404 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 12 / 2018 The contextual framework of the emerging space powers is further aggravated when lack of cooperation transforms into direct competition and rivalry. In this context, the Chinese ASAT test of January 2007, which destroyed the inoperative Chinese weather satellite FY-1C at an altitude of 865 kilometres, generated more than 3,400 pieces of waste, of which it is estimated that half will remain in the space until the year 2027.25 The ASAT test was so significant for space history that some writers have described it as a milestone establishing a dividing line between “space ages”. According to some writers, the ASAT test “marked the end of an era characterised by a lack of friction between space-faring nations and a general acceptance of norms governing the common use of space”.26 Thus, the success of the Chinese test not only served to demonstrate to the Uni-ted States and Russia its technological capabilities, but it also profoundly impacted on the strategies of its neighbouring countries, especially India; a country that ever since has undertaken a review of both its space programmes and the concept of space security.27 This is what Harsh Pant and Ajey Lele say when they declare that the ASAT test “led the Indian establishment to take the military uses of space more seriously”. Among others, the former Chief of the Indian Air Force, PV Naik, declared in January 2010 that “our satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapon systems because our neighbourhood possesses one”, while at the same time urging the development of their own ASAT systems in order to improve their deterrence strategies and reduce the threat on their civil and mili-tary satellites. 28 From then on, although India had been developing a space programme for decades largely for civilian purposes, following the Chinese ASAT weapons test a marked military element was introduced and the development of an indigenous anti-ballistic missile programme with ASAT capabilities. In April 2012, it was learned that India had developed a kill vehicle that could be incorporated into an Agni-V ballistic missile with sufficient capacity to attack a satellite. The Indian strategy aims at develo-ping ground-based ASAT weapons as providing a means to respond to potential attacks on its satellites without “weaponising” outer space.29 On the other hand, although the Indian Defense Research Development Organisation (DRDO) declared that it did not intend to carry out real ASAT tests, just simulated tests, certain circles of Indian strate- 25 Gruss, M., “U.S. Official: China turned to Debris-free ASAT Tests following 2007 Outcry”, SpaceNews, 11 January 2016, <http://spacenews.com/u-s-official-china-turned-to-debris-free-asat-tests- following-2007-outcry> consulted: 15-9-2018. 26 Conrad, W., Anderson, J. & Jacobs, S., “Arms Control in the Third Space Age: Assessing International Efforts to Regulate Military Operations In Outer Space in the “3 C’s” Era”, in Coletta, D. (eds.), Space and Defense, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, vol. 6 (1), Fall, p. 6. 27 Sachdeva, G. S., “Space Policy and Strategy of India”, in Sadeh, E. (ed.), Space Strategy in the 21st Century: Theory and Policy, Oxon, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2013, p. 315. 28 Pant, H. V. & Lele, A., “India in Space: Factors Shaping the Indian Trajectory”, in Sadeh E. (ed.), Space and Defense, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, vol. 4 (1), 2010, summer, pp. 52-53. 29 Conrad, W., Anderson, J. & Jacobs, S., “International Negotiations, Emerging Space Powers, and U. S. Efforts to Protect the Military Use of Space”, in Coletta, D. (ed.), Space and Defense, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, vol. 7 (1), 2014, winter, pp. 9-10. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 12 - Año: 2018 - Págs.: 397 a 431
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