332 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 4 / 2014 was responsible for assessing whether the Islamic jurisprudence of the group was in compliance with religious doctrine, was subordinate to the military committee, the most important committee within al Qaeda. The legal committee decided whether the operations planned by al Qaeda complied with the requirements of classical Islam in relation to the laws of war, and had the right of veto. However, the experts in jurisprudence had no say in the management or direction of operations.24 Unlike other jihadist groups, Al Qaeda did not follow a doctrine laid down by the teachings of its leader. Indeed, as the leader of the organisation, Osama bin Laden was considered just another Muslim. His position was not permanent and he was not considered infallible, nor were members of the organisation expected to swear allegiance to him. The requirements for membership were a commitment to the jihad, the mission to establish a caliphate, the willingness to keep the organisation’s activities secret and to perform activities within the group in a responsible manner. Members of al Qaeda were free to leave the organisation whenever they wished.25 The group originally defined itself as an international entity and source of financing for other jihadist organisations, primarily in the area of military training and combat. In the 1980s and ‘90s, by which time al Qaeda was operating openly, it placed its accommodation and training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan at the disposal of anyone looking for military training in order to be able to participate in the jihad in Afghanistan or elsewhere. This did not mean that anyone who passed through an al Qaeda training camp automatically became a member of the organisation, nor was cooperation with other jihadist organisations conditional on their integration into al Qaeda.26 Despite this cooperation, al Qaeda never sought to formalise these relations under a unified leadership. Members of al Qaeda saw themselves as an entity that was separate from and superior to other jihadist groups. As part of the goal of promoting a global jihad by providing support to all kinds of groups, al Qaeda took it upon itself to carry out “special operations”, i.e., terrorist attacks of major importance and media impact. 24 LAHOUD, 2012, p.34. 25 Ibid., 2012, p.39. There is a degree of controversy over the matter of the oath of allegiance or bayat. Lahoud’s statement is based on Fadil Harun’s autobiography. Abu Jandal, who was recruited by al Qaeda in the late 1980s, speaks of the necessity to take this oath, see BERGEN, Peter, The Osama bin Laden I Know, New York, Free Press, 2006, p.86. However, Abdal Rashim al Nashiri, the brain behind the attack on the USS Cole, repeatedly refused to swear allegiance to bin Laden, without this being an impediment to membership of al Qaeda, BERGEN, 2006, p.252. 26 LAHOUD, N., CAUDILL, S., COLLINS, L., KOEHLER-DERRICK, G., RASSLER, D., AL- ‘UBAYDI, M., “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?” CTC Harmony Program, 2012.
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