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Emilia José Peña Ruiz The iranian nuclear issue and game theory additional phenomenon directly affecting the outcome. The nations themselves –the players interpreted as teams– do not change, but their Presidents and their staff do, and consequently their form of management. One of the characteristics of symmetric games like Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken Game, Stalemate and Deer Hunting is that they are inter-related, so that by changing a single element of the game, a new game is built32. If we consider that Game Theory is the study of a choice of strategies between rational agents33, when we change one of those agents, the game will restart. We can infer that even if we continue to play poker, when one of the five players is replaced by another, that person’s manner of playing and selection of strategies will change, and with it the result. Likewise, in all the games mentioned, if they happen to be n-player games with n-interests, they will become other games. In 2008, analysts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggested that a change in relations between the US and Iran was necessary34. That va-riation in US diplomacy occurred in January 2009 with the changeover in the White House. Although the alteration was asymptomatic until June of that same year, the change of actors in the presidency had consequences for the “game”. With a new US president, the set of strategies, the game, the payoff diagram, and therefore the game, was restarted. However, play between the actors remained stagnant without any concrete solution or pact being reached, since the difficulty lay in how to achieve consensus rather than getting to the nuts and bolts of the agreement35. With an unchanged scenario, the decision makers had reached an impasse situation. An external stimulus was needed that would provoke game changes and by extension new solutions to the conflict emanating from an alternative payoff diagram. George Tebelis developed the “prin-ciple of rationality” that assumes that the actors, be they states, persons or political parties, have preferences which they act upon, seeking the best solution from positions of self-interest. Accordingly, this principle assumes that agents are rational when ac-ting according to their own preferences that meet the characteristics of completeness, 32  SHAHRABI FARAHANI, M. y SHEIKHMOHAMMADY, M. “A review on symmetric games: theory, comparison and Applications”, International Journal of Applied Operational Research, Vol. 4, No 3, p. 94. Accessible at: http://ijorlu.liau.ac.ir/files/site1/user_files_b406fb/admin-A-10-1-109- 7adf351.pdf Consulted on 23/10/2015. Reviewed on 01/01/2018. 33  McCAIN, Roger A. “Game Theory. A…”, op. cit., position 77. KINDLE version. 34  CORDESMAN, Anthony y BURKE, Arleigh. “Iran and the US: Key Issues From American Perspective”, Center For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, 2008, p. 2-3. Accessible at: http://www.bits.de/public/documents/iran/080110_iran.us.pdf Consulted on 17/02/2012. Reviewed 01/01/2018. 35  Document IAEA, INFCIRC/853, par.46, p. 8. Accessible at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ files/publications/documents/infcircs/2013/infcirc853_sp.pdf Consulted on 04/12/2013. Reviewed 01/01/2018. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 12 - Año: 2018 - Págs.: 145 a 175 377 367 395


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