, Editorial Actas, Madrid, 2013., p. 91.

<sup>77</sup> Charles II to Alessandro Farnese, 24 January 1681, in Lonchay, Henry et al (eds.), «Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIIe siècle», vol. V, «Precis de la correspondance de Charles II (1665-1700)», Maurice Mamertin, Bruxelles, 1935, pp. 353-354.

<sup>78</sup> AGS E leg. 3870 n.d., Alessandro Farnese to the King, 25 March 1682.

These units did not always prove to be comprised of true professionals. On several occasions in particular, the High Command in Brussels denounced the poor military behaviour of the soldiers, the indiscipline and the absenteeism of the officers who often did not stay by their men, gradually going home and leaving service. Thus, the great scandal which provoked the action of the *maestre de campo* of the English infantry *tercio*, Sir Joseph Porter, who, as the Marquis of Gastañaga denounced, did nothing but stay in England, leaving his soldiers to their fate. Left without a commander, the *tercio* had been reduced to the minimum, with a large number of officers and very few private in the ranks serving effectively. The outbreak of the Glorious Revolution had further aggravated the situation, as Porter was a fanatical supporter of the last Stuart, the unfortunate James II, and had followed his king into exile, putting himself in the service of France. According to the marquis, it seemed very appropriate to reform the corps, as it had no personnel except the officers, and furthermore, no commander, as Porter would probably not have left his aforementioned loyalty and would remain in France. Consequently, he was not going to return to his post as head of the *tercio*. It was therefore better to reduce the *tercio* to one company in order to save money<sup>79</sup>.

The option of reforming and removing the only remaining *tercio* of British infantry in service was judged inappropriate by the Council of State. It claimed that there had always been English *tercios* in Flanders and that the reform proposed by the governor was not particularly suitable, now that William was King of England and an ally of the Spanish Crown. Therefore, the royal councillors were of the opinion that, as the *maestre de campo* Porter was so fond of France, it was not right to keep him in command. Thus, as far as the command of the unit was concerned, it was considered necessary to contact William III so that he could indicate a new commander that he liked in order to put him in command of the *tercio* and, as consequence of this question, he could have been asked for allowing some recruitments in order to complete the *tercio*<sup>80</sup>.

Between 1660 and 1680, the possibilities of getting soldiers in the British Isles were severely reduced, not only because of the shortage of money, which delayed the possibilities of completing

<sup>79</sup> AGS E leg. 3882 n.d., the Marquis of Gastañaga to the King, 20 July 1689.

<sup>80</sup> AGS E leg. 3882 n.d., Council of State consultation, 8th October 1689.

levies already underway, but also, and sometimes above all, because of the strong recruitment competition of the United Provinces and France. The Dutch always kept a strong contingent of troops from the Stuarts' domains for their service, assembling an infantry brigade with several English and Scottish regiments, which remained in their service from 1660 to 1665 and from 1674 to 1685. These troops were the real spearhead of all Dutch offensives from 1674 onwards<sup>81</sup>. The French, thanks to the alliance signed in 1672 with Charles II against Holland, formed another brigade of regiments enlisted in the three kingdoms, which remained fighting alongside the French until 1678<sup>82</sup>.

The outbreak of the Nine Years War led to further attempts to get Irish troops to serve in the Army of Flanders. We have already seen that, on the occasion of the appointment of another *maestre de campo* for the command of the English *tercio* serving in Flanders, permission was sought to make new recruits on the islands. As late as 1694 and 1695, Spanish ministers tried to convince William III to grant permission to make levies in his domains. However, it was not possible given the British monarch's need to make his own levies in the British Isles to reinforce his army, which was fighting in Flanders on the side of the Allies. In fact, at the end of December 1694, all hopes of enlisting new soldiers for the service of the King were definitively dashed<sup>83</sup>.

In view of the difficulties encountered in obtaining new soldiers, the English and Scottish units – which by 1689, as we have seen, had been reduced to a handful of men, according to the data of the review taken that year, there were no more than 153 soldiers from the British Isles in service, only 1% of all the infantry in service in the Netherlands – had practically ceased to exist during the war<sup>84</sup>. The peace of 1697 did not improve the situation as a general report of the army of 1698 clearly shows how the British

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<sup>81</sup> At the end of the war, four Scottish and three English infantry regiments were still in the States General of the United Provinces: Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, cit., pp. 328-9.

<sup>82</sup> Among the officers commanding these units was the young John Churchill, the future Duke of Marlborough. On the English performance in the armies of Louis XIV see: Manning, «An Apprenticeship in Arms», cit., p. 334. For the composition of the forces sent: Childs, «The Army of Charles II», cit., pp. 244-250.

<sup>83</sup> Charles II to the Duke of Bavaria, 21 December 1694, in Lonchay (eds.), *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, cit., p. 621.

<sup>84</sup> In 1695, the distributions between the three nations of the Islands had already ceased to be recorded as shown by the army sample taken that year: AGS E leg. 3891 n.d., list of officers and soldiers..., undated (but late 1695).

presence in His Catholic Majesty's army was already a memory of the past<sup>85</sup>.

### **Allies of the King of Spain. The British military intervention in the Catholic Low Countries during the Dutch War and the Nine Years War**

Not only did the English and Scottish troops act in Flanders as soldiers in the army of the King of Spain, but also as allies. This happened during the final phase of the Dutch War, when an English expeditionary corps was sent to relieve the Spanish positions in the region and to cope with Louis XIV's aggression, and much more forcefully during the Nine Years War, when William III sent an army to fight in the Spanish Netherlands.

In the first case, England initially started the war as an ally of France. The conflict ended with the peace of 1674<sup>86</sup>, but in the following years the Westminster parliament began to change its policy, moving even closer to the positions of its former adversaries. At the end of 1677, the military situation in Flanders seemed desperate; the French troops who had taken over a few fortresses were still gaining ground<sup>87</sup>. Therefore, on 31 December 1677, the English signed an initial pact with the Dutch that provided for sending an expeditionary corps of about 11,000 infantry soldiers and 1,000 horses, to shore up the Spanish defence system in the region<sup>88</sup>. Not only did England undertake to send an army to the Netherlands, but Charles II also declared ready to dispatch a naval squadron of 20 ships to the Mediterranean, which, together with other Dutch ships, was to ensure control of the Mediterranean routes and to expel the French from Sicily<sup>89</sup>. In addition, the English withdraw the mixed

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<sup>85</sup> AGS E leg. 3893 n.d., Balancing tercios and regiments, companies, living officers, reformed officers, and soldiers, as well as the annual expenditure of the two army plants held respectively in meetings of 21 and 27 September 1698, undated (but September 1698).

<sup>86</sup> On this conflict between the Netherlands and England, the so-called third Anglo-Dutch War, see Jones, J.R., *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century*, Longman, London, 1996.

<sup>87</sup> On the operations in the Netherlands during the Dutch War, see Maffi, «The Last Tercios, cit.

<sup>88</sup> CHILDS, John, *The Army of Charles II*, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 181-185.

<sup>89</sup> Herrero Sánchez, *The rapprochement, cit.*, pp. 391-392. The British decision to intervene in the Mediterranean with the deployment of a navy, which was already planned for the autumn, was decisive in convincing the French monarch, at the end of

Anglo-Scottish brigade fighting as auxiliaries with the French armies, which, as mentioned, had been formed at the beginning of the conflict.

The increase of Dutch and Spanish diplomatic pressure led to the signing of an alliance with Charles II with the Treaty of Westminster, 2 March 1678, by which the country undertook to intervene directly in the conflict. By the beginning of March, the British had virtually completed the levy of 17 infantry battalions, 10 cavalry squadrons and 9 dragoon squadrons with a total of 17,800 men, the first elements of which began to deploy to Flanders at the end of the month. The arrival of the English troops, whose vanguards had begun to land in Ostend, a city destined to become the main base of the English expeditionary force, served to stabilise the situation on this front after the sudden French offensive that had led to the loss of Ghent and Ypres, as it enabled the Spanish army to reorganise. In fact, the appearance of these troops was hardly enough to enable them to cope with the French, as it took several weeks to complete the planned contingent and they were not in a position to begin moving until 13 August. Too late to make a real impact on the progress of the operations<sup>90</sup>.

If Charles II's forces did not fire a shot practically during the 1678 campaign, the performance of the English units during the following conflict was totally different. Firstly, the volume of military involvement was much greater in the case of William III's troops, who played a leading role in many of the armed events that took place in Flanders. It is true that English participation in the war on the continent was fairly limited in the early years of the conflict. The King of England sent 10,972 soldiers to the Netherlands in 1689, only 5,360 in 1690, and just over 11,000 in 1691, representing one-fifth of all Allied troops concentrated in Flanders that year<sup>91</sup>.

The end of the military operations in Ireland, which had so far absorbed almost all the military resources available in the reconquest of the island, enabled the English authorities to swell the ranks of the expeditionary corps fighting with the allies in the

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the year, to definitively abandon any attempt to maintain Sicily, where in 1675 he had sent an expeditionary corps to support the uprising in Messina, giving rise to a fierce fight on the island: Ribot García, Luis, *The Spanish Monarchy and the War of Messina (1674-1678)*, Editorial Actas, Madrid, 2002, pp. 118-122.

<sup>90</sup> Childs, «The Army of Charles II», cit., pp. 186-95.

<sup>91</sup> CHILDS, John, *The Nine Years War and the British Army 1688-1697. The operations in the Low Countries*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p. 162.

Netherlands, making the region the main war front for William III's army<sup>92</sup>. Free from the constraints of the Emerald Isle, the size of the English contingent grew rapidly: about 20,000 men in 1692 and 1693, about 29,000 in 1694 and 1695, 43,000 in 1696 and just over 34,000 in 1697<sup>93</sup>. To these troops were added the auxiliary corps of Germans and Danes, paid by the King of England, which amounted between 11-15,000 men on average per year serving in the Allied army during these years.

William III's troops played an important role in the major military events that took place in the Spanish Netherlands during the entire war<sup>94</sup>. In 1689, the English contingent accompanied the Marquis of Gastañaga and his Spanish troops, during their penetration on France and participated in the battle of Walcourt, when a corps from the French army was defeated by the Allies. The following year, an English detachment was incorporated into the corps under the command of the governor of Flanders which was acting along the border with France.

More evident was the participation of Scottish and English units in the battles that took place at Steinkerque (1692) and Neerwinden (1693). In the first, the Cameronians' Scottish regiment was practically annihilated, losing a third of its strength. The Royal Scots and the Guard also left in disarray<sup>95</sup>. In these two actions, the English infantry equipped with wheel-lock muskets was singled out for its deadly discharges, with the French infantry literally being crushed by the deadly round-fire developed by the Redcoats. The heavy losses suffered in the first battle convinced Louis XIV's ministers to equip their units with these muskets<sup>96</sup>.

Also noteworthy is the participation in the siege of Namur (1695), when English forces cooperated with units of the Army of Flanders under the command of Prince of Vaudemont. Specifically, on the occasion of a sally from the French garrison on 18 August. The

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<sup>92</sup> The literature on King William's war and the end of Jacobite Ireland is overwhelming, and I refer simply to the texts of Simms, J.G., *Jacobite Ireland, 1685-91*, The Four Court Press, Dublin, 2000; and Fitzgibbon, Gerard, *Kingdom Overthrown. Ireland and the Battle for Europe 1688-1691*, New Island Book, Stillorgan, 2015.

<sup>93</sup> Childs, «The Nine Years War», cit., p. 73.

<sup>94</sup> A summary of the military operations carried out by William III's troops can be found in the pages of Childs, *The Nine Years War*, cit., passim. More generally, for the progress of the allied campaigns during this conflict, with particular reference to the Spanish situation, see Maffi, *The last tercios*, cit., pp. 54-85.

<sup>95</sup> Childs, *The Nine Years War*, cit., pp. 201-202.

<sup>96</sup> CÉNAT, Jean-Philippe, Louvois. *Le double de Louis XIV*, Belin, Paris, 2015, p. 202.

French action was stopped by the murderous fire of Lord Cutts' infantry and repelled by the charges of the Spanish cavalry under the command of Count of Rivera<sup>97</sup>.

In short, the British performed a series of assaults, battles and siege by many officers who would be generals of the British Army during the War of the Spanish Succession. Personalities like the already mentioned Lord Cutts, or the Duke of Marlborough, future generalissimo of the Allies, were officers who learned the Art of War in the School of Flanders –as it was called in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century– but that is another story.

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<sup>97</sup> Childs, «The Nine Years War», cit., p. 293.



## Chapter four

### Great Britain and the Spanish War of Succession

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#### Abstract

Britain's role in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) was as much a domestic matter as a foreign policy matter. The war produced tensions between Tories and Whigs, and solidified the Anglo-Scottish union at a time resurgent Jacobitism. English, and 'British' military participation in the war against the Bourbons in Spain helped forge the Anglo-Scottish military union. It also shaped British attitudes towards Spain, changing this from the 'Black Legend' towards a reputation for popular resistance and difficult campaigning. Militarily, the war ended largely victorious from a British perspective. But most importantly, Britain's success prevented the War of the Spanish Succession from turning into a War of British Succession, given foreign support for Jacobinism.

#### Keywords

Marlborough, Stanhope, Mordaunt, popular resistance, army, navy, Anglo-Scottish union, Jacobite, Tories, Whigs, memory, Almansa, Barcelona.



## Context

The Spanish War of Succession is of particular interest considering how it recast Europe and European imperial relations. It is one of the classic 'cabinet wars' of the Early Modern era, the period between the horrors of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and the modern upheaval of the French Revolutionary wars. War was an uncontroversial method of diplomacy, as one royal dynasty protesting the advance of a rival would secure concessions as part of a peace treaty, and a power losing territory in one part of its realm would gain new territory somewhere else. As historian Jeremy Black observed, warfare before the French Revolution was 'litigation by other means'<sup>1</sup>. Some of these wars could have global repercussions, such as the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). But no power sought to exorcise a 'false' religion, as before 1648, or to transform a defeated enemy's politics and society, as after 1792. Soldiers were expensive to arm and supply, so monarchies preferred to maintain a small cadre of long-serving professionals backed up by mercenaries, often foreign in origin. European generals sought wherever possible to avoid battle and to win their campaigns by manoeuvre. In the War of Spanish Succession (1700-1714) there were only about a dozen major battles, whereas during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) there were at least forty<sup>2</sup>. Cabinet war strategy abhorred chance and risk-taking. As Maurice de Saxe wrote in 1732: 'war can be made without leaving anything to chance'<sup>3</sup>. Commanders were aristocrats and often old. They did not need to make their reputations in reckless actions. Armies were not even essential attributes for projecting power. During this era England, and even more, Scotland, survived without large standing armies. England's Royal Navy, which was founded in 1546, over a century before the army was formally constituted in 1660, was rightly called the 'senior service'. Naval power accordingly determined Britain's participation in the War of Spanish Succession more than for any power.

### The War of the Spanish Succession and its historiography

When the childless King Charles II of Spain died in 1700, he offered his throne and possessions in the Netherlands, Italy

<sup>1</sup> HEUSER, Beatrice: *The Evolution of Strategy* (2010), p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> Esdaile, *Napoleon's Wars* (2008), pp. 9-10.

<sup>3</sup> HEUSER, Beatrice *Evolution of Strategy* (2010), pp. 88-89.

and the Americas to Philip of Anjou. Philip was the grandson of Louis XIV, the king of France, Europe's greatest power. Other European powers were alarmed at the prospect of a Bourbon alliance of crowns, so England, Holland, the Holy Roman Empire and Prussia supported a rival claimant to the Spanish throne. This was Archduke Charles, the younger son of the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I. In 1701, along with a number of smaller German states, they formed the Grand Alliance, which was joined in 1702 by Bavaria and 1703 by Portugal. Iberia would be only one theatre of operations in this war, and often a secondary front when compared with the greater concentration of forces and battle along the Rhine and Danube.

The War of the Spanish Succession has recently been called a 'forgotten' world war<sup>4</sup>. The war certainly lacks the attention which has been lavished upon the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) or the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). Spanish historians, appreciating the way the Bourbon ascendancy to the throne fundamentally reshaped their country's political organisation, have afforded the war much greater attention. But even in their case there has been a tendency both to exclude the foreign entanglements produced by the war and to allow the national question to dominate analysis. Whilst a centralist right-wing analysis emerged in the nineteenth century, over the past decades a Catalan nationalist narrative has emerged in sympathy with contemporary regional nationalism. The result has been to tilt of historical attention research towards the Mediterranean littoral<sup>5</sup>. Certainly, the Habsburgs generally received support in the old Crown of Aragón and the Bourbons generally received support in Castile. Contemporaries were also struck by an apparent division in allegiance which went beyond the presence of contending armies. James Stanhope, commander of British forces in Spain, remarked in 1706 that the continent (*sic.*) of Spain is now divided into parties, as formerly into the crowns, of Castile and Aragón. All the latter we are possessed of; and, I believe, the provinces which compose it would be very well pleased to continue thus separated. But this is the thing in the world we ought to fear the most; since such a division would render Spain perfectly insignificant in the balance of Europe<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Stefan Smid, *Der spanische Erbfolgekrieg: Geschichte eines vergessenen Weltkriegs (1701-1714)* (Cologne, 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Angel Smith, *The Origins of Catalan Nationalism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), p. 30; Joaquín Albareda Salvadó, *La Guerra de Sucesión en España* (2010).

<sup>6</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 201-202.

The Spanish historiography is certainly more developed than that originating abroad. The lacuna is somewhat puzzling, considering the war's vast impact: the establishment of a Bourbon dynasty in a more centralised Spain, political changes in Italy and the Low Countries, and the Anglo-Scottish union which sealed Great Britain's rise to European great power status<sup>7</sup>. Britain's alliance with Austria gave London a leading role in Mediterranean operations, the product of which was the most enduring 'rock of contention' in Anglo-Spanish relations, namely the British retention of Gibraltar in the Treaty of Utrecht and thereby naval control of the Mediterranean Sea<sup>8</sup>. The strategic benefits of London's alliance with Austria was often lost on James Stanhope, who frequently complained of the German courtiers' overbearing and militarily illiterate behaviour at the court of the pretender Charles III in Valencia<sup>9</sup>. Despite the enduring British gain of Gibraltar, and shorter-lived gain of Menorca, the English-language historiography has mostly concentrated on two features of the war. It has concentrated first on the dazzling successes of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, along the Rhine and Danube, and second on the ways in which the war accelerated Britain's 'fiscal-military' state and domestic political divisions. The Whigs were more enthusiastic in their prosecution of the war against Louis XIV, whereas the Tories, who had a minority Jacobite wing, were more ambivalent. The Tories who won the general election of 1710 with the aim of ending the war by accepting Philip V as a *fait accompli*. This policy attitude which doomed the pro-Habsburg Catalans whose resistance depended on Britain's naval support. The Tories ended Britain's participation in the war, but in doing so they lost control of its posterity. The Whig view – that the war was justified as a bid to halt French king Louis XIV's ruthless expansion – was accepted by subsequent historians, mostly markedly by the great historian, George Macaulay Trevelyan. And Marlborough's heroic role continued to attract appraisals, including by Marlborough's descendant, Winston Churchill. Churchill wrote an extensive biography of the man during the 1930s, in a context of a rising threat from Nazism in Europe which led the British statesman to draw parallels with the Europe of Louis XIV<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> Hamish Scott, 'The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives and Old' in Matthias Pohl and Michael Schaich (eds.), *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives* (Oxford, 2018), pp. 29-30.

<sup>8</sup> For a classic study of Anglo-Spanish rivalry concerning Gibraltar, see George Hills, *Rock of Contention: History of Gibraltar* (London: Robert Hale, 1974).

<sup>9</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), p. 219.

<sup>10</sup> George Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne (1702-1714)*, 3 vols.; Winston Churchill, *Marlborough: His Life and Times* (Chicago, 2002), 2 vols.

Otherwise, the English-language historiography remains sparse. The popularity of 'Great Man' biographies in the nineteenth century kept studies of Marlborough and, to a lesser extent, Stanhope, in print, especially during times of renewed war in Spain involving foreign armies and interest<sup>11</sup>. When Lord Mahon published his classic study in 1836, he dedicated the volume to the Duke of Wellington, Generalísimo of Allied forces in Spain during the Peninsular War of 1808-1814, and made repeated references to that more recent struggle<sup>12</sup>. He asserted that the Spaniards in the early eighteenth century were 'a brave people with a wretched government ... the same observation holds good with respect to the last Peninsular War'<sup>13</sup>. A foreign history of the dynastic Carlist War (1833-40) made reference to the 'first war of succession' of 1702-13. The late-nineteenth century historical novelist, George Henty, included the War of the Spanish Succession in his nationalistic repertoire of British fighting in Spain<sup>14</sup>. The polarised ideological environment of the Spanish Civil (1936-39) also brought renewed outside interest in Spain's apparent historical propensity for internecine strife<sup>15</sup>. Franz Borkenau, an Austrian Marxist who in 1937 published a famous work on the Republican zone in the Spanish Civil War, celebrated the War of Succession as the «juncture at which the Spanish people arose as historical actors independent of their nobility and higher clergy»<sup>16</sup>. Modern historical analysis had to wait until 1969, when Henry Kamen produced a classic monograph-length study. In 2013 the Spanish Embassy in London hosted an academic symposium dedicated to the tricentenary of the Treaty of Utrecht, whose stipulations concerning Gibraltar remain a stone in the shoe of Anglo-Spanish relations to this day<sup>17</sup>. The most impressive recent study is

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<sup>11</sup> Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History* (London, 1840).

<sup>12</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 85, 95.

<sup>13</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), p. 85.

<sup>14</sup> George Alfred Henty, *The Bravest of the Brave: or With Peterborough in Spain* (London, 1887).

<sup>15</sup> William Bollaert, *The War of Succession of Portugal and Spain, from 1826 to 1840* (London: Edward Stanford, 1870), II, p. 12; Franz Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit* (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Franz Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit* (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), p. 1.

<sup>17</sup> Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700-1715* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969); the papers of the 2013 symposium are published in Trevor J. Dadson and J. H. Elliott (eds.), *Britain, Spain and the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713-2013* (New York: Legenda, 2014).

an edition comprising diplomacy, global history, warfare and its representations<sup>18</sup>.

### Cultural and political context of the War of the Spanish Succession

European attitudes amidst the Enlightenment liked to typecast Spain as an obscurantist counterpoint. Spain's outsized colonial expansion in the Americas seemed less a symptom of Spanish vitality and more of a cause of Iberia's political and economic decline<sup>19</sup>. Seventeenth-century Spain was characterised by a weak central government and overbearing aristocratic blue-bloods, and little changed until Carlos III (1759-1788) bore down on the feudal privileges of Church and nobility<sup>20</sup>. The forbidding spectacle of Spain's baroque royal and Church architecture, designed to overawe rather than enlighten, seemed to symbolise this. Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* argued that climate, religion, laws, government and popular customs forge national character. Whereas warm Spain placed its character in some ways in the positive realm vivacity, passive and sociability, unlike the dull and drunken northern Europeans, other signs were ominous. Montesquieu deemed Spain an Inquisition-prone and priest-addled country, and example of what 'goes wrong' when monarchs refuse to embrace the Enlightenment<sup>21</sup>. Eighteenth-century writers liked to dwell on the decline of empires: the idealised Ancient Greek and Roman empires attracted growing fascination throughout the century. But foreign writers were less charitable about the decline of Spain. Abbé Raynal's 1770 study of European trade with the Indies criticised Spain for its backwardness, as part of a wider Enlightened critique of Spain's empire as leaving no great economic, intellectual, cultural or scientific legacy<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> Matthias Pohligh and Michael Schaich, 'Revisiting the War of the Spanish Succession' in Matthias Pohligh and Michael Schaich (eds.), *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives* (Oxford, 2018).

<sup>19</sup> Matthias Pohligh and Michael Schaich, 'Revisiting the War of the Spanish Succession' in Matthias Pohligh and Michael Schaich (eds.), *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives* (Oxford, 2018), p. 25.

<sup>20</sup> Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700-1715* (London, 1969), pp. 25-41.

<sup>21</sup> Joseph Clark, '«The Rage of Fanatics»: Religious Fanaticism and the Making of Revolutionary Violence', *French History*, Vol. 33, Iss 2 (June 2019), 236-258.

<sup>22</sup> Antonio Feros, *Speaking of Spain* (Harvard, 2017), p. 172.

Only comparatively recently has the Spanish empire gained a more positive appraisal<sup>23</sup>.

Spain occupied a 'black legend' in Britain in the wake of successful Protestant reformations in both England and Scotland. The threat of Spanish invasion in 1588 was answered by popular rumours about Catholic Spanish brutality. Subsequent generations believed the myth that a successful Spanish invasion would have led to Protestant adults being killed and their children branded with 'L' for 'Lutheran'<sup>24</sup>. The Spanish military organisation of 'tercios' was much envied and feared by English observers, given their decisive performance in such battles as the White Mountain in 1620 and Nördlingen in 1634<sup>25</sup>. The seventeenth century saw Spain overtaken by France as chief Catholic challenge to British liberties. But Catholic Spain in decline reaffirmed Britain's Protestant self-image more assuredly than Catholic France on the rise. The fifth of November became doubly sanctified as an anniversary both of the failed Catholic gunpowder plot of 1605 and the landing of the Dutch Protestant invasion (or 'liberation') of England in 1688, the so-called Glorious Revolution. Once the war over the Spanish crown began, Protestant print and religious culture continued the 'black legend' by attributing to Spain itself the cause of its ills. One English sermon preached in January 1705 reflected little on the immediate cause of the war, preferring instead to preach the historic 'cruelty' of Spain as witnessed in the Inquisition and its behaviour in the Indies as causes of the civil war<sup>26</sup>. A nineteenth-century history of the War of the Spanish Succession asserted the decline of the Spanish monarchy since the time of Phillip II, owing to 'bigotry, despotism ... and one long unbroken train of losses, humiliations and disasters'<sup>27</sup>.

Catholic Spain thus continued to be depicted as a cultural and political 'other'. Even so, the domestic impact in Britain of the War of the Spanish Succession also heightened tensions within Protestantism, as well as military reform and the political

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<sup>23</sup> e.g. David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the 'Spanish Miracle', 1700-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>24</sup> William S. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England: The development of anti-Spanish sentiment, 1558-1660* (North Carolina, 1971), pp. 3, 12.

<sup>25</sup> Parker, '»Military Revolution«', p. 205.

<sup>26</sup> Andrew C. Thompson, 'War, Religion, and Public Debate in Britain during the War of the Spanish Succession' in Matthias Pohligh and Michael Schaich (eds.), *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives* (Oxford, 2018), pp. 190-191, 195.

<sup>27</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), p. 1.

settlement between England and Scotland. Despite England's recent Glorious Revolution, the religious question still underlay disputes between Tory and Whig factions. On the venerated date of 5 November 1709, Henry Sacheverell, a Tory Anglican clergyman launched an incendiary sermon which spent very little time condemning the old enemy (Catholicism) and a great deal condemning dissenting Protestants who were challenging the religious monopoly of the Church of England. The sermon was a thinly veiled attack on the Whigs. Riots swept the country targeting dissenters, and some of the ten thousand Calvinist war refugees from Germany, amidst a general discontent caused by the high taxation and impressment for the war in Spain. The seemingly endless war caused disquiet amongst elites, too. The National Debt rose from 14 million pounds in 1702 to 36.2 million by the end of the war, and the anguished Tory faction supported withdrawal from Spain in return for concentration on naval warfare. Raiding enemy vessels brought prize money, which defrayed the costs of war and blockaded enemy trade in a manner which boosted British commerce. Whig attempts to prosecute Henry Sacheverell increased the tension to such an extent that in spring 1710 the Tories won a landslide in that year's general election, and Queen Anne replaced her Whig administration with one led by Tories<sup>28</sup>.

The War of the Spanish Succession transformed the recruitment of the English army. The English army was small by continental standards (unlike its navy), and poorly regarded by a society which was opposed to standing armies in the wake of the Glorious Revolution (1688-89). More even than in Spain, society in England was inclined to see soldiers as criminals and burdens on the community. These popular attitudes were confirmed when over 50,000 soldiers were demobilised between 1697-99 in the wake of the Nine Years' War, which led to a crime wave across England<sup>29</sup>. In 1704 the Westminster parliament introduced the first law allowing the press-ganging, or forced enlistment, of men into the army. Repeated laws to this effect were passed until 1712, owing to the costly operations in Spain, and press-ganging of some sort remained legal in Britain until 1780. Unemployed,

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<sup>28</sup> Manuel Castellano García (2020), 'Construyendo la paz de Utrecht: las negociaciones secretas entre Francia y Gran Bretaña y la firma de los preliminares de Londres' in Cuadernos de Historia Moderna, Vol. 45, No. 1, 199-232, pp. 202-206.

<sup>29</sup> John Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army in the late-seventeenth century' in War and Society, Oct.1997, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 1-17.

vagrant and imprisoned young men tended to be targeted for enlistment, and even these often absconded upon release from prison or on their way to ships<sup>30</sup>.

Even though the War of the Spanish Succession barely shifted domestic attitudes toward the army, it did finalise the military union of England with Scotland. The British neighbours had already been united via the union of the crowns of 1603. Once England established a standing army in 1660, its poorer and smaller royal neighbour languished without a developed officer corps and without a militia. Ambitious Scots thus sought service in English regiments, like during the Nine Years' War, which meant that the English and Scottish officer corps was already partly integrated before the Act of Union of 1707<sup>31</sup>. The Scots Greys, an elite cavalry regiment, served in Spain and took a leading role suppressing a Jacobite rising in Scotland after that war<sup>32</sup>. English and Scottish veterans of the war in Spain became 'British', and by defeating the Jacobite rising of 1715 they ensured that it did not turn into a War of the British Succession.

### Britain's role in the war in Spain

The Allied war effort opened with an unsuccessful Allied attack on Cádiz in 1702. Some 14,000 Dutch and English troops were embarked on a total of 160 ships. But not for the last time the Allies squabbled, impeding their coordination, as there was no unified command. Captain-General of Andalucía, Francisco del Castillo, maximised the slender and run-down forces at his disposal. These forces were boosted by a levy of peasants throughout western Andalucía. These recruits were dismissed by Stanhope as 'rascally foot militia'<sup>33</sup>. But they freed up defending cavalry squadrons to attack the disembarked Allied troops. Even though the Allies captured Puerto de Santa María, the looting and defacing of churches by soldiers alienated the population, ending all hopes that an invasion might promote popular support for the Habsburg cause. Attempts by the Allies to entrench themselves

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<sup>30</sup> Arthur N. Gilbert, 'Army Impressment during the War of the Spanish Succession' in *The Historian: A Journal of History* Volume: 38 Issue 4 (1976), 689-708.

<sup>31</sup> Hew Strachan, 'Scotland's Military Identity' in *The Scottish Historical Review*, Oct., 2006, Vol. 85, No. 220, Part 2 (Oct., 2006), pp. 315-332, 320.

<sup>32</sup> Victoria Henshaw, *Scotland and the British Army, 1700-1750: Defending the Union* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 89-90.

<sup>33</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), p. 51.

around the coast were ineffective, and on 30 September 1702, five weeks after the disembarkation, the Allied troops withdrew to sea once more<sup>34</sup>.

The Anglo-Dutch effort to establish 'Carlos III' was proving difficult beyond coastal areas of Spain where the Allies' naval superiority could be brought to bear. After having been repulsed at Cádiz, the Anglo-Dutch fleet scored a resounding victory at the Battle of Vigo Bay on 23 October 1702. A huge Spanish treasure fleet was captured and the entire French and Spanish fleet either captured or destroyed. British-led forces captured Gibraltar in 1704. The strategic value of this rock on the Andalucía coast was not fully appreciated by either side at this time. The Allied assault which began with a bombardment on 2 August 1704 was opportunistic and the Spanish garrison commanded by Diego de Salinas amounted to only one hundred men. Despite Salinas offering stiff resistance, English troops managed to scale the rock on its unguarded eastern face and to overwhelm Salinas's small force. After Salinas surrendered with full military honours, the Allies left behind a garrison of two thousand troops and sailed in search of more targets<sup>35</sup>.

### Popular resistance

A unified Allied command finally arrived in April 1705, when Charles Mordaunt, third Earl of Peterborough, was made commander of Anglo-Dutch land forces in Spain. But Mordaunt was criticised for slowness in caution, both during the siege of Barcelona in 1705 and in the half-hearted support he gave to Lord Galway's march on Madrid in 1707<sup>36</sup>. His campaign against Barcelona was hampered by faulty intelligence. The defending garrison turned out to be almost equal in size to his own, and Mordaunt was torn between the pleas of Charles III to besiege the city without delay, and the more cautious counsel of his Austrian allies<sup>37</sup>. An Allied attempt to take Barcelona in 1704, after all, had been repulsed.

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<sup>34</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 52-60.

<sup>35</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 63-64, 99-101.

<sup>36</sup> Galway was a French Huguenot in the English service who had commanded Allied forces in Portugal since 1704.

<sup>37</sup> John Friend, *An Account of the Earl of Peterborough's Conduct in Spain* (London: W. Wise, 1707), pp. 4-7.

Also, Mordaunt had been sent to lead Allied forces in Iberia in May 1705 with only vague instructions from Queen Anne. Her guidance advised Mordaunt to take whichever actions he deemed fit and to collaborate with other Allied forces, who, in the case of Portugal, proved reluctant to commit to offensive action in Andalucía<sup>38</sup>. Also, Mordaunt noted from the outset that the Allies' attempts to control Castile were contested by widespread episodes of popular resistance. As he confided to Stanhope in 1706, «Assure yourself that in Castile there is a most violent spirit against us, which appears to a degree that could not be believed»<sup>39</sup>. Mordaunt was eventually recalled to England and charged with incompetence amidst allegations that he had failed to pay the Allied garrison at Valencia. The kingdom of Valencia had been in turmoil even since the anti-seigneurial rising of the *maulets* in 1704. Mordaunt's occupation of the city of Valencia on 4 February 1706 was a form of counter-revolution, as a pro-noble Viceroy accompanied his troops to replace the pro-peasant, Juan Bautista Basset y Ramos<sup>40</sup>. Soon afterwards Mordaunt was recalled to England, his reputation tarnished by suspicions that he was out of sympathy with the Habsburg cause in Spain. His downfall became a proxy for partisan rivalry between dovish Tories and hawkish Whigs. Mordaunt's replacement by James Stanhope was accompanied by animosity between these two men who had previously been friends.

Mordaunt's unease at the indifference, or outright hostility, the Habsburg cause attracted in Castile, was not helped by the Spanish use of irregular tactics. In fact, Spain's enduring reputation as a seat of guerrilla warfare begins with the War of Succession, not the more famous Peninsular War (1808-1814). To a large degree irregular warfare was a product of Spanish geography. The arid and underproductive nature of the Spanish meseta was different from fertile France, and campaigns in Iberia suffered accordingly. Henri IV (1553-1610) remarked how «large armies invading Spain starve whereas small ones are swallowed up by a hostile population»<sup>41</sup>. The Victorian small

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<sup>38</sup> Julio Luis Arroyo Vozmediano, 'Francisco de Velasco y los catalanes. Sitio y capitulación de Barcelona, 1705' in *Hispania*, 2014, vol. LXXIV, nº. 246, enero-abril, 69-94, pp. 76-80.

<sup>39</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), p. 202.

<sup>40</sup> Carmen Pérez Aparicio (2009), 'Don Juan Bautista Basset y Ramos. Luces y sombras del líder austracista valenciano', *Estudis: Revista de Historia Moderna*, 35, 133-164.

<sup>41</sup> Edward Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, p. 41.

wars expert, Charles Callwell, explained how the mobility of an army was in inverse proportion to its size, and that «the moral effect produced on the enemy by the occupation of wide stretches of territory, and in the influence that the appearance of hostile bodies on all sides must exert on a people who know how to turn the situation to account»<sup>42</sup>. The inability to sustain large armies over protracted times made irregular tactics like ambush more attractive. An Allied attack at Villena in February 1707 during the offensive towards Madrid was frustrated by a brilliant ambush laid by the Bourbon forces commanded by Marshal Berwick, as an eyewitness recalled<sup>43</sup>:

*I had placed a regiment of cavalry in an advanced post as the fittest officer in the army to give me proper intelligence he received advice that a large convoy destined for the troops that were in the Vale of Castalla was to be sent from Alicante upon which he placed himself in ambuscade at half a league's distance from Alicante with fourscore select troops. Instead of the convoy, he saw an English battalion come out of the city, which he suffered to approach within 50 paces of him; perceiving then that the battalion was marching in a column with their arms slung, and without any suspicion of him, who was concealed in a bottom surrounded with trees he sallied out on a sudden and forced his way at full speed into the midst of the battalion which had neither time to recollect itself nor to form. He killed 100 of them and took the remaining 400 with their baggage. He had not more than four of his horsemen killed or wounded.*

As Lord Stanhope's descendant and biographer remarked in the 1830s,

In Spain it was shown in the War of the Succession, and again more lately in our own times that the possession of the chief city is of scarcely any avail either to the foreign enemy or to the native partisan twice did the archduke Charles three times did Joseph Bonaparte advance in triumph towards Madrid and as often did they learn that it is one thing to seize the Castle in capital and another thing to subdue the Castilian people thus what in France is the consummation of conquest with the Spaniards is hardly its commencement and thus under every possible disadvantage

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<sup>42</sup> Charles Callwell, 'Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns', *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Vol. 31, p. 367.

<sup>43</sup> cit. James Falkner, *Marlborough's Wars: Eyewitness Accounts 1702-1713* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2005), p. 220.

from wretched armies wretched generals wretched laws and wretched governments they have maintained will continue to maintain their independence<sup>44</sup>.

During the Allies' retreat from Madrid Castilian villagers grew alienated by the army's demands for provisions. Allied forces, like so many in the Early Modern era, depended upon private contractors for their supplies<sup>45</sup>. Private interest persisted. Colonels owned their regiments, controlling pay, recruitment and discipline, and even profits given that logistics depended on private contractors<sup>46</sup>. This military enterprise system worked well in prosperous areas of Europe, and in the case of the French army was at its most developed during the War of the Spanish Succession<sup>47</sup>. But in marginal agricultural areas, like most of Castile, contractors failed to source sufficient local supplies. The pillaging of armies thus produced a major backlash that expressed itself in the outbreak of a savage guerrilla war. At the village of Campillo enraged locals massacred wounded soldiers from the Coldstream Guards. The Allies inculpated the local priest, hanging him at the door of his own church<sup>48</sup>. Officers shared an identity based on honour, sociability with peers and on public esteem. Civilian violence towards them threatened military honour and denied the perpetrators the right to mercy<sup>49</sup>.

