http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 304 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 8 / 2016 clash of wills»48. In confrontations between major powers and weaker enemies, the for-mer lose because public opinion (in the case of democratic regimes) or the ruling elite (in the case of authoritarian regimes) becomes fed up with lengthy conflicts that call for important sacrifices that are considered disproportionate to the potential gains. Mack’s argument is basically in line with that of Snyder and Diesing: strong actors have less of an interest in winning because their survival is not at stake. Weak actors, on the other hand, have a high interest in winning because only victory ensures their survi-val49. For his part, Ivan Arreguín-Toft, in his article How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict50 defends the argument that the final result is not determined by the difference in interests, but by the difference in the strategic models chosen by each opponent. The author divides the strategies of major powers into two types, which he calls «direct attack» and «barbarism» and the strategies of weaker powers also into two categories, which he calls «direct defence» and «guerilla warfare»51. Direct attacks aim to destroy the weaker adversary’s armed forces (destroy their capacity to continue the fight), while «barbarism» is the systematic violation of the laws of war to reach military and/or political targets» (destroy their will to fight). On the other hand, direct defence uses classical military means (although it may include pre-emptive strikes), while gue-rilla warfare basically involves the use of existing military capabilities in fights where direct confrontation with enemy forces is avoided and the idea is to debilitate them. Arreguín-Toft believes that when direct strategies (i.e., direct attack and direct defen-ce) are used against indirect strategies (barbarism and guerilla warfare), the advantages of the stronger opponent are cancelled out, to the weaker opponent’s advantage52. In reality, the importance western societies attach to this type of conflicts is a reflec-tion of the motivations of their states. For western states, a stabilisation operation in a colony or developing country does not jeopardise their existence: it is a conflict of choice, it is optional; while it may have international, humanitarian and security im-plications and responsibilities for the state involved, the direct consequences for that country’s national security are limited or, at least, not immediate53. On the other hand, conflicts of necessity, which are not optional, have a direct impact and potentially 48 «War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will». CLAUSEWITZ, Karl von. On War. Book I, Chapter 1, Section 2. 49 SNYDER, Glenn H. and DIESING, Paul. Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 190. 50 ARREGUÍN-TOFT, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars. The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict, World Politics journal, vol. 26, no. 1, summer 2001, pp. 93-128. 51 Ibid, p. 100. 52 Ibid, p. 105. 53 Adapted from the definition provided in DIBB, Paul. The Importance of the Inner Arc to Australian De-fence Policy and Planning, Australian Security Challenges journal, Vol. 8, no. 4, summer 2012, pp. 13-31, p. 15.
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