365 Carlos Barrachina Lisón The Mexican path to a reform of the National Public... The on-going increase in spending in the federal entities, as well as the funds and subsidies allocated to states and municipalities, also shows that this reform has not only been a priority for the federal government, independently of whether the PAN or the PRI has been in government, but also for a large number of the Mexican states, independently of the political colour of their governments. The reform was designed and planned by a team of security professionals working with Genaro García Luna, Secretary of Public Security in the Calderón administra-tion. However, the situation of violence in which the country has been plunged se-riously complicated the process of consolidation of the public security institutions, leading to an increase in the presence of the military in the streets and, at the time of writing, worsening the violence and Mexicans’perception of insecurity. Despite this shared interest in reforming the National Public Security System that is reflected in the budgets, political agreements have not been simple and the results have been questionable. The federal and state executives received support from legisla-tors in approving budgets and a large part of the reforms. Paradoxically, the legislators aome up against opposition from the federal and state executives and from the muni-cipal presidents when finalising a model that would define the institutional structure of the local security corporations. This apparent contradiction between the use of resources and power can be explai-ned by the fact that the mayors want to continue managing and controlling the secu-rity corporations in their municipalities and the legislators support them in this duty. The debate on the police «single command» in the states is complex. On the one hand, Mexico has identified the weakness of the municipalities in dealing with both organised crime and the de facto powers. On the other hand, it would appear that the resources invested haven’t generated good results. Trustworthy state police structures have still not been established. The critics of the «single command» point out that it is easier to corrupt one single person, i.e. the governor, than various municipal presi-dents. Thus, the security trap in Mexico, as underlined by Bailey, is still having an im-pact on the necessary establishment of structured and trustworthy police corporations and everything would point towards this inertia continuing. As an epilogue to the «drama» of the National Security System reform, at the be-ginning of 2016, the Mexican federal government made an about-turn that this author considers to be wrong and confusing. In one fell swoop, the SUBSEMUN and the SPA disappeared – the two most important subsidies for the national public security system reform. This shows that, on the one hand, the Mexican government recognises that the efforts haven’t given the expected results. In the case of SUBSEMUN, a new subsidy called FORTASEG has been created to replace it. The number of municipa-lities has increased to 300 and the resources invested have been moderately increased. However, priority is no longer given to crime prevention policies and instead focus is placed on the promotion of training within the New Accusatory Penal System that has been supporting SETEC, for its introduction and implementation in August 2016 across the country. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
REVISTA IEEE 8
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