492 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 2 / 2013 The proposals on mandates and authorization put forward in the Brahimi Report are clear: wide-ranging and robust mandates. Nevertheless, such recommendations are broached with greater prudence in the documents that followed and, in fact, some authors have criticised precisely the secrecy surrounding its recommendations in its subsequent interpretation. In this context, Kofi Annan’s clarification is significant in a later report in which he points out that the recommendation of the use of force and robust mandates should not be interpreted as a tendency “to turn the United Nations into a war-fighting machine or fundamentally alter the principles according to which peacekeepers use force” and concludes that the “use of force must always be seen as a measure of last resort”38. For its part, Capstone Doctrine comes up with a more practical than legal evaluation of the principle of the use of force and the UN peacekeeping operations of Chapter VII. It broaches the question from the perspective of the consequences in terms of political and practical order on the peace process. The criteria employed in judging the use or non-use of armed force are practical and strategic rather than legal and this is demonstrated when the doctrine establishes that a combination of factors have to be considered including mission capability, humanitarian impact, the safety and security of personnel, the effect of their activities on the consent of the main parties and the effect that such action will have on the local consent for the mission. The Special Committee’s work in updating and publishing documents on peacekeeping operations from 2004 right up to the most recent reports has maintained a prudent, conservative stance concerning peace operations. The Committee stresses the impor-tance of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, the political Independence of states, non-intervention, consent of the main parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in legitimate defense,39, without referring to enforcement. This caution is in response to the fact that not all states participating in the Committee are prepared to take on board a theory of UN peacekeeping under Chapter VII of the Charter, although in practice neither do they oppose its establishment and deployment. In spite of their growing importance in contemporary international practice, it is true to say that, especially from a legal perspective, the Chapter VII peacekeeping & responses, Center of International Cooperation, New York, External study commissioned by the Best Practice Unit, DPKO, 2003, pp. 1-34; BOULDEN, J., “UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Cold War Era :Trends and Challenges”, International Forum 187, XLVII, nº 1, 2007, pp. 36–52.; INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE, “Peace Operations, Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity”, IPI Blue Paper, nº 9, New York, 2009, pp. 1-72; AGUIRRE, M., Presente y futuro de las Operations de Paz, FRIDE, June 2007, pp. 1-73. 38 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations, A/55/502, par. 7.e 39 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2004 substantive session, New York, 29 March – 16 April, A/58/19, par. 35-36.
REVISTA IEEE 2
To see the actual publication please follow the link above