Varios
112 Memorial de Caballería, n.º 89 - Junio 2020
TRADUCCIONES
LEARNING FROM COMBAT-TRAINING CENTERS: LESSONS IN SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
EMPLOYMENT FOR HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT AT SQUADRON LEVEL
By CPT Peter L. Kerkhof and LTC Steven E. Gventer
Two Ukrainian mechanized battalions were destroyed July 9, 2014, by an intense artillery
barrage near the town of Zelenopillya.1 The battalions had been observed, identified and targeted
through the use of small drones.
Independent analysis later assessed that BM-21s sitting nine kilometers away had launched the
bombardment.
The Ukrainian losses were devastating and sent a shock through the country’s political and defense
establishment. This event, together with the Russian invasion of Crimea, served as a wake-up
call to many in the U.S. government and military that the threat of high-intensity conflict was back
in earnest.
In Europe, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) rapidly adapted to account for this
threat by emphasizing small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS) threats and massed artillery fire in
its training scenarios. However, one persistent trend JMRC has observed over the past three years is
that rotational training units (RTU) have struggled to respond to this training stimulus.2
In early 2017, as 2nd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, prepared for deployment to the Suwalki
Gap as the first North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enhanced-forward-presence (eFP) battle
group – established to deter aggression on NATO’s eastern flank – the unit knew from two recently
completed JMRC rotations that, like the RTUs, the squadron’s SUAS capability was not performing
adequately relative to the threat. During mission analysis, it became clear that in the event of a
crisis, 2/2 Cav would be the first element in contact and would have to fight without brigade intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support.
The unit made the critical realization, informed by the Ukrainian experience and underscored
by the lethality of the opposing forces (OPFOR) at JMRC, that high-intensity conflict required different
organizational arrangements for SUAS than the counterinsurgency (COIN) fights the Army
has been in for the last decade-and-a-half. By adapting employment concepts and organizational
constructs, and using lessons-learned from JMRC rotations, 2/2 Cav consolidated its SUAS and
created an effective reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition capability during the eFP
deployment. This experience led to valuable lessons-learned that can benefit other units in both
combat-training center rotations and future deployments.
SUAS IN COIN VS HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT
By early 2017, 2/2 Cav had recently completed two JMRC rotations – Allied Spirit 4 and Allied
Spirit 5 – separated by a four-month deployment to the Baltic states as part of Operation Atlantic
Resolve. Based on the unit’s experience at Allied Spirit 4, the squadron established a sustained
command emphasis on SUAS. By Allied Spirit 5, the number of trained operators had dramatically
increased, and during the rotation, the unit’s SUAS flight hours were substantially higher. Yet the
squadron still did not achieve the desired effects for reconnaissance and intelligence collection (IC).
It became clear there was a gap between the capability of the systems and the way they had been
employed, in particular the RQ-11B Raven. The Raven is a line-of-sight (LoS)-controlled aircraft
that can range up to 10 kilometers and has a 60-90 minute flight time. It can be hand-launched and
then recovered through a crash landing from nearly any open area. It has a stabilized camera that
provides a 10-digit grid to the center of the field of view and can transmit this view to the operator