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287 Josep Baqués Quesada Fundamental lessons in the work of Mahan: from… British Empire at the time of running for world hegemony that it would end up finally capturing following the defeat of Napoleon; similarities between the two states not only in terms of size and distance from the coast, but also in the type of relations they maintained with their continental neighbours17. The second best geographical position is attributed to continental states with extensive outlets to the sea, especially if they converge in different seas and especially if they have direct access to the open sea. In this case, the potential of Spain, France or the US itself is remarkable, and historically this has been borne out. From this (geographical) perspective, it should not be otherwise. At the time of writing, Mahan staunchly supports the Panama Canal (not yet in service) as well as its control by the US18, as the Canal was to facilitate the US Atlantic and Pacific fleets, turning his country into «almost» an island19. This is interesting for operational purposes, at times for the benefit of the navy, at others as a mechanism for controlling maritime traffic that henceforth would have strong incentives for using this new route. Mahan’s dream went further: it consisted in the Caribbean ceasing to be a terminus for international trade to become one of the great highways of the world of much higher commercial volume20. It is in this context that Mahan elaborates the concept of permanent base, which he attributes to the USA in America and the United Kingdom in Europe, due to the proximity of their main ports and arsenals to the busiest communications hubs of the time. But he calls on the US to make a further effort with a view to bringing some critical infrastructures closer to the Caribbean gateway. For similar reasons, the Iberian Peninsula was a nightmare for France (making it difficult to connect its Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets) while British control of the Isthmus of Gibraltar was a hindrance for us in Spain. Of course, Mahan is not satisfied with making the annotations indicated in terms of the location on the map of the aspiring power states. Their orography is also relevant. Mahan’s analysis in this respect is very detailed. Because the existence or not of good natural shelters or good estuaries is highly relevant. The former contributes to the establishment of these permanent bases; their absence dilutes the expectations mentioned above. 17  After all, the United Kingdom’s relationship with France, Spain or Holland in the eighteenth century was not much better —and sometimes even worse— than Japan’s current relationship with China, Russia and North Korea. In addition, both the United Kingdom of the past and the Japan of today lack raw materials and energy sources essential for their development. However, far from being a problem, this is typically an incentive to increase the required naval power and guarantee the security of supply lines. 18  MAHAN, 2007, op. cit., pp. 98-99 y p. 101. 19  GONZÁLEZ, Andrés, and AZNAR, Federico. «Mahan y la Geopolítica». Geopolítica(s). Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder. Vol. 4, n.º 2, 2013, p. 346. 20  CROWL, P. A. «Alfred Tayler Mahan: el historiador naval», in PARET, Peter (ed). Creadores de la estrategia moderna. Madrid: Ministry of Defence, 1991, pp. 479-481. http://revista.ieee.es

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