529 Ignacio Cartagena Núñez Keeping credibility Graphic n. 1 Actors intervening in the shaping of the international energy regime 1.2 The value of signaling strategies in the energy sector Following James Walsh, “Signaling game logic has been applied to many areas of international politics in the past decade, including decisions to go to war, crisis bargaining, international economic negotiations, regional integration, and the foreign policies of democratic states. The signaling games approach assumes that states are unitary actors with a single preference ordering and set of beliefs”.8 In the energy regime complex, the value of signaling is particularly relevant, given the absence of enforcing mechanisms for the decisions adopted. Through signaling preferences and hinting at possible reactions, many actors contribute to shaping energy markets. Signaling strategies are a particularly common behavioral pattern among western democracies (and the IEA is a group of democratic 8 WALSH, James, “Do states play signaling games?” Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte NC 28223, USA, jwalsh@uncc.edu.
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