While the Allies campaigned across a despondent Castilian countryside, Philip V's Spanish realm faced financial turmoil. The loss of the treasure vessel at Vigo, combined the cost of war, led Philip V to rely increasingly on French arms and money for Spain's defence. 1706 had thus marked an *annus horribilis* for the Bourbon cause in Spain, with cities across Catalonia, Aragón and Valencia having fallen to the allies. To the loss of Gibraltar in 1704 was added Barcelona in 1705, and Alicante, Ibiza and Mallorca in 1706. Bourbon attempts to recapture Barcelona were

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<sup>44</sup> Earl Philip Henry Stanhope, *History of the War of Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836) pp. 393-394.

<sup>45</sup> For a positive appraisal of this system, see David Parrott, *The Business of War* (Cambridge, 2012).

<sup>46</sup> Herfried Muenkler, 'Clausewitz and the Privatisation of War' in Hew Strachan and Andreas Hergerg-Rothe (eds.), *Clausewitz in the twenty-first century* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 226-227; Anderson, *War and Society in Europe* (1988), pp. 47-48.

<sup>47</sup> Parrott, *The Business of War*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>48</sup> Daniel Defoe, *Memoirs of Captain Carleton* (London: E. P. Dutton, 1929), pp. 149-151.

<sup>49</sup> Owen Brittan (2017), 'Subjective Experience and Military Masculinity at the Beginning of the Long Eighteenth Century' in *Journal for Eighteenth-century Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 273-290, p. 276.

defeated. An English captain George Carleton managed to rally some retreating troops outside the city, reinforcements and supplies flowed incessantly into the city, and even a solar eclipse on 12 May 1706 was celebrated in the city as 'the demise of the Sun King' (Louis XIV)<sup>50</sup>.

But 1707 marked an *annus mirabilis* for the Bourbons. An English attempt to seize the southern French port of Toulon failed. Even though the French were forced to scuttle most of their warships in order to prevent the Allies from seizing or burning them, granting the Allies naval control of the Mediterranean, this domination mattered little in terms of conquering land-locked Castile. Even though British naval control of the eastern Spanish seaboard guaranteed a safeguard for an Allied presence of some sort in Spain for the rest of the war, there were no navigable rivers permitting the landing of supplies and men in Castile.

Even worse for the Allies, on 25 April 1707, five months before their naval success at Toulon, their armies suffered a decisive defeat at Almansa. The Bourbon victory at Almansa in 1707 rescued Philip's cause. The Duke of Berwick used his cavalry brilliantly. Even though an English-led counterattack against the Spanish right flank almost succeeded, the Bourbons carried the day. The defeated Allied infantry could not keep pace with its cavalry in retreat, and barely 800 escaped death or capture. The Allies also lost all their baggage and all their twenty-four cannon<sup>51</sup>. The defeat was politically controversial in Britain. The Westminster parliament debated why only 8,000 British troops were available to fight at Almansa, even though Parliament had approved an army of 29,000 to be sent to the Iberian Peninsula<sup>52</sup>. Unlike Marlborough's campaign in Germany and Low Countries, the Spanish theatre was seldom at the forefront of public attention, a situation created as much by the existence of far faster and more reliable postal communications with northern Europe as by Marlborough's undoubted military genius<sup>53</sup>. News arriving from

<sup>50</sup> William Hazlitt (ed.), *The Works of Daniel Defoe: with a memoir of his life and writings* (London: John Clements, 1841), Vol. II, p. 21.

<sup>51</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 231-234.

<sup>52</sup> Arthur N. Gilbert, 'Army Impressment during the War of the Spanish Succession' in *The Historian: A Journal of History* Volume: 38 Issue 4 (1976), 689-708, p. 704.

<sup>53</sup> Matthias Pohl, 'Speed and Security: Infrastructuring the English Postal Service to the Low Countries during the War of the Spanish Succession' in Matthias Pohl and Michael Schach (eds.), *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives* (Oxford, 2018), pp. 343-349.

Spain of radical changes in fortune thus generated more impact. Militarily the defeat was disastrous for the Habsburg cause in Spain. Within a month of Almansa the Duke of Berwick cleared virtually all of Valencia and Aragón of Habsburg control. The Bourbons began the task of imposing Castillian law onto these territories, at the same time as a peaceful union between England and Scotland was established which respected the latter's different legal system<sup>54</sup>. Meanwhile, only the fortified towns of Denia, Alicante and Xàtiva held out for the Allies. Whereas the former two could be resupplied by sea, Xàtiva was overwhelmed after a bitter siege and a brutal onslaught. The indiscriminate killing of both civilians and surrendered English soldiers was noteworthy even at a time in European history when stormed cities were considered 'fair game' for atrocities by enraged troops<sup>55</sup>. Xàtiva was destroyed at Berwick's express orders and its surviving civilians expelled. Even its name was extinguished and replaced with San Felipe in honour of the victorious Bourbon cause<sup>56</sup>. To this day a local museum in restored Xàtiva hangs a portrait of Philip V upside-down in memory of the historical insult.

After Almansa it was largely only Catalonia that remained in Habsburg hands. But threats to Louis XIV's eastern borders caused the withdrawal of Bourbon troops, especially during 1709, which gave the Habsburg forces a second wind. This opportunity was exploited by James Stanhope, Mordaunt's replacement as commander of British forces in Spain. Stanhope, first Earl Stanhope, had been born in Paris as the son of a prominent diplomat, and had spent his youth in Madrid. As he was the grandson of England's ambassador, he got acquainted with Spanish language and culture<sup>57</sup>. In 1706 Stanhope was appointed British plenipotentiary to Habsburg Spain, which enabled him to promote British commercial interests. He tried to emulate the advantages which Britain had secured in Portugal in 1703, most importantly via access to Spain's American markets.

But Stanhope was most effective at his forward policy in Spain and in the Mediterranean. In September 1708, Lieutenant-

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<sup>54</sup> The Act of Union between Scotland and England commenced on 1 May 1707.

<sup>55</sup> Michael Bryant, *A World History of War Crimes: From Antiquity to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 74-77.

<sup>56</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 237-240.

<sup>57</sup> Earl Philip Henry Stanhope, *History of the War of Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836) pp. 177-178.

General James Stanhope captured Menorca. But Louis XIV's troubles on France's eastern borders allowed Stanhope the chance to avenge the Allies' disaster at Almansa. In the summer of 1710 Stanhope led an Allied advance on Madrid. The city had been occupied once before – by the Portuguese in 1707 –but neither this occupation of the Spanish capital, nor its repeat in 1710, could persuade Castilians to yield to the Habsburg claim. Stanhope would discover, like many other conquerors before and since, that capturing Madrid could never induce the sort of despair in the country that the capture of Paris or London might in France and England respectively<sup>58</sup>.

### The second attempt: the Allied march on Madrid, 1710

During the spring of 1710, James Stanhope visited London where he urged a greater British effort in Spain. By the summer Allied forces in Catalonia finally matched those of the Bourbons, and offensive operations resumed. On 27 July 1710, at the Battle of Almenar, the Bourbons were ousted from Catalonia. The Allies occupied a more elevated position with the sun at their backs on a very hot afternoon. The battle involved about 30,000 troops on both sides, as well as the presence of both claimants to the Spanish throne. Stanhope's victory allowed his cavalry to pursue the Bourbon retreat to Madrid<sup>59</sup>. Stanhope accused his subordinates of waiting too long to support his cavalry thrust that day, and of frustrating his plan to destroy the Bourbon field army<sup>60</sup>. But his campaign progressed nonetheless, capturing Zaragoza on 21 August 1710 and clearing Aragón of Bourbon control. Stanhope had hoped that the civilian population would now rally to the Habsburg cause. But this was not to be. As he complained in a letter of 4 July 1710: «We expected an insurrection in Aragón, and that the enemies would have followed us, and marched out of the country; but neither happening, and on the contrary, the enemies applying their thoughts to intercept our convoys ... and I am sorry to say that we have very few deserters, and of those few

<sup>58</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 351-352.

<sup>59</sup> José Cepeda Gómez, 'La historia bélica de la Guerra de Sucesión Española' in *En nombre de la paz: La Guerra de Sucesión Española y los Tratados de Madrid, Utrecht, Rastatt y Baden 1713-1715* (Madrid: Fundación Carlos Amberes, 20 December 2013-23 February 2014), pp. 119, 132.

<sup>60</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 302-304.

hardly any are Spanish; and, from all that we can learn, we have good reason to be persuaded that the Castilians in general, and this army more particularly, are so firmly riveted in the Duke of Anjou's interests. That nothing but force can dispossess him»<sup>61</sup>.

Even though the Allies rallied in 1710 with a new offensive through Aragón into Castile, the civilian population remained hostile. The Allies' capture of Madrid in 1710 was the high point of the Habsburg campaign in Spain. The presence of even the pretender Charles III could not raise much public spectacle beyond the natural curiosity of the capital's street-children. The hostility of elites increased once Charles III expelled from the capital nobles who refused to switch their allegiance. The announcement of the death penalty for any expellee returning to the capital, combined with news of outrages committed by 'heretical' troops at religious sites, lost the Allies any hope of collaboration<sup>62</sup>. This poor impression, combined with the Allies' undoubtedly overextended supply lines, caused a crisis in the Allied command. Stanhope demanded an aggressive campaign to link up with his Portuguese allies in the west. The Bourbon forces, he concluded, were still off-balance, and even the worst damage they could inflict – a march to cut the Allied supply lines along the Pyrenees – posed little risk given that the rigours of winter were in any case forcing the Allies to live off the land. The Portuguese forces lay around 200 hundred kilometres west, at Almaraz. If Almaraz could be reached, and its key bridge across the Tajo secured, then the Allies would achieve the link-up with Portugal and cut Bourbon Spain in two.

But by the time that Stanhope could convince Guido Staremberg, commander of the Austrians in Spain, to join the endeavour, the Bourbons had manoeuvred against this threat. The Duke of Vendôme seized Almaraz and its bridge, pushing the Portuguese into retreat towards their own frontier, and Charles III ordered a general retreat from Madrid. At Brihuega part of the Allies' retreating force, the part commanded by Lord Stanhope, was defeated and forced to surrender. While the British troops rested in the town, they were suddenly surrounded by Vendôme's vastly superior troops, and a relief force commanded by Staremberg arrived too late to change the events of the 6 December. The

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<sup>61</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 298-299.

<sup>62</sup> Cristina Borreguero Beltrán, 'Imagen y propaganda de guerra en el conflicto sucesorio (1700-1713)' in *Manuscripts*, 21, 2003, 95-132, pp. 123-124.

British fortified the town, but they had no artillery, and the wall around the town was dilapidated. Vendôme's troops used artillery to batter the walls and storm the town. The British repulsed the first attack and Vendôme's troops suffered heavy losses. A second attack succeeded when the British troops, having spent all their ammunition, tried desperately to defend their position with stones and missiles<sup>63</sup>. The surviving British troops surrendered, just a day before Staremburg's vanguard arrived at Villaviciosa de Tajuña, only five kilometres from Brihuega, and mauled Vendôme's army. Vendôme suffered about 4,000 casualties and several guns. But the Allies could not hope to keep the field in the wake of Stanhope's disaster. Staremburg salvaged what remained of the Habsburg army – some 8,000 men – and set on a general retreat to Catalonia. He had no draught animals to carry away the French guns, which instead were spiked and abandoned<sup>64</sup>.

Stanhope negotiated generous terms for capitulation, but these terms were violated, as surrendered soldiers ended up being separated from their officers and dispersed in unwelcoming Castilian villages. There was nothing in the international laws of war or custom to prevent the Bourbon behaviour. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 prisoners of war had the right to return home after hostilities without being subjected to a ransom. But no international laws regulated the treatment of prisoners of war during their captivity until the turn of the twentieth century. In this case the English captives were exchanged for Franco-Spanish captives the following year<sup>65</sup>.

The Allies' retreat thereafter was relentless. A strong Allied position in Catalonia at the very least might have held indefinitely. The British navy controlled the Mediterranean in the wake of Toulon, and the Catalans saw in the Allied side their best hope for preserving their autonomy. But the death of the Habsburg emperor on 17 April 1711 changed strategic calculations. As the pretender, 'Charles III of Spain', was now also heir to the Habsburg crown in Vienna, the Allies ran the risk of replacing a domineering Franco-Spanish Bourbon monarchy with an overbearing Austro-Spanish Habsburg

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<sup>63</sup> Richard Cannon, *Historical Record of the First or The Royal Regiment of Dragoons: From Its Formation in The Reign of King Charles the Second and of Its Subsequent Services To 1839* (London: William Clowes, 1836), p. 51.

<sup>64</sup> James Falkner, *Marlborough's Wars: Eyewitness Accounts 1702-1713* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2005), p. 227.

<sup>65</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 321-322, 340-341.

version. With the ascendant Tories in Britain keen on a compromise peace and secret peace feelers to the exhausted French bearing some fruit, the stage was set for Allied disengagement from Spain. During the peace talks of 1711 the French dominated Spanish affairs, thinly disguising their interest by claiming that Philip V's resolve in protecting his Spanish crown in war would be honoured also in peace. But by 1711, Spanish troops were forming the lion's share of the effort against the Allies in Spain<sup>66</sup>.

For the Allied powers, a Habsburg union of the Spanish empire with Austria seemed hardly preferable to a Spanish union with France. Britain, especially, was worried at the prospect of Habsburg domination in Europe and the Americas. By 1713 the Treaties of Utrecht ended the war between the Bourbon and Habsburg sides. British prisoners held at Burgos at the conclusion of peace could not believe that their government had agreed to a peace settlement which did not involve the Habsburg claimant taking the Spanish throne<sup>67</sup>. Philip V was recognised as legitimate king of Spain and Emperor of Spanish America. But he relinquished his claim to the French throne and Spanish territories in the Low Countries and Italy. Portugal retained its colonies and Britain retained Gibraltar, Minorca, and significant trading rights with Spanish America. But the civil war in Spain was not yet over. The Allied abandonment of the Catalan cause led to rancour both in Barcelona and amongst pro-Catalan commentators, mostly Whigs, in Britain. One commentator, Michael Strubell, touched a nerve by publishing his *Deplorable History of the Catalans*<sup>68</sup>. The Catalans fought on, despite the Anglo-French peace of 1713. The death of Queen Anne on 1 August 1714 came too late to effect a change in official British attitudes towards the Catalans. Even though Anne's Hanoverian successor, King George, Elector of Hannover, was more sympathetic, his attention was distracted by a renewed Jacobite attempt on the British throne in 1715<sup>69</sup>. Barcelona was finally captured on 11 September 1714. The conquering Bourbons treated Barcelona harshly, if not bloodily, and stripped the city and the Principality of most of its autonomy.

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<sup>66</sup> Lord Mahon, *The War of the Succession in Spain* (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 347-353.

<sup>67</sup> Ilya Berkovich, *Motivation in War: the Experience of Common Soldiers in Old-Regime Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 203.

<sup>68</sup> Ricardo García Cárcel, *Felipe V y los Españoles* (Barcelona: Debolsillo, 2002), p. 115.

<sup>69</sup> Archibald S. Foord, *His Majesty's opposition 1714-1830* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 44.

### The legacy of the War of the Spanish Succession for Britain

The War of the Spanish Succession was in many ways a second war of the British succession. A British defeat would probably have led to the restoration of the Jacobite line and a likely protracted civil war. As recently as 1689, Britain had faced a major Jacobite revolt, and another followed peace in 1715.

But there are further parallels to be drawn with Spain. In both countries, the threat of regional backlash against centralisation was solved with the Anglo-Scottish Act of Union of 1707 and the Nueva Planta decrees of Philip V. The major difference was a paradoxical one. On the one hand, Scotland, unlike Catalonia, possessed a heritage of independent statehood<sup>70</sup>. But on the other hand, Jacobitism in Scotland never achieved the degree of support that *austracismo* had managed in Catalonia and Aragón. Another parallel lies in the constitutional settlement of both countries. The accession of Bourbon Philip V was agreed with the proviso that there would be no union of the crowns of Spain and France. The death of the first and last Stuart queen of Britain, Queen Anne, in August 1714, bestowed the British with a diametrically opposed problem. As all surviving Stuart lines were Catholic, the closest heir to the British throne lay in the House of Guelph in Protestant Hanover. When in 1701 it had become clear that the next Protestant heir would be of the Guelphic line, the English Parliament passed what would become known as the Act of Settlement in 1701:

«That in case the Crown and imperial dignity of this realm shall hereafter come to any person, not being a native of this Kingdom of England, this nation be not obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories which do not belong to the Crown of England, without the consent of Parliament<sup>71</sup>».

The original intention was that Britain would never have to commit to the extension of Hanover's territory within the Holy Roman Empire, and so would avoid getting dragged into whatever squabbles should occupy the German Princes at any given time. Hanoverian Britain would not merge with Guelphic Hannover any more than Bourbon Spain would merge with France.

<sup>70</sup> John Elliott, 'The Road to Utrecht: War and Peace' in Trevor J. Dadson and J. H. Elliott (eds.), *Britain, Spain and the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713-2013* (New York: Legenda, 2014).

<sup>71</sup> *mcit.* Jeremy Black, *Continental Commitment, Britain, Hanover and interventionism 1714-1793* (Oxford, 2005), p. 25.

The war helped to cement the Anglo-Scottish union of 1707. James Stanhope's son, Philip Stanhope, relished the union. He noted how Glasgow was being transformed from «a petty huckster of a town into a mart of manufacture»<sup>72</sup>. Scotland, whose disastrous attempts to establish a colony on the Panamanian Isthmus in the 1690s had squandered a fifth of all available Scottish capital, got to share its debt with England and to share access to its southern neighbour's growing empire. Thus, Britain's role in the War of the Spanish Succession bestowed Europe with a surprising legacy. England and Scotland were united even though Scotland's separate legal and religious structure was unaffected. Spain, as Henry Kamen argued, also emerged strengthened from its dynastic war, in contrast to the inertia and pessimism of its late seventeenth century<sup>73</sup>. But the Bourbon victory in Spain suppressed much of Aragón's legal and political autonomy. It allowed the gradual militarisation of the Spanish monarchy, including a gradual increase in the intensity and regularity of conscription<sup>74</sup>. The War of the Spanish Succession also left a modernising military impact in Britain. It helped the British regular army evolve from being little more than a royal bodyguard in 1660 into being a major 'continental' army.

Britain secured a strategic victory in the War of the Spanish Succession: possession of Gibraltar, the coveted 'asiento' monopoly on the slave trade with Spanish America, and an enduring great power status in continental diplomacy. Yet the stated aim of preventing a Bourbon occupying the Spanish throne eluded the Allies. Britain's campaigns in Spain, and especially the successes won by Earl Stanhope, helped to cement the new Anglo-Scottish union in symbolic ways. Standing armies were celebrated again, in contrast to the previous century's upheaval of civil war and revolution, and Britishness became more martial in nature. The name 'Marlborough' started to grace taverns throughout Britain, and both Marlborough and Stanhope were given lavish state in 1722 and 1721 respectively<sup>75</sup>.

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<sup>72</sup> Cit. Allan I. Macinnes, *Union and Empire: the Making of the United Kingdom in 1707* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 36.

<sup>73</sup> Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700-1715* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969), p. 381.

<sup>74</sup> José Jiménez Guerrero, *El reclutamiento militar en el siglo XIX: las quintas de Málaga (1837-1868)* (Málaga, 2001), p. 31.

<sup>75</sup> Michael Schaich, 'Standards and Colours: Representing the Military in Britain during the War of the Spanish Succession' in Matthias Pohligh and Michael Schaich (eds.), *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives* (Oxford, 2018), pp. 252, 262-263.

## Chapter five

### Military aspects of British participation in the First Carlist War

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#### Abstract

The United Kingdom's participation was total: political, economic and use of military resources. The military intervention was directed from London and through the relations of the ambassador in Madrid, who exerted a great influence on Spanish political and military action. A key tool was the observation teams stationed in the Liberal operational armies.

At the operational and tactical levels, the British intervention with its supplies of weapons and material was essential, as well as the participation of the British Navy with two squadrons; that of the Cantabrian providing a vital plus to the British Legion, and that of the Mediterranean. In this environment, it is necessary to contextualise the actions of the British Legions and Brigade, which over time, acquired cohesion, and counting on British maritime and Spanish land support, they ended up joining the liberal manoeuvring force.

#### Keywords

Liberalism, Carlism, politics, economy, regular army, Royal Navy, legion, recruitment, drill, military training, cohesion, professionalism, marine corps, observers.



## Overview

The First Carlist War has long been regarded as a bloody civil conflict between national entities, far removed from the concept of a war between States. Indeed, it was not a war between governments, nor was it, by any means, exclusively a civil war, as it pitted the two competing schools of thought other amongst the powers of the time, giving rise to notable interventions and participation by other states. At that time, Europe was divided between the «Northern Powers», which supported the Old Regime<sup>1</sup>, and the «constitutional monarchies»<sup>2</sup>, in line with the new models.

The Carlist War of 1833-40, unlike the War of 1936-39, has not received much publicity, remaining hidden in the memory of our History. There may be many reasons for this, perhaps the main one being how bloody it was. With a much smaller population in Spain than in 1936, half the inhabitants, the number of deaths was undoubtedly higher, which makes it much more traumatic than a matter of succession, which was the aim at the time of the victors, rather a real breakdown in the social fabric of the Nation.

Within this darkness that surrounds it, the most opaque point is related to foreign participation in the war. If we compare it again to the crisis of 1936, here the interventions were planned and organised by the governments based on the interests of each state, although sometimes they participated with the tools of state power (navies, ambassadors, etc.) and other times through «parallel» non-state efforts.

Over the next few pages, we will look at the United Kingdom's participation among these foreign participants, focusing on the intervention of its «human resources». As always, there was no single reason for participation, so here it was not only political reasons, but above all economic ones: «Liberal political thought opens the way to trade, to free trade» and this was essential for a leading industrial power of the time. Regardless of whether the British government was «Tory/Conservative or Whig/Liberal», it would follow this thinking, supporting the Isabelline-Liberal camp, relegating other inclinations to an internal debate.

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<sup>1</sup> Austria, Prussia and Russia. The Italian Bourbon monarchies were aligned with this concept.

<sup>2</sup> UK and France.

The necessarily short length of the article prevents us from focusing on major issues such as arms assistance and the economic aspects of the British intervention<sup>3</sup>.

### Background to Britain's participation in the 1st Carlist War: the Quadruple Alliance

In the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the relationship between the governments of the United Kingdom and Spain went through periods of crisis with long years of confrontation, but also situations of collaboration. Between the latter, following the period of «Revolutions in Europe in 1830», and the dynastic crises in Portugal and Spain, the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance was signed in 1834, with a civil war almost over in Portugal and another on the rise in Spain that would mark a new opportunity for collaboration between Her British Majesty's Government and the Government of Spain. The collaboration would come in the political-military, economic, arms and naval areas.

Prior to this collaboration and in the 19<sup>th</sup> century there were others. The «Riego uprising» took place after the Peninsular War and the first period of Ferdinand VII's government. It was Liberal in nature and aroused sympathy in England, as a result of the symbiosis between Liberalism and the economy, where there was an idea to create a British military unit to back it up. These sympathies were transformed into material support and the creation of a military unit, which was reduced to a small core led by Sir Robert Wilson<sup>4,5</sup>, which did not intervene operationally but did do so politically, both on the Iberian Peninsula and in the United Kingdom. This was 10 years before the intervention and participation of British naval and military personnel, within the framework of the Quadruple

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<sup>3</sup> These aspects are further explored by Professor BULLÓN de MENDOZA. The First Carlist War.

<sup>4</sup> From June 1823, England's aid to the Liberals of Galicia in the form of arms, clothing and money became very effective. Wilson's appeals were reiterated in the press, urging his countrymen to provide financial assistance through the Voluntary Donations Board, created months earlier by our illustrious leader. Wilson was a significant figure: an aristocrat, soldier, politician and Liberal MP in the UK, he was also a prolific writer and historian. 245 MEIJIDE PARDO A. Civil War of 1823: Speech by English General Wilson. p.

<sup>5</sup> Sir Robert Wilson, a British officer who participated during the Napoleonic Wars in many areas, especially Portugal, Spain and Russia. On the Iberian Peninsula, he organised and commanded the Lusitanian Legion, 1808-11. He fought among others in Puerto de Baños, Fuentes de Oñoro, Albuera, etc. He held all the posts in the British Army, was Governor of Gibraltar and died in 1849.

Alliance in the First Carlist War. Two years later, that participation increased with the arrival of the British Auxiliary Legion<sup>6</sup> (BAL). Another attempt to create a British armed land unit to intervene in Spain was made at the beginning of the first Carlist War with «the formation of a unit comprised of Scottish and Irish soldiers, 5,000 men» which was rejected on November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1833, because there was a dislike for «contracting foreign officers having Spanish officers on retirement, half-pay leave and on compulsory leave of absence»<sup>7</sup>, which would change two years later with the officers and men of the BAL.

The Quadruple Alliance began to take shape in 1828. The social and dynastic situation in Portugal reached a peak, when Prince Miguel took over after stripping his niece, Maria II, of the crown on February 22<sup>nd</sup>. In 1832, a crisis broke out into a military confrontation between Maria II, whose rights were defended by her father, the Liberal elements and the constitutional monarchies and Spain, on the one hand, and Miguel with the supporters from the Old Regime, on the other. In the case of Spain, the military participation was with General Rodil and his Army of Observation<sup>8</sup>. But the European interventions were not based on any agreement.

This political and family situation was similar to those that would serve as an excuse for the outbreak of the First Carlist War in Spain between Queen Isabella II and her uncle, Infante D. Carlos, on the death of Ferdinand VII on 29 September, 1833. A day earlier, a key figure in the British involvement had arrived in Spain, British Ambassador to Her Catholic Majesty, Sir George Villiers<sup>9</sup>, who would acquire great knowledge of Spanish society and its political and military leaders, including the Queen Regent. His extensive influence was channelled through his correspondence with British Foreign Secretary Palmerston<sup>10</sup>. In November 1833, Palmerston

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<sup>6</sup> BRETT M Edward. *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War* p. 8.

<sup>7</sup> PORRAS Y RODRÍGUEZ DE LEÓN G. *The Rodil Expedition and the foreign legions in the First Carlist War*. P. 126 *Vid Act of 12/08/18333 on surplus chiefs and officers from the War of Independence*. Proposal by D Enrique O'Shea of the Madrid Commerce Company.

<sup>8</sup> That also included personnel from the Carabineros Corps commanded by Rodil.

<sup>9</sup> Career diplomat since 1804, after finishing his studies at Cambridge. He was assigned to Russia, where he became an expert in customs and tariff issues. He was then assigned to Madrid until July 1840. United and linked to Secretary Palmerston, who appointed him, and to the policy of economic Liberalism.

<sup>10</sup> Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston. He began his political career in the Conservative Party and later moved to the Whig Party in 1830. He was Secretary of

ordered the British Navy, on based on the «Lisbon squadron», to control the Spanish Cantabrian Coast, so that, as it was still a unilateral decision, so it would be reduced to Spanish ships<sup>11</sup>.

In early 1834, the conflict in Portugal and Spain continued and the intensity of fighting increased. The Carlists took the initiative, and it was necessary to increase the level of aid from the Liberal powers to the government in Madrid, seeking to quell the uprising and impose themselves in the theatre of operations. At the same time, there was still no formal agreement giving legal backing to the interventions. As a result, two aspects originated from the Quadruple Alliance Treaty signed on 22 April, 1834 by France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal in London<sup>12</sup>. One, circumstantial, was the situation of dynastic and social confrontation in Portugal and Spain with the presence of the Pretenders, and another, organizational, was the need for a figure to define the form and quality of aid.

The Quadruple Alliance was established to unite the interests of four unequal states, governed in different ways and situated at two different levels of power. The United Kingdom and France were two world powers, while Spain and Portugal were seen by the other two signatories as «territories that could be established as a protectorate». But there were more differences. The British Monarchy was a consolidated institution with defined commercial interests. Meanwhile, France, «the Monarchy of Louis Philippe» was newly established and was trying to consolidate itself. Louis Philippe, a moderate, sought to be accepted by the «traditional powers of the North», especially by the arbiter of the time, the Austrian Chancellor Metternich. Therefore, the Treaty was basic, legalising the participation of the States, seeking to drive «the pretenders»<sup>13</sup> from the Peninsula and outlining the contribution and participation of the signatories: The United Kingdom with its naval resources, Spain

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State for Foreign Affairs for a very long period between 1830-34, 1835-41, and 1846-51. In this role, Palmerston is seen as a good resource manager, making extensive and effective use of the naval resources to drive British trade policy.»

<sup>11</sup> The blockade of the Cantabrian Coast was ordered by the Government of Madrid almost a year later on September 15 1834.

<sup>12</sup> The representatives of the four nations were: United Kingdom, Palmerston, the main promoter of the Treaty, the French representative was the Prince of Talleyrand, the Portuguese ambassador Morais Sarmiento and on the Spanish side Manuel Pando Fernández de Pinedo, Marque de Miraflores.

<sup>13</sup> Charles would leave Portugal with English help, moving to the United Kingdom and then to Spain.

and Portugal with their armies and the «French participation» was «arranged» in a general and vague way.

The end of the conflict in Portugal and the situation in Spain<sup>14</sup>, which was becoming increasingly complicated for the Liberal forces, reduced the value of the Alliance, so on 18 August, 1834 «Four Additional Articles» were added defining the different obligations of France, the United Kingdom and Portugal to assist Her Catholic Majesty in the Carlist crisis. The focus for France and Great Britain was the contribution to the closure of land borders and maritime control. Thus, «Art. 2. H.M. the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland undertakes to give H.C.M. the aid of arms and munitions of war needed and to assist further, if necessary, with a naval force». The way was open for maritime support, although there was no mention of land-based participation.

The uprising marked a turning point for Tomás Zumalacárregui. The situation was getting out of hand for Madrid, and this led to greater involvement by foreign and, by extension, British intervention.

On 15 September 1834, the blockade of the Bay of Biscay was approved by Spain. Thus, on October 16<sup>th</sup>, the Royal Navy with a unit created ad-hoc, the «Northern Squadron», under the command of Lord John Hay,<sup>15</sup> could take actions in support of the Spanish Liberal armies operating in the North, while the British ships of the «Mediterranean Squadron» sailed in the Levant and the South of the Peninsula with support in the Spanish ports with «colonies» of British merchants. A second element of the increased participation took place almost at the same time as the appointment in September of Colonel Wylde<sup>16</sup> as an «observer» in the Northern Army, and the participation began with observers in the army-level

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<sup>14</sup> The Battle of Asseiceira, on 16 May, and the Évora-Monte Agreement, 26 May, ended the Civil War in Portugal.

<sup>15</sup> Lord John Hay (1793-1851) British naval officer, 1804, and politician. Whig from 1833 to 1840, he commanded the Northern Naval Squadron, with a «naval brigade» on board with a battalion of Marines and detachments of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. With both these elements he provided some of the greatest British support for the government during the war. His participation and support was notable in the Convention of Vergara and the «Fueros y Libertades» movement.

<sup>16</sup> A regular officer, he received his Royal Commission in the Royal Artillery in 1803, reaching the post of Lieutenant General in 1863. His career can be followed in the London Gazette.

operation headquarters, with direct communication with the generals in chief.

The international political situation had not changed. The British government<sup>17</sup>, despite its sympathy for the Isabelline cause, had always publicly stated that its position was one of «non-intervention», which prevented the use of regular military contingents in direct combat actions in favour of one of the sides. But this would not prevent *private participation* by the British in the conflict, except for the existence of domestic legislation that prohibited the military/naval service of the British under other flags, the «Foreign Enlistment Act<sup>18</sup>»: This provision could be modified/derogated, to eliminate the problem, as would happen later in 1835.

This position of His Majesty's British Government would not prevent its ships from gradually assuming a greater intervention, 14 March, 1836<sup>19</sup>, going on to provide transport and security support to fire actions by cooperating in short range land actions such as the defence of ports, as in the case of San Sebastian. Traditionally, the concept of maritime operations, the projection of naval power on land, has been highly developed by the British Navy, through a significant capacity for projection on the coast based on the action of strong detachments of «Royal Marines»<sup>20</sup>, of landing columns of sailors or Army Corps.

### The framework for foreign participation on land

The political and social conditions in Spain made the Carlist uprising a people's war that went beyond the provincial, regional and foral level. In 1833, no one questioned it, and it affected all of Spain.

To deal with the uprising, at the beginning of the war the armed men at Queen Isabella's disposal included about 65.000 regular soldiers, which with the army reserves, provincial regiments and

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<sup>17</sup> The Carlist ideology had numerous supporters in the UK including the King himself, the Tory Conservative Party and the House of Lords and all the Conservative press.

<sup>18</sup> Officer and Troop Recruitment Systems at HOLMES Richard Redcoat, Harper Collins Publisher. London 2001

<sup>19</sup> Palmerston received approval from King William for a more active participation of Lord Hay's ships on 14 March 1836. This enabled direct intervention of the regular units with fire support and landing in San Sebastian on 5 May and later.

<sup>20</sup> The Royal Navy reinforced with about 800 men the crews and Marine detachments on the ships that operated in the Cantabrian Zone during the Carlist conflict.

other institutes would reach just over 115.000 men. These data always refer to theoretical forces, which in reality decrease in a large percentage due to illnesses, commissions, postings, leave and even lack of weapons and in the case of cavalry corps due to lack of mounts.

Throughout the war, the total forces employed from the Army, including Provincial Regiments, Free Corps, Navy, Carabineers and National Militia would reach some 500.000 men, who had to be maintained and armed. With them, many tasks had to be fulfilled:

- Protecting Royals and the Institutions.
- Guarding and securing the entire National Territory.
- Acting against Carlist guerrilla parties, throughout the Peninsula.
- Facing the Carlist armies in the various theatres of operation.

Every army at «war» is divided into two major cores: on the one hand, the garrison forces capable of security, defensive or offensive actions of limited scope or complementary effort, and the more capable and motivated manoeuvring force for the offensive actions of the main effort, and carrying the weight of the resolute operations. Therefore, the Liberal Government needed a large amount of human and material resources to achieve the transformation of men into armed men and finally into soldiers capable of the jobs indicated.

To this, we must add the feelings of a large part of the Spanish people, especially the rural population who were not at all inclined to Liberal thinking. This would result in a high rate of desertion<sup>21</sup> in the government forces, beginning with the most «professional», the Royal Guard, and the entry into the Carlist ranks of a great many Isabelline men and soldiers. This caused a problem, adding to the lack of material and the need for men a break in trust and security. It was not possible to assign security tasks for facilities and institutions to just any unit.

In conclusion, the nature, ramifications and extent of the uprising meant that the Government of Madrid could only use a very small portion of the force as a manoeuvring element operating

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<sup>21</sup> BULLÓN de MENDOZA, p.132, The First Carlist War indicates a total of 33,442 deserters, losses or AWOL for the Royal Guard, Army and Provincial Militia, with 7,049 coming from the Guard.

in the hottest areas of the Basque Country and Navarre. General Córdoba, head of the Army of Operations, in his Memoirs, stated in 1835 that the real force to operate was a maximum of some 30,000 armed men.

That is why the option of counting on foreign forces was no trivial matter. At first, the problem of switching to the other side seemed less than in the case of nationals, as those switches would not be for ideological reasons rather simply for economic or logistical reasons. These men would, then, provide an initial boost of confidence. A different issue would be their quality and real combat capability, which would enable them to be integrated into the offensive-operational core, or simply to act as elements of garrison and/or internal security. In either case, the «allied legions» freed men for the response and garrison units.

In the same vein, the Madrid government was faced with another major problem: the availability and manufacture of weapons, which determined the real possibility of arming men to be useful and thus truly increase the size of the army. Here, too, having foreign forces was a help. The same could be said about the uniforms and equipment. For all the above reasons, and as 1835 progressed, the arrival of foreign units, dressed, equipped and armed, was a solution for a government that, economically, could hardly sustain the army it had on the ground. In addition, the perfect thing would be to obtain the foreign units that are regulated and tested. Implementation of the «Four Additional Articles» made it easier for the Government of Madrid to change its initial idea of rejecting the presence of Portuguese, French and British troops and to begin the process of achieving them.

In the Portuguese case, participation was theoretically easy by virtue of merely applying the Treaty, but for the other two powers it would be complicated. In both cases, political and legislative opposition had to be overcome. The matter was discussed in Parliament in May, and it was decided that intervention was appropriate.

Thus, the three contingents would arrive in Spain with a theoretical number of men, close to two-thirds of the operational strength of the Northern Army, 22.000»soldiers», with very different quality, instruction and training<sup>22</sup>; the professional French Foreign Legion,

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<sup>22</sup> The Portuguese Auxiliary Division with a force of 6,000, expandable to 10,000 theoretical men, from the Regular Army, comprised of two brigades, with weapons from the United Kingdom. The Unit was assigned to security/rear-guard missions. The French

the regular Portuguese soldiers and the men recruited for the British Legion.

### **The British Auxiliary Legion: a reality**

Since the implementation of the Treaty articles, the British participation was providing significant results:

1. The surveillance and blockade actions of the Spanish ports, mainly in the north, reduced the supply of the Carlist side. This isolation was also sought with French participation and land control of the Pyrenean border.
2. The intervention of the British Navy<sup>23</sup>, with its projection, fire and transport capabilities, was important to Spanish Army operations, as in the case of the First Siege of Bilbao, and also as a deterrent, particularly in the Mediterranean.
3. The quantities of weapons and material provided would make it possible to arm many Isabelline units, including the Portuguese Auxiliary Division, throughout the conflict<sup>24</sup>.

This made the participation of the British armed forces the most complete. The intervention was reinforced by Lord Palmerston's political vision from the Foreign Office. The Napoleonic Wars brought the consolidation of the British Empire and peace in Europe, which led to a key role in the foreign policy for the British Navy, which Lord Palmerston made good use of. However, when European policy was discussed, the importance of land forces increased, as Wellington pointed out. Therefore, Palmerston was inclined to add a pure ground-based auxiliary force, to consolidate his objectives.

On the Spanish side, it is necessary to consider two Liberal personalities: Juan Álvarez Mendizábal and Miguel Álava, who drove the process. In Spain, the government of Cea Bermúdez was replaced by the moderate Francisco Martínez de la Rosa, June 1834, who did not have the resources to pay the Isabelline army.

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Auxiliary Division, based on the Algerian Foreign Legion, 4.843 men, which could be increased to 12,000, initially armed and equipped by France under the command of «Field Marshal» Bernelle, a colonel in the French Army. From an operational perspective, it was a professional, trained and hardened group. The Foreign Legion would have six infantry battalions, two squadrons of lancers and one battery with six pieces.

