395 Daniel Rajmil The middle east; deterrence and nuclear deterrence Palestinian conflict mount the pressure on Israel and its neighbors on the need of the desecuritization of their politics in order to avoid an acceleration of the Middle East nuclear race. IV. CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS In order to understand the limitations of the deterrence theory overall, the Middle East case will be gradually introduced while exploring the more concrete critics and the wide moral dilemmas that deterrence theory and nuclear deterrence possess. The challenge to credit deterrence theory has appeared several times in International Relations history, when in different particular moments, advocates and detractors have shown their arguments in favoring or against the deterrence theory, especially since the appearance of arms control and disarmament alternatives. In addition, even in a situation with nuclear arms, some negotiation achievements have been reached in order to seek a limitation effect on already existing arsenals. In that aspect, the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) already on the 70’s represented a great advancement in the arms control between the USA and the USSR, establishing some kind of coexistence between nuclear arms and deterrence.37 On the other hand, due to the own historical evolution of nuclear proliferation, it was not until the 1995 Non Proliferation Treaty review conference, that the current nuclear proliferation situation was readdressed as a deeper international concern on nuclear deterrence as a worldwide problem which has been further approached during the recent nuclear negotiations with Iran. Generally, one of the main criticisms to the deterrence theory is its relevance in today’s world. Deterrence theory paid a major role during the Cold War period after WWII within the USA and the USSR confrontation. As Morgan states, “without nuclear weapons and the Cold War, deterrence would have remained an ‘occasional stratagem.’ After World War II, for the first time, deterrence evolved into an elaborate strategy”.38 However, the conditions and actors that were prevailing on that bipolar world have today radically changed. In this sense, some of the most important policy 37 GÄRTNER, Heinz. Deterrence, disarmament and arms control, OIIP working paper, no. 68, May 2013. 38 KOTARSI, Kris. Quoting Patrick M. Morgan in “Deterring the undeterrable? Proliferation concerns in a world of “Rogue states” and non-state actors. ” Chapter IV in Wilner, Alexandre. Revolution or evolution: emerging threats to security in the 21st century. Dalhousie: University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2006, pp. 67-69. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
Revista del IEEE 6
To see the actual publication please follow the link above