375 Felipe Santos Rodríguez Strategic communication in modern conflicts : Afganistan the U.S. forces against the Afghan people. In August 2002, the public became aware of the killing of Taliban prisoners at Sheberghan. During late 2002 and throughout the year 2003, the focus turns to Iraq. The U.S. government then terminates the military phase in Afghanistan and opens a new phase of “stabilization and reconstruction” that receives the backing and the approval of the Afghan constitution in January 2004. In all that time, Afghanistan seemed to be on the right road. It finds itself with the problem, of the Iraqi postwar which begins to give the U.S. administration headaches. Things start to go wrong in 2005; the U.S. incurred its greatest amount of casualties since the operations began in 2001. The attacks of the insurgents continued to rise and this undermined the credibility of the Americans once again for one could perceive mutual mistrust between the Afghan president Karzai and U.S. forces. The Afghan President was concerned about allegations of ill treatment and torture inflicted by American soldiers. The United States on the other hand was bothered by Karzai’s lack of progress in the confrontation with the Afghan Security Force. In 2006 the situation worsens alarmingly. The U.S. military contingent continues to lose its credibility. In May that year the loudest mass protests occurred in the center of Kabul by the way the situation was being handled in the postwar. Afghans protested on how slow it was to receive aid and as well as how slow the improvement in services was being implemented. They also protest against the arrogance of the American soldiers. Nor is it a coincidence that shortly after in July, five multiply suicide attacks and IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) blasts had doubled. On the 3rd of August the most serious attack was produced against a NATO convoy, killing 21 civilians. The delicate situation had an impact on NATO members; within the heart of the organization there was some division on the aim of the mission and what countries were in a position to do achieve its aim. The caveats became more monolithic and in November the Afghan government announced that by 2008 it should be ready to assume its security tasks. It is the first time it imposed a deadline on itself. For the Afghan people it is a sign that the international troops do not intend to stay. The members of the coalition are assuring their respective publics that their troops will leave Afghanistan and that they will be returning home. The insurgents take note of the announcement and they assume that actually the condition of the Afghan forces to take over their security in 2008 is in its worst possible moment to meet this objective. So much so that this year will be considered the most violent one since 2001, despite the fact that the Bush administration increased its number of troops in 2007. In addition to this on August, a new aerial error was produced by United States. This consolidated the anti-American sentiment of the Afghan population. In 2007 there were 56 suicide attacks in Pakistan, in comparison to the six that occurred the previous year. The Taliban concentrated their actions in the south to such an extent that Admiral William Fallon, the commander of U.S. Central
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