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224 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 13 / 2019 as a “revisionist” power questioning the existing status quo, including Algeria’s sover-eignty over provinces such as Bechar or Tindouf that Morocco considers as belonging to it. Thus, with the occupation of the Western Sahara since 1976, Morocco fell into the error of considering that territorial expansion meant greater security28 without realis-ing that expansion brings about gains and losses and that both are cumulative. Expan-sion is attractive to Morocco as it allows it to acquire new resources that increase its national power to compete with Algeria, while preventing those resources from falling into the hands of its adversary. But this form of reasoning is opposed to the balance of power and is based on the erroneous conviction that the other party, Algeria, would not react. By adopting it, Morocco took the risk that an eventual defeat, which it came close to suffering in the 1976-1988 war in the Sahara, would seriously affect its status as a regional power through the depletion of its economic and military resources, loss of strategic depth, or the country’s internal and external deterioration29. Algeria, for its part, bases its security policy on the consolidation of the immense territories of the Sahara granted by France at the time of its independence, and would endeavour to complete with the opening of a maritime corridor through the Western Sahara to the Atlantic, thus encircling Morocco and attaining a dominant position in the Maghreb. In this sense, the geopolitical imperative of holding onto the rela-tive power acquired through independence makes it crucial that its security policy contemplates a second imperative derived from the previous one, that of “defending borders”30, opposing actively and, if necessary, violently to any attempt to question its territorial integrity, as was made clear in 1963 during the “Sand War” against Morocco. The fact that the competition between the two Maghrebi powers materializes in the territory of the Western Sahara has strategic advantages for both states since the con-frontation takes place in this external territory avoiding doing so in the territories of sovereignty. It would indicate that both states would have fallen in what Snyder calls “myths of the empire”31, understood as the commitment to territorial expansion as a way to increase their power and ensure their safety. In this way, although the ultimate goal of the expansion would be to obtain greater security, its actual behavior on the road to achieving this goal would be virtually indistinguishable from the simple and pure territorial aggrandizement32. 28  SNYDER, J. (1991). Op.Cit. pp.1-20. 29  JORDÁN (2013), pp.25-26. 30  JORDÁN, J. (2018). Un modelo de análisis geopolítico para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales, Documento Marco, DIEEEM04-2018), Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, p.14. 31  SNYDER, J. (1991). Myths of Empire. Domestic Politics and International Ambitions, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press. Pp.1-20. 32  SNYDER, G.H (2002). “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security.” International Security, vol. 27 no. 1, pp. 149-173. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 213 a 242


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