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469 Cesáreo Gutiérrez Espada Autonomous weapons systems, drones and international law be noted that the matter also brings another complex issue into the arena, namely if the United States justifies the use of drones based on the understanding that armed conflict exists with Al Qaeda, to what extent can a CIA agent who makes the decision to launch a drone strike (or who even controls the device) and who holds no position in the military chain of command be considered a combatant? Without a doubt, the opaqueness of CIA activities involving the deployment of drones and the difficulties that this presents when holding parties accountable is another issue that must be addressed sooner or later. Another problem is that, if carried out without the consent of the state in question, the deployment of these weapons constitutes a violation of territorial sovereignty of their airspace. In the case of Pakistan, it is not one hundred percent clear if its government accepts these practices, although it does condemn and contest them in certain circumstances (for example, General Kayani, its Chief of Army Staff in reference to the attack of 17 March 2011 where the majority of deaths were of civilians)79. As for Yemen, despite the fact that some believe that the Yemeni government rejects these attacks outright80, the real position of its authorities does not seem quite clear either81. All of the above confirms the view, as far as the authors are concerned, of the Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Ben Emmerson, when he argues that drones and their use constitutes a “real challenge to the framework of established international law” and that the international community should be: “focussing attention on the standards applicable to this technological development, particularly its deployment in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency initiatives, and attempt to reach a consensus on the legality of its use, and the standards and safeguards which should apply to it.”82 to the US government as an ally of the country, the British government became an accomplice of these acts. It was rejected at first instance but is pending appeal. 79  Vid. ad ex. HUFFINGTON, Arianna: “‘Signature Strikes’ and the President’s Empty Rhetoric on Drones”, http://www.huffington.post.es (Spanish version accessed Wednesday 11 September 2013); “Los ataques de los drones de Estados Unidos violan la soberanía pakistaní” (www.europapress.es; accessed 11 September 2013). 80  “La situation yéménite semble diferente, les propos officiels attestent non pas seulement d’une détestation des ataques ciblées mais de leur refus catégorique” The Yemeni situation seems to be different, official statements bear witness not only to abhorrence at targeted attacks but also to their categorical rejection. (QUELHAS, Daniela: “La doctrine des Etats-Unis en matière d’emploi des drones de combat et son évolution récente”, Sentinelle, bulletin no. 351, 9 June 2013, pp. 1-22, p. 16 (www.sentinelle-droit-international-fr.; accessed Wednesday 11 September 2013). 81  Vid. JORDÁN, J.: “La campaña de ataques con drones en Yemen”, Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE Journal), no. 1, 2013, pp. 1-23 (www.ieee.es; accessed Wednesday 11 September 2013). 82  EMMERSON, Ben: Statement by Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism


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