<sup>23</sup> With its maritime projection capabilities: The Royal Marines and Artillery,

<sup>24</sup> DE PORRAS Y RODRÍGUEZ DE LEÓN G. The Rodil Expedition and the Foreign Legions in the First Carlist War, p 127

In this situation, Mendizábal presented his services from London to obtain a loan for Spain, and that would not be his only contribution to increasing British support for the Liberal Government.

With the arrival of the Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis in September 1823, Juan Álvarez Mendizábal left Spain for London, where his interest in business and the financial world put him in contact with the «British establishment» and the circles of British power, which would also allow him to promote the creation of the British Auxiliary Legion in 1835<sup>25</sup>.

The second man to make the British Auxiliary Legion feasible was General Miguel Ricardo de Álava y Esquivel, a Liberal, moderate man with relations in British society, particularly with the Duke of Wellington,<sup>26</sup> who was always critical of British involvement in the conflict, opposing the participation of regular units and the recruitment of professional officers for the Legion<sup>27</sup>. In 1833, Álava, the ambassador in London, focused on implementing the Quadruple Alliance agreements in the economic and military aspects. It reflected not only the feelings of the political establishment but also those of the military, as reflected in the requests made by the commanding officers of the Spanish operational divisions<sup>28</sup>.

Achieving direct participation of British personnel in the conflict required the official request of the Spanish government to the British, which was made by letter on 5 June 1835: the political agreement existed but it was necessary to cancel the legal provision promulgated by George III that prohibited his subjects from serving with arms in the armies and navies of other states, the «Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818». This was achieved by the «Royal Order promulgated on 10 June, 1835, allowing the entry into military and naval service of Her Majesty the Queen of Spain both as an officer or as a soldier, sailor or crew member».

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<sup>25</sup> In that summer he returned to Spain and on 14 September 1835 he became Prime Minister.

<sup>26</sup> In Wellington there was a knowledge of Spain, in particular of the northern regions where he fought most, of the character of the Spanish people, their knowledge and sympathy for Don Carlos and his membership in the Conservative Party, which was inclined towards the traditionalists of Don Carlos.

<sup>27</sup> In 1827, Wellington was appointed commander-in-chief of the British Army, a post he would hold for almost the rest of his life, except for his term as Prime Minister.

<sup>28</sup> An example are the requests collected from the Oraa Division on 1 June 1835, highlighting the importance of cooperation with foreign forces. Fernández de Córdova Luis Justification Report.

The next step was to determine the commander of the force, although there were some other possible candidates, which was made in favour of Colonel Lacy-Evans, on 23 June 1835. This proposal was made by Álava, who had worked with Evans at Wellington HQ. The proposal, endorsed by Mendizábal, was approved by the Council of Ministers in Madrid on 18 June. This aid would have its counterpart, which was none other than a trade agreement aimed at achieving a monopoly for its textile and manufactured products<sup>29</sup>.

The Council also approved the organisational basis for the British Auxiliary Legion, including relationship, command and employment procedures:

- As for the command, «Colonel Lacy-Evans» would initially receive the «rank» of Lieutenant General of the Army and would exercise direct command of the Legion.
- The Legion would «*always*» be used together. (Condition not met).
- The Legion would report operationally to the General in Chief of the Northern Army; that is, Evans would receive orders directly from the General in Chief.

At this point it is worth stressing the political and social importance of this agreement and those signed with France and Portugal in the military context, which enabled some 20,000 armed people to be deployed. This support could be seen as an acknowledgement of the lack of ability of the army, generals or officers to impose themselves on the «guerrillas of the Pretender». It would be difficult to answer this thought affirmatively, as the process was driven by professionals who felt that the armed institutions needed weapons, equipment, material and men to hold terrain and, above all, the economic capacity to obtain soldiers, support the Units and impose themselves on the adversary led by Zumalacárregui in the spring of 1835, who threatened Isabelline survival.

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<sup>29</sup> The treaty was signed, but not ratified by the British Parliament, realising that it would affect Catalonia and the Basque Provinces very negatively, so its main objective, the cessation of the war to facilitate full trade, would not be achieved. DE PORRAS Y RODRÍGUEZ DE LEÓN G. The Rodil Expedition and the Foreign Legions in the First Carlist War. (Library of Congress: Miscellaneous Collection. Series F. Vol. 30 Brochures. «Agreements with England» p. 162. Signature: H 2857.

## Organisation of the Legion

Following the above decisions, the process of recruitment and organisation began. The organisational basis of the process was the *Agreement to organise the British Auxiliary Legion in the service of the Spanish Government, between Mr. J. A. y Mendizábal on behalf of His Excellency Miguel Ricardo de Álava, Minister to Her Catholic Majesty in London, and Major General Sir Loftus Otway, on behalf of Colonel Lacy-Evans M.P.* signed in London in June 1835, with 8 articles, and its derived document «Conditions of admission to the service of Spain of the British Auxiliary Legion», developed also in 8 articles<sup>30</sup>.

The Convention determined the total force: 10,000 men. Most of the articles outlined the conditions for Colonel Lacy-Evans, with the exception of Article IV, which referred to the conditions for officers and troops, which would be set by Evans.

The next document was the «Conditions», addressed to the members of the Legion. It stated that the Unit would be governed by the provisions of the British Army, both in service matters and administratively. Thus, staff pay and emoluments would not be due monthly, as in Spain, but monthly in advance. As regards pensions, they would be British, and generous rewards would be offered after service.

Due to its importance in subsequent events, it is important to highlight the first of the conditions which stated that the «term of service shall not exceed two years» and would generate subsequent problems, especially in the Scottish regiments. The enlistment was for two years, if not otherwise specified by the enlisted man.

Similarly, «the Third Condition» stated that personnel would be «subject in military service to British ordinances and in other circumstances to Spanish legislation». Thus, the service would be provided according to the «Rules and Regulations of British Service» and the «British Military Articles of War». Once on the Peninsula, for the purpose of maintaining discipline and with regard to riots, the regulation would be the «Provision of the

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<sup>30</sup> OLIVART Marquess of Collection of Treaties, Agreements and International Documents. Volume I Madrid «El Progreso Editorial» 1890 - NRXIV, 273 pages. DE PORRAS Y RODRÍGUEZ DE LEÓN G. The Rodil Expedition and the foreign legions in the First Carlist War, pp. 120 and 260-261.

English Mutiny Act 1819». Under these conditions, recruitment began on 23 June at 9 p.m. in London.

For a more detailed study of the organization, see the document «The Army List of the British Auxiliary Legion<sup>31</sup>». The document is not complete, it covers just the interval of participation in the period August 1835 and April 1837, and according to the time gives ample details regarding the officers<sup>32</sup>, and the same is not true for the classes and the troops. A negative aspect for its organisation and effectiveness was the fact that it could not initiate training in the United Kingdom, due to the existing legislation (in particular the aforementioned Mutiny Act), which prohibited it, as the Legion was not in the service of the British Crown.

The Legion was a unit organised according to the parameters of the British Army, but paid and supported by the Government of Madrid, solely serving the orders of the latter. Even so, the British Auxiliary Legion would not receive the traditional insignia of the regular units of the Spanish Army, but were given those used in the National Militia since 1820,»that is three bands of equal width respectively red-gold-red»<sup>33, 34</sup>

### General George De Lacy Evans

Lacy took command of the Legion in Spain at the age of 47 with a brilliant military record, but, strangely enough in the British Army, after many years of being in a half-paying situation<sup>35</sup>. Born in Ireland into a family of smallholders, «not very British looking could pass for peninsular; wiry, short and dark skinned».

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<sup>31</sup> In this document, the eight articles relating to the conditions, appear in eleven more specific The text of the literal contract relating to time of service was»the time of service to be for either one or two years as may be preferred by the individual engaging to Her Majesty's Service». DE PORRAS Y RODRÍGUEZ DE LEÓN G. The Rodil Expedition and the foreign legions in the First Carlist War, pp. 147, 177

<sup>32</sup> The information regarding them can be completed with newspapers and other sources, to obtain an overview of their processes and situations.

<sup>33</sup> CANALES TORRES C. «The First Carlist War 1833»- Medusa Ediciones. DE PORRAS Y RODRÍGUEZ DE LEÓN G. The Rodil Expedition and the foreign legions in the First Carlist War, p. 47

<sup>34</sup> They are held in both the Toledo Army Museum (2) and the National Army Museum Chelsea (1). CAIRNS Conrad, the First Carlist War a Military History. p. 70. Sheets 40743 and 40747 MILES Documentary System for the Management of Historical and Movable Heritage. ARMY ARMED FORCES MUSEUM TOLEDO.

<sup>35</sup> On the officer corps, the situation of half-paid and purchase of commissions HOLMES Richard Redcoat , BRIGHTON Terry Hell Riders.

He attended the Royal Military Academy of Woolwich (London)<sup>36</sup>, as a «Gentleman Cadet», but in 1806, he entered into service in the «volunteer»<sup>37</sup> class in the Indian Army, becoming an ensign in the 22<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment without buying a commission and moving to the British Army, 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment of Light Dragoons in order to participate in the Spanish Peninsula War.

Later, he participated in the War of 1812 (1812-15), linked to the Royal Navy, and gained experience in maritime operations<sup>38</sup>. At the end of that one, he joined Wellington's HQ where he had a stellar career based on brevet-ranks that ended after Waterloo as a Graduate Lieutenant Colonel, was half-paid and went into politics in the radical party<sup>39</sup>. He was a member of the British Parliament on several occasions from 1830 to 1865, finally participating in the Crimean War (1854) commanding a Division.

One point to consider in Evans's career is the fact that in an army like the British one where the system of promotion of officers, even colonels for infantry and cavalry, was essentially based on purchasing commissions, Evans was one of the very few officers who was promoted in all his ranks and jobs based on merit. In the Spanish Army, he was initially promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, later consolidating his employment, by Royal Order of 11 October, 1835. «He was a controversial man, loved or slandered and vilified»<sup>40</sup>.

### Command and personal relationships

«Of all the men I have dealt with or heard during the two years I have been observing what is going on around me, I have found only three: Álava, Córdoba and Mendizábal, on

<sup>36</sup> Woolwich offered a three-year engineering course to graduate and serve as an officer in the Royal Artillery or the Royal Engineers. In those corps, buying commissions was not an option.

<sup>37</sup> The status of «volunteer knights» in the British Army is studied by HOLMES at Redcoat. Their situation was very similar to that of the «distinguished soldiers» in the Spanish Army. Their purpose was to get the Commission without having to buy it. His promotion was motivated by acts of valour in the field. His casualty ratio was very high.

<sup>38</sup> Referred to in the terminology of the time by General Harry SMITH as military-naval-guerrilla-punishment operations.

<sup>39</sup> The radical party, gathering disenchanted elements from other political currents, coming from the proletariat and the middle class, advocated a parliamentary reform and other additional aspects, such as freedom of religion, free trade, extension of the right to vote, freedom of the press and economic inequality.

<sup>40</sup> AGMS, STAFF, CELEB. BOX 82. EXP. 4LACY, EVANS.

whose moral or physical value, honour, disinterest, prudence, justice and honesty I would fully rely. These three men have these qualities; the others are lacking most of them, and I know this<sup>41</sup>».

The organisational and command structures in war direction and management are theoretically structural and independent of the individuals who perform them. This, when analysing the cases, shows that the above statement is theoretical, as empathy and personal relationships are essential. This situation also occurred in the 1833-40 conflict between the main Spanish protagonists, Commanders in Chief of the Armies and the British acting officers with command or influence in the operational context.

The first case, the first relations were those maintained by Don Luis Fernández de Córdoba with the British command. Don Luis can be defined with four adjectives: young, romantic, impassioned and, above all, brilliant. But as his biographers and his service record also highlight, «firstly he is an ambitious man and secondly he is a political general in the truest sense of the word, his achievements as a diplomat being the backbone of his rapid military career, but he also proved to be one of the best generals the Queen had.» Militarily he was an officer of tradition, professionally trained in the best school of the Army, the disciplined Royal Guard commanded by Charles of Spain. Politically he was temperate and moderate, making no secret of his orientation in international politics towards France, where he had been ambassador.

His relations at the diplomatic level with Villiers were good, but the opposite occurred at the military level. The clash with Evans was quick, motivated by two opposing characters, Cordoba being much more disciplined, moderate and political against an impetuous, radical and daring character, and therefore incidents such as the change of the Legion's itinerary from Bilbao to Vitoria and the subsequent disagreements in Vitoria and Arlaban only increased the lack of empathy. The resentment gave way to mistrust and, in time, perhaps led Evans to leave command of the Legion, and the Legion suffered from receiving more supplies than it needed.

On 16 September 1836, Baldomero Espartero was appointed General in Chief of the Northern Army. His relationships with

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<sup>41</sup> Correspondence from Villiers to Edward Villiers 13 December 1835, RODRÍGUEZ ALONSO M. Private correspondence J. Villiers.

British politicians and with Lacy-Evans were not going to be «good» either, given his personality, «impassivity, reckless courage, conceit, fear, respect, discipline and love of her» and those already mentioned of Evans.

However, Espartero had extensive knowledge of the political and military situation. He was therefore aware of the need for foreign «aid», and of the financial shortfalls for the maintenance, sustenance, and endowment of the Army. As a professional soldier he knew the human material and quickly catalogued the foreign corps praising the French Legion, «qualified as arrogant» and the British initially «who were good people and arrogant officers», but he changed and so in correspondence with his wife in February 1836, and after «the first Battle of Arlabán» he stated «it is useless, it is a hindrance because all of it is destroyed with a medium company»<sup>42</sup>. As for Lacy Evans, his initial impression was good; his appointment was well validated. In addition, Evans had a good academic military background, his early career origins were similarly «distinguished soldier,» and «Volunteer in the Indian Army,» he had varied combat experience; Spain, America, Europe and India, i.e. there were many points in common; even a physical resemblance, «both Spanish and British soldiers confused them»<sup>43</sup>.

On the other hand, the opinion that the British had of Espartero was not good at any level. His appointment as Northern Commanding General was disliked, and every effort was made to prevent this from the British Embassy in Madrid<sup>44</sup>. These initial judgements did not change during the war, as can be seen from the correspondence of Ambassador Villiers, who never had any appreciation for Espartero. Thus, in August 1837, he described him as «the curse of his country» and considered him the «instigator of a coup d'état».

The first impressions of Lacy-Evans, a man of action, impatient, and subject to much outside pressure, as a foreign general in an army that was not his own but that paid him and gave him orders, were not good either. He did not consider that Espartero had the necessary qualifications to be the General in Chief: «Espartero is brave and honest. But it is doubtful, if not impossible, to have confidence in his ability to judge.»<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> SHUBERT A. Espartero the Peacemaker. Galaxia Gutenberg, p. 111.

<sup>43</sup> SHUBERT A. Espartero the Peacemaker. Galaxia Gutenberg, p. 117.

<sup>44</sup> SHUBERT A. Espartero the Peacemaker. Galaxia Gutenberg, p. 141.

<sup>45</sup> SCHUBERT A. Espartero the Peacemaker, (Evans correspondence to Villiers from 5 September 1836), p.143.

The clash of personalities between the commander and the subordinate was bound to happen, as can be seen from the correspondence in November 1836 that Espartero sent to Evans, and the subsequent correspondence to Villiers. They show that there is no mutual conviction and even lack of trust towards Espartero, «We must protect ourselves from him by having a minimal relationship with him», «if it were not for Wylde's perseverance Espartero would never have come to Bilbao»<sup>46</sup>. Espartero combined boldness and personal courage with a calm attitude; the disagreement became apparent in the spring actions of 1837, when Espartero first reinforced the «Evans Army Corps» with Spanish troops, moving to their area of action and employing part of the British units in a decentralised manner, even in his own escort.

Initially, Espartero's relationship with his Chief Observer Colonel Wylde was the same, noting that «it was an unfortunate choice». After the second Arlaban bout, with time together, Wylde was still concerned about Espartero's lack of initiative<sup>47</sup>. This working situation changed to function fully both on a personal and professional level with Wylde saying that «Espartero was the only officer he could trust» and on 19 June 1839 Wylde supported Espartero's theses against Palmerston's opinion<sup>48</sup>.

It is clear that relations between Lacy Evans and the Spanish commanders were never good. However, this was not the reason why the Legion sometimes did not receive material support and payments; its situation was no different from that of other Spanish units.

### Command units

Recruitment to provide officers and equivalent to the Legion followed some of the procedures used in the British army and society of the time, but with one fundamental premise: King William IV and the army commander, the Duke of Wellington, opposed service by regular officers in Spain. This closed the door to the most technically qualified and up-to-date professionals.

<sup>46</sup> SCHUBERT A. *Espartero the Peacemaker*, p. 147 Correspondence from Evans to Villiers and from Evans to Espartero 18 November 1836.

<sup>47</sup> Correspondence from Wylde to Palmerston 22 June 1836 WYL1 Durham University

<sup>48</sup> SCHUBERT A., page 143 *Espartero the Peacemaker*, p. 95 Correspondence from Evans to Villiers 5 September 1836 Oxford Bodleian MS Clar 461.

The officers in the service of the India Company were in a similar situation.

So the necessary officers had to be found, about 400, from other backgrounds, such as retired, half-paid, former commissioned officers for the operations in Greece, Colombia and above all from the war in Portugal, those known as «Portuguese officers, or Pedroites,» and those commissioned by Evans himself from his family and friends. They were joined by some 40/50 commissioned sergeants<sup>49</sup> in the Legion, a group that provided the experience and knowledge of training<sup>50</sup>. There were some 20 officers from the Regular Army and the East India Company, who received one or two more ranks in the Legion than their jobs warranted, and went on to command battalions. The most numerous were the «Pedroites» group, who did not have a good relationship with the various groups from the British or Indian Army.

The officer corps was a group with little previous command experience, and who had not been required to undergo a prior selection process, differing in many respects from the archetype of the British officer-knight, the basis of their type of command. Thus, it is common to read in the memoirs and experiences that the «junior officers» were immersed in the long training sessions, to which the units were subjected, an unusual situation, since the training rested on the NCOs, in the British model. The main problem presented by the officers was their lack of preparation, which translated into a lack of leadership, transmitting this lack of confidence to the troops and causing a break in the cohesion of the group and having to resort to excessive punishment of the troops in order to maintain discipline, which undermined their prestige in the eyes of the latter. Command relations were not the most appropriate, and cases of fragging occurred<sup>51</sup>.

The officer corps was not a homogeneous group and during the campaign many of them were dismissed and many others had to resign after action.

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<sup>49</sup> The proportion was 10%, much higher than in the Regular Army, increasing the age of junior officers and exercising leadership and command in a different way.

<sup>50</sup> An initial, incomplete list of the officers in the Times newspaper of 30 July 1835.

<sup>51</sup> This term developed especially after Vietnam as a synonym for death, assassination, of officers/non-commissioned officers at the hands of their troops during combat: The word comes from the procedure of performing it by throwing a fragmentation grenade at them.

## Troops

Troops were recruited by the officers commissioned to command the Legion, in the three major areas of the United Kingdom: England-Wales, Scotland and Ireland. Recruitment was quick, as social and working conditions in the 1830s were not good in the UK, both in the countryside and in industry, which led to rapid enlistment.

The enlisted men came from the traditional sources of candidates: army veterans, deserters, fugitives, low social status, poor, unemployed, alcoholics, with marital and family problems, vagrants, maladjusted adventurers and many hungry people. But in this case, unlike with recruitment, for regular units, practically no selection process was passed, and in many cases no physical exam or at most a very brief one. In the words of their recruiters, they were defined as *cannon fodder*.

Into 1801, 30% of England's population lived in the big cities and had left the countryside. This situation would increase and would always be greater than in the rest of Europe. This meant that potentially and actually most of the new army soldiers came from the urban environment, a situation that was fully realised in the Legion, where the majority, especially the British, Welsh and Scots were working class or suburban men, used to very poor hygienic and sanitary conditions. This circumstance was resolved in the recruitment of the regular units with medical exams that screened the enlisted recruits and with the fact that large numbers of men were not needed in a short time, so that the personnel could be eliminated without the conditions but in the case of the Legion neither of the two conditions was met. This would be demonstrated by the Legion's own health personnel. An eighth of the force was considered unfit for military service in the medical exams that were later carried out in Bilbao, which had not been properly verified at the time of enlistment. In other words, practically every regimental-type unit had in its ranks between 150/100 soldiers unfit for field service «a fifth of the force is made up of individuals without adequate physical conditions<sup>52</sup>. This situation was better in cavalry and artillery.

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<sup>52</sup> VARIOUS AUTHORS: BRETT E. M The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War. SOMERVILLE A. History of the British Legion, London, 1839.

This was one of the reasons for the large number of casualties and very high mortality rates due to the diseases<sup>53</sup> and<sup>54</sup> epidemic of Christmas 1835-36 in Vitoria<sup>55</sup>. This, too, was the reason why orders were soon issued, on 23 January, 1835, to recruit some 3,000 men in order to maintain the effective strength of the Legion estimated at 8,500 men, which by March had already been reduced by 5,763 *bayonets*<sup>56</sup>. Later, due to natural wear and tear, the strength of the infantry would be stabilised at 4,500 *bayonets*.

If the social situation was bad in general, it was even worse in Ireland, so about a third of the Unit's troops would be Irish<sup>57</sup>, serving both in the Irish and in the Scottish and English regiments. This number was in line with what was happening in the Regular Army, where 42% of the total troops came from Ireland in 1830. This proportion had been rising since the American War of Independence and would continue to rise until the «Great Famine of 1846» and emigration to the US. A significant difference is that many of the personnel from Ireland came from the countryside, which meant that they were in better physical shape for campaign life<sup>58</sup>. The proportion of Irish in cavalry and artillery was high.

#### Articulation and composition

The Legion initially consisted of 10 Infantry Regiments, between line and light, and a Rifle Regiment,<sup>59</sup> 2 Lancer Regiments, Headquarters, Engineers, Artillery, Health (Medical Corps)<sup>60</sup> and Logistic Support, (commissionership) with a total of 10,000 men<sup>61</sup>. The Units that comprised it were:

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<sup>53</sup> This situation was not uncommon in England, where cholera in 1832 caused some 31,000 deaths.

<sup>54</sup> For a more complete view of the Legion and the epidemic unleashed in the winter of 1835-36. The British Legion in Vitoria p. SANTOYO Julio Cesar.

<sup>55</sup> The artillery and most of the lancers, especially the 2nd Regiment, were not initially moved to Vitoria

<sup>56</sup> BRETT E. ., The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War, pp. 62-63

<sup>57</sup> DE PORRAS Y RODRÍGUEZ DE LEÓN G. The Rodil Expedition and the foreign legions in the First Carlist War. P.125. Of the first 7,800 enlisted men, 3,200 were British, 2,800 Irish and 1,800 from Scotland. The Welsh were generally integrated into English units. Subsequently, except for certain Welsh Regiments (24th Infantry)

<sup>58</sup> HOLMES R. Redcoat. Harper Pp. 53-56 Collins Publishers. London, 2001

<sup>59</sup> Differences between Light Infantry units and the Rifle Corps in The Royal Green Jackets. WILKINSON-LATHAM C. Osprey Men-At-Arms. London 1978.

<sup>60</sup> They were only officers or equivalent, and the same was true of the commissionership.

<sup>61</sup> 8,448 marines and light infantry, 552 «rifles», 700 horsemen and 300 artillerymen, figures collected in the LONDON GACETTE of 10 June 1835.

- 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment.
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment. Dissolved in the winter of 1836, due to the victims of the typhoid epidemic<sup>62</sup>.
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Westminster Grenadier Infantry Regiment.
- 4<sup>th</sup> Queen's Fusiliers Regiment.
- 5<sup>th</sup> Scottish Infantry Regiment<sup>63</sup>. Dissolved in the winter of 1836, due to the victims of the typhoid epidemic.
- 6<sup>th</sup> Scottish Grenadier Infantry Regiment.
- 7<sup>th</sup> Irish Light Infantry Regiment
- 8<sup>th</sup> Scottish Infantry Regiment.
- 9<sup>th</sup> Irish Infantry Regiment.
- 10<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry Regiment of Munster.  
Rifle Corps.  
Queen Isabella's 1<sup>st</sup> Lancers Regiment.  
Queen's 2<sup>nd</sup> Irish Lancers Regiment.  
Artillery, sappers, health, headquarters and commissionership.

It is interesting to note that five of the ten infantry units are specially designated as grenadiers, riflemen or light infantry.

The Legion also established four depots with recruitment, accommodation and transit missions and a weapons depot. The main ones were in London and two on the Peninsula, Santander, Pasajes, at the natural ports of arrival.

## Infantry

The Infantry was comprised of ten regiments from a single battalion<sup>64</sup>, of which three—the 4<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>—were considered light infantry/riflemen<sup>65</sup>, two of grenadiers—the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup>—and five

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<sup>62</sup> Its final action was the battle of Arlabán. BRETT M Edward. *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War*, p. 74.

<sup>63</sup> Legion Reorganization: BRETT Edward. *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War*, p. 77.

<sup>64</sup> MISCELLANEOUS: SANTOYO J. C. *The British Legion in Vitoria* and BRETT E. M. *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War*.

<sup>65</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> Regiment was English and the other two Irish. The 4<sup>th</sup> Regiment had slow recruitment. It rose in the West of England, not in the city of London. Correspondence from Captain Losack. P. 44 BRETT. Edward M. *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War*.

of line all organised according to British parameters. On paper, all had ten companies; two of them «preferential», grenadiers and light with more, select personnel and eight «centre», but in reality they had eight to six centre and two preferential—and their ranks were different from the British standards<sup>66</sup>, which was completed with the Rifle Corps—six companies—<sup>67</sup> raised in London. «The Rifles» in the British Army were quality units, which claimed to have both highly trained officers and high quality troops trained in skirmishes and «precision» shooters equipped with rifles. The unit did not have the level mentioned.

In addition to all this organic infantry, the Legion had a permanent battalion of Chapelgorris<sup>68</sup>, a light Spanish unit, from the Auxiliary or «Free» Corps<sup>69</sup>. These units, paid one peseta a day, were voluntary, made up of men from the «province», even deserters, under the command of officers from different backgrounds, and were very effective for light actions and combat. Members were hardened, tough and bloodthirsty combatants, who sometimes acted on the legal limits of the law of war. Permanent integration into the Legion highlights the need for light troops with a real capacity to reinforce the «British light units»<sup>70</sup>.

The Irish regiments were the 7<sup>th</sup>Light, the 9<sup>th</sup>Line, and 10<sup>th</sup>Light, Infantry, and the 2<sup>th</sup>Lancers. In addition to these regiments, there was a presence of Irish in other regiments<sup>71</sup> such as the 8<sup>th</sup>Scottish Regiment. Perhaps 25% of the entire Legion's troop personnel would have been of Irish origin<sup>72</sup>.

The Scottish Regiments, although called Highlanders, had mostly been recruited from the Lowlands, Edinburgh, Glasgow and the North of England, but also had their share of personnel from the Irish counties. They were numbered as the 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup>, with the 5<sup>th</sup> being considered «light» in some documents. The physical

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<sup>66</sup> 68 DE PORRAS Y RODRÍGUEZ DE LEÓN G. *The Rodil Expedition and the foreign legions in the First Carlist War*, p. 130. The actual number of troops was for battalions of six companies, with the «preferential» ones.

<sup>67</sup> The Rifles were raised in London, Union Street Borough, their companies being less numerous BRETT E. M. *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War*, p. 45.

<sup>68</sup> In Euskera, basque language, «Txapelgorri» means «Boinaroja».

<sup>69</sup> *The First Carlist War BULLÓN de MENDOZA*, p 145.

<sup>70</sup> BRETT M Edward, p. 74. *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War*. The Legionnaires were not used to moving and fighting on varied terrain, laden with their equipment.

<sup>71</sup> This situation was not new, as KEAGAN J. explains in *the Face of Battle*, and also Holmes in *Redcoat*.

<sup>72</sup> BRETT Edward M., p. 32. *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War*.

condition of their men was inferior to that of the Irish, but better than that of the English recruits and their social background similar to the British.

There would be four English regiments: 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>. Recruited in London and in the various southern counties, many of them from the London suburbs, they were the least physically able.

### Cavalry

It was based on 700 men who comprised two Regiments of about 350 men. The organisation of the British Cavalry followed the old Wellington rules by organising each Regiment into ten companies, of which the last two were depots and theoretically each company would have around 60 riders. The tactical unit was the two-company squad. In our case, two squadrons would be formed per regiment, with companies of around 40/50 riders being very common.

Recruitment of these Regiments was easier, and the men better disposed than in the infantry. Thus, the 1<sup>st</sup> Lancers Regiment, recruited in England, included in its ranks Poles with war experience, Belgians and Germans; that is, men used to deal with cattle and action. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Lancers Regiment was raised in Ireland. Its troops were from the countryside. From its arrival, it acted with Spanish forces, leading a life of some independence from the rest of the Legion.

### Artillery

The recruitment of personnel for artillery was completely different. In the case of the officers, it was easier for regular officers, especially those on half pay, to receive the commission. For the troops, the process was similar, with the Royal Artillery Command making it easier for sergeants, corporals and soldiers assigned to active units to enlist and, at the end of their time in the Legion, to return to their posts. Also, in order to have trained personnel, retired or reserve artillerymen were admitted as «pensioners», which meant that in general there were more professional personnel, distinguished by their discipline and training. The artillery units were the last to leave the United Kingdom. They were equipped with English material, 9-pound pieces, 5.5-inch mountain guns<sup>73</sup>. Among their actions, the Battle

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<sup>73</sup> There is a record of their use in the 1st Siege of Bilbao.

of Oriamendi was outstanding, where it and the Artillery of the Marines<sup>74</sup> provided fire to cover for the retreat, with a total of 12 pieces. The remaining units were recruited in London and the Southern Counties of England.

#### The preparation of the units

Discipline was the main concern of the Legion's troops as had been seen during both recruitment and transport<sup>75</sup>. The men were not accustomed to military life, as they lacked the time needed to transform from armed men into soldiers, and the situation was complicated by the fact that they were physically located in a foreign country with a very hostile and close enemy and a largely unprofessional cadre of junior officers. Another added difficulty for discipline in maintaining relations with the population is that only three men out of the total had knowledge of Spanish<sup>76</sup>.

Due to the provisions in force in the United Kingdom, «Provision of the English Mutiny Act», the Legion was in a new situation for a British contingent in a conflict. The men had not been able to train in the United Kingdom, so they arrived in Spain without a previous knowledge of the militia, without any combat training, and the weapons were issued on the Peninsula<sup>77</sup>. However, Evans would not accept delaying the action.

As soon as the Unit arrived on the Peninsula it had to carry out a very intense but very short period of instruction, based on 8/9 hours of drill and manoeuvres per day in two sessions. This system of instruction was contrary to the usual British procedures, which since Wellington had endeavoured to train men thoroughly, to prepare them as soldiers, both in movements of arms and in evolutions, tabulating the appropriate time in a year. There was another difficulty: this type of instruction sought to achieve an automation and capacity to fight on European field that would be of little use in the type of actions carried out in the «Carlist campaign», on hard, mountainous terrain. With this initial period, an attempt was made for the troops to acquire the habits and customs of obedience.

<sup>74</sup> The First Carlist War: a Military History. CAIRNS C. P. 90.

<sup>75</sup> In transport, there were riots in the 1st, 3rd and 10th Regiments. The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War. BRETT M Edward, p. 48.

<sup>76</sup> This incident was related by THOMPSON in the work 12 Months in the British Legion.

<sup>77</sup> SANTACARA C. The First Carlist War as seen by the British, p. 94. Palmerston agreed to deliver rifles to the United Kingdom for the first 2.000 enlisted personnel.

However, this was not enough to acquire the skills, instruction and training in mountain and guerrilla combat actions, which required basic good physical condition, which many of the enlisted men lacked. They needed to acquire the endurance to march more than 12 leagues over varied terrain in adverse conditions, a capacity that any Spanish unit on either side already had. Finally, it was necessary to acquire personal initiative, mental and physical, which was difficult to achieve or instil in many of the British candidates, and to unite them.

This time is inherent to the history of armies and war, and without it, a group of armed men have never become a unit capable of executing decisive combat and manoeuvring actions, and that was not acquired on 30 August 1835, the date of the first action<sup>78</sup>. It was necessary to combine discipline, training and minor combat actions to shorten the time and put the Legion on the ground with some solvency for the limited combat of the security actions due to the garrison troops.

The training of the Legion's units improved, but their level did not reach that of the British regulars. For that reason, when the Legion did not have support elements, the units based performance on the individual courage of their men that in closed formations charged with bayonets, a procedure with which the units obtained their best results in both victory and defeat. In contrast, the fire training, which had been very careful in British regular units since Wellington, and which was outstanding in the Royal Marines, was not adequate in any of the actions. This demonstrates the courage and aggressiveness of the men, but also highlights their technical deficiencies in their instruction and especially in training, which was the responsibility of the officers.

It was necessary for the units to acquire the necessary speed of movement to move around the difficult terrain of northern Spain, with a high degree of mobility to fight in the agile skirmishes with the Carlists. This was a major shortcoming of the Legion, because although there were nominally several regiments and light companies on its staff, in reality there was always a deficit of initiative and versatility. Thus, during the total period of service, units of light infantry or Spanish free corps had to be added, in addition to the permanent unit assigned to the Legion.

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<sup>78</sup> In this sense, there was the order given to the Espartero Division to protect the movement of the Legion in Castrobarra in the winter 1836, SHUBERT A., Espartero the Peacemaker, p. 112.

Without cohesion and discipline, in a combat zone, the Legion was at the mercy of the enemy and neither could be achieved in the very short initial phase of San Sebastian and Santander. Therefore, the concentration in Bilbao and the trip to Vitoria, which had to be extended to the interior of Castile to travel hidden from the threat, had to be considered as periods of instruction and cohesion for the Legion.

### The 1835 campaign and the arrival of the Legion

In 1835, the war expanded into the nationwide and great changes took place in the plans and methods. Both sides went from acting with «columns» to acting with «divisions». Zumalacárregui died and Luis Fernández de Córdoba took command of the Isabelline Army. This materialised, on the Carlist side, with the beginning of «expeditions» outside their area of influence, and on the Isabelline side with the new strategy that sought to economically isolate and suffocate Carlism in the north and operationally regain the initiative. In the summer of 1835, the Carlist failure in the First Siege of Bilbao, the death of Zumalacárregui and in August the arrival of British land participation coincided.

Within this framework, two key Liberal areas were Bilbao and San Sebastian, both for their political and economic value. Both were isolated from the territory of the Liberal territory, but the sea allowed communication with the government and the arrival of resources, which was assured by the British naval force. A different problem was the «encirclement» of the land, since the need for men throughout the territory did not allow for adequate garrisoning. Therefore, both cities would be linked to the ground action of the British participation. Bilbao, a fundamental Carlist objective, would be the first place on land where British supporters would be present from the forces of the Northern Squadron, materialising by means of officers and men to serve the pieces and ammunition, 20 quintals of gunpowder, materials for the «18» pieces and foodstuffs. The next would be San Sebastian<sup>79</sup>, receiving resources, advisors and staff for the pieces<sup>80</sup>, and producing the first British casualties.

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<sup>79</sup> ALCALÁ Cesar. First Carlist War. The Siege of Bilbao and The Royal Expedition (1835-1837)., pp. 32 and 42.

<sup>80</sup> VIGON Jorge. History of the Spanish Artillery. p. 203.

### The lines of defence of General Fernández de Córdova

With the victory of Mendigorria on 15 July and the Royal Order of the Duke of Amarillas, the «Isabelline» forces changed their operational planning, abandoning the incursions into the Carlist valleys that produced casualties and worn-out ranks to move to the fortified lines. «Where he could come to the aid of the threatened points that deserved to be attended to, and take advantage of all the occasions to attack the factionalists in areas where they could advantageously work all the weapons and recover their superiority, the superiority of our discipline. To make the strong points more resistant to the cannon»<sup>81</sup>.

The aim of the plan was to isolate the Carlists of the North, both from the rest of Spain and from abroad, and then to address the core of the «Carlist state». For this, apart from the land lines, of positions, it was necessary to close the sea and the Pyrenean passes. This meant the possession by the Liberals of the ports of Bilbao and San Sebastián and the towns near the French border of Irún and Fuenterrabía. In addition, the establishment of the lines would give the Liberals time to instruct and train their units, given the large number of new units including Evans's Legion or units reinforced with new recruits.

The Córdova plan, in the land aspect, first required fortification works with a 250 km belt, linked by 60 fortified strong points<sup>82</sup>. In addition, it was necessary to have locations for operational bases in which to house the manoeuvring force that would push the rebels in. So, time was needed to execute it. The bases needed infrastructure to house the units and communications routes to the centre of the Carlist centres in the valleys of Biscay, Guipúzcoa and Navarre. Only Vitoria, in very poor conditions, and Pamplona could accommodate the troops of various capacities, about 20,000 men who would carry out firstly the various tasks of the plan, including the Legion<sup>83</sup>, and later the penetration.

<sup>81</sup> Royal Order of 23 July 1835 to Acting General-in-Chief of the Army Luis Fernández de Córdoba.

<sup>82</sup> FERNÁNDEZ DE CÓRDOVA. Luis. Justification Report that the General addresses to his fellow citizens in vindication. Paris 1837.

<sup>83</sup> It is difficult to specify the beginning of the implementation of the plan, the start of which varies from one author to another. The most realistic thing is to focus it in mid-autumn as BULLÓN de MENDOZA states in his work *La 1ª Guerra Carlista (The First Carlist War)* p. 278. On 10 December 1835, fortification work began in Ariñez, Álava.

The arrival of the first elements of the Legion, coinciding with the preparation of a new phase of the conflict, offered the possibility of having men to initially garrison significant positions. San Sebastian, an isolated stronghold since 1 December 1835, began to receive the British for two Spanish regiments, constituting the garrison. The first contingent left Portsmouth on 2 July 1835, arriving in San Sebastian on 11 July. General Lacy arrived in the Peninsula on August 17<sup>th</sup>, by which time there were already 1,819 British in Santander and 2,803 in San Sebastian which would end up being the main base<sup>84</sup>. The men needed time to train and educate themselves, but they did not have it. On 30 August was the first combat action for the Legion, in the area around San Sebastian. In it, the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Regiments were involved. This action, in which Spanish forces participated, could be framed within the process of instruction/combat of the unit, as the forces encountered an enemy party and pursued it, but were counter-attacked and had to leave the terrain, leaving several casualties in the hands of the enemy and four prisoners who were subject to the Durango Decree<sup>85</sup> being shot.

