228 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 13 / 2019 remaining states, since it guarantees gains for all, while at the same time ensures that the security of the weakest is not put at risk39. Cooperation versus confrontation in the Maghreb As countries of equivalent geopolitical weight that have adopted expansionary se-curity policies, each perceives the other as a state that should feel secure – there is no intention of threatening it– but which nevertheless has an aggressive security policy, while they see themselves as potentially insecure states – they feel threatened by the other – exercising a defensive security policy40. As a result it is very difficult for both of them to simultaneously enjoy high levels of security, since when either of them adopts measures tending to increase its own security levels, the other responds in a similar manner seeking to recover its capacity to defend itself. Cooperation becomes more difficult, while, conversely, competition through the arms race and territorial expansion becomes more intense.41. Figure 4.Source: Perpared with SIPRI data 39 MEARSHEIMER (2014). Op.Cit. pp.162-164. 40 GLASER, Ch. (1992). Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models, World Politics, Vol.44, 4, Cambridge University Press, pp.501-505. 41 HOAG, M. (1961). On Stability in Deterrent Races. World Politics, 13, 4, Cambridge University Press, pp.505-27. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 213 a 242
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