285 Pilar Pozo Serrano The United Nations Charter s doubt on the efficacy of a restrictive conception. For another doctrinal area, the text of article 51 of the Charter and of international practice only legitimise the exercising of the right of-defence against a consummated armed attack.19 The international Court of Justice assumed an even more restrictive concept, limiting the right of-defence to a response to a consummated armed attack of significant dimension and rejecting the lawful nature of exercising it as compared to “lesser uses” of force.20 Although the top level reports and the Secretary General’s report support the notion of self-defence when faced with an imminent attack, they do not set out criteria for settling disputes when there the appreciation of the “imminence”. The debate on this topic is even further complicated by the absence of standard terminology. While the notion of self-defence in the Reports mentioned covers both a consummated attack and an imminent threat, numerous authors make use of the term “preventive self-defence” for the case of threats that are imminent but also potential. In an effort to achieve conceptual clarification, the possibility has been suggested of reserving the term of “anticipatory” self-defence to situations of imminent threats and that of preventive self-defence for the actions in situations o potential threats.21 3.1. The September 11 attacks and broaneded meaning of the traditional concept of self-defence In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1368 (2001), of September 12, in which it recognises the inherent right to individual self-defence22 and it condemns the attacks. 19 BROWNLIE, Ian. International Law and the Use of Force by States. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 257; GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA, Cesáreo. “The ‘use of force’ in the High-level Panel Reports (2004), of the Secretary General (2005) and afterwards, in the final document of the Summit of Heads of State and of Government”, XXI Anuario de Derecho Internacional International Law Yearbook, 2005, p. 38; GLENNON, Michael, J. “The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”, 25 Harvard Journal on Law and Public Policy, 2002, pp. 539, 547; GRAY, Christine. International Law and the Use of Force, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 160; JESSUP, Philip C. A Modern Law of Nations 1948, p. 166. 20 Cases on the military and para-military activities in and against Nicaragua (1986), paragraphs 191-195 and 210-211; Case of the oil platforms (2003) paragraph 51; and in that of armed activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2005), paragraphs 127, 161-164. 21 In ths respect, CASANOVAS Y LA ROSA, Oriol in DIEZ DE VELASCO, Manuel. Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público International Public Law Institions, Madrid, Tecnos, 15th ed., p. 1006. 22 With this assertion, states M Reisman, the Security Council clears up any doubts about its position as regards a posible military intervention by the United States (REISMAN, W. Michael. “International Legal Dynamics and the Design of Feasible Missions: The Case of Afghanistan” The War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis, International Law Studies, Volume 85, Naval War College, 2009, p. 63). At the same time, T. M. Franck, qualifies, the resolution recognises a right to respond in slef-defence but it does not authorise –and it cannot legally authorise- the exercising of this given that
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