On 5 September, the Legion was ordered to gather in Portugalete to participate in the relief of Bilbao, and the first «mass review» of the Legion was done by General Evans. His idea was to participate in actions, minor ones, and to continue with the instruction, particularly offensive, at the same time. On 11 September, some of Evans's new troops, under the command of Espartero, took part in the action in Arrigorriaga, 6 km from Bilbao, where the units were surrounded by the Carlists. Espartero, aware of the lack of training of the units, particularly the British, did not want to get involved by retreating over the Bolueta Bridge, where he would be defeated. After this action, the Legion continued to concentrate in Bilbao and by the end of October there were already 7,800 men<sup>86</sup> dedicated to hardening themselves with marches, exercises, and very low intensity encounters in order to become more experienced. On 30 October, Evans was ordered

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<sup>84</sup> Documentation collected by DE PORRAS Y RODRÍGUEZ DE LEÓN G. The Rodil Expedition and the foreign legions in the 1st Carlist War, p.127. Data from the General Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, number H2857.

<sup>85</sup> Decree of Durango, 20 June 1835, given by the Pretender Charles V: »the foreign corps that came to sustain the dominion of usurpation in the question of succession, which was something that concerned only the Spanish nation, were excluded from the benefits of the Treaty of Lord Elliot«, the death penalty being applied to those taking up arms.

<sup>86</sup> The First Carlist War BULLÓN de MENDOZA, p. 422.

to go to Vitoria to join the forces that were to undertake the Córdoba Plan.

General Córdoba ordered to go directly to Vitoria, but Evans, aware of the capacity of the Legion, took the opposite route, going to Castile keeping in his mind the previous combats. A longer and more sheltered route, which would give his men the possibility of continuing their instruction. This disobedience would be the first difficulty between the two generals, at the same time as British complaints about the lack of winter equipment began. The latter would become endemic and a source of discord.

The British Legion arrived in Vitoria<sup>87</sup> on 3 December 1835, and was stationed in the vicinity until April, when a «dark period» began. Diseases and epidemics, typhoid fever, coupled with the cold, poor housing and food conditions, lack of winter equipment plus the physical conditions of many legionnaires were about to wipe out the Legion. The losses of the Legion in the three months they were in Vitoria<sup>88</sup> could be estimated at about 1,200men amongst diseases, epidemics, deserters and the missing.

### Campaign of 1836. Reorganisation

In early 1836, the Carlists changed their strategy to break the Liberal blockade. To do this, they turned against the Liberal positions on the coast and in the valleys of the Pyrenees, and began the great expeditions. On the other hand, the Liberals, securing the «Arga line», tried to relieve the pressure of the Carlists in Guipúzcoa by reinforcing their garrisons. The British Legion was used for both tasks, first as part of the offensive unit launched from Vitoria and later to garrison Guipúzcoa.

#### The Battle of Arlabán (16 and 17 January)

On 16 January 1836, the first offensive operation of the Legion integrated into the Córdoba forces took place. The Liberals left Vitoria and its surroundings to carry out a series of offensive reconnaissance and frontal attacks, and to reach and occupy the dominant points

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<sup>87</sup> SANTOYO Julio Cesar. The British Legion in Vitoria. The Legion arrived split up, and the cavalry and artillery were later incorporated.

<sup>88</sup> BULLÓN de MENDOZA, The First Carlist War, p. 424 «Defecting to the Carlist ranks was of little help, so much so that 144 of them were sent to Bayonne because they were unsuitable for service in their ranks».

of communication of the «Plain of Alaves» with the Biscayan valleys of Arratia, Duranguesado and the Alto Deva in Gipuzkoa, while threatening Oñate, the court of the Pretender. The old Villarreal<sup>89</sup> and the port of Arlabán were to the west and north, the two key points to get, that are complemented to the east by Guevara.

The idea of manoeuvre was the frontal attack and the encirclement by the flanks. The force was articulated in three groupings:

- The first one, based on the experienced Espartero Division, was the main effort and would act on the «left flank»<sup>90</sup>.
- The second with Spanish units and «the professional» French Legion in the centre of the attack, oriented to the North and under the direct command of General Córdoba.
- The third under the command of Evans and his Legion, which was very much reduced, plus Spanish units, attending to the «right flank», complementing the efforts of the West and the North.

But if there is one thing that characterises this war, it was the superiority of Carlist intelligence/information over the practical absence of it in the Liberal ranks, and Arlabán was no exception, not knowing the entity and location of the enemy<sup>91</sup>. The advance on a wide front with three axes and bad weather conditions required a great deal of coordination between units that did not exist.

The initial actions of the Legion began on the 11 with a series of reconnaissance actions on the Vitoria - Salvatierra axis. The Legion, very much diminished as a consequence of casualties in Vitoria, was reinforced with more Spanish cavalry, in addition to the Chapelgorris battalion<sup>92</sup> which was employed independently, and could have been better employed, on this and other occasions, adding their companies to the British regiments, thus giving them a capacity which they lacked, as British officers point out<sup>93</sup>.

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<sup>89</sup> Historically, it has been considered the key to Álava and there have been constant military confrontations in its vicinity.

<sup>90</sup> The terminology of the time is used, right and left flanks in the present day West flank.

<sup>91</sup> In this case, the Carlists had deployed six battalions and one squadron, in the vicinity of Guevara. The objective was to be achieved by the «right flank», the third grouping under the command of Evans.

<sup>92</sup> The term assigned is used to refer to units which, without belonging to a command or organisation, remain available for operational use on a continuous basis.

<sup>93</sup> Thompson C.W. Twelve months in the British Legion.

After the mentioned reconnaissance, on 16 January with a fog that prevented vision, the Legion deployed to the front a force of 1,800 men<sup>94</sup> coming from six regiments<sup>95</sup>, 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>, reaching the proximities of Guevara Castle. The action was simple, a bayonet charge, and the Carlists withdrew. The following day, the Sierra de Arlabán was reached, the line of maximum advance, where the regiments endured another terrible night without winter equipment. These actions had nothing to do with the fighting that materialised the main effort, the conquest of Alto de Arlabán and the town of Villarreal, which produced high casualties, about 1,000<sup>96</sup>. British casualties in action were one sergeant and about a dozen soldiers. Attrition on the pawned units was heavy, and on the 18th retreat was ordered. That order did not reach Evans, increasing the bad relations that already existed, both because of the lack of coordination and the lack of resources. The Legion went to Treviño in a defensive attitude<sup>97</sup>.

Arlabán showed that the unit was improving in combat discipline but was not yet an offensive unit. It needed time to recover after Vitoria, six regiments had joined together for a battle group of 1,800men. The Legion, in particular its infantry, after 8 months of harsh existence and the casualties suffered, mostly from typhoid and desertion, needed to reorganise. The epidemic had not affected all the regiments equally;<sup>98</sup> the English were the most punished followed by the Scots. The 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Regiments, which had suffered the most casualties, disappeared in March, with officers also transferring and resigning. The new structure consisted of three brigades<sup>99</sup> with three regiments, seeking to form three groups with similar combat capacity:

The first was a Line Brigade with the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> English Regiments and the 8<sup>th</sup> Scottish.

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<sup>94</sup> BRETT M Edward. *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War*, p.74.

<sup>95</sup> The fact that six regiments had to be brought together to form a battle group shows the terrible attrition that disease and desertion had caused in Evans's ranks

<sup>96</sup> These were very hard clashes in which the Prince and Princess Regiments would receive one Laureate each. PRINCE AND PRINCESS IHCM MADRID INFANTRY REGIMENT RECORDS.

<sup>97</sup> The 2nd Battle of Arlabán: On 22 May of the same year, General Córdova carried out another offensive action with no aim of occupying land. After four days of skirmishes, the Liberals withdrew.

<sup>98</sup> This dismantled the hypothesis of the poisoning of the food SANTOYO. The British Legion in Vitoria.

<sup>99</sup> BRETT M. Edward, *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War*, p. 77.

The second, considered «Light», was formed by the Rifle Corps and two Grenadier Regiments, the 3<sup>rd</sup>English and the 6<sup>th</sup>Scottish.

The third was made up of two Light Regiments, the 7<sup>th</sup>and 10<sup>th</sup>and the 9<sup>th</sup>Line, all Irish, and comprised about 1.800 men, making it the strongest. About half of Evans's initial force had been killed, wounded/ill, deserters and stragglers<sup>100</sup>. The Chapelgorris battalion was under the command of the Legion.

### The defence of San Sebastian 1836

In April, between the 12 and the 25, the units, with the exception of the 2<sup>nd</sup>Lancers, left Vitoria for San Sebastian by sea. The route this time would be shorter through the Mena Valley, but secured by veteran forces, to avoid surprises to the Legion. The operational strength was 4.500 infantrymen, the 1<sup>st</sup>Lancers and supporters. The Legion had lost many men, but the rest were hardening. San Sebastian was assigned as a garrison to Evans's forces, reinforced with two Spanish regiments and, from 14 March, with greater support from the Royal Navy and the direct involvement of its Marines.

Relations between Evans and Cordoba were still strained, while the maintenance of San Sebastian and the control of the coast up to the French border were essential for the Liberals. This was seen by both the Spanish political and military command and by Villiers, who saw in San Sebastian the best situation for Evans and his men. In addition, the area bounded by the sea to the north and by the mountainous terrain to the south was the right setting for joint British operations, a narrow strip of land that allowed all the naval power to be developed in support of the land forces, both by precise and deep fire and logistically, facilitating movement, with material disembarked from pontoons to cross the rivers that run across the directions of attack. The security of the flanks, with franca/free or light units, was simple to execute on the coastal strip, so the British line infantry battalions could make the most of their attack. Eventually, Evans would be moved away from Córdoba. The replacement of the latter by Espartero in September consolidated both the allocation of San Sebastian as the base of the Legion and the closure plans for the border.

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<sup>100</sup> This number is too high for a unit even within the bloody conflict. For the number of total casualties in BULLÓN de MENDOZA. The First Carlist War. There are no accurate data on the total number of casualties in the conflict, and no data on civilian casualties.

The Carlists had reinforced the land blockade of San Sebastian with three construction belts. Evans, impatient to regain his independence and without the previous information, launched an attack on the very day of his arrival, 5 May, without waiting to be completed as he was missing two regiments. The aim was to keep the enemy away from the vicinity. The main effort of the Legion was carried out by the «Irish Brigade», with its three Regiments, 7<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>, which attacked with bayonets, reaching the first two belts and being rejected in the third. At that time they were supported by naval fire that opened up gaps, and by the arrival of the remaining units. The Carlists gave up ground until they had artillery support and halted the attack, causing the British to lose 18% of their force, approximately 800 men.

However, this combat was the first victory of the Legion and the first direct intervention in ground combat by the regular forces of the United Kingdom. The Infantry and Artillery of the «Royal Marines<sup>101</sup>», and of the Royal Artillery and Engineers, were very professional soldiers, with great discipline<sup>102</sup> and shooting training.

After the success, the conquest of the port of Pasajes, 5 kms east of San Sebastian, was planned, counting on maritime support. The action, with a lot of fire support, was a success, taking the port on 28 May. The scheme was repeated, fire and support from pontoonists to cross rivers from the boats and landing of the marines acting by closed discharges. The second phase of the plan remained, reaching the French border, and Evans had about 9,000 men between the British, who were receiving recruits, and the Spanish.

The centralised Carlist situation allowed them to act along internal lines and reinforce their units in contact, so Evans had to go on the defensive. A combined operation on Fuenterrabía was designed to take up the initiative again, but it ended in failure due to a lack of information. The terrain at the mouth of the Bidasoa was unknown, so the ships could not approach it,

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<sup>101</sup> VARIOUS AUTHORS, with the reinforcements received Lord Hay had 800 «marines» of which 100 were gunners and the rest an infantry battalion under the command of Major John Owen

<sup>102</sup> On 15 July 1837, the Pretender signed a decree in Ordizia in which he stated that the «Royal Marines» were regular units and therefore not affected by the Durango Decree. It really showed the appreciation that Charles had for them and the desire to facilitate their defection and move into his ranks. There is no record of any desertions from the Corps and their integration into the Carlist ranks.

and so their support was distant and the fire imprecise. Evans also had to leave his command due to illness, and the lack of unity of doctrine amongst the commanders of the Legion became apparent. In addition, several mutinies broke out that beginning with the Scots, would spread even to the cavalry. The reasons, the lack of payment and the completion of the year of service with which many Scots and riders requested their discharge. With the excuse of the Gómez Expedition, the most conflictive units were sent to Santander, while the discharge of personnel who did not want to serve was being studied<sup>103</sup>. This situation was complicated in August by the outbreak of the La Granja Mutiny with its constitutional and military changes when the Northern Army was transferred to Espartero.

Once the units had been subdued, the Legion was once again concentrated in San Sebastian, but the border campaign was also cancelled with the autumn, and attention turned to Bilbao.

In the actions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Siege of Bilbao, 23 October to 25 December 1836 and the Battle of Luchana, British participation was of great value, with special emphasis on the support provided by Lord Hay's forces and the advice of observers. Already in April, the British presence in the area around Bilbao had been reinforced, with the presence of marines and artillery in the «El Desierto» fortress that protected the estuary.

For the liberation of Bilbao, the Royal Navy facilitated the transfer of Espartero's forces to Portugalete, provided men and pontoon equipment to force passage along the right bank by providing rafts to build a bridge, which was destroyed by the sea and another had to be built on 19 December. With the collaboration of Wylde, the plan for the secondary operation of crossing with boats and fire support was outlined, to facilitate the main action of breaking the right bank. The men from the ships HMS «Saracen» and the HMS «Ringdow» took part in this support and with them 30 transport boats and warships. In addition, the detachments of the Royal Engineers on board participated, with the construction of pontoons, and artillerymen of the Legion with their materials, to reinforce the only four pieces of Espartero. Espartero highlighted this participation in the report he sent to the government, «without which Bilbao would not have been freed by the end of the year».

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<sup>103</sup> SANTACARA, C., *The First Carlist War seen by the British*, p. 203. The opinion of Colonel Wylde advising Ambassador Villiers is recorded.

### The campaign of 1837. Guipúzcoa

The year 1837 did not start well for the Legion, financial problems made discipline snap with a new mutiny for the collection of payment. The Isabelline command continued to relish the idea of closing the flow of French resources. To this end, an action plan was devised with three simultaneous and converging efforts to reach the Upper Deva, but without any specific objective. The efforts would be materialised by the Sarsfield forces stationed in Pamplona, by Evans from San Sebastian and by Espartero's forces from Bilbao. The plan failed and led to Oriamendi's defeat.

In 1837, the Royal Expedition of the Pretender was the key milestone. Operationally, it meant that a large number of Carlist forces, with their offensive capability, moved out of the north, which translated into greater freedom and ability to intervene between May and October for the Liberal forces that remained.

Oriamendi 14 to 15 March. At the end of the first ten days of March, the implementation of the Liberal plan began with the three columns towards the heart of Carlist territory. But coordination and intelligence failed again. Sarsfield's, from Pamplona and Espartero's forces, from Vizcaya, did not arrive, and Evans's intelligence did not detect the arrival of the Carlist reserves. As a result of both failures, Evans's forces were left alone, not only facing the Carlist forces surrounding San Sebastian, but also facing the reserves.

Evans began his actions, his first target being Hernani located in the interior. During the 10, 11 and 12, he progressed by freeing the area of Loyola and from there he moved towards Hernani, managing to occupy its heights and the fort of Oriamendi on the 14<sup>th</sup>, but Sarsfield's forces had withdrawn, and Espartero was as far away as the Royal Navy's ships. On the morning of the 15, the Carlist reserves, moving along internal lines and driven by a young general, Prince Sebastian, launched two attacks, one feinting the left Liberal flank and the other in the centre, which broke the joint deployment at its weakest point, the union of the Spanish and British forces.

The Christino army had to retreat with great losses to San Sebastian, protected by a brilliant rear-guard action of the British lancers, combined with the fire of the Legion's artillery and that of

the Marines. That could not cover the entire front, and the battle was a disaster: 400 dead, 900 injured<sup>104</sup>.

After Oriamendi, in the first ten days of May, in accordance with the approach of the Commander in Chief, Espartero, the reorganised Legion was again involved in a series of joint and combined offensive actions aimed at closing the French border by dominating Hernani, Oyarzun, Irún and Fuenterrabía. Under the direct command of Espartero, who moved to Guipúzcoa, this phase was a success<sup>105</sup>. But the Legion would disappear on 9 June 1937 after two years of service. Previously, Evans left Spain on 3 June.

### The 2<sup>nd</sup> Auxiliary Legion 1837

In the summer of 1837, the time of service expired, but as the need for men still existed, the continuity of Evans was attempted, which was surely not achieved due to his clashes with the Spanish commanders and the Legion. The latter was not achieved either, the troops did not want to be re-enlisted, about 4,000 men were discharged, and suffering awaited them on their return home, where they were ignored and left penniless.

With much effort, a «New or 2<sup>nd</sup> Auxiliary Legion» was formed. An attempt was made by Espartero to make Colonel Wylde the commander, but he refused, motivated by Palmerston's criteria «that he was better off advising generals»<sup>106</sup> than commanding a Spanish unit and also by his involvement in recruitment and support work, declaring that «his state was one of shameful abandonment and discontent», and that his survival would be greatly compromised<sup>107</sup>.

The emphasis was on retaining the finest units, artillery and lancers, as well as men, and so princes were turned into artillerymen

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<sup>104</sup> DE APALATEGUI F. Oriamendi, p. 106. San Sebastian 1940. Also, in ALBI DE LA CUESTA J. STAMPA L, Campaigns of the Spanish Cavalry in the 19th Century. SHM. The death toll must have been significant since, according to tradition, «in the Caserío de Arizmendi, due to the large number of corpses, the bodies were piled up and set on fire». This happened with the bodies of Christians and in a very religious area, which shows the number of casualties and the feeling of violence of the war that did not stop with the death of the adversary.

<sup>105</sup> Espartero went to Guipúzcoa leading some 23,000 men by sea, reinforcing Evans's forces, which at that time had only two brigades, including the Chapelgorris battalion. The phase was officially completed on 29 May.

<sup>106</sup> Collected by SANTACARA C, The First Carlist War as seen by the British, p. 261.

<sup>107</sup> BRETT M Edward. The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War, pp.160-161.

and horsemen. The new corps had only 1,746 combatants, of which 122 were officers, 121 sergeants and 1,503 corporals and soldiers. It consisted of three small infantry regiments, rifles, Scottish and Irish with 350/310 sergeants and troops, a lancer unit with 293 men in ranks but only 80 horses, 56 sappers, 213 gunners and medical<sup>108</sup>.

Command was given to Brigadier Maurice O'Connell, who had served in the Legion since 1835, becoming Second Adjutant General. He was a regular officer and had served in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 77<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiments. A courageous officer, who did not know how to maintain good relations with either the Spanish authorities or his commander O'Donnell.

The summer of 1837 was marked by mutinies and murders of officers in the Liberal Army, precisely the first great service of the new unit took place in Hernani on 4 July, where the return to discipline of the Mirasol Division was achieved by the action of Leopoldo O'Donnell and the discipline of the artillery of the New Legion<sup>109</sup>.

Following the restoration of discipline and control of the French border in the previous cycle of operations, the Liberal effort changed direction, seeking to enter Guipúzcoa, occupy Tolosa and attempt to join the forces of Navarra. To do this it was necessary to break the Urnieta-Andoain line<sup>110</sup> which would open the way to Tolosa and the Leizarán valley.

On 1 September, Leopoldo O'Donnell was appointed commander of the army corps of the Cantabrian coast and although troop morale was still low, he decided to carry out an offensive action. These were the decisive times in the war with the Royal Expedition at the gates of Madrid on 12 September. On 8 September, 1837, O'Donnell began the advance towards the south, with Andoain as a target, with 7,000 men. The unit was comprised of two Spanish brigades covering the flanks and in the centre a much reduced

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<sup>108</sup> VARIOUS AUTHORS SANTACARA C. The First Carlist War as seen by the British 1833- 1840, p. 274 and BRETT The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War p. 160.

<sup>109</sup> BULLÓN de MENDOZA Journal of Military History Special Issue II 2017. Leopold O'Donnell and the First Carlist War, p. 66 .

<sup>110</sup> Andoain is located in the Oria Valley extension, and surrounded by numerous mountains, crossed by the river Oria and its affluent the Leizarán, which forms the Leizarán Valley, enabling communication with Pamplona, Navarra, at present the Leizarán Highway (A-15).

«New British Legion», with only two battalions as the third, «Irish» decided that «without pay they would not obey orders».

The advance of the Liberal troops was not disputed, but a harsh policy was followed with the population as some 120 granaries were burned, which exasperated the population. Once again, the information was played on by attributing most of the fires to the British Legion, which would then unleash the wrath of the inhabitants against the legionnaires. Andoain was occupied and, further south, Urnieta, with the Carlists remaining on the Oria line and the Leizarán, the westernmost bank<sup>111</sup>. At dawn on 14 September the Carlists launched an attack with two successive efforts, the first on the Liberal left flank. Once again the information failed and O'Donnell reacted by modifying the deployment of the units, moving his most senior troops to this flank. At this point, the second Carlist effort was unleashed on the right flank, where the newest Christino units were now located. Their morale suffered by retreating in disarray and allowing the British forces that were fortifying themselves in Andoain to become involved.

The two British battalions involved tried to buy time and enable the artillery and other units to retreat to Hernani; one counterattacked with bayonets from below, and the other established a centre of resistance in the church. Also, the Lancers facilitated the withdrawal by conducting charges. The action was a courageous defeat, described as a massacre, with 25 officers and 300 troops killed, 18% of the Legion. This coupled with the lack of resources was the end. On 21 October in Guetaria, a maritime action with the Royal Navy would be the last operation of the Legion, which was dissolved on 19 December 1837.

### **British Auxiliary Brigade 1838**

After the dissolution of the previous one and in order to maintain the best capabilities of the Legion, «Lancers and Artillery», the British Auxiliary Brigade was formed in March 1838, until «the end of the war», commanded by Colonel Frederick La Saussageen, who had served in both the British and Spanish armies<sup>112</sup>.

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<sup>111</sup> A contingent of British regular forces, consisting of Marines and gunners, remained in reserve in Hernani throughout the action. But naval fire support could not be counted on.

<sup>112</sup> In the Spanish Army, he served in the Zaragoza Line Infantry Regiment.

At the time of its creation, the Brigade was made up of 30 officers, 31 sergeants and 341 soldiers, 50% of whom were cavalrymen and gunners, forming two units, but with a great shortage of horses and pack animals. As a result of internal problems, the artillery was disbanded and some of its men were converted into lancers, but contracts had to be terminated due to lack of mounts for all personnel. The lancers were integrated into the forces of General Diego de León where they participated fully and with distinction. Diego de León's group was the most select of the Christino Cavalry. Among the actions of the Lancers, the fight of Los Arcos on 3 December 1838 and in January the fight of Aguaviva stand out, and from 23 March 1839 they participated in the tasks of devastation of the territory dominated by the Pretender. Six months later, by General Order of 29 September in Logroño,<sup>113</sup> the Squadron of Lancers, as proof of its professionalism, was in the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, made up of units of the Royal Guard, the most elite of the Army. The unit was dissolved in January 1841.

The observer detachments: commissioned officers (1834 -1840)

The British Army's personnel commissioned to allied armies or areas of operation depended from the beginning on its Foreign Office commission. They were highly selected staff who could report directly to the Foreign Minister. Their actions went beyond those of mere liaison detachments, and were at the political and strategic levels without, of course, neglecting operational issues. They usually acted in teams of three officers, the oldest being a lieutenant colonel or colonel and they used to be engineers or artillerymen, due to their technical training. The «head of commission» used to receive an extra grade, to reach the rank of colonel. Relationships with management and authorities were fundamental to the success of their work and were not always easy, depending on the people. But, as time went by, they improved and worked very well as between Espartero and Wylde.

In September 1834, Lieutenant Colonel William Wylde received the order to move to Spain and join the Army of Northern Operations with the rank of Colonel, accompanied by Lieutenant George Turner<sup>114</sup>, later joined by Lieutenant James Lynn. In October he presented himself to General Mina, beginning his extensive missions that could cover almost everything, even as

<sup>113</sup> ALBI DE LA CUESTA J. The Carlist Army of the North 1833-39, p. 475.

<sup>114</sup> Details of the officers of the detachments in SANTACARA C. The First Carlist War as seen by the British.

Evans's adviser, except «accepting the surrender of the Pretender Carlos»<sup>115</sup>.

This team had great importance in the actions leading to the lifting of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Siege of Bilbao, where he was involved in both the planning and coordination of fire support provided by the British Navy and the Legion Artillery and of combat support provided by the Royal Engineers and the Royal Navy crews, co-directed by Colonel Wylde.

Also, Wylde and Lord Hay intervened in the previous steps and talks of the Vergara Agreement, although since Espartero was always clear that the war was between Spaniards and therefore peace had to be agreed by Spaniards». Previously, British officials had been involved in the Elliot Agreement and the «Peace and Fueros» movement<sup>116</sup>. In this case, the mediators were Commodore Hay and Lieutenant Turner.

During the war, motivated by their achievements, the first team of commissioners under Wylde's command would be joined by two other teams, one for the Army of the Centre and a third for the Army of Catalonia. In total there were nine officers, six gunners and three engineers<sup>117</sup>. For the Army of the Centre, the team was activated on 22 September 1837 under the command of Colonel Richard Lancy with Captain Williams, an engineer, and Lieutenant Crofton, a gunner, who would receive the Cross of St Ferdinand. The two adjutants were relieved on 2 February 1838 by the captain of engineers, Alderson, and artillery lieutenant Askwith. Initially, too, relations between Oraa and Lacy were not good.

In July 1839, a decision was made to activate the group of observers for the Catalan Army, which would be commanded by Colonel Edward Mitchell and the commander of the engineers Du Plat and the artillery lieutenant Dickson. The team arrived in Catalonia in August with instructions not only from the military but also to sign the commercial agreement<sup>118</sup>.

The British presence at Espartero's headquarters did not end with Vergara, but was maintained during the subsequent campaign

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<sup>115</sup> SANTACARA C. The First Carlist War as seen by the British, p 75. Communication from Ambassador Villiers to the President of the Council of Ministers Martinez de la Rosa

<sup>116</sup> This movement with foral implications exempts the Provinces from paying taxes, which in the end affected commercial interests, which were of concern to the United Kingdom.

<sup>117</sup> Actually, 11 with the two relieved on the Army of the Centre staff.

<sup>118</sup> SANTACARA C. The First Carlist War as seen by the British. P. 376. N.A FO-72-539.

in Maestrazgo and Catalonia. When Colonel Wylde<sup>119</sup> returned to the United Kingdom, he was replaced by Lieutenant James Lynn, who remained in Spain as a military attaché at the end of the War in Catalonia<sup>120</sup>. In the autumn of 1840, London gave the order to dismiss the commissioners. Espartero, fully convinced of the usefulness of the commissioner system, ordered that each of the army corps that was to control the territory of Catalonia be assigned a British liaison officer from those that were with the Armies, appointing Du Plat, Turner and Lynn. Throughout the conflict, these officers would become increasingly important both politically, with their correspondence with Lord Palmerston, and militarily, with their advisors.

### Regular British participation: Navy and Army

In the First Carlist War, personnel from the Royal Navy belonging to the Navy, the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy Artillery, as well as from the Army belonging to the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, integrated in naval detachments, participated. This participation was important for the Government of Madrid and for the cause of Queen Isabel II by covering the seven years of conflict and the peninsular coasts with one of its ports. In the east, their presence was a deterrent to the squadrons of Sardinia and Naples. In the North, its main task was the security and blockade actions and later the main support of the Legion in Guipúzcoa.

With its vision of projection, the British Government reinforced the Marine garrison of its ships on the Cantabrian coast and later facilitated the intervention in those of the Levant and South. Both the Royal Marines and the Royal Marine Artillery Corps were regular units with great tactical training and outstanding discipline and their officers were professional. These qualities became apparent as the confrontation dragged on and the Royal Navy and the detachments of marines and artillery were involved in ground actions, being employed as second-stage or reserve units; that is, safe troops to resolve crises such as in Oriamendi, Andoain and others. They, along with naval fire support, were

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<sup>119</sup> Wylde's final service was, at the end of the war and in Barcelona, on the occasion of the appointment of Espartero as a member of the Order of the Bath in the audience with the Regent where he tried to soften the confrontation between them by the Town Councils Act.

<sup>120</sup> SHUBERT A. Espartero the Peacemaker, p. 207.

the key elements in making sure that actions were victories or defeats were not disasters. The increase in maritime participation in the war would reach a qualitative peak in the summer of 1837, when Barcelona became the main British naval base in the Mediterranean, temporarily replacing Malta<sup>121</sup>.

The actions of Cabrera, the Royal Expedition and the popular uprisings made the British landings and collaborations in the Levant more and more frequent and committed, as in Barcelona and Valencia<sup>122</sup>, where the marines gave security and support to the authorities. The ships also participated in these support actions with their fire, as shown by the support given to the forces defending the Grao de Valencia during the Royal Expedition by HMS «Barham». These actions had their cost in lives and materials, with the HMS «Tribune» being lost in a storm. Finally, we must add the British crews of the Spanish ships «Reina Gobernadora», «Isabel II» and «Mazeppa» bought from the United Kingdom.

Artillery and engineering officers were few in number in the British Army but were key. Their total involvement in the conflict was about 10/20 officials. The Artillerymen served by directing both the land fires of the Legion and the landing columns, as well as in the batteries of the ships. The tasks of the engineers were mobility support, bridge construction and guidance and advice in the establishment and erection of fortified positions and sites.

Relations between the Spanish naval authorities and Lord Hay were not easy either. Thus, Lord Hay managed to gain, through his actions, the trust of the Spanish political authorities and, as regards the land commanders, his relations were developed through professional channels with little friction with them and with a little more intensity with Evans. However, the tension between Lord Hay and Admiral Ribera, the Spanish naval commander of the North Coast, was not so great that Ribera presented his resignation to the Government, which was accepted, in July 1837 and he was replaced<sup>123</sup>.

### An end and a beginning

The end of the British intervention would mean the end of the presence of foreign personnel in the ranks of the Spanish militia.

<sup>121</sup> SANTACARA C. The First Carlist War as seen by the British, p. 276

<sup>122</sup> SANTACARA C. The First Carlist War as seen by the British, pp. 257, 276.

<sup>123</sup> Bullón de Mendoza. The First Carlist War, p. 421.

As we shall see, more than 70 years will have to pass before we see non-nationals in the Spanish ranks again, and when that happens, it will be in the form of complete integration of both foreigners and nationals within the same unit.

We could expect an assessment of foreign intervention and particularly of British intervention in the conflict, which should be carried out by encompassing all its elements: political, economic, naval and military. There is no doubt that the British intervention was costly to Spain's political and economic coffers, but much was also achieved, particularly in the field of tactical procedures, especially in the joint field, and advice, and even the most select British units ended up in the Spanish military Parnassus.

To achieve this, personal interests and a high price in blood were left along the way. The British volunteers, as they were trained in different tasks, cohesive, and counting on British maritime and Spanish land support, ended up joining the Liberal manoeuvring force.



## Chapter six

### The English volunteers of the Tercio de Extranjeros

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#### Abstract

The colonial war that arose when the Protectorate was established in Morocco at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century gave rise to the recovery of the recruitment of foreigners in the Army. A practice extinguished throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century as an evolution of the transition from the royal armies of the Old Regime to the constitutional ones of a national nature. The creation of the *Tercio de Extranjeros* in 1920, known as *la Legión*, was the organic instrument that allowed its recruitment and framing. The presence of foreigners in their ranks never exceeded 20%, being those of English origin a minority, with a very short stay due to the diplomatic problems that arose, the object of analysis in this work.

#### Keywords

Army, Legion, Third Foreigners, legionnaires, Morocco, United Kingdom, British, Protectorate, recruitment.



The presence of foreigners in the Spanish Army gradually disappeared throughout the first quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as part of the transition from the royal armies, characteristic of the Old Regime, to the national armies that emerged from the French Revolution. The enlistment of foreigners in royal armies – basically into complete units – cannot be surprising given the dynastic character of the armies and the transnational nature of the monarchy.

Although the Cádiz Constitution established the concept of a national army as opposed to the king's army and therefore denied the presence of foreign troops, the Peninsula War itself and subsequent events would delay the extinction of foreigners in the Spanish army until well into the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

With the reform of June of 1818, in which the foreign-named regiments were extinguished, the last of them, The Regiment of the Royal Walloon Guards became the 2nd of the Royal Spanish Guards. With this, foreign units disappeared definitively in Spain, although old Swiss soldiers from the dissolved units were still in service<sup>1</sup> and even some foreigners bought as replacements until the Law of 10 January 1877—which re-established compulsory military service—expressly stated that only Spaniards could serve in the army, a principle that was confirmed by the Law establishing the Army of 29 November 1878, article 20 of which states '*To belong to the army, it is a precise circumstance to be Spanish*'.

Shortly before this date, and as a unique case that we want to recover, in 1868 Lieutenant Colonel Valeriano Weyler organised, on the occasion of the *Ten Years' War* of Cuba, a unit formed by volunteers and financed by the merchants of Havana that would receive the name of the *Hunters of Valmaseda*. This unit, formally outside the Spanish military organisation, recruited both Cubans and European foreigners. Weyler points out in his memoirs that no documentation was required of them, which is why many escapees or former prisoners were enlisted and *not a few who had outstanding accounts with the justice system*<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Royal Order of 30 June 1835 of Queen Governor Maria Cristina solving the life problems of the former soldiers of the Swiss regiments, which had been dissolved in 1822 and were in an anomalous situation. Some were employed on surveillance missions in Catalonia during the first Carlist War.

<sup>2</sup> WEYLER, Valeriano: *Memorias de un general (Memoirs of a general)*. Destino, Barcelona, 2004, p. 69.

It would be precisely a new colonial war, together with the extension of compulsory military service to the whole population in 1912, that would bring foreigners back to the Spanish army.

The lack of volunteers to cover the staff of the African units during the Moroccan War, which began in Melilla in 1909 and would last until 1927 as a result of the establishment of the Protectorate in Morocco, would drive a search for foreigners to cover military needs. This would lead to the creation of the 'Tercio de Extranjeros', similar to the French Foreign Legion, in 1920.

Although this unit aimed to cover its staff mainly with European foreigners from the armies defeated in World War I, the reality was different. On one hand, France raised serious objections to the recruitment of Germans to prevent its Legion from losing this important recruitment niche. On the other, the government's fears of the Bolshevik ideology entering Spain imposed restrictions on foreign recruitment and, as a result, the 'Tercio de Extranjeros' was mainly manned by Spaniards, with foreigners accounting for no more than 20% of the Moroccan campaign.

However, the so-called 'Disaster of Annual' in July 1921, with its international resonance, and the doubling of 'Tercio' forces that required an increase in recruitment, led to propaganda and recruitment campaigns being conducted in foreign capitals, both in Europe and America, with varying results, as in the case of the United Kingdom and the United States that are the subject of this analysis.

### Recruitment in the UK

Inflation and unemployment were the scourges of Europe after World War I, the latter reaching mass proportions from 1921<sup>3</sup>. This social crisis also affected the United Kingdom, which in the summer of 1921 had thousands of repatriated soldiers who could not find work, as the Ambassador in London, Merry del Val, explained to the Minister of State when he reported the presence of more than two thousand individuals in the consulate general in London and hundreds in provincial consulates willing to enlist if they were provided with transport to Spain<sup>4</sup>. He even announced

<sup>3</sup> JACKSON, Julian. *Europa, 1900-1945 (Europe, 1900-1945)*. Critica, Barcelona 2003, p. 144.

<sup>4</sup> AGMAE H-2883. Telegram from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State dated 18/8/1921.

the possibility of recruiting two regiments, with only officers<sup>5</sup>, and another 12,000 through an English colonel who had already recruited 800 for the French Foreign Legion<sup>6</sup>.

The Ministry of War did not hesitate in taking advantage of this opportunity, which allowed it to quickly complete two flags which had been authorised, and in this respect the Ministry of State said that «up to two thousand can be accepted if they meet the appropriate conditions for campaign life aged up to 40 years and of robust constitution». Transport is requested from the Minister of the Navy for transfer to Ceuta, where they would be enlisted<sup>7</sup>.

This huge influx of English to the consulates, which even led to altercations requiring police presence, alarmed the British authorities and attracted the attention of the press. On 18 August, the ambassador warned of the possible contrary attitude of British military authorities and the negative comments made by the press about the Spanish army, claiming that «our troops are incapable of controlling the Moor and that we intend to replace them with foreign forces»<sup>8</sup>. On the 19, the first official reaction was published by the newspaper *ABC*.

London 19, 9 pm. The Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, replying to a question on this matter [Spanish recruitment in England], states that he has news that the Spanish government is enlisting former British and other soldiers in England with the aim of sending them to Morocco.

He adds that he cannot say more about the matter until he has consulted the other ministers concerned; but that a statement on the subject will be made as soon as possible.

To further questions on the same issue, the Undersecretary answered that the law of foreign recruitment is still in force, and that the good relations during the war between the Riffians and Gibraltar must be taken into consideration<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Dispatch no. 933 from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State dated 19/8/1921.

<sup>6</sup> AGMAE H-2883. Telegram from the Ministry of State to the Ministry of War dated 20/8/1921.

<sup>7</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram from the Minister of War to the Minister of State dated 20/8/1921.

<sup>8</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Dispatch no. 933 from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State dated 19/8/1921.

<sup>9</sup> ABC 8/20/1921.

The Minister of State, in a telegram dated 21 August, consulted Merry del Val on the accuracy of these statements in the British Parliament and whether recruitment for the 'Tercio' could be completed under normal circumstances. On the same day, 99 volunteers began to board the 'Almirante Lobo' transport, docked in Southampton where it was stowing military equipment acquired from the United Kingdom<sup>10</sup>. However, on 23 February, Merry telegraphed Minister Hontoria informing him that, owing to the hostility shown by the press *to an indescribable extent* and the government's unfavourable attitude, as the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs had told him, he considered that «in order to avoid serious displeasure and friction we should merely accept isolated volunteers in this country as we have done up to now», suspending large-scale recruitment<sup>11</sup>.

The English press would play a decisive role in the crisis that was beginning. The first news items included complaints concerning the «detention of bonuses and payments, lack of food and clothing, and discipline imposed in a somewhat old-fashioned way»;<sup>12</sup> complaints which had already been reported to the Ambassador by the British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and brought to the attention of the Minister of State, who transferred them to War.

But the real storm would break out once the volunteers on board the 'Almirante Lobo' arrived in Ceuta. Those who were rejected for being useless or for refusing to sign the commitment were abandoned on the Peninsula, as their return ticket was not paid,<sup>13</sup> their complaints were added to those of the first defectors that were beginning to be published in the British press. On 27 September, the UK Ambassador to Spain wrote to the Minister of State with complaints and enquiries about recruitment conditions, to which the Minister replied that misinterpretations of recruitment conditions are «very understandable with people such as volunteers, mostly from a certain social class»<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> AGMM Africa Box 86 Communication from the Ministry of State to the Ministry of War dated 31/8/1921 communicating the names of 99 volunteers on board the 'Almirante Lobo' and one volunteer travelling on his own by the Irun border.

