363 Felipe Santos Rodríguez Strategic communication in modern conflicts : Afganistan but in this era of asymmetric warfare, this situation was becoming quite common for the military in command of the operations. General David Petraeus a colleague of his had encountered a similar situation after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The insurgent forces had taken over the street and were fighting to influence the population who were suspicious of the Western troops who had remained there. In two months, General McChrystal reviewed the situation he had and sent a report to his superiors, which, over time, would develop into a handbook on how to deal with a conflict of asymmetric nature. That document, which was entitled (Com-mander of International Security Assistance Force) COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, it reviewed those features that redefined the confrontation with the Taliban insurgents. The Afghanistan conflict should be viewed as a diversity of interconnected insurgents. Each of which is a complex system with multiple participants and a wide range of interactions related to one another. (...) This perspective means that the system must be understood in a comprehensive fashion (...) this is not a cyclic and kinetic campaign based cyclic on combat operations. Rather it is an ongoing effort to help the Afghan government to win the support of the population, to counter the coercion and intimidation of the insurgents (...). There are five main groups of participants in this conflict: the population, the Afghan government, ISAF, the insurgents and external agents. It is important to start with an understanding of each of these groups, starting with the most important of them all: the Afghan people.19 “The war amongst the people” of Rupert Smith brings to life the full meaning of theses words. McChrystal recommended, in his report submitted to the Defense Secretary of the US in Afghanistan, that a change be imposed in the “operation culture”: a new concept of the conflict designed “to connect with people”: I think we should interact more with the population and focus on the operations that bring stability, whilst we protect them from coercion, corruption and violence of the insurgents.20 It is no longer a question of beating the taliban forces exclusively via military means, but that victory cannot be complete if it forgets about the support of the civilian population. Our strategy should not be focused on winning terrain or in destroying the insurgent forces: our objective should be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action should support this effort (...) Winning their support requires a better understanding of their needs and options. Nevertheless, the difficulty in making progress lies in the dual threat of the insurgency resistance and a crisis of confidence in the Afghan government as well as in the international coalition. 19 NATO ISAF COMMANDER, Comisaf ’s Initial Assessment. 30th of August 2009, p. 2.3. 20 NATO ISAF COMMANDER, Comisaf ’s Initial Assessment. 30th of August 2009, p. 1.2.
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