428 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 2 / 2013 sometimes very tenuous, it is premature to say whether we are seeing a fundamental change in U.S. global strategy or simply an analysis of scenarios. In any event, the arms and logistics needs identified by these analyses far exceed the current capacity of the US forces deployed in the area. The ASB concept is an update of the ALB (Air Land Battle) concept, which was developed for the Central European Theatre of Operations in the 1970s. In this case, the general objective is to counter anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)-type strategies, although it is plain to everyone that it encompasses the strategic and tactical thinking of the People’s Liberation Army of China. The A2/AD strategy is defined by the Department of Defense (2013) as those actions and capabilities designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area (anti-access), or limit an opposing force’s freedom of action within an operational area (area denial). This entails a radical conceptual shift in the way forces deployed by the USA have been operating for the past fifty years. In general, they had at their disposal secure land bases and free access to territorial waters in conflict zones from which to acclimatise the deployed troops and prepare the targets safety. The A2/AD strategy would prevent a deployment of these characteristics, with the peculiarity that there are no secure bases in the Western Pacific Theatre of Operations and that the operation would have to be carried out jointly by the Navy and the Air force. Conceptually, the aim of ASB is to ensure that U.S. forces have freedom of action within the Western Pacific Theatre of Operations.5 The costs of actually adopting this strategy are impossible to assess at this point in time, among other reasons, because the forecasts of the Department of Defense are classified documents (2013). However, the paper by van Tol et alia (2010) details some of the operational requirements of this deployment, thus giving us an idea of the size of the budget that the federal government would need, in addition to improving the efficient use of navy and air force resources through greater coordination and the avoidance of duplication. Two types of actions, with very different time horizons and budgetary implications, would have to be undertaken. In the short term, the most immediate course of action would be to improve U.S. military facilities within the range of Chinese systems, and to build up all types of supplies at the Navy bases and units deployed in the area. The budgetary impact of such measures, while high, is acceptable even in the current climate, however the measures are not sufficient to counter A2/AD effectively. For this, new weapons systems would need to be developed, and the weapons are not expected to be available before the mid-2020s6. We are 5 The conceptual basis of these analyses have also been contested in the USA. Amitai Etzioni draws the attention of the U.S. public to these preparations in “Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?”. The objective of the work is to demonstrate that the Pentagon has begun preparations for this scenario without having had enough coverage in the media or the House and Senate. 6 Van Tol, J., et alia (2010) AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, CSBA, http:// www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/ page 114.
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