346 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 5 / 2015 but a commitment to certain concrete successes, linked to two special dates: it is expected that by 2021 -centenary of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party- that Chinese society will be “moderately prosperous”: the per capita income of the year 2000 should have quadrupled; while, in 2049 -centenary of the foundation of the People’s Republic- the construction of “a modern, rich and powerful Socialist country will have completed”. It is these basic objectives underpinning the legitimacy of the Party which establish a time-frame for the central direction of Chinese diplomacy. Achieving this inevitably requires stable relations with the countries in its periphery.30 While not explicitly stated, Beijing’ international ambitions are also well-known. In 2021, the Chinese GDP will probably have surpassed that of the United States as the largest world economy, close to the Communist Party’s 20th Congress, which will mark the handover from Xi and his team to the sixth generation of leaders. It is also expected that in 2049, the Chinese defence budget will have surpassed that of the US, thus situating it as the world’s greatest military power.31 Implicit in the “Chinese Dream” is a major effort to reduce the power differential with Washington.32 “Core interests”. These were defined on 28th January 2013 by the Politburo on peaceful development as the guiding principle of diplomacy.33 At that forum, Xi made it clear that adopting this doctrine responded to a strategic decision that would be preserved: “we shall never give up legitimate rights, or sacrifice national interests”.34 “No country should presume that we will engage in trade that will place our core interests at 30 YANG Yiechi. “Innovations in China’s Diplomatic Theory and Practice under New Conditions”. Similar terms used by the Foreign Minister: “Embark on a New Journey of China’s Diplomacy: Address by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Symposium ‘New Starting Point, New Thinking and New Practice 2013: China and the World’ ”, Beijing, 16 December 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1109943.shtml (last consultation 12-1-2015). 31 RUDD, Kevin. “China’s Impact on Regional and Global Order”, Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, IISS, London, 16 December 2013, www.iiss.org/in/events/events/archive/2013-5126/ december-c771/rudd-buchan-083c (last consultation 12-1-2015). 32 YAN Xuetong. “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement”, p. 64. 33 The doctrine of “peaceful ascent”, presented in the year 2003, was formally assumed in 2005, called “peaceful development”: INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL. “China’s peaceful development road”, 22 December 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/ eng20051222_230059.html (last consultation 12-1-2015). On the strategic logic of the concept and its evolution, see DELAGE, Fernando. La República Popular China y la reconfiguración del orden asiático (1997-2005), pp. 168-175. 34 “Xi vows no surrender on ‘legitimate rights, core interests’ ”, China Daily, 30 January 2013, http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-01/30/content_16185761.htm (last consultation 12-1-2015). See also ANDERLINI, Jamil. “Xi strikes strident tone on foreign policy”, Financial Times, 29 January 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/13f6b08a-6a21-11e2-a7d2-00144feab49a.html?siteedition=intl#a xzz3H3DKNKVp (last consultation 12-1-2015). http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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