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351 Fernando Delage The Asian strategy of Xi Jinping the fact that never before had a Chinese leader publicly described the United States’ system of alliances as contrary to long-term security in the region. Xi’s message in Shanghai could be interpreted as a challenge to the Asian security order of recent decades, by defining it as incompatible with Chinese strategic interests.48 The concept would thus represent an attempt to build a pan-Asian structure favouring Chinese preferences that would minimise the influence of the United States. The confirmation that all these elements belong to the same strategy was made clear in a speech delivered by Xi Jinping in November 2014. In the second Communist Party work conference on foreign policy, he summed up the concepts put forward by official doctrine during the previous two years replacing the instructions given by Deng Xiaoping twenty years earlier. While still insisting on the continuity of Chinese foreign activity, the “low profile ” recommended by Deng has been formally substituted by a proactive approach that will facilitate the achievement of these major objectives: “peaceful development and national rejuvenation, the defence of the interests of China’s sovereignty, security and development, striving for an international environment more favourable to peaceful development, and maintaining and sustaining an important period of strategic opportunity”.49 Xi expressed his satisfaction at the successes notched up since the 18th Congress (November 2012) and put forward the proposal for a new model of relations between major powers and periphery diplomacy. Nevertheless, in an implicit recognition of the damage caused by maritime tensions, he declared that China must make greater efforts in getting its message across. But perhaps the most relevant aspect of this doctrine is the fact that Asia, more than the United States, is the central focus, with a clearly defined leaning towards the formation of a web of connectivity: “we must promote diplomacy towards neighbouring countries, shaping a community of common destiny, maintaining the principles of friendship, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusion in the management of neighbourly diplomacy, promoting friendship and association with our neighbours, fostering a friendly, secure and prosperous environment, and fomenting cooperation”. These principles are manifested in the mechanism of incentives which Beijing came up with in order to align its interests with the periphery. and la reconfiguración del orden asiático (1997-2005), pp. 145-152. 48  HEATH, Timothy. “China and the U.S. Alliance System”. 49  “Xi eyes more enabling int’l environment for China’s peaceful development”. See also CHEN Dingding. “Xi Jinping’s Evolution of Chinese Grand Strategy”, The Diplomat, 2 December 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/xi-jinpings-evolution-of-chinese-grand-strategy/ (last consultation 5-12-2014); PERLEZ, Jane. “Leader Asserts China’s Growing Importance on Global Stage”, New York Times, 1 December 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/01/world/asia/leader-asserts-chinas-growing- role-on-global-stage.html (last consultation 5-12-2014). http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee


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