378 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 5 / 2015 agreements, etc. On the other hand, the principle of intergovernmentality16 remains in force, and, in practice, the European defence institutions (if we may describe them as such) maintain their consultative role: they merely play a potential leadership role; NATO prevails in collective defence; more importantly, no new commitments are proposed, and the principle of “voluntariness”17 and the primacy of national defence policy are underscored. This second view, which places limitations on the Treaty, but not on expectations, was the one that prevailed in the ensuing years. Since the Treaty came into force in late 2009, its implementation has been characterised by a double paradox: what was devised to help create a common defence is never developed. The double paradox we are referring to is that the Member States, while reluctant to take the path of community cooperation, nevertheless recognised that on their own they did not have significant defence capability. Interestingly, an essence that it was now legally possible to transform on account of the Treaty of Lisbon was strengthened. We have moved from harbouring hopes of a common defence to seeing a proliferation of multiple cooperation platforms (or “sub-alliances”) under the European banner which, when added to the initiatives of the previous decade, further complicate the European defence map. The most important point is that any reference to a common ambition or horizons is diminished and, with it, the possibility of building a European defence. The latter aspect, and the impact of the economic crisis on EU financial policy, marked a turning point in the evolution of European defence, giving rise to an even more complex environment. Because there are so many players involved, the quest to find new methods of cooperation will never cease. In the area of military capability, we see the coexistence of different lines of action. We see the urgent realisation that the resources required to carry out European missions and operations are not being met, as evidenced by the Statement of Capabilities of 2008. The letter of the Weimar Triangle to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy in late 2010 (with every conceivable hypocrisy) is another call for attention, as is the Council Declaration of April 2010. Although the Capability Development Plan (CDP) had been approved in 2008, let us not forget that it merely served as a guideline for national defence planning. In early 2010, the British government embarked on a wave of significant cuts in defence spending and Europe’s main nations followed suit, thus demonstrating the limited influence that the aforementioned guideline had had. Offers to cover the Battlegroup rosters decreased. During the first half of 2012 only one such unit was available, despite the fact that the first declaration on operational capability (2007) stated that there should be at 16 The definition and implementation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy becomes the responsibility of the European Council, and the possibility to resort of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg is not permitted. 17 The Member States undertake to progressively improve their military capabilities, which is nothing new, as they continue to maintain their competence in defence matters. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
REVISTA IEEE 5
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