530 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 5 / 2015 that public opinion would make of the operation. Since Vietnam, the perception of the legitimacy of an operation (its success or failure) varies according to the public consideration of whether or not measures were adopted to reach the desired objectives speedily, efficaciously and efficiently, with a reduced number of victims. The humanitarianism of contemporary military actions is based not only on a prior ethical question –which undoubtedly exists-, but on a new discourse and an arithmetic of costs and results, which calculates acceptability in terms of damages and loss of lives and material goods.61 A reduced ratio is proof of efficiency in planning and delivery, and of the possession of a military technology and adequate knowledge. “Proportional violence”, “intelligent weaponry”, “military humanism” and “cutting-edge systems” are expressions that allude to this new discourse on conflict, in which panoptic technology should ensure success associated with a reduced number of victims and damages. The fewer we kill, the more civilised we are. The new postmodern discourse is verbally nuanced with other very creative ideological/linguistic findings, such as “humanitarian bombing”62 and “surgical weaponry”. Their aim is to represent structures, thoughts and values that remain hidden from their idiomatic realisation, of utmost importance because they are designed to influence public opinion and the media. The underlying values/thinking refers the brutality of war to a new ethical, complex and paradoxical reality. Collateral damage is a dual-use concept: an internal tool to control military efficacy and efficiency, based on “weaponeering”63 and “Collateral Damage Estimation” (CDE),64 an essentially statistical technique that allows for choice of target according 61 BROWN, John, Teoría del bombardeo humanitario (ensayo sobre algunos aspectos de la dominación neoliberal), Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política, nº 21 (July 2003). 62 BROWN, John, op. cit. The expression appears to come from an article by Vaclav Havel, published in “Le Monde” 29 April 1999. 63 Demanded under the Additional Protocol I (Article 57, 2, a, ii.) whereby the attacking forces must take all possible precautions with their activities to avoid civilian casualties and damages. “Weaponeering” is not just a question of choosing a particular weapon or arms system; it involves a more complex activity; it is the process of estimating the “quantity of weaponry” required to reach the level of damage desired in the selected target, bearing in mind its vulnerability, nature, effects produced, errors, availability of arms, deadliness and reliability. In terms of effectiveness, thanks to the experiences of campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, western Armed Forces have redefined the bases for calculating damages produced in direct and indirect attacks, with the resulting ramifications. The most widely followed initiative is the “Collateral Damage Estimation”. The US Armed Forces have published a document that updates its doctrines since 9/11 incorporating technical progress and conclusions reached from lessons learnt in Libya and Afghanistan. All Chiefs of Staff must reduce their expectations of forecasting with exactitude what damages any action is going to produce, minimising collateral damages. The document is titled “CJCSI 3160.01ª, 12 October 2012, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology”, available in http://info.publicintelligence.net/ CJCS-CollateralDamage.pdf. 64 It combines damages forecast, probable casualties and legal restrictions resulting in 5 possible http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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