292 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 12 / 2018 are no radiation detectors and the terrorists can carry out the attack, Pierce says that: ‘The whole plan is pretty scary, but it has one big advantage: the psychological im-pact on the public. People are almost superstitious in their fear of nuclear radiation’84. Breivik has pointed out that the target of a sabotage mission is not necessarily the loss of human lives, stating that ‘(Sabotage operations are) the most efficient ways to cripple the current Western European multiculturalist regime’85 and that ‘The primary purpose of sabotage missions is to cause system disruptions or contribute to gradual but devastating economic losses to the cultural Marxist regime. The most potent and efficient way of doing this is to select targets and use means that will trigger secondary reactions and effects. These secondary reactions/effects can be for example pollution/ oil spills (requiring extremely expensive cleanup operations), damage on the electricity or communications net’86. One example of this would be the sabotaging of the Doel 4 nuclear power plant (2014), where an unidentified individual drained 65,000 litres of lubricating oil from a turbine, resulting in repair costs of more than 100 million euros87. Furthermore, when speaking of sabotage, it is important to highlight the insider security gap, a threat that has emerged in the past, as evidenced by the following examples: – The lone wolf Bruce Edwards Ivins, a microbiologist at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, and key suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks. – A group of insiders, whether coordinated or not, who misuse information they are privy to within a company or institution. – A coordinated group of insiders and outsiders where the latter are individuals unrelated to the company or institution that they wish to attack or steal material or information from. Therefore, based on the above, insiders are one of the greatest challenges for nuclear safety systems. This is because insiders are the most effective means by which a lone wolf or individual terrorist can reach their targets in nuclear terrorism, whether the goal is to damage the power supply grid, thereby creating social panic, or the theft of radioactive material. Given this potential threat, we may therefore ask ourselves the following question: Could a terrorist end up working in a nuclear power plant? Nuc- Net director Santiago San Antonio refutes this idea, pointing out that ‘in addition to the various examinations candidates have to take before working in a nuclear power plant, they also have to sit psychological and technical tests and undergo annual me- 84 See Macdonald, op. cit., p. 174. 85 See Breivik, op. cit., p. 965. 86 Ibid., p. 966. 87 BLANCO NAVARRO, José María y ESTEBAN MORENO, Estefanía. Barack Obama, seguridad nuclear y terrorismo», Documento de Opinión IEEE, Madrid no. 84/2016, p. 9. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 12 - Año: 2018 - Págs.: 273 a 298
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