348 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 2 / 2013 conclusion as the US and have decided that this war cannot be won. Another possibility is that they are using the offer of talks as a way to buy time and ease the military pressure on their forces so that they are in a position to fight against Afghan government troops from 2014 onwards. Both of these scenarios are feasible if one considers that the Taliban movement, far from being a monolithic organisation, may consist of different groups with varying interests. At least three different schools of thought may be identified within the Taliban movement40. There are those who believe that it would be difficult to impose a regime based on Islamic law across the whole of Afghanistan and who fear that civil war could break out after the withdrawal of NATO troops. These more pragmatic elements might be more favourable to peace talks that would give them a certain level of international recognition and a role in a future Afghan government. There are also those who basically see the negotiations as a way in which to conserve their strength and consolidate their power in the south of the country and, finally, those who want nothing to do with negotiations and see themselves as part of a global jihad movement. These would primarily be the new generations of Taliban fighters from refugee camps in Pakistan who have adopted part of the discourse and ideology of Al Qaeda. Even though Mullah Omar remains the indisputable leader of the movement, and it is conceivable that all Taliban groups abided by his orders, he himself has not clearly spoken out either in favour or against talks. His speeches are characterised by marked ambiguity seemingly aimed at keeping all ideological undercurrents happy.41 On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the Taliban’s track record in diplomatic negotiations. During their rise to power in the 1990s, there were many examples of negotiation that the Taliban deemed to be an additional way of achieving their mili-tary objectives.42 On many occasions, steps made towards negotiations concealed military operations or were simply attempts to buy time in moments of weakness. Proposed prisoner exchanges were habitually used as confidence-building measures. Maybe the most blatant case of Taliban betrayal took place in 1995 when a recently concluded alliance with the Hazara militia (Shia), who had been victimised at the hands of Ahmed Shah Massoud’s troops in districts of Kabul, was dismissed by the Taliban after they had occupied Hazara positions and captured their heavy weaponry.43 40 BARRETT, Richard. “Talking to the Taliban”, Foreign Policy, 20 August 2012. 41 Mullah Omar’s speeches can be found on the official site of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: http://shahamat.info/ 42 SEMPLE, Michael. “Talking to the Taliban”, Foreign Policy, 10 January 2013. 43 An event that will forever mark the enmity between the Taliban and the Afghan Shia was the death of the Hazara leader Abdul Mali Mazari whilst in the custody of the Taliban, RASHID, Ahmed, Taliban. Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001, p. 35.
REVISTA IEEE 2
To see the actual publication please follow the link above