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219 Manuel R. Torres Soriano Proxy wars in cyberspace d) Allows undercover operations. Recourse may be had to a proxy in order to avoid the barriers hindering a State from acting explicitly in specific environments of cyberspace. One of the most meaningful examples is that of the black markets in exploits. The cyber capacities of an actor are directly linked to his ability to construct an arsenal of hardware and software vulnerabilities which may be integrated into his operations in cyberspace. Although the most advanced actors are capable of detecting and deactivating these breeches of security by their own means, normally they also have recourse to non-regulated markets for the sale and purchase of exploits to increase their resources22. The direct intervention by a State agency on these non-regulated, or illicit, markets presents a series of problems which may be avoided if this intervention is carried out undercover. So, for example, a legal dilemma exists the moment a State has acquired (usually using opaque funds23) a vulnerability which compromises not only the security and secrecy of its adversary’s communications, but also that of citizens themselves. In spite of this, it decides not to make public this vulnerability to avoid its being “patched”, and to exploit to its benefit this ignorance. Using a proxy as intermediate actor offers not only denial capability but also additional advantages such as the avoidance of an image crisis when the existence of the interactions with actors of dubious reputation is exposed24, or keeping adversaries from being able to create an accurate image of the cyber capacities which the State has at is disposition. A TYPOLOGY OF CYBER PROXIES The nature of the link established between a State and those groups which it uses as proxies in a cyber conflict is an essential element in order to understand its dynamics of performance and capacities. Therefore, the following typology is suggested: 22  HARRIS, Shane, “@War. The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex”, Boston, Mariner Books, 2015. 23  DIEBERT, Ronald J., “Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace”, Toronto, Signal/ McClelland & Stewart, 2013. 24  This was the situation which was produced when the controversial Italian company Hacking Team, dedicated to the sale of software for the offensive monitoring of communications systems, underwent hacking which resulted in the publication on Internet of 400 gigabytes of company data, including its list of clients and contracts. Many democratic governments had to contend in the face of their country’s public opinion with the inconvenient reality of having done business with a company which had on its list of purchasers certain dictatorial regimes which used its services to repress opposition and violate human rights. See: KOPSTEIN, Joshua, “Meet the Companies that Helped Hacking Team Sell Tools to Repressive Governments”, Mother Board (July 2015). https:// motherboard.vice.com/read/meet-the-companies-that-helped-hacking-team-sell-tools-to-repressive-governments. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee

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