340 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 2 / 2013 continuous flow of Islamist militants from the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.14 Following the military defeat of the Taliban regime, thousands of its fighters crossed the Pakistani border and found refuge in the tribal areas of the country. Over the years, these regions have become a real sanctuary for the Taliban forces who engage in combat against NATO and US forces on the other side of the border. The existence of this safe zone for the Taliban poses a serious threat to the stabilisation of Afghanistan.15 The US administration itself recognised the link between the Afghan conflict and Pakistan when Richard Holbrooke, US Special Envoy for both countries, introduced new Af-Pak policy in 2008. In recent years, the US, India and Afghanistan have levied accusations that Pakistan’s secret services, the ISI, are behind various terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, in particular those against Indian interests. Examples of such attacks include the repeated attacks against the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008, 2009 and 2010 or those against its consulates in Kandahar in 2006 and in Jalalabad in 2007. Furthermore, Afghan leaders frequently accuse the ISI of aiding attacks against Afghan security forces and of providing cover for Taliban leaders to operate from Pakistani territory.16 Although General Musharraf ’s government did indeed pursue Al Qaeda members on Pakistani soil and launched military operations against the Pakistani Taliban, it seems that it did little to combat Afghan Taliban members who had found refuge in its territory. The Afghan government under Hamid Karzai is perceived as weak and corrupt in Islamabad and it is believed that it stands little chance of surviving once international support disappears. On the other hand, a growing Indian presence in Afghanistan could have led Islamabad to maintain relations with the Taliban as a way of exerting its influence over an Afghanistan that might be too close to India in the future.17 In this regard, the Taliban continue to represent an additional tool for Pakistan as part of its efforts to secure “strategic depth”. The Pakistani elite who, if one analyses those who define foreign policy, are primarily from the military, consider Afghanistan to be an extension of and another battlefield for their long-running conflict with India. Efforts taken to improve relations between the governments of Pervez Musharraf and Hamid Karzai proved to be more symbolic than practical. The US and Turkey 14 KRONSTADT, K. Alan, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service, CRS Re-port for Congress RL 33498, February 2009, p. 34. 15 GRARE, Frédéric, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations Post-9/11 Era”, Carnegie Endowment for In-ternational Peace, Carnegie Papers no. 72, October 2006, p. 5 16 FAIR, C. Christine, HOWENSTEIN, Nicholas, THEIR, J. Alexander, “Trouble on the Pakistan- Afghanistan Border”, United States Institute for Peace, Briefing, December 2006. 17 SINNO, Abdulkader H. and RAIS, Rasul Bakhsh, 2008, p. 18.
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