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285 Josep Baqués Quesada Fundamental lessons in the work of Mahan: from… this logic. Thus, in the following section (2) we will analyse the geographical constraints effectively adduced by Mahan, as well as their relevance (past and present). Section (3) will expand on the arguments tending to underpin the role of the various actors in the task of implementing and/or maintaining sea power. Thus, reference will be made successively to demographic and sociological considerations (3.1); to the national character and the mentality of the political elite (3.2) as well as to the script that should guide decision-making at the highest level (3.3). To conclude (4), an overall assessment will be made, an all-embracing conceptual summary, extrapolating the main points from the analysis of each section based on these independent variables that will enable us to visualise in a few short paragraphs the authentic hard core of the Mahan’s geopolitical contribution. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR Mahan contends that some states are better equipped than others for exerting their influence at sea. The first explanation is always geographical. Both the location of each state, as well as its orography, and even the extension of its seaboard are relevant factors, specifically treated by the historian in two sections of his work. We have grouped them together in this section, with a view to extrapolating their most relevant contributions rather than entering into a mere description of each item. In the first instance, Mahan indicates that the most privileged geopolitical position is that of large islands or archipelagos that constitute a sole state. In reaching this diagnosis, with its empirical pretensions, the visualisation of the success of the British Empire —especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries— is useful. But Mahan’s reflections on the impact of geographical factors are intended to be permanent, and thus go beyond this space-time interval. Because for an island state (or archipelago), the kind of servitude that consists in having to monitor one or (probably) several land borders, is automatically reversed. Insularity also generates certain advantages with regard to defence: attack is rendered more difficult by sea. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of attempts to invade the British Isles failed. Examples subsequent to Mahan’s narrative are also citable, reinforcing his thesis. Let us recall the main reason given to justify the launch of the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in 194510. The possibilities these islands can avail of in terms of deployment of forces are not insignificant either... the states whose territory they form part of have a 360 ° circumference. In the case of Britain, Mahan’s thesis is as simple as it is compelling because, thanks to its location, «in a strategic sense, the position of Great Britain was central, although geographically peripheral» 11. 10  It was linked to the huge number of losses calculated by the US in the case of invading the archipelago by sea… and all this despite the fact that at the outset of the summer of 1945 Japan was virtually defeated. 11  TERZAGO, 2006, op. cit., p. 60. http://revista.ieee.es

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