<sup>11</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram dated 23/8/1921 from the Ambassador in London to the Ministry of State.

<sup>12</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State dated 24/8/1921.

<sup>13</sup> AGMM. Africa, Box 86. File on passage and appeals for eight individuals from Ceuta rejected as useless.

<sup>14</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Letter from the Minister of State to the British Ambassador to Spain dated 4/10/1921.

On 17 October, the *Devon & Exeter Gazette* and the *Liverpool Daily Courier*, and on the 22nd the *Pall Mall & Globe*, *Territorial Service Gazette*, *Star*, *Evening News* and the influential *The Times* reported a long and appalling list of allegations concerning the treatment received, which they compared to the worst horrors of German prison camps<sup>15</sup>. On the 23, the British Ambassador to Spain addressed the Minister of State, communicating the *distressing reports* received, not only from British ex-legionaries, but also from other nationalities through consular agents. The ambassador went on to say that the seriousness of the complaints and the impression their publication has created in public opinion make it very likely that Parliament, which is «extremely sensitive in matters of this nature», would intervene in the matter and requests, in order to clarify the facts, that the Military Attaché or the Secretary of the Embassy be allowed to travel to Morocco to «question some or all of the English legionnaires» *privately* and to obtain the discharge of those who, on reasonable grounds, express their wish to rescind the commitment undertaken<sup>16</sup>.

On the 25, the Marquis de Lema met with the Viscount of Eza at Congress, expressing his concern about the evolution of events and the severity of the English request. The next morning, Lord Winterton MP addressed the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons, asking if he was aware of the allegations against the Spanish military authorities and if there were any plans to investigate. The Undersecretary, Mr Harmsworth, replied that the Spanish Government has already been asked to conduct an independent and impartial investigation and he was awaiting a reply<sup>17</sup>.

The Minister of State was unwilling, on grounds of national sovereignty, to grant the British request, and required Merry del Val's opinion. The ambassador agreed with this position, but recommended that an investigation be carried out by a Spanish authority outside the 'Tercio' and that, if necessary, English subjects who wish to do so be granted discharge, recommending in this case that they be given a generous gratuity and their return trip be paid as the best way of putting an end to the *irritating incident*.

<sup>15</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Dispatch no. 1173 from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State dated 24/10/1921.

<sup>16</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Note from the British Ambassador to the Minister of State dated 23/10/1921.

<sup>17</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Copy of the Journal of the House of Commons sent by the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State along with dispatch no. 1194 dated 27/10/1921.

The Minister of State summoned the British Ambassador and informed him of Spain's refusal to carry out the investigation, a decision which the latter understood, stating that the British government's intention was not to «cause the slightest disturbance to national self-esteem, but simply to have a practical means of responding to parliamentary enquiries with the truth of what was happening»<sup>18</sup>.

The ambassador proposed, as an alternative solution, a private visit by the British Consul in Spain to his nephew, a former British army captain serving as a sergeant in the 'Tercio de Extranjeros' and hospitalised in Melilla because he was wounded. With the information obtained, the British Government could respond to the parliamentary questions, settling the matter. The minister did not agree with the new proposal and pointed out that we are «very fond of the British recruits, but as they are few in number and we can do without them, if their stay there is going to give rise to so many press comments and complaints from the British government, the most comfortable thing would be to dismiss them, making the reason public». A comment which, in the Minister's opinion, impressed the Ambassador<sup>19</sup>.

Comments continued to appear in the British press, which reported on the request for an independent investigation (*The Times* 27/10), the description of the war that maintained Spain in negative terms (*The Observer* 30/10) or the declarations of three defectors (*Star* 25/10). All the articles contained allusions to the shortcomings of the Spanish Army. The Spanish press also reported on the incident. The newspaper *El Sol*, in its 29 October edition, echoed the article in *The Times* dated 22 October and blamed it on an international campaign to discredit the 'Tercio' de Extranjeros, dismissing the accusations made by the defectors, who have no defence other than to justify their cowardice. On the 31, the same newspaper published a letter from the head of the 'Tercio', Millán Astray, stating that the matter was in the hands of the Minister of War and he could not give his opinion, but that the heroism with which the 'Tercio' was fighting in Morocco can only be the result of the high spirit of its soldiers, which is incompatible with the accusations made by the English newspaper.

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<sup>18</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram no. 250 dated 31/10/1921 from the Minister of State to the Ambassador in London.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*.

The British government, eager to find a solution that would enable it to deal with questions in Parliament, encouraged by media pressure, proposed a new formula to the Spanish government: the affidavit or sworn statement of the British Legionnaires stating their complaints and wishes to remain in the 'Tercio' or not, and those who so wished would be licensed. In this way, said the British government, Spanish demands to «avoid foreign intervention in the investigation» are reconciled with the British need to «satisfy public opinion and Parliament». The ambassador was in favour of this formula and passed it on to the Minister, saying that «we will have solved an unpleasant incident and established in London a high concept of our rectitude and loyalty»<sup>20</sup>.

The Government finally decided to withdraw from the front and gather all the British legionnaires in Ceuta, where they would be invited to declare whether they were happy to continue in the 'Tercio'. The British Government was satisfied with this solution and asked if it could make it public. The Spanish government did not consider it appropriate at the time, given the consequences that it could have among legionnaires of other nationalities, an aspect that was of serious concern in the 'Tercio'. On 6 November, the Anglo-Saxon legionnaires met in Ceuta with the following outcome.

Having questioned English legionnaires in Ceuta, only a few expressed their desire to withdraw from the commitment for insignificant reasons. The others would have been willing to continue, but as it has been noted that they found payment low and that the questioning aroused a general desire and hope to seize the opportunity to collectively get a raise, I have advised Minister of War that, in order to avoid angry incidents, they should also be amicably discharged. I ask that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be informed. Around 40 would be discharged; the others questioned so far have strongly insisted on staying and so they are kept. On publicity of the matter I will reach an agreement with the English ambassador<sup>21</sup>.

On 9 November, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs replied in Parliament to a new question from Lord Winterton, informing

<sup>20</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram no. 475 from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State dated 2/11/1921.

<sup>21</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram no. 260 from the Minister of State to the Spanish Ambassador in London. 13/11/1921.

him that he expected a satisfactory solution to the matter very soon<sup>22</sup>. On the 17, 41 English and 14 American soldiers were discharged; we will study these cases later. Four more Englishmen, one Anglo-Egyptian and one American remain pending discharge, as well as eight to ten injured and sick people left in hospitals. The discharged men were helped with four pesetas a day and their journey to England via Bilbao paid, as well as being given warm clothes and blankets, as recommended by the ambassador in London and despite the contrary opinion of the Minister of State, who considered that they should not be treated differently from the rest of the legionnaires who had been discharged, as this created an inconvenient precedent, as well as economic losses for the State's coffers. The price of the tickets from Bilbao to England was 4,529.40 pesetas.

As was to be expected, the arrival of the former legionaries in England was widely covered by the press, which had not failed to cover the events of the preceding days despite Spanish interest in preventing it. The Spanish authorities were particularly outraged by an article in *The Times* on 26 November, which reported the arrival of the discharged English soldiers at Victoria Station under the headline: *HOME FROM MOROCCO. SUFFERINGS OF THE LEGION. HARDSHIP. CRUELTY. AND DISEASE. THE SPANISH RABBLE.*

Merry del Val addressed the newspaper in protest at the *rude* way in which it treated Spain and its army, as he had done on previous occasions with similar news items in other newspapers, without better success, as *The Times*, when publishing the Ambassador's note, added the footnote «the news did not express an opinion on the matter, but that they had reason to believe that the article was an impartial account of the facts»<sup>23</sup>. This news received wide international coverage, as the diplomatic representations in Lisbon, Switzerland and even Japan informed the Ministry of State of similar information reproduced from English newspapers. News that would feed similar claims from other nations.

On 30 November, the now retired sergeant legionnaire Walter May, former army captain and nephew of the British Consul mentioned earlier, appeared at the Spanish embassy in London

<sup>22</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Journal of the House of Commons for 9/11/1921.

<sup>23</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Dispatch no. 1346 from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State dated 29/11/1921 enclosing press cuttings.

to protest at the conduct of his compatriots, who in his opinion should not have been recruited without the advice or intervention of English officers, as the worst had been gathered. This sergeant handed over to the embassy a copy of the written statement he had submitted to the Foreign Office refuting the accusations made against the 'Tercio de Extranjeros'<sup>24</sup>.

Merry del Val immediately used this statement to counteract the press campaign which, although declining, had already lasted several weeks. He referred to the *Morning Post* the text by Sergeant May, which was published on 7 December «not without some small resistance from certain editors of the newspaper whose patriotism exceeds their spirit of justice, but instead the editor and majority of the editorial staff understand the injustice that Spain has been subjected to»<sup>25</sup>.

The Ambassador asked the former British Army captain to visit the offices of some newspapers and to give an sworn statement referring to the falsehoods of the former English legionnaires at the offices of the British Legion, an association of former British combatants that had been charged with investigating the claims of the discharged English soldiers, a statement that, in the words of Merry del Val, «has resulted in the complete failure of the slanders referred to and the withdrawal by the British government of support for their unjust claims»<sup>26</sup>.

Meanwhile, the Minister of State sent these declarations to the diplomatic offices of those nations where negative news had been published about Spain and the 'Tercio de Extranjeros'. They put into perspective the punishments imposed on some of the legionnaires, comparing them to those they would have suffered in the British army if they had committed the same faults. They also reported on the food and equipment provided to the English, and the warm welcome they had received on arrival in Ceuta. The diplomatic representatives of Chile, Lisbon and other nations reported to the Minister that they had managed to get them published in newspapers in their area.

In December, as a reaction to the press campaign against the Spanish government and its army, a British general who had

<sup>24</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Dispatch no. 1371 from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State dated 5/12/1921.

<sup>25</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram no. 544 from the Ambassador in London to the Minister of State dated 07/12/2021.

<sup>26</sup> AGMAE H-2887 Dispatch no. 65 from the Ambassador in London dated 16/1/1922.

officially visited the Protectorate and specifically the 'Tercio' at its Dar Riffien barracks prior to these events, wrote a long and balanced article in *The Times* defending the Legion and the Spanish government's behaviour with his compatriots, whose credibility was undermined.

Franco Salgado-Araujo, at that time captain of the 'Tercio' with several of these Englishmen in his company, remembering the harshness of operations in Melilla in September 1921, would declare years later:

«The brave English soldiers in my company suffered a lot from this absolute lack of comfort and the inconvenience of not being able to drink tea, which they could not do without, and also from not being able to obtain tobacco<sup>27</sup>».

Legionnaire Nuez Comín, part of the 20th company, would write in his diary on 12 November:

«The English and the Yanks have returned to their countries demanded by their governments. From the Company I have only felt the departure of Remintong Mackarney, always with his monocle, as he had a personality that was out of the ordinary. Of tall stature and strong constitution, he was a formidable swimmer. Even on rainy and cold days (which are being felt) he would not fail to come early in the morning. Then he would arrive at the Company on time before reveille. He came to say goodbye to me and I thought he didn't speak Spanish, but I was surprised to hear him say in perfect Spanish that even though he was happy to leave he would always remember with affection the days he had spent in the Legion. He was always accompanied by a miniature English edition of Don Quixote. He had been a captain in the English army of the Dardanelles. Go with God Mackarney!, if only because he wanted to see Quixotes among the Spanish legionnaires<sup>28</sup>».

Despite the press campaign, British subjects continued to apply for recruitment in the Legion, as Merry del Val reported to the Minister; they were not accepted. In the sample of Legion Archive

<sup>27</sup> FRANCO SALGADO-ARAUJO, Francisco; *Mi vida junto a Franco (My life with Franco)*. Ed. Planeta. Barcelona 1977, p. 53.

<sup>28</sup> NUEZ COMIN, José. *Diario inédito (Unpublished journal)*. The Inspection Lists of the 'Tercio de Extranjeros' have been checked with a new recruit appearing with the name Remigton Macariney Wufrod in the list of November and in December as discharged on 17 November according to R. O. Manuscrita dated the 8th of the same month.

files, an Englishman appears enlisted at the Office of Valencia in December 1924, which suggests that they were still admitted if they visited recruitment offices in Spain. However, the recruitment list by nationality up to August 1930 in the Legion Museum in Ceuta shows only two more than those listed in the already known list of April 1922, a quantity which seems meagre to us. Fermín Galán, in his novel *La Barbarie Organizada (Organised Barbarism)*, tells of the case of an Englishman enlisted under a false identity, which could have been a remedy for them if they were prevented from doing so by the diplomatic problems that arose in 1921.

«[...] He is an Englishman who is not English. He signed up as a Romanian. England is opposed to its rejects being used on peoples it does not oppress. An Englishman must always die for England. Even if he is just a reject.<sup>29</sup>».

Pablo La Porte maintains that British pressure to free its subjects from their commitment to the Legion was linked to Britain's desire to maintain strict neutrality with respect to Morocco.<sup>30</sup> However, at the same time that the issue of the British legionnaires was being discussed, British companies were selling Spain surplus military material from the European War, including aircraft, thousands of sandbags<sup>31</sup> and uniforms, whose buttons stamped with the British emblem were used by the Riffians to fill the eye sockets of the mutilated bodies of the legionnaires<sup>32</sup>.

The British government never demanded the mass discharge of British legionnaires, but media harassment and Spanish foreign policy, which avoided confrontations with the United Kingdom, were the reasons that forced the British to be discharged in conditions that would in the future cause the increase in the demands by legionnaires of other nationalities and demands by other governments for the same criterion used in the British case.

<sup>29</sup> GALÁN, Fermín; *La Barbarie organizada: novela del tercio (Organised Barbarism: novel of the 'tercio')*. Castro. Madrid, 1931, p. 62.

<sup>30</sup> LA PORTE SAENZ, Pablo; *La atracción del imán. El desastre de Annual y sus repercusiones en la política europea (1921-1923)*. (The attraction of the magnet. The Battle of Annual and its impact on European politics (1921-1923).) Ed. Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid 2001. P. 32.

<sup>31</sup> AGMAE H-2883. Telegram from the Minister of State to the Minister of War dated 20/8/1921.

<sup>32</sup> NUEZ COMIN, José. Op. Cit. Note of 11 January 1922.

## Recruitment in the United States

The case of American volunteers is very similar to the English. Recruitment in the United States began on the same dates and for the same reasons as in the United Kingdom. It was carried out by the Military Attaché at the Spanish Embassy in Washington, Colonel Pérez Vidal, organised with the help of the consuls in New York, New Orleans, Boston and Puerto Rico<sup>33</sup>.

The social situation was very similar to England, with an economic crisis and huge unemployment, which was mainly due to the repatriated European War veterans. This is how the newspaper *ABC* described the situation in its edition of 7 October 1921.

«Imagine, readers that the crisis of the unemployed is worsening by the minute, and that there are already nearly six million unhappy people forced to go on strike today. The lack of work continues, and there is no longer any idea what to do about it. It was of little use that thousands and thousands of men would return to Europe, for there are still no jobs to offer to those who stayed.

The Government is very concerned about this issue, especially about those who left everything to serve their country, giving their lives, and when they returned, the doors of their former jobs were closed. Thus they fill the parks in painful spectacle, and not even to plough uncultivated lands anyone decides to use them. They have come to miss the war, and for this reason they rushed to register in the 'Tercio' de Extranjeros... If our government had not suspended the enlistments more than 20,000 would have signed up<sup>34</sup>».

The situation was not lost on the thousands of Spaniards who had emigrated to this American nation.

«The situation of hundreds of Spaniards in the United States, and especially in New York, is beginning to become unsustainable. The forced strike due to lack of work continues, and winter is looming. We must help our fellow countrymen in need, and this must be done as a matter of the utmost urgency. The best help, given the present circumstances, is to repatriate them; to take them back to their respective land,

<sup>33</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Dispatch no. 426 from the Spanish Embassy in Washington to the Minister of State dated 19/11/1921.

<sup>34</sup> *ABC* dated 7/10/1921.

where, however hard the struggle for life was, it would never have been as cruel as it is now<sup>35</sup>».

The fact that 'Tercio' volunteers were paid a 'relief' and passage to Spain, which cost \$100, ensured the success of the recruitment, with hundreds turning up at the consulates. On 26 August, recruitment was suspended because the 'Tercio' had covered its needs and there were no funds available for more volunteers.

On 14 September, 105 volunteers embarked in New Orleans without hindrance from local authorities<sup>36</sup>, and the same occurred in New York, where nearly 300 did so, as reported by the *Washington Post* in its 17 September edition in an article entitled *Spain's Foreign Legion*, which detailed the Spanish difficulties in Morocco and the unpopularity of the war that had prompted the government to «recruit a mercenary force, a foreign legion, along the same lines as the French foreign legion in Algeria.»<sup>37</sup>

The expeditions were made up of unemployed veteran soldiers, both American and Canadian, as well as Spanish and Hispanic Americans from the Central American republics. Seventeen different nationalities were noted by *The New Orleans Item* in its 13 September issue.

The Spanish press, which had been reporting with great attention on the audacity with which the 'Tercio de Extranjeros' was fighting in Morocco, published the arrival of these expeditions in early October. As did US newspaper *The Christian Science Monitor* in its 19 October issue, in a long and very favourable article on the Legion whose first lines read:

«It is evident that the Foreign Legion, which is now serving in the Spanish army in Morocco, is growing in number and, it should be said, in prestige as well, and it is noteworthy that it is not understood abroad, and it is desirable that it should be<sup>38</sup>».

However, as in the English case, negative declarations of those who refused to sign the commitment in Ceuta – or were not accepted – and found themselves in Spain without resources,

<sup>35</sup> ABC dated 04/11/1921.

<sup>36</sup> AGMM Africa Roll 76. Telegram from the Captain General of La Coruña to the Minister of War dated 2/10/1921.

<sup>37</sup> AGMAE H-2883. Dispatch no. 365 from the Embassy in Washington to the Minister of State dated 17/9/1921. Newspaper clippings attached.

<sup>38</sup> AGMAE H-2887. *The Christian Science Monitor* dated 15 October 1921, attached to dispatch no. 391 from the Spanish Embassy in Washington dated 19 October 1921.

appeared in the press at the same time as the news in the British media. On 31 October several American newspapers, including the *Washington Post*, echoed the statements made by a Canadian recruited in New York, Barry Smith Davidson, denouncing that the conditions announced in the United States were not true and, furthermore, his life had been threatened for refusing to sign the enlistment contract<sup>39</sup>. However, the official version stated that he barely stayed in Ceuta for 24 hours since, not wanting to join up, he was deported to Barcelona as he wished, bringing five Americans with him as witnesses who, in the same circumstances, preferred to stay in Ceuta working on benzine depots under construction<sup>40</sup>.

The Ambassador in Washington took advantage of his cordial relations with the editor-in-chief of the *Washington Post* to publish a letter, received by the Military Attaché, in which one of the *soldiers of fortune* enlisted in New York thanked him for the kindness with which he had been treated and the good journey and welcome he had received<sup>41</sup>.

On 17 November, *The Christian Science Monitor* again published an article praising the Legion and its campaign behaviour, and denying reports in some foreign newspapers about the treatment and pay received by the legionnaires, noting in one paragraph that «the Legionnaires' camp is generally the brightest and liveliest place in the general camp, and there is no trace of discontent»<sup>42</sup>. However, that same day, as a result of the press campaign unleashed in the United Kingdom, 41 Englishmen and 14 Americans were discharged in Ceuta, the latter without any prior request.

*The Times-Picayune*, a New Orleans tabloid, and other American newspapers published the news of the discharge of these 14 American citizens and their statements at the end of November. This news, and claims by American Legionnaires remaining in the

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<sup>39</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram no. 168 dated 1/11/1921 from the Ambassador in Washington.

<sup>40</sup> AGMM. Africa. Roll 76. Telegram from the High Commissioner to the Minister of War dated 9/11/21.

<sup>41</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Dispatch no. 412 from the Spanish Embassy in Washington to the Minister of State dated 3/11/1921.

<sup>42</sup> AGMAE H-2887. The Christian Science Monitor dated 17 November 1921, attached to dispatch no. 434 from the Spanish Embassy in Washington dated 20 November 1921.

ranks, mobilise Senators and other influential figures who force the US State Department to intervene<sup>43</sup>.

Both the Spanish Ambassador in Washington and his US counterpart in Madrid asked the Spanish government to grant discharge to those American citizens who request it, under the same conditions as for British nationals. The Spanish ambassador was furthermore informed that «the Department of Justice had wanted to intervene in the matter by prosecuting the Consul General in New York on the basis of Section 10 of the criminal code, which provides for a fine of one thousand dollars or imprisonment for three years for those who enlist soldiers in the United States for another country»<sup>44</sup>.

The effect was immediate. The very recent precedent of the British case and the aim of avoiding a diplomatic confrontation with the United States obliged the Minister of War, who was forced by the Ministry of State, to decree on 15 December the discharge of all American subjects enlisted in the 'Tercio de Extranjeros'. However, on this occasion, the return of enlistment and repatriation rewards were demanded at no cost to the State. The US response was not long in coming. It demanded that the discharge be without payment of any amount, similar to the decree for English legionnaires, as was finally done<sup>45</sup>. However, the costs of repatriation, through French ports, were borne by the United States with the support of the Red Cross. The total number of American subjects discharged, including those who did so alongside the English, was 53<sup>46</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Several dispatches from the Consulate in N. Orleans and Embassy in Washington.

<sup>44</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram no. 216 from the Ambassador in Washington to the Minister of State dated 10/12/1921.

<sup>45</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Note no. 65 from the United States Embassy to the Minister of State dated 28/12/1921.

<sup>46</sup> AGMAE H-2887. Telegram dated 18/3/1922 from the Minister of War to the Minister of State.



## Chapter seven

### British fighters in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939

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#### Abstract

Talking today about the Spanish Civil War is certainly a complicated undertaking when there are practically no direct witnesses to it who can provide us with personal experiences. If we add to that that it is about telling the adventures (and misadventures) of some people who have come from far away from Spain, specifically from the United Kingdom and who joined both sides, it makes the work much more complicated. Despite the Spanish Civil War, it has a splendid bibliography that allows you to consult and meet the main actors. It is also possible to investigate in the historical archives such as the *Instituto de Historia y Cultura Militar*, in one of its sections, such as the *Archivo Central Militar de Madrid* or the *Archivo de la Guerra Civil* of Avila. We also have the *Archivo Histórico Nacional* of Spain, the archives of the foundations of political parties such as the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) and the *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE) as well as the *Biblioteca Nacional de España* and the main newspaper archives of information. With all this we can try to reconstruct the puzzle of the British intervention in the Spanish Civil War, and we are going to put all our efforts into this.

**Keywords**

Spanish Civil war, Republican Army, Nationalist Army, British Battalion, International Brigades, Foreign Volunteers.

### British Civil War policy. Non-Intervention Committee

In July 1936, the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was headed by the Tory politician Stanley Baldwin, who had been informed by his diplomats in Spain of the military uprising against the Popular Front government, considered as a defender of communism by those who opposed it.

From that moment onwards, the British government's guidelines were to keep out of what was happening in Spain, always with an eye on the attitude held by the Third Reich Germany. For the British government, supporting the government of the Second Republic equated to supporting the USSR and, in a way, this was considered unnatural for them. This fear of the revolutionary giant was conveyed to Leon Blum, president of the French Republic and a militant of a French Popular Front party, and therefore a possible ally of his Spanish counterparts. The French government's reaction was the communiqué of 25 July ratifying its «non-intervention in any way in the internal conflict in Spain». This dialogue between France and the United Kingdom culminated in the creation of the so-called «Non-Intervention Committee», which European countries were invited to join, and then the rest of the world<sup>1</sup>.

By the end of August, all the governments of European countries had joined the «Non-Intervention Treaty» except for Switzerland. For the implementation of the agreement, the so-called «Non-Intervention Committee» was set up in London and chaired by Lord Plymouth, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office<sup>2</sup>, with a sub-committee made up of Germany, France, Portugal, Great Britain, Italy and the USSR<sup>3</sup>.

90% of Spanish diplomats supported the military coup and the Popular Front Government<sup>4</sup> appointed Pablo de Azcárate as ambassador to the United Kingdom. On the national side, the representatives in London were the Duke of Alba, also holder of the British title of Duke of Berwick and Juan de la Cierva Codorniú, inventor of the Autogyro and resident in Great Britain.

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<sup>1</sup> MORADIELLOS, Enrique. La política británica ante la guerra civil española. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, Hf Contemporánea. 1992.

<sup>2</sup> Foreign Office is the equivalent of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> USSR, acronym for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

<sup>4</sup> Popular Front, in Spanish Frente Popular, winning coalition in the February 1936 general elections.

The attitude of the British government was somewhat peculiar because, on the one hand its stance defended democracy as such, yet on the other hand, and supported in business circles, it helped the rebels, for example with the sales operations of «Minas de Río Tinto», in Huelva, whose products were destined for German companies.

Throughout the war, the British government adapted to the ups and downs of the struggle, in some cases favouring and protecting the arrival of war material smuggled into the ports of northern Spain and the Mediterranean, and in others preventing actions to condemn the actions of the (Italian) Aviación Legionaria, whose planes operated from the island of Mallorca.

### Beginning of the Spanish Civil War

The official date established as the beginning of the civil war is Saturday, 18 July 1936. However, the uprising began the day before in Melilla when *Guardias de Asalto*<sup>5</sup> tried to arrest a group of military conspirators gathered at the *Comisión de Límites* building. The facts are known and before the arrival of a squad of the Tercio<sup>6</sup>, the Guardias de Asalto joined the uprising and, from that moment, the military units took to the streets declaring the state of war.

But what had happened on the dates prior to those mentioned?

The Popular Front took over the government of the nation after the previous February elections and the opposition parties had begun to put together plans aimed at overthrowing the government. The *Comunión Tradicionalista*<sup>7</sup> had sent a group of Carlist officers to be trained in Italy and to prepare their *requetés* in the open fields of Navarre. The members of the FE de las JONS<sup>8</sup>, chaired by José Antonio Primo de Rivera and arrested since March, were being persecuted by left-wing militants and it was dangerous to walk in the streets of the cities. The deputy of *Renovación Española*<sup>9</sup>, José Calvo Sotelo, denounced in the Congress the situation of violence

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<sup>5</sup> Guardia de Asalto, name of the Spanish urban and anti-riot police.

<sup>6</sup> Tercio was the name of the Foreign Legion in 1936. Later in 1937 it changed to Legión.

<sup>7</sup> *Comunión Tradicionalista*, a political grouping that framed the Carlist monarchists.

<sup>8</sup> FE de las JONS, acronym for the Falange Española y de las Juntas de Ofensivas Nacionales Sindicalistas.

<sup>9</sup> *Renovación Española*, monarchical political party.

that existed in the streets pointing out the number of attacks, strikes, murders, fires, assaults to properties, etc. which cost him the direct threat of the politicians in power. On 14 April, on the occasion of the military parade, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant of the Guardia Civil Anastasio de los Reyes was killed. During his funeral, the official retinue was attacked by leftist militants and Guardias de Asalto, resulting in five deaths, including Andrés Sáenz de Heredia, cousin of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, and 32 wounded. The officer who commanded the Guardias de Asalto in Manuel Becerra Square was Lieutenant José del Castillo Sáenz de Tejada, an instructor of the Juventudes Socialistas militias<sup>10</sup>. Lieutenant Castillo was killed on 12 July and it was not known who the perpetrators were, some blaming the Carlists, and others blaming the Falangists<sup>11</sup>.

In the barracks of Pontejos, on the night of 12 to 13 July, the captain of the Guardia Civil, Fernando Condés Romero, recruited a group of Guardias de Asalto and bodyguards of PSOE leaders belonging to the group called «La Motorizada», with the intention of avenging the death<sup>12</sup>.

That night several vans of the Guardia de Asalto left, and one of them contained Captain Condés and the gunmen of «La Motorizada», Luis Cuenca Estevas and Santiago Garcés Arroyo. At 3 am they went to Calvo Sotelo's home and, faced with his claims of parliamentary immunity, Captain Condés identified himself, which reassured Calvo Sotelo that he had dressed, said goodbye to his family and left his home. On the way, Luis Cuenca shot him twice in the back of the head, causing him to die on the spot, and his body was abandoned in the Cementerio del Este (La Almudena at present).

This assassination was the call for the uprising which, until then, had been managed secretly and which took place four days later and, as a consequence of its results, led to the Spanish Civil War.

But other events had already taken place, which were later clearly linked to the military uprising.

On 4 July 1936, banker Juan March gave a check for 2,000 sterling pounds to Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena, director of the newspaper

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<sup>10</sup> Juventudes Socialistas, the youth branch of the PSOE that merged with the Communist Youth in 1936 to form the Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas.

<sup>11</sup> GIBSON, Ian. *La noche en que mataron a Calvo Sotelo*. Ed. Argos Vergara. 1982  
THOMAS, Hugh. *La guerra civil española*. Editions Ruedo Ibérico. 1962.

<sup>12</sup> GARCIA SERRANO, Rafael. *Diccionario para un macuto*. Editorial Planeta. 1979.

*ABC*<sup>13</sup>, which instructed its correspondent in London, Luis Antonio Bolín Bidwell, to rent a plane for a major transfer. Bolín contacted Douglas Francis Jerrod and Reserve Major Hugh Pollard who worked for MI-6. At Croydon airfield, near London, Bolín was able to rent a De Havilland DH-89 «Dragon Rapide» with registration G-ACYR. The final destination of the flight was the island of Gran Canaria. To camouflage his intentions, Luis Antonio Bolín invited Major Pollard, his daughter Diana and a friend of hers named Dorothy Watson on the trip.

The flight left for Bordeaux at 7 am on 11 July, piloted by Captain Charles William Henry «Cecil» Bebb. As a flight engineer Walter Petrie was scheduled to travel with assistant mechanics George Ovey Bryers and John Rice and radio operator Nevil Shute. It is not clear how many of them completed the journey as new travellers had to be accommodated at the various stops made, although some authors suggest that Bryers and Rice travelled<sup>14</sup>.

In Bordeaux they refuelled, and a mechanic gave his place to José López de Carrizosa, Marquis of Mérito. The next stop was in Biarritz for another refuelling, before crossing the peninsula without stopping on Spanish soil and arriving at the Espinho military airfield near Porto where they spent the night. The next day they flew to Alverca airfield near Lisbon where Bolin and the Marquis of Mérito met with General Sanjurjo.

In the afternoon they flew from Lisbon to Casablanca where they stayed for three days while the Marquis of Mérito went to Tangier to buy a «Caudron» plane as an alternative means of transport to the «Dragon Rapide». On the 15 the plane left only with British travellers and crew and made a new stop for refuelling at Villa Bens, from where they flew to their final destination at the Gando airfield in Gran Canaria. Major Pollard, his daughter and her friend went to Santa Cruz de Tenerife on the steamship «Viera y Clavijo» where they introduced themselves to Medical Service Lieutenant Colonel Luis Gabarda Sitjar at the «Costa Clinic» in the capital, identifying themselves with the agreed password «Galicia salutes France». Gabarda, after the visit, informed Franco's assistant and cousin that the plane was at the general's disposal for his transfer to Morocco.

On 16 July, General Amado Balmes Alonso passed away in Las Palmas as a result of a gun accident and the following day General Franco,

<sup>13</sup> «ABC, a newspaper with a declared monarchical tendency.

<sup>14</sup> LARGEAUD, Bertrand. *La perception des volontaires britanniques de la guerre d'Espagne, de la surveillance à la redécouverte*. Université Paris Sorbonne. 2013.

after being authorised by the government, travelled to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria to attend the funeral accompanied by his cousin Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, the Legal Adviser Major Lorenzo Martínez Fuset, and two Captains and two Lieutenants as escorts<sup>15</sup>. He was also accompanied by his wife and daughter, who embarked the next day on the Woermann shipping company vessel «Wadai» for Le Havre (France), accompanied by the Major, member of the Canarias Staff, Fernando García González. Major Pollard, his daughter and her friend returned to England by sea on 24 July.

On 18 July, Franco woke up early and, after a few hours waiting for news from Morocco and the rest of Spain, he left for Gando with his companions on the tugboat «España 2» and, after disembarking, they entered the airfield. The expedition was formed by General Franco, his assistant and cousin, Lieutenant Colonel Franco Salgado-Araujo and Lieutenant Pilot Antonio Villalobos Gómez, who knew the territory over which they were to fly. After taking off at 2 pm, they flew to Agadir to refuel and continued on to Casablanca where they landed and were welcomed by Luis Bolín and spent the night in a hotel.

The following day, 19 July, they took off at 5 am, landing at Sania Ramel airfield in Tetouan, and were welcomed by the main military commanders of the capital of the Protectorate who informed Franco of the triumph of the military uprising.

The objective of the trip was fulfilled, and Franco took over the military command of all the troops of the Protectorate<sup>16</sup>. However, Captain Bebb's mission did not end there as Franco commissioned Bolín to carry out a mission in Italy.

The «Dragon Rapide» left for Lisbon in order to take Sanjurjo to Spain, but he travelled in Ansaldo's DH.80 «Push Moth» plane, with the disastrous consequences that this entailed. Bebb continued the journey to Biarritz where Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena embarked for Rome. The flight went smoothly to Marseille from where the expedition took a regular flight to Rome. They were welcomed by Count Ciano, who made arrangements with his father-in-law Mussolini to request help. At first this was refused, but that same

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<sup>15</sup> The following officers were involved: Infantry Captain Francisco Espejo Aguilera, Artillery Captain José Gil de León Entrambasaguas, Infantry Lieutenant Alvaro Martín Bencomo, and Infantry Lieutenant Manuel Logendio Clavijo. (<https://pedromedinasanabria.wordpress.com/tag/amado-balmes-alonso/>).

<sup>16</sup> GONZALEZ-BETES, Antonio. El histórico vuelo del Dragon Rapide. Revista «Aeroplano» no. 10. Instituto de Historia y Cultura Aeronáutica. Madrid. 1992.

day another commission sent by General Mola and headed by Antonio Goicoechea arrived in Rome and met Mussolini in person who approved the sale of 12 three-engine Savoia-Marchetti SM-81 bombers which were transferred from Sardinia to Nador near Melilla a few days later. Three aircraft were lost due to lack of fuel as one fell into the sea and two landed in Algerian territory, raising the alarm of the French government. This was the first direct foreign aid received by the national side. Once the planes arrived at Sania Ramel airfield, they took part in the «air bridge» that moved troops of the Protectorate to the peninsula.

We therefore see that the first Englishman to take part in the Spanish Civil War on the so-called national side was Captain Charles William Henry Cecil Bebb, who would be rewarded by Franco himself with the Grand Cross of Military Merit with a white badge.

But, what was happening on the government side at that time? In several Spanish capitals, armed militias loyal to the government had thwarted the military coup. In Barcelona, the People's Olympiad was scheduled to take place, organised by political and trade union entities opposed to the celebration of the Berlin Olympic Games, which the International Olympic Committee had entrusted to Germany, governed by Adolf Hitler<sup>17</sup>.

In view of the news coming from Morocco, the competitions were suspended, and the workers' organisations mobilised against the troops preventing the military units from winning. The athletes were waiting for the situation to be resolved and the same thing happened to those who had come to Barcelona to watch the competitions.

These people included Felicia Mary Browne, born in Weston Green, Thames Ditton (Surrey) in 1904, who had travelled by car from England to Barcelona accompanied by her friend Edith Bone (in other publications Nancy Johnstone is mentioned as a travelling companion). Felicia was an artist who mastered painting and sculpture. From 1932, she was a member of the British Communist Party (BCP) and an active member of the Artist's International Association. Her friend Edith Bone, a photographer, was also affiliated to the BCP.

Once the military uprising had been quelled, a revolutionary period began that prompted Felicia to report to the headquarters

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<sup>17</sup> MARTIALAY, Félix. Amberses, allí nació la furia española. Ed. Real Federación Española de Fútbol. Madrid. 2000. The Olympiad is really the period of time between two consecutive Olympic Games.

of the PSUC (*Partido Socialista Unificado de Cataluña*), the Catalan branch of the PCE (*Partido Comunista de España*), and apply for membership by enlisting in the «Karl Marx» battalion on 3 August and going off to fight on the Huesca front. The initial idea was for her to act as a nurse in support of her comrades, which she opposed by saying that whatever a man did, she could do too.

The «Karl Marx» battalion took up positions in the Tardienta area and in an action set up on 25 August to blow up a train loaded with explosives, the militia group to which it belonged fell into an ambush and, trying to help another militia man of Italian origin who had been wounded, she was shot in the head and her body abandoned on the ground by the hasty retreat of her comrades<sup>18</sup>.

Felicia Mary Browne was the first and only woman of British origin to die in combat in the Spanish Civil War<sup>19</sup>.

### Civil War in the North

The military uprising in northern Spain also failed, except in Oviedo, the capital of the *Principado de Asturias*, and in the neighbouring region of Galicia. The provinces of Santander, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa remained loyal to the Madrid government while Álava and Navarra joined the uprising.

So, we see two initial fronts of struggle: one, near the French border and the other on the borders with Galicia. In between, the line of contact between the two parties was initially quiet.

In all these scenarios we find volunteers from abroad who joined the fight. In addition, smuggling ships loaded with weapons and ammunition from various sources arrived and were often protected by British Royal Navy vessels.

The foreign volunteers came to support the fighters of the anarchist, socialist and communist militias. Most were French or of other European origins but residents in France, but there were no British volunteers among them.

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<sup>18</sup> TOFONI, Ennio. *Il lungo cammino nella Sierra*. Ed. Lavoro. Milán. 1971.

MARTIN, Simon. *Conscience and Conflict: British Artists and the Spanish Civil War*. Chichester. 2014.

<sup>19</sup> BUCHANAN, Tom. *The Impact of the Spanish Civil War on Britain*. Sussex Academic Press. Eastbourne. 2007.

JACKSON, Angela. *British Women and the Spanish Civil War*. Routledge. 2003.

BUCHANAN, Tom. *The Lost Art of Felicia Browne*. *History Workshop Journal*. Autumn 2002.

