350 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 2 / 2013 hing honest diplomatic relations that would reinforce mutual trust with the government in Kabul. This, however, would preclude the control that Pakistani authorities seem to seek in their relations with Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, Pakistani authorities have raised serious doubts as to the legitimacy of the Afghan government and its chance of survival. A halfway house solution would include Taliban participation in any government formed from 2014 onwards. This would supposedly afford Pakistan a certain degree of influence in Afghan affairs that could be deemed satisfactory. The internal conflict that Pakistan endures with its own local Taliban movement should not be forgotten. A situation could arise where if Afghanistan were to once again to come under Taliban control, the country could in that case become a safe haven for their Pakistani brethren. This is clearly not an option that would please the Pakistani authorities, who may plump for reconciliation with the government in Kabul, while in turn pushing for Taliban inclusion therein. Hitherto, Pakistan has made it clear that it intends for any negotiation attempts to pass through its hands and that it has the means at its disposal to at least make negotiations a great deal more complicated. Be that as it may, this option assumes that Pakistan has clout and control over a Taliban movement that is tricky to determine with certainty. The relationship between the Taliban and Islamabad has never been a particularly comfortable one, not even in the nineties. Since relocating to Pakistan in 2001, the Taliban leadership has made itself more vulnerable to Pakistani pressure, something that may displease the higher levels of the movement. On the other hand, Taliban willingness to negotiate should not be taken as a given, in spite of their participation in the ongoing peace process in Qatar. As observed, the Taliban have not shown themselves to be extremely gifted in the arts of diplomacy over their 19-year history, their talent for deception in furtherance of their objectives notwithstanding. The possible internal divisions within the Taliban movement are another factor that will carry weight when talks are considered. In this case, it would probably be hard to identify the interlocutor. Finally, it is conceivable that Western diplomacy is not particularly prepared, in spite of many years of ties with Afghanistan in the eighties and in the last decade, to deal with Taliban “diplomacy”. Perhaps it would be more practical to make certain that any negotiations that do take place remain wholly in the hands of the Afghans. If, as clearly seems to be the case, Pakistan is the regional element that may offer the greatest potential for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, the parties involved must do their utmost to get the country on board. This would entail a series on guarantees, in particular one to practically expel India from Afghanistan, which the international community may be loath to propose. Pakistan might draw on its ability to stir up trouble in Afghanistan -in fact, it could be said that it is already doing so- in a similar vein to North Korea’s usual policy
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