Eisa Younes Framing and analyzing ISIS through classical management… 291 hostile, and also to systematically degrade the leadership capabilities to inflict terror. In the case of a high level of preference divergence seen, as is the case of various cells operating for ISIS, they can be simply observed. As their leadership eventually focuses upon these cells, the governments have a clear sight of the framework and the iden-tities of members executing the same for the leadership. For instance, when Ayman al-Zawahiri identified a cell commander as siphoning off funds of the organization, the counterterrorism agencies left that member stay in the organization. This strategy was adopted as the cell commander was an element that could sustain a drive inside the organization against the main leadership, on account of his own perception of being victimized. Alternatively, when a cell leader is identified as having security problems by the main leadership, they can be given an exit route, thereby also reducing the credibility and deterrence of punishment for disobedience of the top leadership. These measures can provide for a practical exit route for various dissident cells and the rank and file from the grip of the top leadership. However, they cannot be brought into effect due to legislative measures inside developed nations in many cases, but can practically be rolled out in the war-affected zones in other regions of the world where such cells are operating. This also triggers a high element of preference divergence within the organization, for when the cell leaders and other operatives feel their lives are more in danger at the cost of protection of the top leadership, they can be persuaded to leave the outfits and join mainstream society. When faced also with the cellular structure of ISIS, the governmental agencies can trigger additional leadership issues within the organization as a whole where different cell leaders are positioning themselves for more power. When the government enters into a negotiation round with representatives of these organizations, it creates a feeling of lack of trust within the organization as perceptions of switching sides and leaving terrorism are triggered. Crucially, as unity among the leadership gives the entity a binding force, when the leaders are shown to be involved in internal rifts, their credi-bility is reduced considerably. Recruitment Linked directly with the structure, the dimension of recruitment exists to provide human resources for the terrorist entity, just as it does for the conventional business. As traditional and conventional organizations work towards attracting, developing and retaining high-quality competent staff, the terrorist organizations, also in the same vein, look for various avenues to enhance their manpower. As it has been docu-mented copiously26, the environment in socially deprived areas gives ideal grounds for recruitment to terrorist outfits. There is indeed a significant segment that has joined 26 Center for the Analysis of Terrorism. “ISIS Financing”.CAT, 2016. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 275 a 306
Revista_IEEE_13
To see the actual publication please follow the link above