In the absence of pilots prepared to make war, the Basque government hired a group of foreign pilots such as the Americans Frederick I. Lord, Bert Acosta, Gordon Barry and Edward (Eddie) Schneider and the British of Jewish origin Sydney Holland. The latter, who was over 50 years old, was an unemployed man who decided to go to fight in Spain as a volunteer with a good contract that stipulated a monthly pay of \$1,500 and a bonus for enemy aircraft shot down. The group formed a squadron known as the «Yankee Squadron» which acted throughout December with the obsolete Breguet XIX aircraft, attacking the national positions near Villarreal. On 11 December, a national Heinkel He-51 plane shot down the Monospar ST-25 piloted by Sergeant Holland<sup>20</sup>, who died along with the two Spanish crew members, the mechanic Gumersindo Gutiérrez and the soldier Domingo Calles. Also, the English pilot Walter Coates, on his return to England, visited the widow of Sydney Holland and gave her his remuneration of \$1,500. Holland's death caused the other pilots to lose interest in the fight and two of them tried to escape by sea to France, being arrested and finally expelled from Spain without being paid for their services. Upon arrival in the United States, they denounced the Republican government, pleading for the seizure of the cargo of the merchant ship «Mar Cantábrico» in the port of New York. The lawsuit delayed the departure of the ship which finally left New York a few hours before the US government passed the Embargo Act prohibiting the shipment of arms to Spain. After a stopover in Veracruz (México) to load more weapons, it headed for Spain and was boarded by the cruiser «Canarias», which took it to El Ferrol and the seized cargo was very useful for the national side. When it left Veracruz, the «Mar Cantábrico» changed its name to «Adda» flying the British flag and, when it was intercepted by the cruiser «Canarias», it asked for help from the Royal Navy which sent four destroyers but, in the end, the deception was useless<sup>21</sup>.

The Ambassador of the Republic in México, Félix Gordón Ordás, had a small merchant fleet for the transport of war material to Spain, including two English ships: the «Cydonia» and the «Essex Druid»<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> ALPERT, Michael. *Franco and the Condor Legion*. I B Tauris & Co. 2018.

<sup>21</sup> VARGAS ALONSO, Francisco Manuel. *Voluntarios internacionales y asesores extranjeros en Euzkadi (1936-1937)*. Universidad del País Vasco.

<sup>22</sup> IÑIGUEZ CAMPOS, Miguel. *Félix Gordón Ordás: un embajador al servicio de la República en guerra (1936-1939)*. Centro de Estudios de Iberoamérica. Madrid. 2016. ALCOFAR NASSAES, José Luis. *La marina italiana en la guerra de España*. Editorial Euros. 1975.

However, in the Basque Country, a South African-born British man did stand out, although it cannot be said that he was a combatant. This was George Lowther Steer, a journalist trained in Oxford and sent to Spain by the London Times. Steer rose to fame by sending a telegram to his newspaper dramatically recounting the aerial bombardment of Guernica. The article had a wide repercussion, contrary to the editorial line of the newspaper, and therefore its director did not use the journalist<sup>23</sup>. Steer, who worked for the British MI-5, managed to act as a councillor to José Antonio Aguirre Lecube's Basque government, even attending some of the ministerial meetings held in Bilbao. Steer wrote the book entitled «The tree of Gernika»<sup>24</sup>, based mainly on the bombing of the Basque village. During World War II he was a special envoy of the *Daily Telegraph* in Finland and, in June 1940, he joined the Royal Army and died in a Jeep accident in Burma in 1944.

#### National and Republican aviators

When the war began, both sides lacked aviators with flying experience on the aircraft being acquired.

The aircraft on both sides, according to the different authors, were as follows<sup>25</sup>:

<b>Brand and model</b>	<b>SALAS</b>	<b>RELLO</b>	<b>GOMÁ</b>	<b>SANCHÍS</b>
Niuport 52	50-10	28-7	30-4	28-7
Hawker Fury	3-0	3-0	3-0	5-0
Hawker Osfrey		1-0		
Mastinsides F4A		6-0		
Vickers Vildebeest	27-0	27-0	27-0	27-0
Breguet XIX	60-60	60-30	60-33	60-30
Fockler F-VII	5-3	10-3	7-3	10-4
Dornier Wall	20-10	9-15	5-3	9-6
Savoia 62	20-5		36-0	15-5

<sup>23</sup> ALPERT, Michael. Franco and the Condor Legion. I B Tauris & Co. 2018.

<sup>24</sup> STEER, George L. The tree of Gernika. Faber & Faber Editions. 2011.

<sup>25</sup> ALCOFAR NASSAES, José Luis. Spansky. Los extranjeros que lucharon en la guerra civil española. Ed. Dopesa, Primera edición 1973.

SALAS LARRAZABAL, Jesús. *La guerra de España desde el aire*. Ed. Ariel. Barcelona 1969.

RELLO, Salvador. *La aviación en la guerra de España*. Ed. San Martín. Madrid 1969.

GOMA ORDUÑA, José. *La guerra en el aire*. Ed. AHR. Barcelona 1958.

SANCHIS, Miguel. *Alas rojas sobre España*. Ed. Publicaciones españolas. Madrid 1956.

<b>Brand and model</b>	<b>SALAS</b>	<b>RELLO</b>	<b>GOMÁ</b>	<b>SANCHÍS</b>
Macchi 18				10-0
Macchi 41				0-4
Boeing 28 (caza)		1-0		

The contribution of French aircraft to the Republican government alleviated the situation, as did the recruitment of aviators by the writer André Malraux, who was declared a Communist sympathiser and creator of the «Spain» squadron with almost three hundred volunteers, including pilots and ground staff, and some fifty aircraft in flight. Most of the staff was French, but the pilots included nine British, as Mikhail Koltsov points out, noting that of the nine he met, three died, five were wounded, and the last one decided that the war was not for him and left<sup>26</sup>.

After a poor performance by its commanders, the «Spain» Squadron was withdrawn to the base in Alcantarilla (Murcia) without penalty or glory and finally integrated into the Republic's Air Force.

A Briton from the «Spain» Squadron was Hugh Oloff de Wett who signed his contract on 3 August with a monthly salary of 108 £<sup>27</sup> and a premium of 300 £ per plane shot down, as well as life insurance of 2,000 £ in case of death, and 1,000 SP in case of disability<sup>28</sup>.

Oloff de Wett wanted to join the national side but, when interviewed, said that he had piloted in the Abyssinian war in favour of the Emperor and against Mussolini's Italy, so he was rejected and had to leave Spain. Once in France, he joined the Malraux volunteers.

Hugh Oloff de Wett started out driving a Niuport NI.52 just like his compatriot «Clifford», whose real name was Claude Warsaw, and who died on 25 September 1936 after a clash with a Fiat CR-32 «Chirri». In the same combat, another English pilot named «Lieutenant Smith-Piggot» was shot down and killed. His name was Edward Gawen Dawnes-Martin and his opponent was the Italian sergeant major Brunetto di Montegnacco at the controls of a Fiat CR-32 aircraft<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> KOLTISOV, Mijail. *Diario de la Guerra de España*. Akal Editor. 1978.

<sup>27</sup> SP, acronym for Sterling Pounds.

<sup>28</sup> ALCOFAR NASSAES, José Luis Spansky. *Los extranjeros que lucharon en la guerra civil española*. Ed. Dopesa. 1973.

<sup>29</sup> ALPERT, Michael. *Franco and the Condor Legion*. Bloomsbury Academic. 2019.

The first British pilot to be shot down was the 19-year-old known as «Cartwright», and whose name was Brian Griffin, after a battle that took place on 27 August with a Fiat CR-32 «Chirri».

Another British pilot from the «Spain» Squadron who was shot down on 16 September was Bruce Keith «Kay» Lindsay at the controls of a Dewoitine D.372, and the pilot who shot him down was Italian Sergeant Raffaele Chianese of the Aviación Legionaria<sup>30</sup>. The pilot was wounded but managed to return to Republican lines as he was recorded as having died in wartime action during World War II while flying a «Halifax» aircraft over the Netherlands in 1943<sup>31</sup>.

On 18 September, Edward Hillman was shot down, flying a Dewoitine D.372 and belonging to the same squadron as Lindsay, his opponent being the Italian Sottotenente<sup>32</sup> Adriano Mantelli «Arrighi». Hillman managed to reach the lines<sup>33</sup>.

Among the British pilots from the early days of Republican aviation, the following are mentioned in various media<sup>34</sup>:

- Robert «All weatherMac» McIntosh
- Vincent Philip Joseph Doherty, shot down twice
- Eric Neville Griffiths<sup>35</sup>, of New Zealand origin.
- Robert Pickett
- Patrick Mertz
- George Fachiri
- Frank George Fairhead
- John Loverseed
- Percy Papps
- A. Russel-Browne
- John Wilson
- John Hardy, former RAF pilot Sergeant

<sup>30</sup> Aviación Legionaria, the name given to Italian aircraft and pilots during the civil war by the national side.

<sup>31</sup> CAWSEY, Richard. British civil aircraft accidents 1935-1939. Bison Consultants Ltd. 2000. [www.rcawsey.co.uk/Accb1939.htm](http://www.rcawsey.co.uk/Accb1939.htm).

<sup>32</sup> Sottotenente, Italian military grade equivalent to 2nd Lieutenant.

<sup>33</sup> LOGOLUSO, Alfredo. Fiat CR.32 Aces of the Spanish Civil War. Bloomsbury Publishing. 2013.

<sup>34</sup> LOPEZ PERMUY, Rafael A. Spanish Republican Aces. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.

<sup>35</sup> LAUREAU, Patrick. Les pilotes mercenaires pendant la guerre civile: Problèmes, Légendes et Realités. Article. 1986.

- Victor Edgeley, former RAF pilot Sergeant
- Harold Claude Garret Cosh, Observer and machine gunner, former RNASand RAF
- Walter Scott Coates, a RAF Reserve Pilot Lieutenant who signed his contract because he was out of work and who, having returned to England, went to hand over the compensation to Holland's family.
- Charles Kenneth Upjohn-Carter, known as «Charles Kenneth», was assigned to the MajorAntonio Martín-Luna Lersundi's Unit, which already included Russian pilots such as Yevgueni Erlykin, Ivan Kopets, Anton Kovalevskii, Ernst Schach, Georgii Tupikov and Ivan Proskurov<sup>36</sup>.
- Charles Kenneth and Robert Pickett were travelling in a De Havilland DH.80A «Puss Moth» plane, registration G-ABWA, when they plunged into the water in the Seine estuary near Le Havre and were both rescued unharmed. The event occurred on 30 December 1936<sup>37</sup>

The MI5 archives released in 2011 bring in more British volunteers in the ranks of the Fuerzas Aéreas de la República<sup>38</sup> such as those listed below:

- Gavin Downs Martin
- Kin-Man<sup>39</sup>
- D. Hutchinson
- Raymond
- R. Raymon
- Claude Warson
- Edward Whitelaw «Jock» Bonar, RAF Lieutenant Pilot in 1945
- William L. Bamborough
- Leslie Gartner Goult
- Edward AJ Hillman

<sup>36</sup> IBARRURI, Dolores and others. Bajo la bandera de la España Republicana. Editorial Almuzara. Córdoba. 2019. Statements by General Gavriil Mikhailovich Prokofiev

<sup>37</sup> CAWSEY, Richard. British civil aircraft accidents 1935-1939. Bison Consultants Ltd. 2000.

[www.rcawsey.co.uk/Accb1939.htm](http://www.rcawsey.co.uk/Accb1939.htm)

<sup>38</sup> Fuerzas Aéreas de la República means Republic Air Forces

<sup>39</sup> This is how it is written in the list.

Others related in various ways to the Fuerzas Aéreas de la República also appear:

- HB Fraser, RAF deserter
- Norman Elcoat, who died in 1940 over France as a RAF Sergeant
- Herbert Alan Winfield, in 1943 was a Lieutenant in the RAF.
- George Bryan, Torpedo Instructor in Cartagena
- Albert Edward Cole, a sailor who went to the Anti-tank Company of the 129<sup>th</sup> IB<sup>40</sup>
- John Agnew, deserted from the Berkshire Regiment
- Augustine Harris (Liverpool), deserter
- George Martin Henney, Army Volunteer Reserve
- J. Cross, former RAF pilot
- Alfred E. Clark, former RCAF pilot<sup>41</sup>
- William J. Digby, former Brigade of the Royal Fusiliers
- RF Robinson, former RAF pilot
- W. Ryan, who died in the Royal Lancashire Regiment<sup>42</sup>

We see therefore that the British contribution to the Fuerzas Aéreas de la República was extensive from the beginning of the war but, the arrival of Soviet pilots and ground staff meant that there were no more British pilots, and no specific British unit was created in the Air Force organisation.

We have also noted that Britain's contribution to the war effort on both sides did not include military aircraft in the strict sense of the word but rather civilian aircraft that was adapted for military use.

The researcher Gerald Howson provides a chronology of aircraft deliveries for both sides published by Jesús Salas Larrazábal, which we transcribe below:

<b>Date</b>	<b>Government Aviation</b>	<b>National Air Force</b>
01-08-36	-	1 DH.89 Dragon Rapide
02-08-36	-	1 G.A. Monospar ST-12
04-08-36	-	1 DH.89 Dragon Rapide
06-08-36	-	1 Airspeed Envoy

<sup>40</sup> IB, acronym for International Brigade.

<sup>41</sup> RCAF, an acronym for the Royal Canadian Air Force.

<sup>42</sup> <https://www.greatwarforum.org/> 2011.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Government Aviation</b>	<b>National Air Force</b>
07-08-36	1 Percival Gull Six	-
09-08-36	1 Airspeed Envoy	-
09-08-36	1 Miles M.2H	-
09-08-36	1 Miles M.3B	-
09-08-36	1 G.A. Monospar ST-25	-
08-36	2 G.A. Monospar ST-25	-
12-08-36	1 Airspeed Envoy	-
13-08-36	1 Airspeed Viceroy	2 DH.89 Dragon Rapide
13-08-36	-	2 Fokker F.VII b
15-08-36	4 DH.84 Dragon	4 Fokker F.XII (2 did not arrive)
08-36	1 B.A. Swallow	-
08-36	1 Percival Gull Six	-
<b>19-08-36</b>	<b>British government orders embargo on war material</b>	
21-08-36	1 Airspeed Envoy	-
29-08-36	1 Airspeed Envoy	-
07-09-36	1 DH.89 Dragon Rapide	-
15-09-36	1 B.A. Klemm Eagle 2	-
10-36	2 Miles M.2H	-
11-36	1 B.A. Swallow	-
12-36	2 Airspeed Envoy	-
01-37	2 Avro (1 626 and a 643)	-
01-37	1 Miles M.23 Hawk Speed Six	-
02-37	1 G.A. Monospar ST-25	-
03-37	1 Airspeed Envoy	-
04-37	1 DH.89 Dragon Rapide	-
05-37	2 G.A. Monospar ST-25	-
05-37	1 B.A. Klemm Eagle 2	-
06-37	1 G.A. Monospar ST-25	-
06-37	1 Airspeed Envoy	-
07-37	2 Airspeed Envoy	-
08-37	2 Airspeed Envoy	-
08-37	1 Spartan Cruiser II	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>40 aircraft</b>	<b>12 aircraft (2 did not arrive)</b>

We can see that, despite the embargo on war material decreed on 19 August 1936, the deliveries to the government side continued and so 33 more British aircraft were added between August 1937 and the end of the war in 1939. On the other hand, no British aircraft arrived at the Aviación Nacional since 15 August 1936<sup>43</sup>.

Meanwhile we had left the English captain Bebb with his «Dragon Rapide» travelling through the south of France to Marseille from where he returned to Spain and a few days later, after an unscheduled landing in Burgos, the crew was detained for two days and finally authorised to return to their base in Croydon, near London. From 11 July when Luis Antonio Bolín Bidwell left, five weeks had passed that, for the crew, were truly historic.

But this was not the end of the British pilots' performance on the national side, as other pilots appeared on the scene of the Civil War<sup>44</sup>.

On 21 July, Captain Robert Henry McIntosh and mechanic Ryway took a group of British journalists on board a DH-89 «Dragon Rapide» to Burgos. From there they flew to Lisbon, taking General Ponte. Juan Antonio Ansaldo, who had been injured in the plane crash in which General Sanjurjo died, embarked in Lisbon, returning to Burgos from where they made several trips to Biarritz, returning later to their base in London.

Later, a DH-87 «Leopard Moth» arrived in Spain, piloted by the British nobleman Edward Arthur Saint George Hamilton Chichester, Marquis of Donegal and Rupert Belville, who was on observation missions on the Somosierra front. Saint George returned to the United Kingdom while Belville went to Barcelona where he stayed until 14 August, when he was authorised to travel to Perpignan (France). On 13 November he landed at the Noaín airfield (Pamplona), then passed through Gamonal in Burgos and returned to Noaín where, after being checked at a passport control that he had landed previously in Barcelona and did not have a visa to enter and leave France, he was «invited» to leave Spain. Returning to Spain with his plane, he acted in the operations of Andalusia linked to Falange Española Units. In the summer of 1937, while in San Sebastian, he was informed that the nationals had already

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<sup>43</sup> SALAS LARRAZABAL, Jesús. La aportación de material aéreo por parte de los principales países extranjeros. (I) Generalidades y ayuda a la República. Revista «Aeroplano» nº 7. Instituto de Historia y Cultura Aérea. Madrid.1989.

<sup>44</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Voluntarios extranjeros en la Aviación Nacional 1936-39. Revista «Aeroplano» nº 16. Instituto de Historia y Cultura Aérea. Madrid 1998.

entered Santander and together with his friend from Jerez, Ricardo González Gordon, they travelled in their small plane to La Albericia (Santander) where they landed and left the aircraft shouting *¡Viva Franco!* and *¡Arriba España!* One can imagine the faces of the militiamen before they are arrested. When they were transferred to Gijón, Ricardo González Gordon, who was fluent in English, posed as an Englishman and both managed to be exchanged for members of the *Ejército Popular*. Belville later declared that he thought they would be shot at any moment.

On 1 August 1936, the Scottish pilot and nobleman Lord Malcolm Avondale Douglas-Hamilton landed in Burgos on board a «Dragon Rapide» with the registration G-ADCL with which Richard L'Estrange Malone from Airwork Ltd. was travelling, an aircraft that had been acquired by the already named *Aviación Nacional*. Airwork General Trading Ltd. was based at Heston Aerodrome and was involved in all types of aviation business such as civil aircraft sales and repair, flight school, passenger transport etc. and supplied aircraft to both sides in the first year of the war. He provided the Fuerzas Aéreas de la República with a DH-84 «Dragon II» registration G-ACEV and a DH-89A registration G-ADDF while he provided the *Aviación Nacional* with the already mentioned DH-89A registration G-ADCL and DH-89A registration G-ACPN which, piloted by Richard John Beattie «Dick» Seaman, arrived in Burgos the next day<sup>45</sup>.

On 3 August, the «Beechcraft» B-17R aircraft arrived in Gamonal (Burgos), piloted by the British Owen Cathcart-Jones as co-pilot and owner of the aircraft, the American James Haizlip. The plane was used to transfer people. On a flight to Innsbruck (Austria), the authorities blocked the exit of the aircraft and it was abandoned on that airfield.

But the shipments of aircraft from Great Britain to Spain continued, and so on 13 August two Fokker F-VIIb/3m landed at Gamonal. Bought in the Netherlands, they made the journey directly from Croydon carrying extra fuel tanks in the place where bombs were normally transported and piloted by Captains Thomas Neville Stack and Donald Salisbury Green, born in Lambeth (London) in 1902, who returned to England once the delivery had been made. These Fokkers were the same model as the three-engine plane that bombed the Basilica del Pilar in Zaragoza on 3 August 1936<sup>46</sup>.

<sup>45</sup> MCCLOSKEY, Keith. *Airwork, a history*. The History Press. 2013.

<sup>46</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Voluntarios extranjeros en la Aviación Nacional 1936-39*. Revista «Aeroplano» nº 16. Ministry of Defence. 1998.

In the same month, a «Monospar» ST-12 aircraft arrived from Heston, registration G-ADWH, crewed by Captain Hugh Mac Phail, Tom Campbell Black and navigator L.T.C. Castlemaine. On 30 July he had flown another plane to Burgos, this time a De Havilland DH-80A «Push Moth» with the registration G-ABYW, which he used for trips to Lisbon and the Protectorate.

On 10 October 1936, the Englishman Peter Hubertus Reulenton Criminil, Duke of Reulenton<sup>47</sup>, who also had German family origins, enlisted in the Tercio recruiting depot in Cáceres. He was an aeronautical engineer born in London in 1910 and, upon enlisting, said that he could fly planes and, after tests carried out in Tablada (Seville), he went on to pilot the Breguet XIX in Captain Soler's Squadron. In October 1938 he was added, along with other Spanish pilots, to the AS.88 Group of the Condor Legion based in Pollensa (Balearic Islands), piloting Heinkel He-59 seaplanes and acting as flight instructor and German translator for the Spanish pilots led by Captain Carlos Pombo Somoza. Then, he was known as Pedro Humbertum<sup>48</sup>. On 2 April 1939, he applied for and was granted a leave of absence from the *Aviación Nacional*. Interestingly, his service record is not recorded in the military archives despite having performed 52 war services with 180 hours of flight time<sup>49</sup>.

The magazine «The Aeroplane» of 29 June 1937 published an interview with the Irish pilot William Dickson Winterbottom who said that he had flown for the *Aviación Nacional* and had even flown the DC-2 plane used by Franco. In March 1937 he had flown to England on a special mission, but the «Non-Intervention Committee» blocked him on the ground, so he travelled to Dublin and no longer returned to Spain. In Spanish archives, he is listed as a Lieutenant but The Legion reports that in its archives there is no record of him by that name<sup>50</sup>. In the Second World War he appears as a possible 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant in the Royal Navy Reserve of Volunteers.

<sup>47</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Voluntarios extranjeros en la Aviación Nacional 1936-39*. Revista «Aeroplano» nº 16. Ministry of Defence. 1998.

<sup>48</sup> PERMUY, Rafael A. – O'DONNELL, César. *As de Picas*. Galland Books. 2008.

<sup>49</sup> The author of this work has researched the family background of Complementary Lieutenant Peter Humbertum and, apart from his English ancestors, he belonged to a noble German-Danish family in the current German state of Schleswig-Holstein, surnamed Reventlow, which, when it was registered in the Tercio, was mistakenly transformed into Reulenton, and its real noble title was Count.

<sup>50</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Voluntarios extranjeros en la Aviación Nacional 1936-39*. Revista «Aeroplano» nº 16. Ministry of Defence. 1998.

Another curious case refers to the English military pilot Malcolm Frederick Craig Strath seed who flew «Gloster Gladiator» planes in Gibraltar and who one day decided to fly to Spain with his own plane and for a certain time was flying the Legion Condor planes such as the «Messerschmitt BF-109» returning to Gibraltar a few weeks later<sup>51</sup>. This pilot died during the Second World War.

Another British pilot, W. Carlton Ross, on board a DH-85 «Leopard Moth» aircraft, registration G-ACSH, travelled between Seville and Burgos as early as August 1936<sup>52</sup>.

Two Irishmen enlisted in August 1936 under the Bandera «Sanjurjo»<sup>53</sup> in Zaragoza, one as a pilot captain and the other as an aspiring pilot. They were Jack Courtney and Sean O'Connell. Not knowing Spanish, they were sent to Tablada to complete the transformation course, but the command finally considered that their services were no longer needed, and they were demobilised even though O'Connell was enlisted in the «Irish Bandera»and, after the repatriation of the latter, he served in the Legion<sup>54</sup>.

Another pilot enlisted in Aviación Nacional was Conrad Everard who in 1937 wrote a book published in Berlin with the title «Luftkampf über Spanien». It is not certain that the name is authentic because the British author Bridgeman has not found references to it in British archives, and yet it existed. Everard says that he entered Spain through Ayamonte, and from Seville he went to Cáceres by plane. He claims that with a Levasseur PL110 aircraft he came to the aid of those besieged in the Alcázar de Toledo and with the Junkers Ju-52 he took part in the bombing of Málaga, Madrid and Cartagena. It is still possible to find references to this book on the Internet<sup>55</sup>.

In the summer of 1936, another group of Britons arrived in Spain led by a certain Rayenau joining the Aviación Nacional. They formed a squadron that their enemies called the «Richthoffen» Squadron because they confused British pilots with Germans. This

<sup>51</sup> BRIDGEMAN, Brian. *The Flyers*. Self-published by B. Bridgeman.1989.

<sup>52</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Voluntarios extranjeros en la Aviación Nacional 1936-39*. Revista «Aeroplano» nº 16. Ministry of Defence. 1998.

<sup>53</sup> Bandera «Sanjurjo», military unit equivalent to a battaillon that recruited volunteers in the Region of Aragón.

<sup>54</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Voluntarios extranjeros en la Aviación Nacional 1936-39*. Revista «Aeroplano» nº 16. Ministry of Defence. 1998.

<sup>55</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Voluntarios extranjeros en la Aviación Nacional 1936-39*. Revista «Aeroplano» nº 16. Ministry of Defence. 1998.

BRIDGEMAN, Brian. «*The Flyers*». Self-published by B. Bridgeman.1989.

Squadron acted over two months, losing three pilots of which only their first names are known: Tim, shot down by a Potez Po-54 which was in turn shot down; David, who collided with a Dewoitine, and Claude who disappeared in combat behind enemy lines. Two more Englishmen fell in battle, but their names are unknown. The survivors returned to the United Kingdom but Rayenau flew from Paris to Madrid where he joined the *Fuerzas Aéreas de la República*. After a fortnight he returned to the national side where, after knocking down an adversary whom he recognised as a friend, he abandoned the fight and returned to England having taken part in twenty-four air battles<sup>56</sup>. The Germans Karl Ries and Hans Ring<sup>57</sup>, mention a French pilot Rayneau as a Republican pilot who won five air races. It is possible that this is an error in the transcription of the name of that pilot.

Finally, there was a Spanish pilot with an English mother, Rafael Serra Hamilton<sup>58</sup>, who at the command of a Heinkel-51s of the 1-G-2, died in war action on the Sarrión front (Teruel) on 13 July 1938, hit by anti-aircraft artillery. He was the son of Colonel Wenceslao Serra Lugo-Viña and Selina Hamilton. Three more brothers joined the national army: one in the Infantry, one as a sailor and the last one as a doctor in a field hospital in the rear. Another brother, a technical architect, was mobilised in the Ejército Popularin Madrid and, through the so-called «Fifth Column», passed on reports to the nationals of the fortifications that were being erected on the Madrid front, earning the Campaign medal in vanguard units at the end of the war<sup>59</sup>.

### Volunteers in the Ejército Nacional

Below is a list of British soldiers who fought in ground units of the *Ejército Nacional*<sup>60</sup>.

Frank H. Thomas, a Welshman from Cardiff, enlisted in October 1936 in the Tercio as a legionary, and was assigned to the VI Bandera (Bandera is equivalent in the Tercio to Battalion type unit). He was promoted to corporal and, after being seriously wounded in May 1937 in Toledo, not liking the reality of the war,

<sup>56</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Voluntarios extranjeros en la Aviación Nacional 1936-39. Revista «Aeroplano» nº 16. Ministry of Defence. 1998.

<sup>57</sup> RIES, Karl - RING, Hans. The Legion Condor. Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 2013.

<sup>58</sup> <http://serra.hamilton.net/rafael.htm>.

<sup>59</sup> JIMÉNEZ-ARENAS, José Luis. Cadenas del aire. Ed. San Martín. 1973.

<sup>60</sup> Ejército Nacional means National Army, the opposite side to the Republican Army.

he deserted with another English sailor and they camouflaged themselves among O'Duffy's Irishmen when they were repatriated to Ireland. He wrote a book of memoirs «Brother Against Brother» which was not published until 1998<sup>61</sup>.

Peter Mant Mac Intyre Kemp, an Indian-born Englishman with a law degree from Trinity College, Cambridge, travelled to Spain in November 1936 as a journalist for the Sunday Dispatch and joined the Requeté<sup>62</sup>. He was promoted to Sergeant in the Cavalry Squadron «Borgoña» and later moved to the 8<sup>th</sup> Battalion, «Argel» Regiment and was appointed Provisional 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant for the rest of the campaign. After a trip to England in January 1937 on the occasion of his father's death, he went to the Tercio<sup>63</sup> de Requetés «El Alcázar» as an assistant to the Staff Office, taking part in the combat of La Marañosa in the Battle of Jarama. Once again he travelled to England, and upon his return he was assigned to the Tercio de Requetés «Nuestra Señora de Begoña», in Biscay, with which he fought and entered Bilbao in June 1937, continuing the campaign in Santander and Asturias. The Tercio «Nuestra Señora de Begoña» had been financed by, among others, the English businessman from Birmingham based in Bilbao Edward Kenneth Lutton Earle Jones. On 25 October 1937, Franco authorised the passage of Peter Kemp to the Legion with the rank of a Legionary 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant (although without having taken the official course), and was assigned to the 56<sup>th</sup> Machine Gun Company of the XIV Bandera. He later moved to the 53<sup>rd</sup> Company, being slightly injured from fighting in Alfambra (Teruel). He recovered from his injuries, but on 23 July 1938 he was seriously wounded in the jaw and throat by a mortar shell at the Serós bridgehead and was taken to Fraga hospital, then to Zaragoza hospital and finally to San Sebastian hospital. He was operated on by Dr Soler, Dr Shernant and Dr Joseph Eastman Sheehan, an expert in plastic surgery, the anaesthetist being the British Dr Robert Reynolds MacIntosh. During his convalescence in England, the civil war ended, and he was discharged in July 1939. He wrote his memoirs in 1957 with the title: «Mine were of trouble»<sup>64</sup>.

<sup>61</sup> THOMAS, Frank – STRADLING R.A. – HAMM, Sid. *Brother Against Brother*. Sutton Pub. 1998.

DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>62</sup> Requeté, militia of the *Comunión Tradicionalista*.

<sup>63</sup> Tercio is the Carlist military Unit sized Battalion.

<sup>64</sup> KEMP, Peter. *Legionario en España*. Biblioteca Universal Caralt. 1975.

DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

John Peel was another volunteer with English parents, born in Lisbon where he was known as «Dom João» or «Inglesinho». Knowing that the nationals were about to enter Badajoz, he gathered a group of six former military service colleagues in Portugal and crossed the border, capturing twelve militiamen with their weapons, taking them to Badajoz and, once there, they enlisted in the Tercio. After fifteen days of training, he joined the Yagüe Columns that were advancing towards Madrid suffering from a slight injury. He was one of the first to enter the Alcázar de Toledo, integrated in the 20<sup>th</sup> Company of the V Bandera. He continued on to Madrid, arriving at Ciudad Universitaria, where he was most seriously injured. In the Tercio, he was known as John of Talavera. After the war, he was granted Spanish nationality and was registered as John Price, and it is quite possible that his surname was changed by mistake at the civil registry<sup>65</sup>.

Lieutenant Gilbert William «Bill» Nangle, sometimes written as Neagle, was the first foreign officer of the Tercio to reach that position without having passed through the ranks. He was placed in the V Bandera attending the toughest operations of the war and was injured twice, the second time so badly that he was discharged, returning to Northern Ireland in early 1938. At the beginning of the Second World War, he was a member of the Palestinian Police Force, and in April 1941 he joined the British Army where he became a Major and killed in action on 2 March 1944 in Montecassino fighting the Germans. O'Duffy referred to him as Gilbert and never William<sup>66</sup>.

Lieutenant Noel Fitzpatrick, an officer of Irish origin, who was awarded the V Bandera of the Tercio and then the Irish Bandera. According to O'Duffy his real name was Michael Skeffington-Smyth. This officer, along with Bill Nangle, had reported to the Tercio at the beginning of the war and was interviewed personally by Franco who authorised their enlistment as officers<sup>67</sup>.

Those who spoke English because of their family background or studies were also assimilated to Sergeants of the Tercio and assigned to the Irish Bandera: Charles William Hoke, Mulcham Sobrajh, Walter Waller, Amaro and Antonio Duarte Boyd-Harvey, (both to be later Provisional 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenants), Adolfo Berthy Consiglieri, José Mascarenhas, Diego Azcona Granda, Juan Roca

<sup>65</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Los otros Internacionales. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>66</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Los otros Internacionales. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>67</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Los otros Internacionales. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

Lodo, Luis Morales Mejías, Lutgardo Macías López who was City Major of La Línea de la Concepción in the 1940s, José Romero Muñoz, Jaime Juanals Dagnino and Francisco «Curro» Larios and Carver<sup>68</sup>.

Other officers who spoke English or were of British origin were incorporated into the Irish Bandera: Cavalry Mayor Juan Botana Rose, Lieutenant of the Tercio Bernardo Menéndez López, Officer Training Corps (OTC) Lieutenant of the Cavalry Jacobo Jordán de Urríes; Officer Training Corps (OTC) 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant of the Cavalry José Raventós and Pedro Bové; Officer Training Corps (OTC) 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant of the Infantry Alfonso Díaz de Bustamante Quijano and Non Commissioned Officer Training Corps (NCOTC) Sergeant of the Cavalry, Ricardo Martorell Téllez-Girón, Marquis of Monesterio who died a few months later in Sabiñánigo (Huesca) in the I Bandera of the Legion. Honorary Captain of the Tercio, José María Fernández de Villavicencio and Croke Marquis of Vallecerrato, Marquis of Castrillo and assistant to O'Duffy, Officer Training Corps (OTC) 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant of Aviation, Álvaro Fernández-Matamoros Scott born in Liverpool and who would later join the Squadron of García Morato<sup>69</sup>.

English volunteers for the Irish Bandera were Hugh Alapnourusos, H.M. McDaniel, 26, and Jack Colley, 22, both deserters, were tried, sentenced to death and ultimately saved because an English priest expressed an interest in them, and they were expelled to Gibraltar on 28 November 1936. Both said they intended to join the Aviación Nacional but were expelled because they were thought to be working for the British Secret Service. Under the Irish Bandera, there were also Irishmen from Northern Ireland, and therefore British although they are not fully identified<sup>70</sup>.

Walter Meade, a well-known sportsman, was O'Duffy's Assistant Captain and was of Spanish descent. After the repatriation of the Irish Bandera, he continued in Spain attached to the 4<sup>th</sup> Brigada de Navarra, despite not being recognised as an Honorary Captain<sup>71</sup>.

Reginald Victor Kelleth, a 19-year-old soldier, was serving in the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in Gibraltar when he deserted in December 1937 with Percy Appleyard across La Línea de la Concepción. Appleyard returned to Gibraltar but Kelleth enlisted

<sup>68</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>69</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>70</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>71</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

as a legionnaire in the 61<sup>st</sup> Company of the XVI Bandera, fighting in Aragon and was killed in action at Orcau in June 1938<sup>72</sup>.

Joseph Nugent Bull, an Australian Catholic, fought in the «Jeanne d'Arc» Company of the Legion and stayed in Spain after the war. At the beginning of the Second World War, he was in the United Kingdom where he joined the RAF and died on 8 September 1940 after his bomber was shot down<sup>73</sup>.

Cecil Owen, whose mother was Spanish, had lived in Vigo before the war and first joined a Tercio de Requetés, then went on to become part of the XVI Bandera of the Legion as a Provisional 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant<sup>74</sup>.

Tom Burns was an ambulance driver for English Medical Aid, Anglo-Spanish Medical Service<sup>75</sup>.

Gabriel Herbert was responsible for the «Anglo-Spanish Medical Service team», which had been set up thanks to the English Catholic organisation «The Bishops Fund for the Relief of Spanish Distress». With the money raised, a medical unit of two ambulances and medical supplies and a medical team made up of Spanish staff were organised. This Medical Unit acted as an addition to the Tercios de Requetés of the Brigadas de Navarra on the northern front. He then acted on the fronts in Aragon and Catalonia to end the war in Madrid in 1939<sup>76</sup>.

Patrick Campbell joined the Tercio de Requetés «Nuestra Señora de Begoña» in Biscay on 20 November 1937 and was discharged on 19 September 1938 after the agreements for the withdrawal of foreign fighters from Spain<sup>77</sup>.

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<sup>72</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

OTHEN, Christopher. *Franco's International Brigades: Adventurers, Fascists, and Christian Crusaders in the Spanish Civil War*. Hurst & Co. 2013.

<sup>73</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998. <http://archives.anu.edu.au/exhibitions/australia-spanish-civil-war.activism-reaction/serving-spain-international-brigades>.

<sup>74</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

ARIAS, Luis M. – CAÑEDO, M<sup>a</sup> Carmen. *Los espinos de la memoria*. UNED. 2017.

<sup>75</sup> KEENE, Judith. *Luchando por Franco: Voluntarios europeos al servicio de la España fascista, 1936-39*. Salvat Editores. Barcelona. 2002.

<sup>76</sup> KEENE, Judith. *Luchando por Franco: Voluntarios europeos al servicio de la España fascista, 1936-39*. Salvat Editores. Barcelona. 2002.

DAY, Peter. *Franco's Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco to Power in Spain*. Biteback Publishing, 2011.

<sup>77</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

Hugh Thomas. *La Guerra Civil Española*. Ed. Ruedo Ibérico. 1962.

Thomas Smith, a 21-year-old English student at Saint Alban's College in Valladolid, joined the Legion in March 1938 and became a member of the V Bandera of the Legion<sup>78</sup>. Other volunteers were rejected at the medical examination<sup>79</sup>.

In August 1938, the list of British members of the Legion was presented, and it included several with purely Spanish names, such as:

- Aurelio Valls Carreras, Transmissions Platoon, Staff Office, 1<sup>st</sup>-Tercio<sup>80</sup>. Enlisted in Talavera de la Reina on 7 January 1937.
- Francis Albert James, I Bandera.
- Alberto Pereira López, VIII Bandera.
- Adolfo Cazorla Menzallus, XII Bandera.

The English newspaper *The Guardian* published an obituary in 1997 referring to Andrew Fountaine, stating that he had been a combatant of the Ejército Nacional but without indicating the military unit. He was the son of Charles Fountaine, Admiral of the Royal Navy. During the Second World War he was employed as a 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant on the aircraft carrier R-10 HMS «Indefatigable» and was seriously injured and declared disabled after an attack by Japanese «Kamikazes» in April 1945. He later graduated in chemistry from the University of Cambridge<sup>81</sup>.

In his book, Chris Hall published the names of four British pilots who acted in the Aviación Nacional<sup>82</sup>:

- Edward Arthur Saint George Hamilton Chichester, Marquis of Chichester and Marquis of Donegal already mentioned.
- Roland «Roly» John Falk, well known British test pilot and awarded the OBE (Order of the British Empire).
- Richard L'Estrange Malone, a mechanic from Airwork Ltd. already mentioned.

<sup>78</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

KEENE, Judith. *Luchando por Franco: Voluntarios europeos al servicio de la España fascista, 1936-39*. Salvat Editores. Barcelona. 2002.

<sup>79</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>80</sup> Tercio in this case means not battalion but one or the two parts in which were divided the Legion en 1937.

<sup>81</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>82</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

HALL, Chris. *¡Viva la muerte!. Nationalist Forces of the Spanish Civil War*. Gosling Press.1998.

