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296 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 1 / 2013 Some heralded armed intervention with the Security Council’s backing as a triumph of the doctrine of the “responsibility to protect”.59 Others pointed to a possible exceeding of the limits of the mandate of the resolution in conducting the operation, which was stated in the numerous declarations of the political leaders of the countries involved, according to whom one of the goals of the of the intervention had become a change in the Libyan regime. Resolution 1973 does not contain any mention about Gaddafi’s future, nor did it set the goal of overthrowing the current regime in Libya. 60 The international coalition however, went on to decide that the only acceptable final scenario to guarantee the protection of the civilians was for Gaddafi to leave power.61 Numerous analysts declared their objection on considering another aspect of the intervention: its poorly defined strategy. Using regime change, as the goal had not been accompanied by an assessment of the potential implications that overthrowing President Gaddafi could have on a state like Libya, characterised by its low level of institutionalisation.62 Finally, when it was then possible to consider that the Gaddafi regime had been defeated, the Security Council would “welcome the improvement of the situation of that country”, encouraging the setting up of an inclusive and representative transnational government.63 Thus we see evidence of one of the risks inherent in the use of force in exercising the responsibility to protect: that the action ends up becoming an intervention in a civil war for the benefit of the faction opposing the regime which is surely usually the pp. 9-55. 59  Gareth EVANS, one of the parents of the concept, argued that this was not a question of a bombardment by democarcy or to obtain Gadaffi’s head, but rather that “legally, morally, politically and militarially, it only has one justification, to protect the country’s population” (BAJORIA, Jayshree. “Lybia and the responsibility to protect”, Council on Foreign Relations, March 24, 2011, available at http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480) 60  In accordance with the United Nations mandate, on repeated occasions NATO asserted that the sole purpose of the international bombings was to protect the population and that when the violence ended, these would come to an end. Initially, Obama also declared that the objective of the United States and of the international intervention was to avoid a massacre by Gadaffi’s trops against the dissidents, and he declared that overthrowing the dictator by force was not amongst the coalition’s plans because that would entail weakening and dividing the allies, repeating the errors committed in Iraq (cf. European Mediterranean Institute. Cronología de las revueltas en el mundo árabe 2010-2011. Libia Timeline of the uprisings in the Arab world 2010-2011 (http://www.iemed.org/dossiers/tunisia/ cronologies/Juliol22/Libia22julio.pdf ). 61  B. Obama, D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy. “Libya’s Pathway to Peace”. The New York Times. April 14, 2011. 62  HAAS, Richard N. “Why Europe No Longer Matters”, Council on Foreign Relations, Op- Ed, June 17, 2011, p. 1 (available at http://www.cfr.org/europerussia/ why-europe-no-longer-matters/ 25308). 63  Security Council Resolution 2009 (2011), of September 16. For an analysis of the Security Council’s action, see BLANC ALTEMIR, Antonio. La Unión Europea y el Mediterráneo. De los primeros Acuerdos a la Primavera Árabe The European Union and the Mediterranea. From the first Agreement to the Arab Spring, Madrid: Tecnos, 2012, p. 228-229.


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