Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 213 a 242 237 Ignacio Fuente Cobo Security policies in the Maghreb from the perspective… implies some risk to its security”77. This “imperialist security dilemma” arises in the Maghreb as a consequence of a limited regional competition between Morocco and Algeria over territorial interests (Sahel/Sahara) that do not derive from security needs, but are the product of conflicting geopolitical conceptions. To achieve their political goals, the two regional competitors develop offensive military forces with the purpose of intimidating the adversary. The result is an arms race in which both opponents try to demonstrate that they have sufficient capabilities to achieve their objectives. In this sense, the “imperialist security dilemma” in the Maghreb constitutes a real security di-lemma because in a context of acute competition “both competitors may prefer some kind of compromise to a great war, although they are unable to achieve it because the dynamics of the arms race and risky politics make their interests incompatible”78. From a complementary perspective, and quoting other authors such as Wheeler and Booth, one could also speak of a “deliberate security dilemma” to explicitly differ-entiate it from the unintended security dilemma as originally defined by Butterfield, Herz and Jervis79. From this perspective, the Maghreb would resemble a scenario in which a state that initially accepts the status quo deliberately adopts offensive security policies to deter another, because it sees itself as bound up in a confrontational rela-tionship with it. This would be the case of Algeria, satisfied with the status derived from the territorial benefits obtained with independence, but in confrontation with Morocco over regional hegemony. The conventional formulation of the security dilemma explicitly contemplates the possibility that states that accept the status quo (i.e. realistic defensive states) when threatened may deliberately adopt “offensive” strategies to deter alleged aggressors (and even eventually start a pre-emptive war against them). Therefore, this situation of “deliberate security dilemma” would not be a distinctive form of security dilemma, but simply a possible result of the dynamics of a deep or highly exacerbated security dilemma, such as that existing in the Maghreb. An intermediate solution between the imperialist security dilemma and the deliber-ate security dilemma is the one defined by Alan Collins that arises when a power that accepts the status quo (but is a hegemonic aspirant) pursues a deliberately aggressive policy with its neighbours to intimidate them.80. This is a “state-induced” security di- 77 TANG (2009). Op.Cit. p.610. 78 JERVIS, R. NED LEBOW, R. GROSS STEIN, J. (1985). Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914, Psychology & Deterrence, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.166. 79 TANG (2009), p.611. 80 COLLINS, A. (2000). The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia, New York, St. Martin’s Press, pp.10-13.
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