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312 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 3 / 2014 dominated by rival powers surrounding the Chinese coast and that condition its access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans is all too noticeable in recent events in the East China Sea23 and the South China Sea24. The circumpolar routes – and in due course the transpolar routes- will call for a reinterpretation of existing maps. In our navigation charts, the Arctic always appears –when it does– as a marginal region. In the future, and for the first time in history, we will have to take into account the most northerly latitudes, as they will have to be included as commercial routes. But also in order to provide the services and the security that these new spaces are going to require. Connection inland… and its consequences It is clear therefore from what has gone before, that there will be a relevant role for the Arctic routes in the future, in spite of the increases in South-South trade. It is also evident that the opening up of these routes will bring about a much more spherical vision of the planet that the one presented in today’s navigation charts, once the Arctic region is open to the traffic of goods, which will present its own risks and threats. Finally, extrapolating from the evolution of the of routes crossing the extreme south of the Eurasian continent, we can draw the conclusion that the emerging navigability of the maritime routes will encourage the setting up of secondary networks linking the inland of the continent with the ports that will be established on the coastline. While it is probable that a similar evolution could take place on the American continent25, the different level of development in Siberia compared with that of Canada and Alaska, combined with the opening in the foreseeable future of the North-eastern Route which will facilitate the North-western Passage between the de Marina,December 2010. 23  At the time of writing this paper, the setting up of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) by China was the latest step in the escalation of tension over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. More in HISLOP, Roxanne, “China and Japan’s dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands”, e-International Relations, 16 December 2013. http://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/16/china-and-japans-dispute- over-the-senkakudiaoyu-islands/ 24  RAINE, Sarah y LE MIERE, Christian, “Regional disorder. The South China Sea disputes”, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-70262-1.See also BENTLEY, Scott, “China’s claim and strategic intent in the South China Sea” in http://southeastasiansea.wordpress. com/2013/11/18/chinas-claims-and-strategic-intent-in-the-south-china-sea-part-1/ 25  The United States also has its own strategy for the Arctic. See PARRISH, Karen; “Hagel Announces DOD’s Arctic Strategy”, U.S. Department of Defense web page, 22 November 2013. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121220


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