417 Pedro Fatjó Gómez y Guillem Colom Piella The waning power. An analysis of... an impulse to the Common Policy for Defense and Security, codified in the Lisbon Treaty (2007-9) with the organization of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the creation of a joint Operational General Headquarters, the reinforcement of the interoperability of the European armies, the collaboration in intelligence, the creation of a competitive defense industry in the international market, and the establishment of a single and integrated command for European civil and military operations. The traditional French ambivalence was maintained regarding the North Atlantic Alliance. On the one hand, it underlined the importance for the country of the cooperation between the EU and NATO, of the role of the Alliance to address new threats, and of a new balance between the United States and the European partners, in favor of the latter. But, even though the French collaboration with NATO has increased, particularly after its integration in the military structure and the attainment of the leadership of one of the two strategic commands, the Transformation Allied Command, Paris continued being outside allied organizations such as the Defense Planning Committee, or the Nuclear Planning Group, to keep its decision-making autonomy.37 The change in the nuclear doctrine and in the entity of the force de frappe was highly important. Since the White Paper of 1972, the first to define the doctrine of the use of its nuclear power, its content had suffered no significant changes: deter a potential aggressor, defend the vital interests of France -even though they were never defined with sufficient clarity- and maintain its technological self sufficiency of weapons as well as of its launch missiles. Nonetheless, since its origins, the French nuclear doctrine presented a special characteristic which made it different from the Anglo Saxon doctrine: the preparation for a first strike, ruling out a flexible response or escalation. The French authorities gave nuclear weapons the role of last defense barrier; but, if the need arose, they ruled out gradualism, and affirmed their readiness for a decisive attack. Neither was it ever specified what type of objectives (military, industrial, population areas, etc.) would be attacked nor with what priority, thus making uncertainty an integrating element of the deterrent capability.38 Throughout the decade of the 1990s, when France began to bet on nuclear disarmament more decisively than previously, reducing the number of atomic warheads, and decreasing the budget allocated to these devices. In 1996, it committed to suspending nuclear tests, to dismantling its installations for the production of fissile material, to eliminate its nuclear land capacity, to reduce one third of its fleet 37 PESME, Fréderic. “France’s return to NATO, implications for its defence policy”, European Security, vol. 19, nº 1, 2010, pp. 45-60. 38 ARTEAGA, Félix. “French nuclear deterrence according to President Chirac: reform, rupture or a reminder?” Analysis of the Real Instituto Elcano, nº 11, 2006. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
Revista del IEEE 6
To see the actual publication please follow the link above