Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 12 - Año: 2018 - Págs.: 134657 a 13795 374 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 12 / 2018 payoffs, since one of the two would be the chicken and the other would win. However, if one of them chooses not to abandon thereby demonstrating greater bravery than the other, he will survive, if and only if, the other makes the decision to swerve because he is a chicken. The worst situation is to be the chicken, although it is better than dying. The optimal outcome for the two participants deriving from cooperation is when they step aside. Both stay alive and neither can accuse the other of being chicken26. This game, when applied to our case study, would translate into going forward and continuing with the development of the nuclear programme and the threat to the IC; or defect, which would entail abandoning the development of the programme. If the option not to abandon is chosen in order to demonstrate greater bravery than one’s opponent that party will survive, if, and only if, the other makes the decision to swerve. The ideal would be for both parties to abandon the contest, since a zero-sum game is an “open war”. If Iran had abandoned non-proliferation activities and the UNSC had imposed new sanctions, it would have been the sucker27 but if the E3/EU+3 had trusted the Iranian government and that decision had led to the withdrawal of sanctions while Teheran was developing a military nuclear programme, the IC would have been the one to be side-lined. This game can be applied to the final stages of a geopolitical debate that could cul-minate in a destructive situation for both parties. Ideally, both parties should move away from the contest, since a zero-sum game between two players is an “open war”, with one player only winning when the other loses, what is known in nuclear terms as “Mutual Assured Destruction28”. In an arms race, if agent A cheats agent B by not ceasing its proliferation activities, it generates a worse scenario for agent B – from a strategic point of view – than if B withdraws from negotiations. For this reason, the parties in dispute choose a non-cooperative strategy, not because they suspect that their opponent is going to defect, but because ending up a sucker is worse than ending up as a chicken. In the absence of a principal authority imposing cooperation as a solution to the conflict, the dispute becomes projected over time, an intrinsic characteristic of IR. In 26 This solution is called “Minimax Theorem” and is applied to any “slice of the pie” type zero-sum game. GAME THEORY STRATEGIES, John von Neumann’s minimax theory. Accessible at: http:// www.gametheorystrategies.com/2012/06/07/john-von-neumanns-minimax-theory/ Consulted on 04/03/2014. Reviewed 01/02/2018. 27 The term “sucker” is typical of Game of Theory. For further information, see: SNYDER, Glen H.” ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’ Models in International Politics”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15, No 1, 1971, p. 69 28 NuclearFiles.org.Mutual Assured Destruction, Web. (2017). Accessible at: http://www.nuclearfiles. org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-mutual-assured-destruction. htm Consulted on 04/03/2014. Reviewed 01/02/2018.
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