390 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 4 / 2014 The document stated the need for undertaking an ambitious process of transformation that would exploit the technological advances of the RMA (the document makes explicit reference to the C4ISTAR systems, intelligent armaments, unmanned systems, the integration of platforms and the interconnection of networks) to accommodate the strategy, facilities and capabilities of the Navy to deal with present and emerging threats. This would guarantee the fulfilment of its traditional obligations (control of the sea, projection of power, deterrence, strategic deployment and forward deployment presence) and would reinforce its absolute control of the oceans and the rapid and decisive projection of naval power further inland. To achieve this objective, the white paper proposed working in three large areas: • Sea Strike, defined as the capacity to project persistent offensive power in a flexible, precise, decisive manner and with full autonomy for the utilisation of lethal and non-lethal means. • Sea Shield, understood as the capacity to provide full protection –especially anti- aircraft and anti-missile coverage– both to troops deployed abroad and on U.S. national territory.44 • Sea Basing, understood as the ability to sustain any military deployment with flexible, efficient and secure support to the force, thanks to the use of networked sea bases situated inside the theatre of operations.45 The offensive capabilities of Sea Strike, the defensive capabilities of Sea Shield and the logistics of Sea Basing would be integrated under Force Net which was defined as “…the architecture of systems and the operational concept for naval warfare in the information age integrating warriors, sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force”,46 thus constituting the Navy’s initiative to make networked warfare a reality.47 44 This work referred explicitly both to the Navy’s theatre defence initiative already raised in previous papers and its contribution – via the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence programme aimed at the destruction of enemy ballistic missiles during the central phase of its flight towards its objective – to the Ballistic Missiles Defence proposed by President Bush. 45 There have been repeated calls for the building of large logistic bases which, situated in peace times on the open sea, could be towed to the theatre of operations in the case of conflict (FRIEDMAN, George and Meredith: The Future of War…op. cit., p. 379). However, the Sea Basing concept refers to the use of logistic support ships as floating bases, to increase the security of supplies and logistic autonomy by doing away with the requirement of ports within the area of operations. For further details on this initiative : HENNING, Mark: U.S. Navy Transformation: Sea Basing as Sea Power 21 Prototypes, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2005 or the viability study carried out by Secretary Rumsfeld: Defence Science Board: Task Force on Sea Basing, Washington DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003. 46 Department of the Navy, Sea Power 21…op. cit., p. 6. 47 This initiative to implement Network Centric Warfare/Operations in the Navy adopts the
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