378 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 2 / 2013 Afghan government. It has governors in all the provinces. It promises order and security in contrast to corrupt officials, international forces and criminals. It substitutes them when the population is unhappy. It maintains the Islamic law, Sharia that judges as its fundamental law appears. They present themselves as the protector of the Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign invasion. Altogether it “provides the essential elements of government, nation and a religious nature.” The major insurgent groups surpass the Afghan government and the ISAF in operations that deal with information. These operations also work in order to relate to their cultural and religious nature. They have carefully analyzed their audience and target products. They use their Pashtun identity, physical proximity to the people, spreading violent intimidation and solid instant messages with which the ISAF and the Afghan government are incapable to compete against. They achieve their advantage by projecting the inevitability of their victory, which is a key source of their strength.53 The insurgents get their narratives through various different sources. Tens of thou-sands of videotapes and DVDs have been produced by Omat Productions y Manbaul- Jihad, the Taliban audiovisuals, and placed into circulation for just a few pennies in Pakistan and Afghanistan bazaars. The Al-Qaida producer, Al-Sahab Media Foun-dation, released 89 messages in 2007, at the rate of one message every three days, doubling those issued in the previous year.54 Each and every audience receives the appropriate account in the most suitable storage medium, depending on a centralized communication strategy. The objective is to convey to these audiences that foreign forces “cannot cope with them, will end up losing control and will eventually leave”. It is always an emotional message, which seeks to draw out the frustration that the people are undergoing, “their humiliations, the xenophobia against them, denouncing corruption that exists, the immorality and lack of power of the local authorities and magnifying the civilian casualties “.55 To Mark Laity, Director of Strategic Communications at NATO SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), the insurgent forces have it easier to communi-cate because they have a strongly negative message, easier to explain, and which has a more immediate impact. “For them, information is their main effort, whilst for us it is a support task.” They know that a successful information campaign is inherent to their success. They have one message that is the same for everyone. That has virtually been unchanged over the years. NATO on the other hand is an organization comprising of 53 NATO ISAF COMMANDER, Comisaf ’s Initial Assessment. 30th of August , p. 2.7. 54 RASHID, A. Descent into chaos: the US and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking Penguin, 2008, p. 398. 55 ARTEAGA, F. “Terrorismo, contrainsurgencia y opinión pública”, en JORDÁN, J., POZO, P. y GUINDO, M.G. (coords.) Terrorismo sin fronteras. Actores escenarios y respuestas en un mundo global. Cizur Menor: Aranzadi Thomson Reuters, 2010, p. 216.
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