216 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 13 / 2019 Realistic security foundations in the Maghreb Political realism is based on the idea that international politics, like society in gen-eral, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature; so if we know these laws, and are able to develop a general theory that explains them, we can under-stand how politics works1. Within the realm of security policy, this involves examin-ing the activities and behaviours of states and ascribing a political meaning to them through reason so that we can understand their predictable consequences. In other words, states define rational security policies because this is the only way to minimise risks and maximise benefits in a way that fulfils “the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success”2. Realism views security policy from the perspective of national interest in terms of relative power, in other words, the amount of power one state has in relation to others. But this relative power does not have a fixed and unalterable character over time; it depends on the structure of the international system and on the greater or lesser conformity of states to its distribution. Power relationships thus acquire three geopolitical dimensions3: relative power understood as the power-sharing that a state possesses in comparison with others, both globally and regionally; the different at-titudes of acceptance or denial of states towards its distribution and the ways of increasing or maintaining it, or preventing it from diminishing and using for that purpose either confrontation or cooperation. Herein lies the difference between de-fensive realism and offensive realism – both structural – allowing us to understand why in the Maghreb the latter prevails. While defensive realists would be satisfied with an “adequate” level of power, without trying to excel at the expense of the in-terests of the other states since, if that were to happen, there is a risk that they would react with a counterweight strategy4, the offensive realist standpoint explains why the dominant powers, in this case Morocco and Algeria, base their security policies on the principle that the only “adequate” level of power consists in being significantly superior to the other. As Mearsheimer succinctly puts it: “for defensive realists the international system provides few incentives for states to seek additional increases in power; instead, it pushes them towards maintaining the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the primary objective of states. Offen-sive realists, on the other hand, believe that world political powers are rarely found to favour the status quo, because the system creates powerful incentives for states to seek opportunities to gain power at the expense of their rivals and to take advantage 1 MORGENTHAU, H (1950). Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, p.4. 2 Ibid, p.8. 3 WALTZ, K (2001). Man, the State and War, New York, Columbia University Press. p.12. 4 SNYDER, J. (1991). Myths of Empire. Domestic Politics and International Ambitions, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, pp.123-28. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 213 a 242
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