587 Juan Ignacio Castien Maestro Modernisation and regression in Afghanistan... of the upper class, linked by kinship ties and the exchange of favours. Under these conditions, it was necessary to establish a tactical alliance with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a party with a pro-Soviet ideology. It was a small party but was firmly established among the urban minority who had managed to win some seats during the period of liberal democracy. It also had many followers among the middle-ranking officers and their help was vital in organising the coup d’état. The party was divided into two factions, who each took their name from their respective print media. The Khalq, “Masses”, group was more radical and called for the revolutionary seizure of power and the immediate implementation of deep-reaching reforms. The Parcham, “Flag”, group were in favour of participation on a broad front of progressive forces and, logically, were more inclined to support Daud. From his point of view, this alliance with pro-Soviet communists was extremely awkward. After all, both he himself as well as his closest associates were rich aristocrats. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that he broke away from the PDPA, began to hound it, and tried to distance himself from the Soviet Union. Confrontation was inevitable and led to a military uprising in 1978 resulting in the death of Daud and hundreds of his associates and relatives.16 The new government was composed mainly of members of the Khalq group, who progressively marginalised the Parchamis. Their policy was to radicalise previous reforms, together with the decision to impose said reforms by fire and sword. Anti-patriarchal measures were intensified, arranged marriages and the “bride price” were prohibited, and an agricultural reform based on expropriation of land belonging to landowners and the redistribution of this land was enacted, with debts owed to rural moneylenders by peasants being cancelled. In parallel, a wave of terror was unleashed against aristocrats, Mullahs, leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods, political opponents and, in general, all members of the urban minority who were not aligned with the new regime, such as teachers, military personnel and civil servants. Victims ran into tens of thousands. The Khalq government’s aim was to broaden its small support base through a rapid series of advanced reforms that would mobilise a previously passive population. The idea, then, was to construct a social base from the top down. And in the meantime, mass-terror would crush resistance, neutralising any opponents. With Soviet help, the state would also be able to invest heavily in infrastructure, education and health, thus improving the living conditions of the majority of the population and gaining their sympathy. But the exact opposite occurred; in a year rebellion had extended across almost the entire country leaving the government fenced into the large cities, while desertion decimated the army. This mass rebellion occurred for several reasons. Firstly, 16 Etienne, G.: Imprévisible Afghanistan, Barcelona, Ediciones Bellaterra, 2002. pp. 47-59; Requena, P.: Afganistán, Madrid, Editorial Síntesis, 2011. pp. 56-62. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
REVISTA IEEE 5
To see the actual publication please follow the link above