380 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 2 / 2013 stability and development. • Increase communication effectiveness of the government and international forces toward the Afghan nation as well as the international public opinion. • Increase its democratic and political decision of its society, to counteract violent extremism and to protect the center of gravity of the operations: the support of the Afghan people. • Improve the coordination of StratCom with the HHQs (Higher Head Quarters) and through them, with the TCN (Troops Contributing Nations) in order to sustain the strategic center of gravity of the SACEUR that is maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance. • Build the capacity and confidence of the Afghan security forces as a strength needed for the good of the country. • Maintain and build up public and international support of ISAF’s objectives and policies in Afghanistan. One of the most difficult questions is how to share life together with the Afghans on a daily basis without losing the necessary security measures needed inside a military base. Michael Ignatieff states that this approach to get close to the people distances itself from a colonialist perception of the troops: “Nation-building should not be an exercise in colonialism. However, the relationship between locals and foreigners is intrinsically a colonial one. The locals translate, clean and drive, whilst the foreigners are engaged in grandiose imperial planning.”59 The fundamental problem is its security. The Insurgent Talibans know that the troops are after these goals through their efforts, so they counter with attacks in an attempt to make the soldiers go back to their military base. If they are able to keep the troops apart distanced from the people than much of what they want to achieve will not succeed. It is difficult to provide the Afghan people with more security if the forces that are supposedly there to protect them do not transmit the sense of security. Therefore it is therefore inevitable to some extent share those risks with the local population. To get closer to the civilian population increases the risks for coalition forces, without a shadow of doubt. A recent suicide attack on U.S. intelligence agents at the base of Khost shows the complexities that are being encountered in obtaining intelligence through closer contact with the local population, as well as the risks that can be incurred by the security forces in the fulfillment 59 IGNATIEFF, M. El nuevo imperio americano. La reconstrucción nacional en Bosnia, Kosovo y Afganistán. Barcelona: Paidós, 2003, p. 84.
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