379 José Díaz Toribio Moving through a european defence landscape... least two BGs on duty at any given time. The accession of the new Member States prompted a review of the Force Catalogue (FG) in 2009, just one year after the CDP had been approved, as well as a review (approved in 2011) of the overall plan. Member States sought to cooperate with players who had similar strategic interests to their own: this is a symptom of the direction taken by European defence and an inevitable response because of the nature and characteristics of a European defence integration that never had a common approach. At the time (2010-2012), we must consider the geostrategic retreat of the United States and the challenge this posed for Europe. Perhaps we should ask ourselves whether Europe’s “disengagement” from its common defence project is not even most significant.18 The preceding paragraphs help us to understand the factors that have shaped developments in EU security and defence policy. While there is more and more talk of the EU having more competencies in the area of security, the possibility of creating a defence policy for the twenty-eight Member States is diminishing. Building on the mechanisms at its disposal, the Commission has progressively taken the lead in designing programmes and reforms that impact European defence. Given its competencies, aspects concerning security and the defence industry19 are the only fields where we can expect to see real progress being made. At the same time, the European Defence Agency – the main common institution pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon (albeit of an intergovernmental nature) - merely identifies opportunities and coordinates projects between groups of countries, given that its budget has been limited to around 30 million euros since 2008.20 Other changes have affected community structures since 2010. In European security and defence policy, the institutions that oversee the CSDP became part of the European External Action Service (EEAS), although not without difficulty,21 and this prompted the need to modify the organisational structures on numerous occasions. 18 In 2001, European defence spending represented 37% of the NATO total, in 2012 the figure dropped to 28%. Data obtained from JANSEN, Christian, WITTEK, Kai, et al, “The Future of European Defence: Tackling the Productivity Challenge”, online edition by Mckensey & Company 2013, available at www.cfr.org/europe/mckingsey-future-european-defence-tackling-productivity-challenge/ p31216. Pág. 10. 19 As noted in the decisions taken at the Council of the European Union of April 2010 (with the participation of defence ministers), on the Defence Industrial Base, Improved Context for Defence Research, preparation of a civil-military synergies plan, maritime security, etc. In Council of the European Union, EN 8979/10 (Presse 90). 20 The budget for 2015 remains frozen at 30.5 million euros. 21 The main difficulties stem from relations with the staff of other European institutions, the duplication of functions with the diplomatic services of Member States and a lack of leadership for the performance of its functions. This is analysed in-depth by Howorth, Jolyon, op cit. (2014). http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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