Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 213 a 242 217 Ignacio Fuente Cobo Security policies in the Maghreb from the perspective… of such situations when profits outweigh costs. The ultimate goal of a state is to be the hegemon in the system”5. Therefore, deducing to what extent each of these two states tries to impose itself on the other is fundamental when considering their security policies, given that their stra-tegic lines of action are determined by the characteristics of their opponent. Any mis-take in the assessment of the security environment by one or both states could trigger the possibility of an underestimation or overreaction with potentially disastrous results. In the case of the Maghreb, the security policies of its main actors, Morocco and Algeria, are closely linked to geography, since the main concepts on which they are based, such as the fundamental “Greater Morocco” or Western Sahara, have a strong territorial character. This means that the realistic offensive vision in the Maghreb area offers greater advantages in explaining regional security since both states, Morocco and Algeria, aspire to be the territorially dominant power, opposing the other being, because this is what guarantees their own security6. This leads to relationships marked by “continuous competition” in which each par-ty seeks to impose itself on the other, so that this state of permanent conflict is but a “by-product of competition”7. From this perspective, competition between these two potentially dominant states becomes an inevitable reality and the levels of aggressive-ness are determined by the incompatibility of their interests, with the additional input of the aggressiveness of their leaders and the expansionary principles of their security policies. In this sense, the security policies of Morocco and Algeria are guided by the com-petition that can lead to war characterised by the use of violence rather than by the existence of an authority and international law8. This does not mean that war is a permanent and inevitable phenomenon, nor that competition is limited exclusively to the military arena, but it does reinforce the idea that each state decides which course it thinks best serves its interests. Each state decides for itself whether or not to use force and when or how to do so, which means that war can break out between the two at any time. In these circumstances, the possibility of either state using force is always present not only as a last resort, but as a constant threat9, albeit a restricted one, given that 5 MEARSHEIMER, J (2014). The Tragedy of Great Powers Politics, New York, W.W. Northon & Company, p.21. 6 JORDÁN, J. (2018). Un modelo de análisis geopolítico para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales, Documento Marco, DIEEEM04-2018), Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, p.5. 7 WALTZ, K (2001). Man, the State and War, New York, Columbia University Press. Cap. XI. 8 Ibid, pp.80-85. 9 WALTZ, K (1979). Theory of International Politics, Illinois, Waveland Press Inc., p.113.
Revista_IEEE_13
To see the actual publication please follow the link above