Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 12 - Año: 2018 - Págs.: 134657 a 13795 368 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 12 / 2018 THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE AND GAME THEORY The geostrategic implications of negotiations associated with the nuclear pro-gramme of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) and the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (hereinafter, JCPOA), represent an area of knowledge which, despite its multidisciplinary nature, has not been given sufficient attention by the academic community. The study of the Iranian nuclear programme has been addressed from numerous different perspectives, ranging from its nuclear policy to the more technical aspects of the programme or in isolation from the perspective of its external relations policy. More often than not, these studies have focused on the strategic evolution of the is-sue or the technical vicissitudes of the nuclear programme and constitute tangential approaches. However, while they represent essential parts of our study, they have not brought together key political, security and/or energy issues and therefore fall short of offering a complete view from an international relations (hereafter IR) perspective. In our study we will examine factors beyond nuclear policy per se, such as regional stability, external relations and natural resources in the region, with a view to fin-ding variables which, while initially appearing extrinsic to the nuclear legal framework itself, in fact have a considerable bearing on negotiations. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GAME THEORY The fact that certain countries are driven “to acquire more and more power, in or-der to escape the impact of the power of others” was interpreted by John Herz as the concept of Security Dilemma, referring to how certain countries display a trend that leads to a vicious, spiralling, mutual arms race. This concept plays a fundamental role in a multipolar system between states since it follows Game Theory logic in a game of N-people (nations, in this case) and specifically in the so-called ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. The “Security Dilemma” concept was referred to by Immanuel Kant in his essay on Perpetual Peace1, a notion which he addressed 155 years before John H. Herz2 develo-ped and elaborated the concept in his work Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma3. Meanwhile, the British historian Herbert Butterfield described the same 1 KANT, Immanuel, Sobre la Paz Perpetua, (Perpetual Peace) Tecnos, 5th ed., Madrid, 1996. 2 HERZ, John H., “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, Vol. 2, No 2, Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 157ff. 3 WHEELER, Nicholas y BOOTH, Ken, The Security Dilemma. Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 21. For further information see: HERZ, John H., “Political Ideas and Political Reality”, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 3, No 2, 1950, p. 161-178.
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