- Count Theodore Béla Rudolf Zichy of Zich and Vásonkeő known as Count Zichy, born in Eastbourne (Sussex) but with double nationality, Hungarian and British, and owner of a DH.80 «Puss Moth» registered G-AAXY with which he travelled to Spain transferring national people.
- James Francis Walford y Borbón joined the Tercio de Requetés «El Alcázar» and took part in the combats at the Casa de Campo in Madrid, but later lost his way<sup>83</sup>.
- Ray Campbell, an English poet born in South Africa, fought in the ranks of the Tercio de Requetés «Nuestra Señora de los Reyes» in Seville by dedicating a book of poetry to Requeté. This is confirmed by Requetés Captain Jaime del Burgo in his book «Conspiración y Guerra Civil»<sup>84</sup>.
- Guy «Guillermo» Spaey Bauss, of Belgian origin with a British passport, volunteered in a Tercio de Requetés and then took a course as a Provisional 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant in artillery and was assigned to an artillery battery where he spent the rest of the war. In 1938, he was promoted to Provisional Lieutenant with the ordinal number 625<sup>th</sup> of the Artillery List. After the war, he returned to his home country<sup>85</sup>.
- John Amery arrived in Spain in October 1936 as an intelligence officer and arms dealer. He later went on to join the CTV, earning rewards for his bravery in combat, and was discharged in July 1939. During the Second World War he collaborated with the Germans in propaganda actions and at the end of the war he was arrested on charges of treason, tried, sentenced to death and hanged at the end of 1945<sup>86</sup>.
- Evelyn Waugh, was a driver of one of the ambulances of the «Anglo-Spanish Medical Service»<sup>87</sup>.
- Priscilla «Pip» Scott-Ellis<sup>88</sup>, was the daughter of Lord Howard of Walden and Seaford. She arrived in Spain in 1937 where

<sup>83</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

ARIAS, Luis M. – CAÑEDO, M<sup>a</sup> Carmen. *Los espinos de la memoria*. UNED. 2017.

<sup>84</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

DEL BURGO, Jaime. *Conspiración y guerra civil*. Ed. Alfaguara. 1970.

<sup>85</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.  
«Escalilla de Artillería». Secretaría de Guerra. Burgos. 1938.

<sup>86</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>87</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>88</sup> SCOTT-ELLIS, Priscilla. *Diario de la guerra de España*. Ed. Plaza & Janés Barcelona. 1996.

she took the nursing course and worked for 20 months in the hospitals of Teruel, Escatrón and Ebro even under enemy fire. She was rewarded with the Cross of Military Merit with red badge and after the war she married the Spanish José Luis de Villalonga, Marquis of Castellvell<sup>89</sup>.

- Hewig Holmes was another British nurse who worked at the hospital in Las Navas del Marqués and received the Cross of Military Merit with red badge at the end of the war<sup>90</sup>.
- Florence Farmborough had been a nurse in Russia but spoke every Sunday night on Radio Salamanca in propaganda and counter-propaganda work since she had lived live the Russian revolution of 1917<sup>91</sup>.

A case of help is described on the Serra Hamilton family website when one of their members travelled during the war from Havana to Gibraltar on the Italian ship «Conde Biancamano». On this ship, María Luisa Gómez-Mena de Cagigas, Countess of Revilla-Camargo, loaded several tonnes of sanitary material, food and clothing for the national hospitals<sup>92</sup>.

Charles Reginald Norman Smith, who had been an RAF aviator during the First World War, worked in 1936 in «La Canadiense» as a maintenance engineer for several dams on the Noguera-Pallaresa River as well as the Camarasa power station. When the war arrived in the area, he went to England but when the front was stabilised he returned through the national zone and, travelling in an armoured car, he was in charge of the maintenance, cleaning and greasing of the machinery of the installations in no man's land. During the Republican offensive in Balaguer, he opened the gates of the San Lorenzo reservoir, preventing the troops from crossing the river at Vilanova de la Barca. He repeated this later in the Ebro offensive, but the water flooding was barely noticed. He lived the rest of his life in Tremp, where he died<sup>93</sup>.

When the Irish Bandera was repatriated, among those, who decided to stay in Spain were Machine Gun Sergeant Maurice Alexander Gordon Cadell and Corporal Sean O'Connell. Sergeant

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<sup>89</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

KEENE, Judith. *Luchando por Franco: Voluntarios europeos al servicio de la España fascista, 1936-39*. Salvat Editores. Barcelona. 2002.

<sup>90</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>91</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>92</sup> <http://serra.hamilton.net/>

<sup>93</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. *Los otros Internacionales*. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

Cadell was employed as a captain in the British Army during the Second World War, serving in various special operations and receiving the Military Cross<sup>94</sup>.

General Sagardía spoke of several Irish people without providing any further information, but in July 1937, a report of the Guardia Civil informed an accident involving two German, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenants of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Company of the 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion, one of whom was called James Kimkeits, a clearly Irish name and surname, but not very German<sup>95</sup>. It cannot be ascertained whether these Irish were from the Republic of Ireland or British subjects from Northern Ireland.

Douglas Dodd-Parker, a founding member of the Military Intelligence Service MI-R, recruited Peter Kemp to the SOE (Special Operations Executive) during the Second World War. It is quite possible that he would have coincided with Peter Kemp, both fighting in Spain<sup>96</sup>.

In Gibraltar, Lionel Imossi, owner of a petrol station, helped two officers and five Falangists who had arrived on board the No. 19 Torpedo Boat and took them back to Algeciras once in national hands. Two days later the battleship «Jaime I» arrived in Gibraltar with two cruisers, a destroyer and another smaller ship for the purpose of charcoal. The authorities of the colony refused to grant permission, so attempts were made to do so through private companies. These, led by Imossi and knowing that most of the officers were detained in the holds, tried to negotiate their release in exchange for charcoal but the revolutionary sailors refused so the ships left and most of the officers were shot<sup>97</sup>.

Other Gibraltarians were also involved in the fight, such as Jorge Bassadone Pittaluga, a British citizen and owner of a shop in Ceuta, who joined the fight from the beginning by boarding one of the «Nuestra Señora del Pilar» and «Pitucas» feluccas of the Consorcio Almadrabero, which, under the command of Lieutenant Manuel Mora-Figueroa Gómez-Imaz, circumvented the blockade of the strait by passing through Tarifa to the legionaries of the 18<sup>th</sup> Company of the V Bandera of the Tercio, in which Pittaluga

<sup>94</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Los otros Internacionales. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>95</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Los otros Internacionales. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

SAGARDIA RAMOS, Antonio. Del Alto Ebro a las fuentes del Llobregat. Ed. Nacional. 1940.

<sup>96</sup> DAY, Peter. Franco's Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco to Power in Spain. Biteback Publishing, 2011.

<sup>97</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Los otros Internacionales. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

enlisted, fighting until he reached Madrid. His last action in the Tercio was the taking of Pozuelo de Alarcón. Then, as a member of the Falange, he passed to the Banderade FE<sup>98</sup>de Marruecos where he spent the rest of the war and ended it with the rank of Jefe de Falange<sup>99</sup>.

Another «llanito»<sup>100</sup> who fought in the national ranks was José Wink Olivero, who was enlisted in September 1936 in the *Falange del Campo de Gibraltar* to fight on the Andalusian fronts. In March 1937 he went on leave to Gibraltar, and upon his return the British police did not let him cross. When he finally succeeded, his Bandera de Falange de Cádiz claimed him but being a foreigner, he was only allowed to return in exchange for joining the Legion<sup>101</sup>.

The Englishman Horace Philbin, fought in the siege of Oviedo framed in the 10<sup>th</sup> Compañía de Asalto from the «Voluntarios Movilizados»<sup>102</sup>.

Once the civil war was over, three deserters from the Royal Navy crossed to La Línea de la Concepción on 4 April with the intention of joining the Legion. They were sailors Harry Dale, J. Smith and Leonard Victor Holmes who were sent to three different companies of the XI Bandera of the Legion<sup>103</sup>.

Finally, we should mention the Cantabrians from the MacLennan family. The first, Luis MacLennan de la Vega, had dual nationality and at the beginning of the war, he wielded his British passport in Santander and managed to be transferred to Alicante where he boarded a British ship and travelled to Lisbon. After crossing the border, he arrived in Talavera de la Reina where he enlisted in the El Tercio recruitment office. On 5 February 1937, he was assigned to Cáceres to the newly created Italian-Spanish Mixed Legionary Brigade «Flechas Negras», initially appearing as Luis M. Vega, with whom he fought in the Vizcaya and Santander campaigns, later going on to the Aragon front where he was seriously wounded and was discharged from that Brigade on 8 October 1937 with a good report on his performance in the campaign in which he had

<sup>98</sup> FE, acronym for Falange Española (Spanish Phalanx).

<sup>99</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Los otros Internacionales. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998. Jefe de Falange means Platoon Leader.

<sup>100</sup> Llanito, a word used for Gibraltarians

<sup>101</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Los otros Internacionales. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>102</sup> DE MESA, José Luis. Los otros Internacionales. Ed. Barbarroja. 1998.

<sup>103</sup> Documentation by Harry Dale and Leonard Holmes. Institute of Military History and Culture of Ceuta.

been promoted to Corporal on war merits. The rest of the war he served in the Staff Office of a Great Unit commanded by the breveted Colonel José Vierna Trápaga<sup>104</sup>, from La Montaña.

The second MacLennan was a cousin of the previous one called José Manuel Latorre MacLennan, a lawyer by profession and Provisional 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant of Infantry who died on 4 July 1938 at the age of 23 in the hospital of Castellón while he was part of the 6<sup>th</sup> Batallón of «San Marcial» Regiment assigned to the 4<sup>th</sup> División de Navarra<sup>105</sup>.

We see therefore that the British, who enlisted or collaborated with the National side in the civil war, did so in most cases acting individually and looking for Units that adapted to their particular idiosyncrasy, be it ideological or simply adventurous. Peter Kemp reflects this very well in his book «Legionario en España»<sup>106</sup>, as well as other fighters in his personal memoirs. Having reviewed their histories, we find the British with the Requetés, in the Legion, in Infantry battalions, in artillery companies, in the first aviation squadrons, in medical units, etc., as well as in General O'Duffy's Irish Bandera. However, none of these Units can be considered as British Units. All of them were perfectly adapted to the character of their fellow Unity members, and in general they fought, and some died with courage and boldness.

### Volunteers in the Ejército Popular de la República

Unlike the Ejército Nacional, the Ejército Popular de la República organised in a completely different way «its» international volunteers who were enlisted in the offices and delegations of the Komintern in the various European capitals.

In the case of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the enlistment was carried out by the British Communist Party from its headquarters in London's Covent Garden and in branches throughout the country. They were also assisted by the ILP (Independent Labour Party), as well as by Duchess Katherine

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<sup>104</sup> PIAZZONI, Sandro. *Las Flechas Negras en la guerra de España (1937-1939)*. Ed. Fides Tarragona. 2020.

Information provided to the author by his grandnephew Pedro Crespo Baraja. The northern Region of Cantabria is also known as La Montaña.

<sup>105</sup> Information provided to the author by his grandnephew Pedro Crespo Baraja.

<sup>106</sup> Spanish edition title: *Legionario en España*; English edition title: *Mine were of trouble*.

of Atholl. The recruitment office was later set up in Litchfield St. in London under the misnomer «International Brigade Dependents and Wounded Aid Committee»<sup>107</sup>. These affiliates will later form the so-called «British» battalion of the 15<sup>th</sup> International Brigade.

But before that mobilisation, there were already British fighters in Spain. We have seen the performance in Barcelona and Huesca of the Englishwoman Felicia Mary Browne, who joined the «Carlos Marx» battalion and was sent to take the city of Huesca, although she remained in the area of Tardienta. Other British who were already in Spain from the very beginning included John Cornford and Tom Henry Wintringham. The first one, a poet educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and great-grandson of Darwin, went to fight at the front of Aragon together with the heterodox communists of the POUM (*Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista*) of Trotskyist line and clearly confronted with the directives emanating from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union<sup>108</sup>. However, Tom Wintringham, a member of the BCP (British Communist Party) was in charge of mobilising the English who were in Barcelona participating in the creation of the anti-fascist English Centuria «Tom Mann» with its slogan «Proletarian discipline will defeat fascism», activating a group of about 35 English people and leaving to fight also at the front of Aragon. The cover of the book «The Last English Revolutionary»<sup>109</sup> shows a photo of that Centuria with Tom Wintringham holding a rifle crouched in the centre of the front row. The rest of the components of the photograph are from left to right: Sid Avner, who would later go on to the «Thälmann» battalion, dying in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936; Nat Cohen, a London tailor and leader of the Centuria; Ramona Cohen, his wife, née Siles García; Tom Wintringham, who came to command the «British» battalion; George Trioli, an Italian living in England; Jack Barry, an Australian; Dave Marshall, who would also go on to the «Thälmann» battalion. Another tailor who was Nat Cohen's partner and whose name was Sam Masters is missing from the photograph<sup>110</sup>.

<sup>107</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>108</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>109</sup> PURCELL, Hugh – SMITH, Phyll. *The last English Revolutionary*. Sussex Academic Press. 2012.

<sup>110</sup> BRADLEY, Ken. *Brigadas Internacionales en España, 1936-39*. Ed. Del Prado- Osprey. 1994.

Nat Cohen and Sam Masters, recently arrived from England, quickly became involved among the fighting troops along with the also British Richard Kisch, Tony Willis and Paul Boyle participating in the expedition that, commanded by Captain Bayo, landed in Majorca in August 1936 and in which Richard Kisch was seriously injured. A British officer named Esmond Dunwald also participated in this landing, acting as Bayo's assistant<sup>111</sup>. On the return to Barcelona, the «Tom Mann» Centuria was created and joined by the rest of the British. However, the fight in Aragon did not please everyone and both Nat Cohen and Sam Masters returned injured to England to later return to Spain, but directly to Albacete, to join the International Brigade that was being formed there<sup>112</sup>.

With John Cornford came Richard Bennet, a fellow student of his in Cambridge who soon left the front line to join the radio services of the Generalitat de Catalunya, broadcasting programmes from «La voz de España». John Cornford left Spain to work in the UK to recruit new volunteers, which he did by travelling to Albacete and joining the International Brigades<sup>113</sup>.

The *poumista* groups included the British writer Sonia Brownell as well as Eric Blair, better known as George Orwell, who left a written testimony in 1938 of his struggle in Spain. Orwell, after six months in Spain and a serious neck injury, managed to escape to France on 23 June 1937 after the persecution decreed against the POUM militants. His wife, Eileen O'Shaughnessy, and his two compatriots, John McNair and Statford Cottman, accompanied him on his escape.

Another English woman from Wolverhampton called Greville Texidor, a dancer and writer, had been established in Tossa de Mar since 1933 and went to Barcelona at the beginning of the war, joining the «Aguiluchos de la Libertad» (Eaglets of Freedom) who joined the Anarcho-Poumista Ortiz column, establishing themselves in La Zaida (Zaragoza) already on the Aragon front. After her return to Barcelona, she enlisted in the Centuria «Giustizia e Libertá», also known as the «Matteotti» battalion, and became a member of the Ascaso column in the town of Almudévar on the Huesca front. On her return to Barcelona, she

<sup>111</sup> ALCOFAR NASSAES, José Luis. Spansky. Los extranjeros que lucharon en la guerra civil española. Ed. Dopesa. Barcelona.1973.

<sup>112</sup> <http://www.international-brigades.org.uk/content/tom-mann-centuria>.

<sup>113</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España. Ed. Ariel.1974.

took charge of a children's orphanage with the support of the «British Quakers» organisation until her retreat to France in February 1939, when, after crossing the border, she returned to England. She immigrated to New Zealand in 1940 and passed away in Australia in 1962<sup>114</sup>.

Most of the British POUM fighters came to Spain recruited by the ILP (Independent Labour Party), and organised by John McNair. He set up an office with Edward Joseph «Ted» Fletcher. With the costs obtained in England, an ambulance was purchased and sent to Spain with John Gordon and William Martin as drivers and it seems that Robert «Bob» Edwards, leader of the ILP, also travelled. The foreign contingent of the POUM, which was integrated into the 29<sup>th</sup> Division of the *Ejército Popular*, consisted of some 900 combatants from 28 different countries. The British group was gradually subdivided, with several volunteers joining the IBs, the rest remaining on the Aragonese front. In May 1937, they were the protagonists of the *poumista* and anarchist revolt that led to the sacrifice of several of them, such as 22-year-old Bob Smilie, who died in the Valencia prison<sup>115</sup>.

John McNair tried to negotiate the transfer of his compatriots to the IBs but eventually fled to support the return of the British fighters to their homeland from outside Spain.

The following volunteers were sent to Spain by the ILP<sup>116</sup>:

- Agnew, John.
- Ivory, Lewis Ernest.
- Bennett, William.
- Blair, Eric (George Orwell), Corporal; seriously wounded by sniper on 20 May 1937.
- Braithwaite (Branthwaite), John.
- Buttonshaw, Harvey
- Castle, Les.
- Chambers, Bill, corporal, killed in action after being transferred to an anarchist unit in August 1937

<sup>114</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España. Ed. Ariel.1974.

<sup>115</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu.Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España. Ed. Ariel.1974.

ORWELL, George. Homenaje a Cataluña. Ed. Destino. Barcelona. 2003.

<sup>116</sup> HALL, Christopher. Not Just Orwell. The Independent Labour Party Volunteers and the Spanish Civil War. Warren and Pell. 2009.

- Clarke, William.
- Clinton, Arthur, injured in back during bombing, March 1937.
- Coles, Tom.
- Connor, Jock.
- Cottman, Stafford.
- Donovan, «Paddy» John, Sergeant.
- Doran, Charles.
- Edwards, Bob, ILP ambulance driver in September 1936; captain of the POUM militia He returned to England in March 1937 for the ILP Congress, but the British Government prevented his return to Spain.
- Evans.
- Farrell, James.
- Frankford, Frank.
- Gross, George.
- Hiddlestone, Reg, wounded in a night attack, April 1937. He was the last of the group to leave Spain in February 1939.
- Hunter, Philip, injured in leg, April 1937.
- Jones, Uriah, fought until the beginning of 1938; after the dissolution of the POUM militias he joined a unit of the PSUC.
- Julius.
- Justessen, Charles.
- Kupinskyi, Wolf «Harry Milton», imprisoned in Barcelona's Model Prison on 13 August 1937 and released after pressure from the US Consulate in Barcelona.
- Levin, Louis.
- McDonald, Robert.
- McNeil, Hugh.
- Martin, William B., ambulance driver between Great Britain and Aragon in September 1936 He had been a gunner in the First World War and was put in charge of a 60-man artillery platoon.
- Moyle, Douglas.
- O'Hara, Patrick, first aid health technician.
- Parker, Thomas «Buck», corporal, wounded during an attack in April 1937
- Ramón.

- Ritchie, John.
- Smillie, Bob, died in Valencia prison after being arrested in June 1937.
- Smith, James J.
- Stearns, Douglas Clark.
- «Tanky» (James Arthur Cope).
- Thomas, Harry, Welshman, wounded in a night attack in April 1937
- Thomas, Parry.
- Thompson, Douglas, wounded in a night attack in April 1937.
- Webb, Harry, stretcher-bearer.
- Williams, Bob. He was wounded three times and returned to England in December 1938.
- Wilton, Mike.
- Wingate, Sybil, joined the ILP contingent as a nurse because she was already in Barcelona.

In the first moments of the struggle, a medical unit created by Isabel Brown was organised. This service was run by Dr Kenneth Sinclair Loutitt, a socialist, and included Tom Wintringham as editor of the *Daily Worker*, although we have seen that he was better at using weapons than the keys<sup>117</sup>.

Taking a geographical leap, we find ourselves in the Sierra de Madrid. Once the military uprising in Madrid had been put down, the popular militias tried to prevent the troops, led by General Mola, who had triumphed in Castilla la Vieja and Navarra, from crossing the mountains. Among the units forming part of the 5<sup>th</sup> *Regimiento de Milicias Populares* were several so-called «Compañías de Acero», one of which included the British Frost and Frank Pitcairn, the latter a correspondent for the *Daily Worker* newspaper, who preferred to put down his pen and wield his rifle. The «Compañía de Acero» to which they belonged was decimated on 25 July<sup>118</sup>. Frank Pitcairn told about it in his book «Reporter in Spain». Pitcairn's real name was Francis Claud Cockburn and on

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<sup>117</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>118</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

18 July he was in Barcelona from where he travelled to Madrid to join the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment<sup>119</sup>.

Two other groups of British volunteers formed the English Platoon of the Centuria «Muerte es Maestro» described by James Albrighton on 2 October.

They were the following:

- Albrighton, James, medical student and Political Commissary who wrote a book of memoirs.
- Beale, John
- Bentley, Albert; died on 14 October 1936 in Chapinería (Madrid)
- Campbell, Bruce
- Garland, Frank
- Harris, Michael
- Henderson, John
- Hudson, William
- Lloyd Jones, Sidney (Chief); died on 14 October 1936 in Chapinería (Madrid).
- Mackenzie, David
- Middleton, George; died 14 October 1936 in Chapinería (Madrid)
- Morton, Sidney
- O'Connor, Frank
- O'Malley, Patrick
- Zanettou, Benitzelos

More volunteers joined these troops to reach the figure of 128 men. On 14 November there were only 40 men, and since 10 October their casualties were: 42 dead, 27 injured and 10 missing<sup>120</sup>.

Albrighton was in charge of 16 men in the Casa de Campo, when 8 of them were killed, as an artillery grenade fell in the middle of the group. Albrighton later served in George M. Nathan's British Battalion 1<sup>st</sup> Company and was a medic in that Battalion. In 1938

<sup>119</sup> PITCAIRN, Frank. *Corresponsal en España*. Ed. Alberto Lázaro. 2012.

<sup>120</sup> BAXELL, Richard. *British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War*. Routledge. 2004.

he was seriously injured in Aragon and repatriated to England on 2 August<sup>121</sup>.

The presence of volunteers from the United Kingdom became more numerous as they arrived in Barcelona and were taken over by Hugh O'Donnell who, via Valencia, sent them to Albacete. The first volunteers were integrated into the 4<sup>th</sup> Platoon of the Machine Gun Company «Commune de Paris» Battalion, 11<sup>th</sup> International Brigade which is mostly French speaking. These British took part in the hard fighting in November 1936 that prevented the nationals from entering Madrid.

The British volunteers of the Battalion «Commune de Paris» were:

- Barry, Jack «Blue». Australian who died in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936.
- Burke, Edward. Also known as «Edward Cooper», he was wounded in Cordoba in December 1936 and died in a hospital in Madrid on 12 February 1937.
- Clarke, Jock. Probably born in Glasgow.
- Cornford, John. He died in Lopera on 28 December 1936.
- Cunningham, Jock. Later commander-in-chief of the British Battalion; repatriated in August 1937.
- Hinks, Joe. Later commander-in-chief of the British Battalion; repatriated in August 1937.
- Jones H. «Freddie». Head of Platoon number 4 who died in Madrid in November 1936 and was relieved by Joe Hinks.
- Knox, Bernard. Political Commissar of the battalion wounded in Boadilla del Monte and repatriated in January 1937.
- Lesser, Sam «Sam Russell». Repatriated in January 1937, he later returned to Spain to work for the Communist Party as a broadcaster and took over from Peter Kerrigan as correspondent for the Daily Worker.
- Mackenzie, David. Wrongly thought to be dead when in fact he was repatriated in December 1936.
- McLaurin, Griffin «Mac». Born in New Zealand but resident in Great Britain who died in Madrid on 9 November 1936.
- Patton, Thomas. Irish, he died in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936.

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<sup>121</sup> ALBRIGHTON, James: «Spain Diaries». Not published memories kept in Marx Memorial Library's Spanish Collection, CID: 67032, Ref.: SC/VOL/JAL. London, England.

- Sawyers, Robert. Scottish, injured in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936 and repatriated in February 1937.
- Sommerfield, John. Injured on 11 November 1936 in Aravaca, and wrongly presumed dead as he returned to Britain in January 1937.
- Sowersby, George. A Scot from Edinburgh, he arrived in Spain in October 1936 and was repatriated in January 1937.
- Stevens, Joseph. Australian, died in Brunete in July 1937.
- Symes, Robert. He died in Madrid on 9 November 1936.
- Thorneycroft, Chris. Later it was transferred to the «Thälmann» Battalion.
- Yates, Steve. Born in New Zealand but resident in Great Britain who died in Madrid on 9 November 1936<sup>122</sup>.

On 9 November, the 11<sup>th</sup> IB came under the command of General «Kleber». On December 7<sup>th</sup> it was withdrawn from the front with a large number of casualties. The surviving British, who were 12 men, maintained their platoon and after the subsequent fighting in December, only five were left unharmed and were ordered to join the 14<sup>th</sup> IB that had begun to be organised in Madrigueras (Albacete).

There were other Britons in the fighting in and around Madrid. In the 12<sup>th</sup> IB, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon of the 1<sup>st</sup> Rifle Company of the «Thälmann» Battalion was made up of British who suffered even more casualties than the 11<sup>th</sup> IB, as of the 18 initial, only 2 were left unharmed at the end of December and were sent to Madrigueras to join the new IB. The British who fought in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Zug (Platoon) of the 1<sup>st</sup> Company of the 11<sup>th</sup> IB Battalion «Thälmann» were the following:

- Addley, Harry «Tich». He died in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936.
- Avner, Sidney «Sid». He died in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936. He had been in the Centuria «Tom Mann».
- Birch, Lorimer. Head of ½ Zug. He died in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936.
- Cox, Ray. He died in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936.
- Donovan, John «Paddy». He left the Battalion before the combats of Boadilla del Monte, joining the POUM and being repatriated in July 1937.

<sup>122</sup> BAXELL, Richard. *British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War*. Routledge. 2004.

- Fontana, Ettore «Jerry». He was an American and deserted the combats of Boadilla del Monte.
- Gillan, Phil «Jock». He was wounded in the neck at Boadilla del Monte, and was repatriated in 1937.
- Gough, William «Joe». He died in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936.
- Hutschinson, Donald. He was wounded in October 1936 and later joined the British Battalion.
- Jeans, Arnold. Head of ½ Zug. He died in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936.
- Marshall, David. Injured in the foot on 12 November 1936 at Cerro de los Angeles, and repatriated to England in December 1936.
- Messer, Martin. He died in Boadilla del Monte in December 1936.
- Norman, Phillip. He deserted to England after the Battle of Boadilla del Monte.
- Ovenden, Arthur «Babs». Repatriated in December 1936.
- Paester, Samuel. A native of Stepney. He fought on the Aragon front in 1936.
- Romilly, Esmond. Nephew of Churchill, repatriated in December 1936.
- Scott, Bill. Repatriated to Ireland in 1937.
- Sollenberger, Randall. American doctor who fought bravely with the Thälmann Centuria.
- Thornycroft, Chris. Battalion gunner, from the «Commune de Paris» Battalion, who later moved to the 35th division and was repatriated to England in April 1938.
- Watson, Keith. He left the fight against the combats of Boadilla del Monte to work as a correspondent for the Daily Express newspaper.
- Whateley, Richard «Aussie». Melbourne sailor, repatriated in 1937<sup>123</sup>.

In December, the 14<sup>th</sup> IB, commanded by the Polish general «Walter» (Karol Swierzevski), left Albacete. It was made up of 4 battalions and in the 12<sup>th</sup>»La Marsellaise», the 1<sup>st</sup>Company was known as British Machine Gun Company and its 1<sup>st</sup>Platoon, called

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<sup>123</sup> BAXELL, Richard. British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War. Routledge. 2004.

«James Connolly», was made up of Irish and British. From 23 December to 28 December, fighting took place in the area of Lopera (Córdoba), leaving more than 800 bodies on the ground. The British volunteers stood out for their discipline but, of 145 fighters who went in line, 78 were killed and very few were left unharmed. Among the dead were the poet, John Cornford, who had just turned 21 and the novelist, Raph Winston Fox. French Lieutenant Colonel Gaston Delasalle, head of the «La Marsellaise» battalion, was tried and executed and George Samuel Montague Nathan, captain of the 1<sup>st</sup> Company was appointed Battalion Commander and Jock Cunningham, head of the 1<sup>st</sup> Company<sup>124</sup>. After fighting on the road to La Coruña in January, the British survivors were transferred to Albacete and integrated into the new British Battalion that was to be called «Saklatvala» after the Indian communist Shapurji Saklatvala who was a member of the British parliament but eventually kept his name «British Battalion» or simply «British». Its framing centre was established in Madrigueras and new recruits and those who had already been fighting in Spanish territory were sent there<sup>125</sup>.

The battalion was put under the command of Wilfred Mc Artney and assistant to the Irishman Alex Mc Dade. Sam Wild was responsible for the armoury. Among the volunteers there was a group from Ireland that did not fit in with the British, let alone accept the orders of Mc Artney who had been an officer of the «Black and Tans» in Ireland. The leader of the Irish Platoon «James Connolly» was Frank Ryan. At a meeting of commanders, there was a heated discussion and Frank Ryan was arrested. The Irish asked for his freedom and in these discussions, McArtney was accidentally injured and, after passing through the hospital, returned to England. His successor was Tom Wintringham and the dissenting Irish moved to the «Lincoln» battalion which included many Irish Americans who welcomed them without reservation<sup>126</sup>.

The «British» battalion was the 16<sup>th</sup> of the International Brigades and later, in September 1937, became the 57<sup>th</sup>. The «British» consisted of four companies numbered from 1 to 4, the 2<sup>nd</sup> company being for machine guns and the other three for rifles.

<sup>124</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>125</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>126</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Company formed with survivors of the 1<sup>st</sup> Company of the battalion «La Marseillaise», was commanded by Jock Cunningham. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Machine Gun was commanded by Harold Fry. The 3<sup>rd</sup> was commanded by the trade unionist, Bill Briskey, and the 4<sup>th</sup> by Bert Overton. At that time, it is estimated that there were 750 Britons in the ranks of the EPR<sup>127</sup> of whom 500 were in the British Battalion and the rest a group of 20 riders from the Cavalry Squadron of the Brigade, others in charge of the Cartographic Services of the 15<sup>th</sup> Brigade at the Madrigueras Base, and several hospitalised.

In the 15<sup>th</sup> Brigade, commanded by General «Gal» (Janos Galicz), the Englishman George Nathan took over the General Staff. The Political Commissar was George Aitken, while Dave Springhall was appointed Political Commissar of the British Battalion. With this organisation, the battle of Jarama began between 6 and 27 February 1937.

During the battle of Jarama, the «British» had the mission of preventing the advance of the troops of Colonel Carlos Asensio Cabanillas' 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade. The fighting began on 12 February and after a few days of hard fighting the British were virtually wiped out and reinforced with new recruits and commanders because when Jock Cunningham took over the battalion, only 160 men were left unharmed<sup>128</sup>. The positions of the Jarama were held for five months, and the front was stabilised for the rest of the war.

The prisoners taken by the nationals were sent to an internment camp and later expelled from Spain in May on the condition that they would not return to combat in the ranks of the Ejército Popular, since if they were taken prisoner again with their weapons in hand, they would be shot<sup>129</sup>.

Captains «Kit» Conway and Bill Briskey died in the struggle. The poet and novelist Christopher Caudwell, whose real name was Christopher St John Sprigg, died on 12 February covering the retreat of his fellow members of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Machine Gun Company. The death toll of the «British» battalion is estimated at 250 men out of a total of 600<sup>130</sup>.

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<sup>127</sup> EPR, acronym for People's Army of the Republic.

<sup>128</sup> GONZALEZ DE MIGUEL, Jesús. La batalla del Jarama. Ed. La esfera de los libros. Madrid. 2009.

<sup>129</sup> GONZALEZ DE MIGUEL, Jesús. La batalla del Jarama. Ed. La esfera de los libros. Madrid. 2009.

<sup>130</sup> GURNEY, Jason. Crusade in Spain. Faber & Faber. London. 1974.

GRAHAM, Frank. *The Battle of Jarama*. Self-published. Newcastle. 1987.

In July, the battle of Brunete took place, involving the 15<sup>th</sup> division under the command of General «Gal», who was deploying the 13<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> International Brigades. In the 15<sup>th</sup> IB they formed the «British» battalion and a company of anti-tank guns equipped with three Russian 45 mm pieces, commanded by the British Malcolm Dumbar, who had Hugh Slater as his second and, among the artillerymen, was Miles Tomalin. The «Spanish» battalion, also part of the 15<sup>th</sup> Brigade, was commanded by Captain Felipe Martín-Crespo Powys, whose mother was English.

On the 6, the battle began by deploying the «British» in front of Villanueva de la Cañada, and taking part in its encirclement which cost them 50 dead<sup>131</sup>. They then took up position in front of the «Mosquito» height and Fred Copeman, the commander of the «British» was injured on 15 July and was relieved by Joe Hinks.

On the 22, the British were ordered to defend a key position south of the bridgehead in the sector already called «Romanillos-Mosquito», a position they lost on the 23. On the 25 in the evening the 15<sup>th</sup> IB passed to the final reserve area established in the El Canchal estate. On the 26, Major George Montagne Nathan, who was head of the Ops Staff of the 15<sup>th</sup> Division<sup>132</sup>, was killed in an air raid.

The casualties of the British Battalion, now under Klaus' command, were tremendous and of the 300 British who started the battle only 42 men were available, the rest being counted as dead, wounded, prisoners or missing. Tapsell, Fred Copeman and Jock Cunningham returned to England to defend and clarify the political line of the «British». Cunningham was accused of being a fascist who left the BCP (British Communist Party) while the other

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GREGORY, Walter. *The shallow grave: A Memoir of the Spanish Civil War*. Ed. Victor Gollanz. 1986.

RYAN, Frank. *The Book of the XVth Brigade: Records of British, American, Canadian and Irish Volunteers in the XV International Brigade in Spain 1936-38*. War Commissariat. Madrid. 1938.

WINTRINGHAM, Tom. *English Captain*. Faber & Faber. London. 1939.

GONZALEZ DE MIGUEL, Jesús. *La batalla del Jarama*. Ed. La esfera de los libros. Madrid. 2009.

GARCIA RAMIREZ, José Manuel. *La batalla del Jarama*. Febrero 1937. Editorial Almena. Madrid. 2007.

PERMUY, Rafael R. – MORTERA, Artemio. *La Batalla del Jarama*. Quirón Ediciones. 2003

<sup>131</sup> BRADLEY, Ken. «The International Brigades in Spain, 1936-1939». Osprey. London. 1994.

<sup>132</sup> VIÑAS, Ernesto – TUYTENS, Sven. *Lugares de las Brigadas Internacionales en Madrid. Batalla de Brunete*. Edited by AABI and Brunete in the Report. Madrid. 2015.

two returned to Spain but were watched as suspects<sup>133</sup>. Among the British dead was the head of the 15<sup>th</sup> IB Medical Surgical Unit, the Jew Sollenberg, as well as Julian Bell, nephew of the novelist Virginia Wolf. Janos Galiçz «General Gal», head of the 15<sup>th</sup> Division was repatriated to the USSR where he disappeared in the purges of that year.

Brunete's consequences within the «British» battalion were not long in coming and many were sent to Albacete to be tried and, after diplomatic intervention by the Foreign Office which prevented their execution, they were sent to the Jucar re-education (concentration) camp.

When the journalist Edward H. Knoblauch was «invited» to leave Spain, he embarked on an English destroyer in the port of Valencia together with two deserters from the 15<sup>th</sup> IB, the Canadian Lawrence Muller and the Irish Tim Keenan from Dublin who had been facilitated in their escape by the English consul in Valencia Mr W.C. Sullivan<sup>134</sup>.

On 19 August, the «British» battalion was transferred to the Aragonese front to take part in the offensive against Zaragoza that was aimed at helping the Republican troops of Santander and Asturias. The 15<sup>th</sup> IB became part of the 35<sup>th</sup> International Division together with the 11<sup>th</sup> IB. The 15<sup>th</sup> IB was formed by the «British», «Lincoln-Washington», «Dimitrov», «Spanish» and «Galindo» battalions. The «British» was led by Peter Daley, an Irish communist who was assisted by Paddy O'Daire, and Jack Roberts as Political Commissar<sup>135</sup>. The 35<sup>th</sup> International Division had the mission of reaching Zaragoza by the south of the Ebro River. From the north it would attack the 45<sup>th</sup> International Division, which included the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> IBs and was commanded by Kebler in what would be its last action in Spain.

The general attack began on 24 August, the same date on which, in the north, the nationals entered Torrelavega and the ejército

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<sup>133</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>134</sup> VIÑAS, Ernesto - TUYTENS, Sven. *Lugares de las Brigadas Internacionales en Madrid. Batalla de Brunete*. Edited by AABI and Brunete in the Report. Madrid. 2015. BRADLEY, Ken. *The International Brigades in Spain, 1936-1939*. Osprey. London. 1994. CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>135</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

popular began the withdraw from Santander to Asturias<sup>136</sup>. The «British» battalion advanced towards Quinto. After the failed attack by the «Dimitrov» battalion on Mount Pulburell, the «British» took over and the Irish Peter Daley, head of the battalion, was killed in the crash. Political Commissar Jack Roberts was wounded and Paddy O'Daire took over command of the battalion. The Englishman Tom R. Wintringham was also injured. In the afternoon, the British carried their bayonets to the wire fences and the Anti-tank Company, now commanded by the British journalist Hugh Slater, fired directly at the machine gun forts that were destroyed. After the final assault, the last defenders fell, some of whom were White Russians enlisted in a Tercio de Requetés.

The 15<sup>th</sup> IB then went on to complete the conquest of Belchite which was completely surrounded. In the following days the «Dimitrov» and «Lincoln-Washington» battalions intervened, followed by the «British» and «Spanish» battalions. Also noteworthy is the AT Company<sup>137</sup> which, sent out again by Malcolm Dumber, fired 2,700 shots during those days, finally taking over the village on 5 September<sup>138</sup>.

There were reproaches from politicians towards the fighters and even «Lincoln's» chief Hans Amlie was tried for refusing to attack a Belchite position head-on. Other volunteers, American and Canadian, took over an ambulance and tried to cross the French border, but were stopped. Finally, Hans Amlie together with Stember and David McKelvey returned to the United States. The «British» withdrew from the final positions of Mediana to rejoin the «Lincoln-Washington» battalion in Azaila, which had been badly worn out from Brunete and had recovered its initial name of «Lincoln».

The 15<sup>th</sup> IB transferred its «Dimitrov» battalion to the 45<sup>th</sup> International Division and incorporated the «Mackenzie-Papinau» battalion created in May 1937 with personnel of American and Canadian origin and known as the «Mac-Paps» battalion and commanded by the veteran Robert Thompson. The casualties

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<sup>136</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España .Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>137</sup> AT, acronym for anti-tank.

