regulations and organization
of the international regime
for the non-proliferation
of weapons of mass
destruction. Nuclear activity
in Spain is fully subject to
international monitoring
by EURATOM (European
Atomic Energy Commission)
and the IAEA (each body
conducts its inspections
independently).
In the field of disarmament,
the goal is to maintain a
balance between the military
capabilities necessary for
national security, based on
the principle of legitimate
defense, and the creation
of a framework of peace
and stability in which mutual
trust prevails. The principles
that inspire Spanish policy
on non-proliferation and
disarmament are the
protection of peace and
stability, the promotion
of human rights and the
creation of the necessary
security conditions for the
development of people,
institutions and States.
Spain has signed and
ratified the main non-proliferation and disarmament agreements,
and participates actively and constructively in relevant
organizations and forums. Specifically: the NPT (as a signatory
country, Spain continues to believe in its full validity and enormous
potential); the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare; the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC); the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); and the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (signed in 1996
but still pending entry into force).
Spain is also in favor of convening a Conference on the
Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. Regarding
the operational initiatives in which our country participates, the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) stand out. Our country also
participates in all international conventional disarmament efforts
and is party to the core treaties: the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW); the Antipersonnel Mine Ban
Convention; the Convention on Cluster Munitions; the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE); the Treaty of Open
Skies; and the Vienna Document.
In the Ministry of Defense,
and organically located in the
Defense Staff Headquarters
(EMAD), it is important to
highlight the work carried out
by the Spanish Monitoring
Unit (Unidad de Verificación
Española or UVE), created
on October 8th, 1991, in
view of the need to have
a permanent military unit
specialized in disarmament
and arms control.
CONCLUSION
We only have to look back
to ask ourselves what would
have happened if the validity
of the NPT had not been
extended indefinitely since
1995. Having to renegotiate
the extensions would have
been a very complicated task
and not without friction given
the differing intentions and
approaches. Although it has
obvious limitations, the NPT
remains today one of the
most useful tools to contain
the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. The upcoming
Review Conference in the
summer of 2021 will again
EFE
generate demands and controversies but, at least, some of
the stepping stones of the Berlin Declaration are already partly
beginning to be reached, such as the extension of the New START
Treaty (this agreement’s stepping stone would be fully reached if
other countries also acceded).
The world in which disarmament —nuclear or conventional—
operates is extremely complex, entailing many difficulties in
conducting diplomatic negotiations and many positions with
differing political ends. After a few dark years where the crucial
agreements between the United States and Russia have been
practically broken, a new stage is underway that envisions
future negotiations contributing some consensus and generating
confidence in the international and especially European community.
Traditionally, Spain has been and continues to be a country with
a broad capacity for dialogue, with strong ties with Latin America,
the Mediterranean, Africa, the Arab countries and a member of
NATO and the EU. To this end, we cooperate in the field of Defense
Diplomacy with a wide network of bilateral relations. This situation
allows us to be well disposed to generate positive dialogue and
contribute to fruitful negotiations in an area as difficult as the nonproliferation
of nuclear and conventional weapons. L
April 2021 Revista Española de Defensa 55