376 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 2 / 2013 Command, said that during the months of November and December’s level of violence in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan had been reduced by 40 percent. The Tailbone offensive coincides with the discredited Karzai as ruler of the Afghan people. This caused a crisis in the manner and the objectives of the NATO’s mission. The coalition members did not reach an agreement on their priorities. Some of them maintained a long list of warnings about participating in military operations against the Taliban in the south. Two European governments had fallen in 2007. This was largely due to the opposition of its population to its involvement in Afghanistan: in February, the Italian Parliament lost its trust on Romano Prod on his continuing to defend the mission of two thousand Italian soldiers in Herat; in September, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, was forced to resign due to differences with his government’s coalition partner. They opposed Japan having to assist in the providing NATO’s vessels guarding the transportation sea routes that Al-Qaida usually used.48 For the newly elected President Obama in 2008, Afghanistan was to be his primary test. In 2009 the number of troops was increased, a new strategy was also approved. This included deadlines and extends the range to Pakistan as part of the Afghan problem (Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy). President Obama replaces the Central Command commander and in his stead places General McChrystal. In August 2011 McChrystal elaborates a report that highlights the need for a radical change of strategy, which passes through proper strategic communication. One can sense that McChrystal did not very well agree with the announcement made by President Obama setting a date of departure from Afghanistan, scheduled for 2014, although its first troops began to withdraw in July 2011.49 In his report, he said: This is an important-and possibly decisive-period of this war. The Afghans are frustrated and tired after eight years without any evidence of the progress they had predicted. Their patience is understandably short for Afghanistan and for our countries as well. Time is of an essence, we must act now to reverse the negative trend and demonstrate that we are making progress.50 Such as what happened at the end of 2006, its internal dissent generated a sense of weakness among Afghans as well as the insurgents. In his region report, Michael Ignatieff felt that “American’s reputation of its power is faltering.”51 48 RASHID, A. Descent into chaos: the US and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking Penguin, 2008. 49 SPILLIUS, A. “Afghanistan: Barack Obama sets date of July 2011 to begin withdrawal”, The Daily Telegraph, 2nd od December 2009. 50 NATO ISAF COMMANDER, Comisaf ’s Initial Assessment. 30th of August 2009, p. 1.4. 51 IGNATIEFF, M. El nuevo imperio americano. La reconstrucción nacional en Bosnia, Kosovo y Afganistán. Barcelona: Paidós, 2003, p. 79.
REVISTA IEEE 2
To see the actual publication please follow the link above