405 Pedro Fatjó Gómez y Guillem Colom Piella The waning power. An analysis of... The construction of a nuclear force was conceived as a very relevant priority, since nuclear capacity was not only one of the cornerstones of French exceptionality, but was also fully independent from the outside. In contrast to the United Kingdom, whose missile-launching submarines used American vectors and depended on the consent of the President of the United States for their use,4 in France, nuclear weapons, its launching missiles and associated equipment were designed and manufactured domestically. The first step of the reorganization of the French defense took place in 1959, with the approval of the Ordinance for the General Organization of the Defense, which meant updating the regulations that dated from the period between wars.5 The document required the distribution of competences among the Cabinet of Ministers, the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of Defense.6 Nonetheless, in spite of the modernizing effort of the armed forces and the launching of a deterrent nuclear capacity of their own, codified in subsequent Military Programme Laws for the periods of 1965-70, and 1971-75,7 there was no strategic conception defined to sustain the defense policy being put into practice since the end of the war of Algeria. It was necessary to wait until 1972 –during the presidency of Georges Pompidou– for the first explicit formulation of the principles, objectives, capacities, and means of French defense to see the light with the publication of the first White Paper on Defense and Security.8 This roadmap recognized that the defense policy was the tool needed to guarantee the continued independence of the country and the nationalistic feeling of its population.9 Drafted surrounded by the rejection to the policy of aligned blocs, and 4 By virtue of the accords for the acquisition of the Polaris and Trident missiles, the British doctrine of usage was based on nuclear interdependence, understood as the joint planning between the United Kingdom and NATO, to select objectives and the British option of unilateral use in case of national emergency. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that the choice of objectives for its strategic bombers was a national prerogative, the same as the eventual use of tactical nuclear devices as multiplier of the conventional capabilities. (TETRAIS, Bruno, A comparison between US, UK and French nuclear policies and doctrines, París, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, 2007. 5 Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Ordinance nº 59-147 of 7 January 1959 including the general organization for the Defense. Paris: Documentation Française, 1959. 6 DUBURG, op. cit., pp. 59-64. 7 National Assembly. Programme Law nº 64-1270 of 23 December 1964 regarding certain military equipment, París: Documentation Française, 1964 and Programme Law n° 70-1058 of 19 November 1970 regarding military equipment of the period 1971 to 1975, París: Documentation Française, 1971. 8 Ministry of Defense, White Paper on National Defense 1972, París: Documentation Française, 1972. 9 There are authors who consider that the basic design of defense was the work of the govenment of De Gaulle, and that the White Paper was limited to updating and sistematizing the Gaullist inheritance.(LESPINOIS, Jérôme, “The Army: from one White Paper to another”, in PASCALON, op. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
Revista del IEEE 6
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