274 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 1 / 2013 sity of negotiating with and challenging what is “social”7. The availability of resources, per se, is not an element that the composition of rebel groups depends on. However, the action taken by different governments; the existence of a corrupt system in almost all spheres; the unequal distribution of the benefits that a country gets from the economic activity it generates; the illegal assumption of the capital of the public resources; or the exclusion of groups or minorities that bring about horizontal inequalities are, at the end of the day, elements that are largely conditioned by the origin and transformation of a conflict, as well as the gestation and subsequent consolidation of insurgent groups. To put this in another way, these types of explanations offer us a rather incomplete photograph of a particular conflict, inasmuch as they deny the possibility that the State, or any authority exercising de facto power, is established upon the basis of the factor that gives rise to and perpetuates the conflict. The focus of the analysis solely and exclusively lies on the existence of insurgent movements. This is an analytical shortfall, which in turn implies the denial of the possible existence of repressive and corrupt elites that, in many cases, seek to gain benefit from the war at the expense of the civilian population8. In turn, the serious danger that is run by inferring individual motivations of statistical correlations is clear. The fact that the participants feel attracted by the benefits that arise from the conflict cannot be used as a central argument on which to build a theory explaining the ultimate source of the insurgency. While some make their participation conditional on obtaining particular benefits, others simply become involved due to questions of mere survival or they are compelled to cooperate when they are subject to coercive practices. In a study carried out in 2007, in the Afghan provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, 80 per cent of those interviewed stated this issue to be the main reason that had led them to make the decision to join the ranks of the rebels. The situation of extreme poverty, in addition to which there is a heavy pressure involved in the necessity of having stable income to feed those families that are normally rather large and the practical non-existence of a job market, are some of the factors that compel many Afghans to adopt a more favourable position towards the insurgency9. Regardless of what is stated above, individual motivations may vary over time, as the conflict develops and evolves. In the same way as has happened on countless oc- 7 Cramer, Christopher. “Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War”, World Development, Vol. 30, Nº 11, 2002. pp. 18-45 8 Ballentine Karen and Heiko Nitzschke. “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict”, International Peace Academy, 2003. Available at: http://www.worldpolicy.org/sites/default/files/imported/projects/arms/study/bak05_1.pdf. With access in 2012 9 Senlis Council. Recommendations for US policy in Afghanistan: security recommendations, 2008. P 37. Available at http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/us_policy_recommendations.pdf. with access in August 2012
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