393 Guillem Colom Piella Defining the US Navy in the 21st Century programmes– detailed in the Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access… From the Sea– have been cancelled, redefined or postponed. For its part, the Global Naval Operations Concept cannot now be implemented following the deactivation of two air-sea groups, three expeditionary groups and the possible immobilisation of three of the ten aircraft carriers actually in service, due to the economic crisis; the strategic and operational aspects of this roadmap have been redefined thanks to a new naval strategy 53and a new concept of naval and amphibian operations54 which in all probability will be refined in the coming months in line with the principles established in the Quadrennial Defence Review of 2014 and the National Security Strategy which Obama will be presenting in 2015.55 53 In effect, 2007 saw the presentation of the document A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which traces the broad outlines of naval strategy for the third millennium. Jointly produced by the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coastguard Service, the work identifies new imperatives: an efficient response to regional crisis, maintaining a naval presence to deter China, safeguarding the freedom of navigation, free access to any port on the globe, the far-reaching defence of the country and new operative needs, such as strengthening joint action between the three armies, combined action with forces from allied countries and inter-agencies as well as with other civil actors, both national and international. To do all this, the strategy proposes centring naval efforts in three areas: sea control to guarantee that the United States can freely operate on the oceans; the projection of power for swift deployment and efficient sustainability of a force capable of defeating any adversary at any point on the globe; and maritime security to protect world maritime traffic from any act of terrorism, piracy, organised crime or deliberate attack and combat any illicit activity that could arise on the sea and in coastal regions (Department of the Navy: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Washington DC: GPO, 2007). 54 The Naval Operations Concept 2010 – which replaces the 2006 edition, drawn up in the middle of the War on Terror and coinciding with the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq – takes on the principles set down in the naval strategy and goes on to detail the obligations of the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coastguard service. This bases itself on forward presence, maritime security, humanitarian aid and disaster-response, control of the sea, projection of power and extended deterrence to guarantee that the Navy may continue to enjoy the dominance of the seas in an uncertain world (Department of the Navy: Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy, Washington DC: GPO, 2010). On the other hand, for more detailed information on this maritime strategy aimed at revitalising the importance of the Navy in the wake of the War on Terror, see, Guillem: “la seguridad marítima y el renacimiento del poder naval estadounidense.”, General Marine Journal, vol. 259 nº 3, 2010, pp. 449-458. 55 For more detailed information on the contents of this roadmap for the period 2014-18 and the implacable criticisms from the National Defence Panel – an independent group of experts set up to evaluate its approach and proposals – on the shortcomings of this strategy, see: Guillem: “la Nueva Revisión Cuadrienal de la Defensa estadounidense.”, Boletim Meridiano 47, vol. 15 nº 144, pp. 32-36.
REVISTA IEEE 4
To see the actual publication please follow the link above