<sup>138</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

suffered by the international battalions had to be replenished with Spanish recruits.

The fighting in Aragon continued in October in the area of Fuentes de Ebro with «Operation Moscow» involving the 12<sup>th</sup>, 13<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> IBs. The attack began on 11 October with artillery and aircraft bombardments and on the 13<sup>th</sup>, the «British» intervened. Like the other battalions of the 15<sup>th</sup> IB, they suffered serious losses. The commander Harold Fry dying, who had been taken prisoner at the head of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Machine Gun Company at Jarama, and the Political Commissar Eric Whaley were killed. «Operation Moscow» proved to be a complete failure as Soviet observers could see, some of whom were taken to the rear by crew members of the surviving tanks and were never heard from again<sup>139</sup>.

The next action of the «British» battalion was in Teruel, because although André Marty declared that the International Brigades were not going to intervene in the Teruel offensive, the reality is that since 15 December the 15<sup>th</sup> IB was already in the vicinity of the front<sup>140</sup>. Teruel was surrounded from almost the first days after the attack and surrendered on 8 January. The national troops were about to liberate the capital but the heavy snowfall on the last day of the year prevented this. To stop the national offensive, international troops were sent to the front, including the 15<sup>th</sup> IB.

They deployed their units in the northern zone of Teruel, supported by the Alfambra riverbed. On 18 January the British fought on the Santa Bárbara slopes, counterattacking on the Barranco del Rubio, commanded the battalion by William «Bill» Alexander and suffering 150 casualties, the same as the rest of the brigade's battalions. Sent to recover in the rear, after 24 hours it returned to the front, this time to the area of Vivel del Río Segura and where the leader of «British»<sup>141</sup> was injured.

After the reconquest of Teruel, on 9 March a new national offensive began in Aragon and the weight of it fell on the 11<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> IBs. The national manoeuvre was aimed at recovering the village of Belchite, lost in the previous September, and was taken that

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<sup>139</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>140</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>141</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

same day when Thomas Oldershaw, Political Commissar of the «British», died and 90 British people were the last to leave the village. From that moment on there was a general disbandment on the Aragon front of both Spanish and international troops. Merriman took over the 15<sup>th</sup> Brigade and used harsh methods to regain command, earning himself the nickname «Murderman». The retreat continued to Alcañiz and Caspe. The «British» was commanded by Sam Wild who was about to be taken prisoner in Caspe. The «British» managed to reach Corbera, past the town of Gandesa, where it was reorganised, with Sam Wild in command of the battalion and Willy Tapsell as Political Commissar. On the 30<sup>th</sup> it came under fire again, now commanded by George Fletcher, but in the early morning of the 31<sup>st</sup> it was destroyed by the enemy in Calaceite, with Tapsell dying, and Fletcher and Dumber, as assistant Ops Staff, becoming injured. One hundred Brits were killed and 50 more were injured, and 100 prisoners were taken, including Frank Ryan. Some sources point to even more prisoners<sup>142</sup>. The disaster was complete, and the international troops had no choice but to cross to the left bank of the Ebro, with Sam Wild's English being the last to do so. The consequences of the withdrawal were harsh disciplinary measures, and courts-martial with maximum sentences affected at least two British officers and a sergeant.

Following a further reorganisation, Malcolm Dumber became chief of staff of the 15<sup>th</sup> IB and John Gates Political Commissar. In July, the beginning of the Battle of the Ebro took place. The «British» crossed the Ebro at Ascó on 25 July and quickly advanced to Corbera, taking prisoners and capturing a group of 75 mm of the national artillery. The following day Gandesa was attacked but the national reserves held out and no further progress was made. Gandesa was dominated from the nearby heights by the forces of both sides. The «British» headed for Puig del Aguila, suffering the first British casualties. On the 29<sup>th</sup>, the British attacked again at the height 481 and finally reached this position on the August 1<sup>st</sup>. Among the dead were Lewis Clive, head of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Company and descendant of Lord Clive «Clive of India», as well as David Haden-Guest, son of Lord Haden-Guest.

On 6 August, the 15<sup>th</sup> IB moved to the reserve in Mora de Ebro until the 14<sup>th</sup> when it took over from the 11<sup>th</sup> Division of the EPR. On the 24<sup>th</sup>, the «British» took over from the «Lincoln» in the

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<sup>142</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

area of heights 666, 671 and 609 of the Sierra de Pàndols, later moving to the area of Venta de Camposines. On September 6<sup>th</sup>, the 35<sup>th</sup> International Division was placed among the 10<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> CE. The fighting took place in the low mountain ranges of La Vall de la Torre and Cavalls trying to cover the area of Venta de Camposines. On 22 September, the British suffered heavy losses due to the effects of adverse artillery<sup>143</sup>. On the 23, the «British» was fighting at height 281 despite the fact that the order to withdraw the international troops to the rear had been received the previous night. On the same day the 35<sup>th</sup> International Division, which included the «British» battalion, was replaced by the 46<sup>th</sup> Division.

The League of Nations appointed an «International Commission for the Retirement of Volunteers» constituted on 14 October. Their reports detail that the International Brigades, when demilitarised, were made up of Spaniards and foreigners and the foreigners were 7,102 plus 1,906 Portuguese and South Americans integrated into other units and 3,160 hospitalised, totalling 12,208 men who had already been removed from the front<sup>144</sup>. The 15<sup>th</sup> IB in which the components of the «British» battalion were integrated then had 478 foreigners in all its battalions, so we can assume that the British would not be more than 120 at that time.

In relation to the British in the IBs, and estimating a number of 3,500 volunteers, the casualties were 566 dead; 497 missing, prisoners and deserters; 1,236 recoverable wounded, and 494 unrecoverable wounded, and only 1,947 survivors were at the end of the war<sup>145</sup>. On 7 December, 304 survivors of the British battalion arrived in England, many of them recovered from the hospitals. In February, after the fall of Catalonia, the British volunteers of the «John Brown» artillery Battery, which was armed with 155 mm pieces, were evacuated from the fronts of Extremadura and Toledo. The battery was commanded by the American Arthur Timpson and the Political Commissar was Jack Waters, also American. The British formed a Platoon under the

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<sup>143</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>144</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

<sup>145</sup> CASTELLS, Andreu. *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España*. Ed. Ariel. 1974.

RUST, William. *Britons in Spain*. Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. London. 1939.

command of Sergeant David King and had no casualties in the war. The 27 volunteers evacuated were:

<b>NAME</b>	<b>PARTY</b>
David King	Communist Party
Allan Moulton	Communist Party
Jack Foster	Communist Party
Geoffrey Servante	Communist Party
Ernest Wilson	Communist Party
Harry Blackley	Communist Party
Patrick Gibson	Communist Party
George Dimitroff	Communist Party
Ernesto Barrato	Communist Party
Clarence Wildsmith	Communist Party
Charles Simpson	Communist Party
Frank King	Communist Party
John Edwards	Communist Party
Phil Goodman	Communist Party
Joe Latus	Communist Party
Hyman Adler	Communist Party
Samuel Segall	Communist Party
Richard Presman	Young Communists
Timothy Christie	no party
Edward Gallagher	Young Communists
John Walsh	Young Communists
William Rees	Young Communists
Lloyd Edmonds	Young Communists
Thomas Reid	Young Communists
Thomas Dickson	Young Communists
Walter Bevan	Young Communists
Frederick Langdon	Young Communists <sup>146</sup>

On 29 March, the English ship «Stanbrook» picked up 3,016 refugees in Alicante bound for Oran (Algeria) and on 30 March, the English cruise ship HMS «Galatea» evacuated 194 people from Gandía, including Colonel Casado and his family, and transferred

<sup>146</sup> BAXEL, Richard: «Entrevista a Geoffrey Servante», Revista No pasarán (IBMT, London), 1, 2018, p. 3.

them to the hospital ship «Maine» which took them to Marseilles where they disembarked on 3 April 1939<sup>147</sup>. On 1 April, the Spanish Civil War officially ended<sup>148</sup>.

## Annexes

### Annex 1

#### List of British merchant ships that took part in the war<sup>149</sup>

- «Abenton». Sunk in Barcelona
- «Aerscofin». Several trips to load ore in Bilbao until April 1937.
- «African Mariner». Seized in November 1937 by national ships and sent to Malta where it was released. Sunk in Barcelona by the Aviación Nacional. Refloated, it was named «Castillo de Montjuich».
- «African Trader». Detained by national trawlers and freed by English destroyers in Gijón on 27 August 1937. It then made several trips to the Mediterranean, including Alicante, and in March 1939 it transported refugees to Oran.
- «Alcira» or «Alcyra». Sunk by a Cant-Z seaplane on 4 February 1938 near Barcelona.
- «Arlon» or «Arlow». Sunk by planes in Valencia on 27 June 1938.
- «Atlantic Guide». A well-known smuggler's ship that entered Valencia on several occasions in 1938.
- «Authorpe». It entered Alicante in 1937 and its captain was arrested for admitting refugees on board.
- «Auton». It transported war material to Santander on 3 March 1937.

<sup>147</sup> SANTACREU SOLER, José Miguel. La huida imposible: El fracaso de las gestiones del Consejo Nacional de Defensa en marzo de 1939. Artículo Ebre38. 2011. The shipping list is in the archives of the «Pablo Iglesias» Foundation.

<sup>148</sup> Last official part Civil War 1939. Archivo General Militar de Avila. Featured pieces. <https://patrimoniocultural.defensa.gob.es/es/centros/archivo-general-avila/piezas-destacadas>.

<sup>149</sup> ALCOFAR NASSAES, José Luis. La marina italiana en la guerra de España. Editorial Euros. 1975.

- «Beatsa». It left Bilbao with ore on 2 August 1936.
- «Begonia». Detained by national ships in the Strait on 3 August 1936.
- «Black Hill». Several trips to Bilbao to transport ore. On 8 January 1937, it was hounded by the national trawler «Galerna» and was protected by an aeroplane.
- «Blackworth». It broke the blockade of Bilbao on 28 April 1937, entering again in May protected by English ships.
- «Blue Shadow». A private yacht that broke down and wanted to enter Gijón in August 1936. It received gunfire, its captain dying with his wife wounded, but it is not clear who fired.
- «Bonford». It denounced an attack by national planes on 29 August 1937 on its way from Barcelona to Piraeus.
- «Boston». Detained in the Mediterranean in August 1937 by national ships, it was released.
- «Bovie». It made several trips to Republican ports in the north under the command of French Captain Georges Dupuy. On 27 August 1937, it tried to evacuate militiamen from Santoña and was detained by the miner «Júpiter».
- «Bramhill». It landed war material in Alicante on October 2<sup>nd</sup> 1936 from Hamburg. It was declared a smuggler by Mr Eden. It landed throughout the war in Republican ports generally under the protection of «Royal Navy» ships such as the «Sussex» on 12 January 1937, on July 1937 by the «Resolution» and on 28 August 1938 by the «Fearless» and «Foresight» destroyers.
- «Brienkberu». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 13 April 1937.
- «British Corporal». British Tanker. Bombed near Algiers on 10 August 1937.
- «Burlington». Seized near Sicily on 9 September 1937. It was the Greek ship «Nausika» that had changed its name.
- «Camposines». Sunk by aviation in Alicante.
- «Candleston Castle». Detained by trawlers off Santander on 18 August 1937 and released after confiscation of the cargo.
- «Cantwoc». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 13 January 1937.

- «Caper» or «Cater». Detained on 8 August 1937 by the trawler «Tritonia» and released after confiscation of the cargo.
- «Cap Luis». Sunk by national aircraft on 29 August 1937.
- «Cap Vert». Detained by the trawler «Tritonia» in September 1937.
- «Cardonia». Detained by the cruiser «Almirante Cervera» in July 1937 near Santander, it was released by the battleship «Resolution».
- «Cermistoen». In Bilbao on 5 February 1937.
- «City of Manchester». It transported a large amount of war material from Germany to Lisbon in August 1936, and the order was justified as material for the Portuguese army.
- «Coresea». It left Bilbao with iron ore in August 1937.
- «Cousset». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 18 January 1937. On 27 April 1937, it attempted to enter Santander supported by the destroyer H-74 «Forester», avoiding the national battleship «España».
- «Cydonia». It brought food from Mexico.
- «Dellwyn». Known as the «Potato Jones», it broke the blockade of the northern ports helped by the British destroyers. It then went to the Mediterranean, being sunk by a plane near Gandia on 27 July 1938. Refloated after the war it was named «Castillo de Montesa».
- «Dover Abbey». It was the merchant with 100 names: «Dober Abbey», «Dober Abley», «Dowe Abbey», «Doner Abbey», «Dovena Bley», «Dobenabley» and «Dobenable». It was detained on several occasions but was always released both in the Cantabrian and in the Mediterranean.
- «Dun Aengus». It transported members of the Irish Bandera entering El Ferrol in January 1937.
- «Earnham». Sunk by aviation in Alicante.
- «Ebelester». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 28 August 1936.
- «Eckan». Seized in the Mediterranean with wheat loaded in Odessa, it was allowed to leave.

- «Eleni», former «Vernier» and former «Wireless». Sunk by the air force in Aguilas and refloated after the war with the name of «Castillo de Vera».
- «Endymion». Known smuggler ship sunk by the submarine «General Sanjurjo» 10 miles off Cabo Tiñoso.
- «English Tanker», former «Oil Field». Oil tanker sunk by aviation in Alicante. Refloated after the war with the name of «Castillo de Almenara» and later «Camposines».
- «Essex Druid». It transported a cargo of chickpeas from Mexico to a port in Republican Spain.
- «Etrib» or «Estrib». Seized in the Strait by the trawler «Huelva» on 31 December 1936.
- «Etruria». Oil tanker detained in the Mediterranean by the cruise ship «Baleares» in July 1937. It is not clear whether it continued its loaded journey to Barcelona.
- «Euphorlia». Seized in the Mediterranean on 17 November 1937 and sent to Gibraltar for registration.
- «Euprobion». Bombed in Barcelona on 16 May 1938, with the captain and first officer being injured. There is confusion as to whether it was the «Euphorlia» or whether it was really called «Euphorbia».
- «Farnham», former «Putney». Sunk by the aviation in Alicante and refloated after the war with the name «Castillo de Montiel».
- «Foynes», former «Island Queen». Sunk by the aviation in Valencia and refloated after the war with the name «Castillo de Riazor».
- «Francois», former Greek and standard bearer in England. Known smuggler vessel seized several times and released.
- «Gardonia». Detained by the cruiser «Almirante Cervera» off Santander and freed by two English destroyers.
- «Gate». Seized by the trawler «Tritonia» and taken to Ribadeo.
- «Gibel Zerjon». Ferry between Gibraltar and Morocco was detained several times by Republican ships and released by English destroyers. Curiously, it made several trips to Valencia, where it is recorded in September 1937.

- «Greah». Detained by the destroyer «Velasco» in the Bay of Biscay on 13 November 1936.
- «Greatend». Sunk by the aviation in Valencia and refloated after the war with the name «Turégano Castle».
- «Greatophe» «Greathorpe» or «Greatphe». Detained by the gunboat «Eduardo Dato» on 29 April 1937 and sent to Gibraltar for inspection.
- «Hanostelley». It loaded iron ore into Bilbao on 16 March 1937.
- «Hansterley» or «Hamsterley». It forced the blockade of Bilbao protected by the H-79 destroyer «Firedrake». It left again on 5 May 1937 and entered again on 6 July 1937, now protected by the battleship «Royal Oak».
- «Harra». Oil tanker that reported being attacked by torpedoes on the Port Said-La Goulette route on 8 August 1937 leaving unscathed.
- «Hemenge». It left Bilbao with ore on 27 March 1937.
- «Hertloa». It left Bilbao with ore on 9 March 1937.
- «Hillfern». It left Bilbao with ore on 11 August and 9 November 1936. From Malaga it evacuated refugees on 7 February 1937 to Alicante. In July 1937, it brought war material to Santander.
- «Isadora». Sunk by aircraft in Castellón and refloated after the war with the name «Castillo de Frías».
- «Jean Weems» or «Jean Wuns». It was sunk by aviation near Barcelona in November 1937 and transported trucks.
- «Jenni», former Greek, English flag bearer. It entered Santander on 6 April 1937 protected by the H-74 destroyer «Forester» and the cruiser «Shorpsire».
- «Joyce Lewelling» or «Levellin». It forced the blockade of Bilbao. Detained in the Strait by the coastguard «Arcila» on 4 May 1938 who subsequently let it go.
- «Kenfil Post». It entered Bilbao on 23 May 1937.
- «Knitsley» former «Thornhope». It tried to enter Santander on 30 April 1937 when the battleship «España» ran into a mine and sank. In the end it was able to enter Santander protected by the English destroyer H-76 «Fury».

- «Ladoga». Seized by national vessels.
- «Lake Lugano». Attacked by aircraft and sunk by the «Mar Negro».
- «Lalehan». It landed wheat in Alicante in March 1938.
- «Landobery Castle». Sunk after hitting a mine near Cape Creus in 1938.
- «Latham». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 8 August 1936.
- «Leoalgate». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 18 February 1937 and 16 March 1937.
- «Loake Luzano» or «Lake Luzano». Sunk in Palamós by airplane on 6 August 1938.
- «Loeck Drorer». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 11 August 1936.
- «Lucky» former «Locke». Sunk by aircraft in Valencia and re-floated after the war with the name «Castillo de Benisanó».
- «Llenorth». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 16 August 1936.
- «MacGregor». Journeys from Bilbao with iron ore in 1936. It broke the blockade of Bilbao on 25 April 1937, protected by the battleship «Hood» and the destroyer H-79 «Firedrake» which prevented its capture by the cruiser «Almirante Cervera» and the trawler «Galerna». Later, it made trips to the Mediterranean, one of them loaded with explosives from Bordeaux to Barcelona in April 1938.
- «Marie Lewelling». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 11 February 1937.
- «Marion Moller» or «Marie Moller» or «Hilna Moller». It left Santander with armed militiamen and was pursued by the auxiliary cruiser «Ciudad de Palma». It was protected and escorted by the destroyer H-61 «Express» to San Juan de Luz (France). Denounced, it was searched, and 35 soldiers and 5 militiamen were found on board.
- «Maritime». A ship belonging to a Republican-controlled shipping company. It took refugees out of Alicante on 28 March 1939.
- «Markling». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 24 February 1937.
- «Marvia». It left Bilbao with iron ore in April 1937. On the next trip on 9 May 1937, it was protected by English destros-

- yers. It then went into the Mediterranean, entering several ports and in Alicante it was bombarded by aircraft on 4 June 1937, with a stoker being killed. Most of the crew were Greek.
- «Medon». It coincided with the crossing of the victory convoy in the Strait on 5 August 1936, when it was overflown by aircraft.
  - «Menin Ridge». With a reputation as a smuggler, it was detained by the Bou trawler «Maria Teresa» in the strait and escorted to Gibraltar for inspection following its uneventful journey.
  - «Meztin». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 3 April 1937.
  - «Miocene» former «Eocene». Oil tanker. Sunk by aircraft in Barcelona and refloated after the war with the name «Castillo de Pedraza» and later «Campanero».
  - «Miorar». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 26 March 1937.
  - «Mirupano». Seized in August 1937 in the Mediterranean and released. Again seized in Gijón in September 1937 and freed by the destroyer H-77 «Boreas». A last seizure loaded with food that was confiscated leaving the ship free.
  - «Molton». Detained by the cruise ship «Almirante Cervera» off Santander on 4 July 1937 and sent to Bilbao being let go. Again, detained by the trawler «Galerna» in September 1937.
  - «Morna». It landed weapons in Santander on 13 March 1937.
  - «Mostyn». Several trips to Bilbao to load iron ore between January and March 1937.
  - «Nasanchall». Detained by the battleship «España», it was protected by the English destroyer H-43 which forced it to head for La Pallice (France).
  - «Noemi Julia». Bombed by aircraft near Corsica on 23 August 1937. It could have reached Port-Vendrés following Barcelona. The ship was flagged as English, but the crew was not and was carrying war material.
  - «Oakgrove» or «Oak Grove». It entered Santander in February and on April 25<sup>th</sup> 1937, protected by the English destroyer H-74 «Forester» and the cruiser «Shorpsire». It entered Bilbao on 20 May 1937.
  - «Olavus». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 12 April 1937.
  - «Oltinge» or «Otlinge». It was in Bilbao in August 1936.

- «Ortais». It transported potatoes to Alicante in September 1937.
- «Pacheco». Seized in the Strait by the gunboat «Cánovas del Castillo» on 1 March 1937.
- «Patridge Hill». Detained in the Strait by the auxiliary cruise ship «Mallorca» in January 1938. It was loaded with iron ingots and trucks and, taken for inspection to Gibraltar, was released and continued his journey to Barcelona.
- «Pegasus». Oil tanker that reported being chased by a submarine in September 1937.
- «Penthames». Sunk by aviation in Valencia.
- «Philomenia». Seized in December 1936 by the cruise ship «Canarias».
- «Plonarnaux», broke the blockade of Bilbao entering on 5 June 1937.
- «Portelet» or «Postelet». It entered Bilbao in April 1937, leaving on 4 May 1937 protected by the battleship «Royal Oak».
- «Rambon» or «Rarmond». It landed weapons in Santander on 27 January 1937.
- «Sairolo». Detained by the torpedo boat no. 7 in the Bay of Biscay in September 1937.
- «Sanmore». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 11 October 1936.
- «Sanston». Detained by the nationals and declared a prisoner, it changed its name to «Castillo de Campanario».
- «Sarusias». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 25 January 1937.
- «Scotic». It broke the blockade of Bilbao on 5 June 1937, protected by English ships.
- «Seabank Spray» or «Seabrank Spray». It transported a cargo of securities and titles to La Pallice (France), which was seized, together with the Spanish ship «Axpe Mendi», by the judge in La Rochelle, and was denounced by English, Spanish and Canadian banks. The captain opposed the embargo, stating that he had been chartered by the Basque government but was not attended to. It was sunk off Barcelona in 1938.
- «Seven Seas Spray». It broke the blockade of Bilbao on 19 April 1937 ordered by Captain Roberts. In August 1937, it

tried to evacuate the «gudaris» who had surrendered in Santoña, which the Italians prevented. Then it went to Santander and it seems that it left with militiamen and evacuees.

- «Sheafgarth». It broke the blockade of Bilbao on 26 April 1937 by transporting war material.
- «Sheatfield». It broke the blockade in Bilbao on 3 May 1937.
- «Skraane». It made several trips to Valencia. In one of them it was recognised by the cruise «Canarias» on 3 March 1938.
- «Solinge». It left Bilbao loaded with iron ore on 26 August 1936 and February 18<sup>th</sup> 1937.
- «Sollerton Rosa». It left Bilbao loaded with iron ore on 28 January 1937.
- «Springwear» or «Springgear». Detained by the national gunboats in the Strait, it was taken for inspection to Gibraltar and after 12 days was able to continue its journey.
- «Stanbrook». It broke the blockade of Bilbao in April 1937, protected by the H-79 destroyer «Firedrake». It evacuated 3,016 fugitives from Alicante on 29 March 1939.
- «Stanburgh». Sunk by an internal explosion in Sète (France) in November 1938.
- «Stancourt». It broke the blockade of Bilbao on 13 May 1937 protected by the battleship «Resolution». It evacuated refugees from Valencia in March 1939.
- «Stancroft» former «Greebatt». It entered Mediterranean ports several times. In one of them in Barcelona it was sunk by airplanes and refloated after the war with the name «Castillo de Almansa».
- «Standale». Sunk on the high seas on the way to Cartagena in May 1937.
- «Standing». Detained leaving Gijón on 21 August 1937, it was protected by the H-67 «Fearless» destroyer.
- «Standrove» or «Stan Rove» entered the port of Valencia in February 1939 protected by the English cruise ship «Sussex».
- «Standwell». Bombed in Tarragona by aircraft on 19 March 1938, killing several crew members and the Control Commission officer.

- «Stanword». It landed in Alicante 20,900 boxes of condensed milk in April 1938. On another trip to the same port, it took canned fish.
- «Stangate». Seized near Sagunto by the auxiliary cruise ship «Mar Negro» on 16 March 1938 despite intervention to prevent it by the cruise ship «Sussex».
- «Stangrove». Detained on 20 October 1937 near Gijón by the trawler «Juan Ignacio», it was released by the cruiser «Southampton». It carried Republican militiamen and pilots. Captured at Cap Creus on 23 February 1939 and taken to Palma de Mallorca.
- «Stanhill». It entered Gijón on 5 January 1937 without lights, boarding and sinking the oil tanker «J.M. Martínez».
- «Stanholm». Detained in the Straits and taken to Gibraltar for inspection on 23 March 1937 on charges of transshipping war material on the high seas to another vessel that had been photographed, but was nevertheless released by the Gibraltarian authorities.
- «Stanhopel». Seized in the Strait by the gunboat «Dato» loaded with explosives and taken to Gibraltar for inspection, it was allowed to continue its journey.
- «Stanhull». Detained in the Bay of Biscay by the armed tug «Galicia» in September 1937, it was allowed to leave.
- «Stesso». It forced the blockade of Bilbao on 25 April 1937 by unloading war material.
- «Strenver». English yacht that entered Alicante on 16 August 1936.
- «St Winifred». Sunk in Alicante by air raid on 6 June 1938.
- «Sunion». Former Greek, English flag bearer. Detained in the Strait on 18 January 1938 and taken to Gibraltar for inspection and released. Later sunk in Valencia by aviation.
- «Teagle» or «Tagle» or «Tacle» or «Tingue». Former «Jorge» of Panamanian flag sold to English shipping company. It landed planes in Bilbao in March 1937.
- «Tesar Palsaven». Sunk in Valencia by aviation.
- «Thorpehall». It transported war material from Alicante to Bilbao in March 1937. Detained by the cruiser «Almirante Cerve-

ra», it was released by the English destroyers H-80 «Brazen» and H-47 «Blanche». Sunk by plane in Valencia on 25 May 1938.

- «Thorpehaven». It made several trips to Valencia and Alicante. Sunk on the beach of Alicante by airplanes on 10 June 1938 and refloated after the war and named «Castillo de Guadalete».
- «Thorpeness». Sunk by plane in Valencia on 21 June 1938.
- «Thorston» or «Thurston» or «Thursten». It loaded war material into the USSR on 5 December 1936.
- «Ulmuss». Reached in the Strait by accidental naval fire on 18 January 1939 and taken to Barcelona for repair.
- «Valleta». Oil tanker without further identification that entered Gijón in August 1937.
- «Wardham». It tried to enter Santander protected by the destroyer H-75 «Decoy» and prevented by the battleship «España» and the destroyer «Velasco».
- «Warrior». It was actually the «Goizeko-Izarra» yacht owned by Ramón Sota y Llano and requisitioned by the Basque government. It transported refugees from Bilbao to France and was sold to an English shipping company that changed its name to «Warrior».
- «Werwood». Old English notice transformed into a yacht and bought by the Republic who called it «Remigio Verdía». Sunk by aviation in Cartagena.
- «Woodford». Known smuggler ship with a non-English crew. Sunk by an unknown submarine near Benicarló on 2 November 1937.
- «Worrand». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 13 January 1937.
- «Yorkbrook», former «Solo». One of the best known among smugglers. Artillery pieces landed in Bilbao on 9 November 1936. On 3 March 1937, it was detained by the cruiser «Canarias» but it fled when a fight broke out between the Basque Country trawlers and the national cruiser, entering the port of Bermeo. Seized on 8 October 1937 by national trawlers, it was taken to El Ferrol and released. It moved to the Mediterranean by entering Barcelona and Valencia. Sunk in Barcelona by air-

craft on 13 October 1938 and refloated after the war with the name «Castillo de Monteagudo».

- «Yorkhorch». It left Bilbao with iron ore on 12 March 1937. On one occasion it used an Estonian flag.

There were other ships of British origin, but they had been sold to shipping companies in other countries, thus operating under a flag other than the «Union Jack» and without being protected by the Royal Navy's ships.

The author of the list, José Luis Alcofar Nassaes, indicates in his book that the list is incomplete and encourages scholars to expand it for better general knowledge.

## Annex 2

### British merchant ships that were sunk by aircraft of the AS.88 «As de Picas» Group from The Legion Condor<sup>150</sup>

• « <i>Jean Weems</i> »	30-10-37	2,349 tonnes.
• « <i>Alcira</i> »	04-02-38	1,387 «
• « <i>Thorpehall</i> »	25-05-38	1,251 «
• « <i>Penthames</i> »	31-05-38	3,995 «
• « <i>Maryad</i> »	04-06-38	
• « <i>Thorpehaven</i> »	07-06-38	3,688 «
• « <i>English Tanker</i> »	07-06-38	6,170 «
• « <i>Gandía</i> »	07-06-38	316 «
• « <i>Isadora</i> »	09-06-38	1,324 «
• « <i>Thorpeness</i> »	21-06-38	4,798 «
• « <i>Sunion</i> »	22-06-38	3,054 «
• « <i>Dellwyn</i> »	26-07-38	1,451 «
• « <i>Lake Lugano</i> »	07-08-38	2,120 «
• « <i>Margaret Rose</i> »	07-11-38	
• <i>Lake Lugano</i>	07-08-38	2120 toneladas

<sup>150</sup> PERMUY, Rafael A. -O'DONNELL, César. As de Picas. Galland Books. 2008.

List of British warships involved in the Civil War<sup>151</sup>

- H-09 destroyer «Acasta». August 1936 in Alicante and control patrols since April 1937.
- H-40 destroyer «Anthony». July, August and September 1936 Strait. Control patrols.
- Cruise «Arethusa». Valencia and Palma in 1936. It towed the H-35 destroyer «Hunter» after hitting a mine. Control patrols. In Palma in March 1938.
- H-42 destroyer «Arrow». July, August and September 1936 Strait. Control patrols.
- H-11 destroyer «Basilisk». Protection of Mediterranean traffic. Torpedoed by an unknown submarine that did not reach him on 5 October 1937.
- H-30 destroyer «Beagle». In Tangier in July 1936. In Alicante on 16 August 16<sup>th</sup> 1936. Control patrol since April 1937.
- H-47 destroyer «Blanche». Bilbao, April 1937. Surveillance of Mediterranean routes. Castaway aid «Balearic Islands».
- H-65 destroyer «Boadicea». Cantabrian 1937. Naval control patrol.
- H-77 destroyer «Boreas». Cantabrian 1937. Surveillance of the Mediterranean routes at the end of 1937. Castaway aid «Balearic Islands» cruise.
- H-80 destroyer «Brazen». Cantabrian since April 1937 as a naval patrol and protection of English merchant ships such as the «Thorpehall».
- H-84 destroyer «Brilliant». Naval traffic surveillance.
- D-65 destroyer «Codrington». It operated in the Strait from Gibraltar in 1936.
- H-00 destroyer «Comet». Cantabrian 1937. Naval control patrol.
- H-53 destroyer «Dainty». In Alicante on 22 August 1936. Naval patrol.

<sup>151</sup> ALCOFAR NASSAES, José Luis. La marina italiana en la guerra de España. Editorial Euros. 1975.

- H-16 destroyer «Daring». In Alicante on 27 July 1936.
- H-75 destroyer «Decoy». Cantabrian 1937. Naval control patrol.
- Cruise «Devonshire». It operated in the Mediterranean. In February 1939 it intervened in the surrender of Minorca by evacuating the surrenders.
- H-66 destroyer «Escort». Cantabrian 1937. Naval control patrol.
- H-15 destroyer «Esk». Cantabrian 1937. Naval control patrol.
- H-61 destroyer «Express». Cantabrian 1937. Naval control patrol.
- H-67 destroyer «Fearless». Cantabrian 1937. Naval control patrol. Anchored at El Musel (Gijón) in August 1937.
- H-79 destroyer «Firedrake». Cantabrian April 1937 as a naval patrol and protection of English merchant ships such as the «MacGregor», «Stambrook» and «Hamsterley». Mediterranean since September 1937.
- H-74 destroyer «Forester». Cantabrian April 1937 as a naval patrol and protection of English merchant ships such as the «Oak Grave», «Cousset» and others. Mediterranean since September 1937.
- H-70 destroyer «Fortune». Mediterranean 1937. Protection of routes treated Nyon.
- H-69 destroyer «Foxhound». In the Bay of Biscay in 1937.
- H-76 destroyer «Fury». Alicante January 1937. Naval patrol since April 1937.
- Cruise «Galatea». In Tangier in July 1936. It entered Alicante, Valencia and Barcelona several times. In Palma in 1938. On 30 March 1939, collected 194 escapees in Gandía, among others, Colonel Casado. A total of 170 men, 20 women and 4 children were evacuated with the help of the cruise ship «Sussex», which landed a company of Marines to cover the evacuation. It then transhipped the escapees to the hospital ship «Maine» which finally landed them in Marseille.
- H-37 destroyer «Garland». In Alicante on 8 August 1936.
- H-92 destroyer «Glowworm». In Cartagena in November 1936 when the cruise ship «Miguel de Cervantes» was torpedoed.

- H-31 destroyer «Griffin». In Alicante on 29 August 1936, and then in Valencia.
- H-87 destroyer «Hardy». It operated in the Mediterranean. It was in Palma during the government air raid of May 1937.
- H-43 destroyer «Havock». It operated in the Mediterranean. It was torpedoed on 31 August 1937 in the Gulf of Valencia, throwing depth charges but losing contact with the attacker.
- H-93 destroyer «Hereward». It operated in the Mediterranean in 1937. It came to the aid of the «Havock».
- H-24 destroyer «Hasty». It operated in the Mediterranean in 1937. It came to the aid of the «Havock».
- Battleship «Hood». It operated in the Bay of Biscay protecting English merchants. It had an incident with the cruise ship «Almirante Cervera».
- H-35 destroyer «Hotspur». It operated in the Mediterranean. It intervened in the surrender of Minorca by evacuating the surrenders in Mahon.
- H-35 destroyer «Hunter». It operated in the Mediterranean. It suffered serious damage and casualties after hitting a mine near Almeria on 3 May 1937 and was towed to Gibraltar by the «Arethusa».
- H-97 destroyer «Hyperion». It operated in the Mediterranean in 1937. It came to the aid of the «Havock».
- D-18 destroyer «Kempelfelt». Protection of Mediterranean shipping routes in 1937. It collected 270 survivors from the «Balears» cruise to Palma de Mallorca.
- «Maine». Hospital ship that evacuated English subjects in Alicante in August 1936. It evacuated refugees in Gandia in March 1939.
- Battleship «Malaya». It anchored in Palma de Mallorca in 1938.
- Battleship «Nelson». In Valencia in 1937.
- Cruise «Penelope». It operated in the Mediterranean, often docking in Palma where it produced some incident. It assisted the cruise ship «Balears».
- Battleship «Queen Elizabeth». Admiral's ship of the Mediterranean Fleet based in Gibraltar.

- Battleship «Repulse». In Gibraltar in 1936.
- Battleship «Resolution». It operated in the Bay of Biscay in 1937, protecting the English merchant traffic.
- Battleship «Royal Oak». It was hit by a government shell near Valencia on 23 February 1937. It then moved to the Bay of Biscay, protecting English merchants and helping the Spanish «Habana» and Goizeko Izarra» in May 1937. In Palma de Mallorca in February and March 1938.
- Cruise «Shropshire», operated in the Bay of Biscay in 1937 protecting English merchants having an incident with the cruise ship «Almirante Cervera» on 25 April 1937.
- Cruise «Southampton». It operated in the Bay of Biscay in 1937.
- Cruise «Sussex». It operated in the Bay of Biscay protecting English merchants by having an incident with the destroyer «Velasco» which had detained the merchant ship «Bramhill» on 12 January 1937. It went to the Mediterranean at the end of 1937 and embarked refugees in Gandía on 30 March 1939 with the cruise ship «Galatea».
- Battleship «Valiant». In Palma de Mallorca in December 1936.
- D-53 destroyer «Venetia». It entered Alicante on 29 August 1936.
- D-94 destroyer «Whitehall». Sent to Tangier in August 1936.
- D-98 destroyer «Wolsey». It operated in the Strait from Gibraltar and protected the ferry «Gibel Zerjon» which was on the Gibraltar-Morocco route and was attacked by government vessels.

#### Annex 4

British shipping companies that maintained traffic on behalf of the Republican government<sup>152</sup>

- «Angel Son & Co. Ltd.». Cardiff (Wales). It belonged to the Spanish government after being bought by Republican agents.

<sup>152</sup> ALCOFAR NASSAES, José Luis. La marina italiana en la guerra de España. Editorial Euros. 1975.

CERVERA VALDERRAMA, Juan. Memorias de guerra. Editora Nacional. 1968.

- «Atlantic Shipping». London. It belonged to the Spanish government after being bought by Republican agents.
- «Bay of Biscay Shipping». London. Used to register as English a dozen ships of a Bilbao shipping company.
- «Bethell P. Co.». Cardiff.
- «Billmier JA. Co.». Cardiff.
- «Cardigan Shipping Co. Ltd.». Cardiff
- «Crosby Son Co. Ltd.». West Hartlepool.
- «Currie James Co.». Leight
- «Dalgliesh R.S. Ltd.». Newcastle.
- «E.R. Management Co. Ltd.». London.
- «Gow Harrison Co.». Glasgow
- «Hull Netherland Steam Ship Co. Ltd.». Hull
- «John Bull Meyer». Tyneside. The main Republican shipping company that chartered ships or flagged them to other nationalities.
- «Johnes Frederick Co.». Cardiff
- «Loteo Shipping Co. Ltd.». London
- «Mac Andrews Co. Ltd.». London
- «Mediterranean S.S. Co. Ltd.». London
- «Mid Atlantic Company». London. It acquired the transport ship «Maritima» with Republican money.
- «Murell Jos E. Sons». Hartlepool.
- «Newbigib Ltd. E.R.» Newcastle.
- «Nunting Son Ltd.». Newcastle.
- «Ohlson Sir Erick Bart». Hull.
- «Rapp Arthur A.». London.
- «Richley Halvorsen Sample». Newcastle.
- «Robinson Sons». North Shielde.
- «Rodney S.S. Co. Ltd.». Newcastle
- «Shipping Cool Co. Ltd.». London.

- «Siejo Sea Fishing Ice Co. Ltd.». (There is no central office).
- «Souter W.A. Co.». Newcastle.
- «Stanhope Steamships Ltd.». Shipping company controlled by the Republican government as majority shareholder.
- «Stone Rolfe Ltd.». Llanelly
- «Turnbull Scott Co.». London
- «Walton W. G.». London
- «Westeliff Shipping Co. Ltd.». London although it was a company founded by Greeks to flag their ships as English.
- «Whimster Co.» Glasgow.



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